

---

# INTENTIONALITY

---

Intentionality is the category without which people and society would have to be regarded as mere machines and natural processes. Intentional phenomena have a direction toward something outside of themselves. A statement is intentional, for it refers to something outside itself. A wish is a non-linguistic intentional phenomenon, for a wish points forward to a possible fulfilment lying outside itself.

In the present chapter the category of intentionality will be presented and related to the other categories. Peculiarities in the whole-part structures which are exhibited by *systems* with intentionality will be dealt with in chapter 15.

The ontological system I am presenting is Aristotelian in its orientation, but for Aristotle himself the two categories tendency and intentionality are merged in an unfortunate way in teleological explanations. Both the concept of 'tendency' and that of 'intentionality' have had something of a renaissance in Anglo-American philosophy during the last decade – unfortunately, however, each on its own.<sup>1</sup> No one has shown the connection between the two concepts. But this is necessary if one wants to rehabilitate the two categories without confusing tendencies and teleological explanations. Both tendencies and intentionality are forms of 'directedness', but there are teleological explanations only where there is intentionality.

## 13.1 INTRODUCTION TO INTENTIONALITY

The modern philosophical concept of 'intentionality' was introduced by Franz Brentano.<sup>2</sup> He employed the concept, among other things, in order to delimit the psychical; he saw intentionality as a

necessary and sufficient condition for something's being psychological. In the tradition in which the concept of intentionality has been most prominent – phenomenology – intentionality has generally been regarded not as a necessary, but as a sufficient condition for something's being psychological. There exist, however, those who have tried to introduce a non-psychological variety of intentionality, most notably Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In this, Merleau-Ponty represents a kind of return to Aristotle. In Aristotle there was no clear dichotomy between the material and the psychical.

Examples of intentional phenomena are the following: linguistic phenomena (statements, questions, exhortations, etc), seen pictures, perceptions, memories, beliefs (as well as fantasies, thoughts, wishes, etc.), certain sensory states (like being angry *at*, happy *about*, sad *about*, and so on), and intentions.

Real intentionality is bipolar. The 'directedness' which characterizes it is a directedness *from* something *to* something. Objects or things lack this kind of directedness. They never 'get beyond' the space-time they occupy. But subjects can, thanks to their intentionality, 'point' beyond themselves in space and time. There are two kinds of fundamental states of affairs in this theory of categories: subjects and objects (the terms 'object' and 'thing' are synonymous terms in this book).

*Subjects* are states of affairs which have (normally, intermittently) intentionality. *Objects* (or *things*) are states of affairs totally lacking intentionality.

Intentionality is a special form of connection between a subject and objects or between subjects and subjects. As can easily be understood, and as will later be shown in greater detail, this peculiar kind of connection is the basis for completely different types of part-whole relations than those exhibited by the other categories. (The intentional subject-object connection is described in sections 13.5–7; the intentional subject-subject connection is described in chapter 15: nested intentionality.)

In the phenomenological tradition, that which an intentional act is directed at is sometimes called the 'intentional object' sometimes the 'intentional correlate'. For many reasons the former phrase is a bad one, and I shall only speak of the intentional correlate. Developments within the phenomenological tradition itself have made the 'object' terminology I am opposing obsolete. But if we

stick to the type of intentionality which thinking and language exemplify, then it may be justified to speak of intentional objects. We often think and speak precisely of objects in the sense of spatially isolated things, or moments of these. But if we turn to that type of intentionality which perceptions constitute, this terminology is clearly misleading. We perceive, as so many phenomenologists have now told us, not only things and other states of affairs, but things and states of affairs in a world. Things, and states of affairs in general, do not only appear against a background, they have definite relations to this background and constitute with it a quite different sort of structured whole than that formed by things and states of affairs alone.

The things and the other states of affairs we perceive always appear as parts of a situation, and it is a situation extended in both space and time. The intentionality which occurs in the normal perception of an everyday situation is not only the pointing of a subject toward a simultaneously existing state of affairs in a momentary situation, but is also a pointing to both a past and a future. When we perceive an ordinary material object, we see it as something that has existed for some time and which will continue to exist at least a few moments longer. There is a kind of pointing both toward the thing's past and towards its future. This feature manifests itself even more clearly in the perception of objects such as tools and furniture. These are seen as things which have been used in a certain way and which in the future can be used in the same way. And this pointing toward the past and the future makes the term '*intentional object*' unsuitable as an umbrella term. Thus I shall use the term '*intentional correlate*'.

We can now pose the general question: What types of entities can figure as correlates of intentional acts? Part of the answer may of course be found in the examples already given. Things and relations in container space have been mentioned, as well as their moments, but it should be pointed out that not all intentional correlates need be situated in space and time. The intentional correlate can be a universal. When, for example, we think of the category of property in itself, or some specific property subsumed under the category, we can think of it without thinking of it (as) being positioned in space and time. That an intentional correlate can be independent of space and time does not of course mean that the subject which has intentionality can exist outside space and

time. This is impossible. Every intentional act must exist in space and time, but not every intentional correlate.

If we keep to the intentional phenomena whose correlates can have a spatio-temporal position, we can make an observation which is seldom accorded the importance it deserves: intentional pointing is normally a pointing *over* or *across* a spatial and/or temporal distance. The subject is spatially and/or temporally separated from the intentional correlate. Intentionality is normally 'intentionality at a distance'. When we think of something other than ourselves, remember something or are angry at someone, as subjects we are clearly spatially and/or temporally distinguished from the intentional correlate.<sup>3</sup> In the case of perception the relations are more complicated, due to unclarity regarding whether the intentional correlate is a spatial part of the actual intentional act or not. I shall later return both to this problem and to the meaning of the expression 'intentionality at a distance'. But for present purposes it is enough to point out that *in every perception there is a pointing by a subject over a spatial distance toward that which is perceived, whether or not the latter should be considered, in some deeper sense, as a part of the perceiving subject.*

## 13.2 REAL AND FICTIONAL INTENTIONALITY

Intentional phenomena point at something, their intentional correlates, but they do not always reach what they point at. When a statement reaches or 'hits' its correlate, it is true. When it does not reach its correlate it is false; in this case *there is no correlate to reach*. Just as one can distinguish between true and false statements, one can also distinguish between realized and unrealized intentions, correct and mistaken memories, obeyed and unobeyed commands, correct and incorrect pictures, fulfilled and unfulfilled wishes, correct and incorrect perceptions. In these cases of intentionality one can ask oneself whether that which is pointed at is hit or not, whether the acts are satisfied or not. Such intentional acts have what I shall call a modality of satisfaction.<sup>4</sup>

The satisfaction modality, however, does not only have the two values satisfied and unsatisfied. Wishes, for example, are often neither completely fulfilled nor unfulfilled, but are rather *partly* fulfilled. In the case of wishes the satisfaction modality can assume the value *partially satisfied*. This possibility also occurs, as can be

easily seen, in many other types of intentionality. Most misperceptions are, for example, not completely mistaken, but rather reach parts of their goals. The situation – much discussed in the empiricist tradition – in which a straight oar appears as a broken oar in water, is an example of a partially satisfied perception. Part of the intentional correlate is reached (the facts that there exists an oar and that there exists water) while part of the intentional correlate is not reached (the fact that the oar is broken). The same possibility of partial satisfaction also occurs in the case of statements – as has been shown by, among other things, the discussion of ‘verisimilitude’. The old bipolar concept of truth should be given up in favour of a truth concept which allows grading; I shall return to just this case of partial satisfaction in section 16.1.

In order fully to understand the category of intentionality it is important not only to discern the satisfaction modality, but also to realize that *some intentional phenomena lack this modality*. Stories about invented characters are obvious examples. When one reads such a story one has intentional acts, but there can be no question about truth and falsity in the ordinary sense. Intentional acts which do have a modality of satisfaction, on the other hand, are directed at entities ‘presumably existing somewhere in space and time. This world-directed kind of intentionality I shall call *real intentionality*. Its opposite I shall label *fictional intentionality*. The latter term, of course, reflects the fact that fictional discourse is a kind of fictional intentionality. But not the only kind. Lively fantasies which are understood *as* fantasies exemplify fictional intentionality of a perceptual kind. Both stories and fantasies are characterized by the fact that the question whether they reach any correlate is a meaningless question.

Fictional intentional phenomena can neither hit nor miss any correlate since they lack the satisfaction modality. In the case of a real intentional phenomenon, like an ordinary descriptive statement, it is often impossible to *decide* whether it is satisfied or not, i.e. whether the statement is true or false. But this is completely in keeping with these statements having a satisfaction modality. Fictional intentionality, on the other hand, as just pointed out, lacks this whole modality. Fictional intentionality points without pointing at anything.

There are many problems to solve with regard to fictional

intentionality. Some concern the nature of fictional intentionality's relation to classical phenomenological categories like 'mere presentations' and 'non-positing acts' and some concern the by now very large discussion about fictional discourse.<sup>5</sup> All those problems, however, will, except for some remarks in the next section, be ignored in this book. For the purpose at hand, the category of fictional intentionality is necessary only as a foil for real intentionality.

## 13.3 PRESENTATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL INTENTIONALITY

All types of non-fictional intentional acts have a satisfaction modality which can assume different values. The two values satisfied and unsatisfied must be carefully distinguished from two of the subcategories of real intentionality: *presentational* and *representational* intentionality.<sup>6</sup> The distinction between the two values of the modality of satisfaction is based on the parallel between statements which are true and false, perceptions which are correct and incorrect, and intentions which are realized and unrealized, while the distinction between these two new subcategories is based on the special position which perceptions have as compared to such things as thoughts, uses of language, pictures, and memories. Let us, in order to understand these subcategories of real intentionality, compare a statement and a perception.

A statement and a perception can have the same intentional correlate. Compare, for example, the situation where a person *A* stands and watches another person *C* occupied in digging a trench with the simultaneous situation in which person *B* at another place states that *C* is occupied in digging a trench. *B*'s intentionality has – at a certain level of generality – the same intentional correlate as *A*'s; and the satisfaction modality has in both cases the value: satisfied. The radical difference between the two intentional acts is that in the one case the intentional correlate is obviously located in space *outside* the act (*B*'s utterance or statement), while in the other case it seems in some way to be a part of the intentional act (*A*'s perception). The difference can also be expressed by saying that an utterance or statement is in no way itself part of the evidence for the possible fact that it is satisfied, while in the case of normal perceptions the perception itself constitutes part of the evidence for

the claim that it is satisfied. In an utterance the intentional correlate is *represented*; in a perception it is *presented*.

In the above example involving *C*'s digging, the satisfaction modality was given the value satisfaction in both cases. Let us now see how the example works if we let the modality assume the value non-satisfaction; that is, we assume there is nothing corresponding to the utterance or perception of *C*'s digging. *A* has a hallucination or experiences an illusion, and *B* makes a false statement.

As regards the utterance, it is still obvious that the statement contained in the utterance points to a state of affairs outside itself; even though in this case the state of affairs in question does not obtain. Every statement represents a state of affairs outside itself as obtaining or as not obtaining, whether or not this state of affairs *does* obtain or not.

As regards the misperception that *C* is digging, it may first be pointed out that the perception is qualitatively identical with the corresponding correct perception. Also, misperception, like correct perception, claims to have an intentional correlate as a part of itself. It is this that characterizes presentational intentionality. The character of presentational intentionality is, like representational intentionality, an inner property of the intentional act itself; and presentational intentionality can, like the representational variety have the values satisfied and unsatisfied. Presentational versus representational intentionality is not a distinction between intentionality which does and intentionality which does not reach its correlate.

*Presentational intentionality* is characterized by its *making a claim* to directly present its intentional correlate. *Representational intentionality* is characterized by its making a claim not to present its intentional correlate directly; it claims to point to a correlate which is outside the intentional phenomenon itself. If one thinks only of utterances as examples of representational intentionality, it can seem unnecessary to say that representational intentionality *makes a claim not* to directly present its correlate. Why not just say that representational intentionality does not directly present its correlate? No chance of making a mistake seems to present itself. But representational intentionality also includes such things as different types of pictorial representation, including documentary films; and here the possibility of mistakes is sometimes present. A wax doll of a person is a sort of picture of the person. Assume, now, that you

believe yourself to see a wax doll representing a certain person in spite of the fact that what you actually see is the real person. This is an example of representational not of presentational intentionality, because the intentional act is such that it claims to have its intentional correlate outside itself, in spite of this not being the case.

Both presentational and representational intentionality have a satisfaction modality, but the way we determine the modal value is not the same in each case. In representational intentionality the modal value is determined by acts of presentational intentionality. Whether it is true that *C* is digging (utterance = representational intentionality) is determined by someone's going and seeing whether this is the case (perception = presentational intentionality). In the case of presentational intentionality the modal value is determined with the help of *other presentational acts*. This is possible because presentational intentional acts also point beyond themselves. As remarked above, a normal perception contains not only a pointing from a subject to a simultaneously present state of affairs; it also points to both the past and the future. It is of course especially the latter which allows us to determine whether the modal value is 'satisfied' or 'unsatisfied'.<sup>7</sup>

If we take into account fictional intentionality and disregard partial satisfaction, we get Table 13.1.

It should be stressed that to be a modality is quite different from being a subcategory; that is the reason why the concepts of 'satisfied' and 'not satisfied' each appear in two rows. That an intentional act lacks the modality of satisfaction is not the same as non-satisfaction. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between unsatisfied presentational, unsatisfied representational, and fictional intentionality. They all lack correlates. False stories and fiction are in this respect similar, although different in kind. Only satisfied

Table 13.1

Category	Subcategory	Sub-subcategory	Modality-value
Intentionality	Real intentionality	Presentational intentionality	{ satisfied
		Representational intentionality	{ not satisfied
	Fictional intentionality	-----	-----

presentational and satisfied representational intentional acts do have correlates, and only in these cases may intentionality be relational. (This topic will be discussed in section 13.5).

In those cases where there is no correlate, the elusive peculiarity of the category of intentionality is most apparent. That which exists is simply *pure directedness*. And that this type of phenomenon truly exists should actually be equally as obvious as that phenomena belonging to the category of property exist. Both are self-evident from a phenomenological point of view.

### 13.4 MIXED INTENTIONALITY

The fact that there are three basic kinds of intentionality, presentational, representational, and fictional, does not mean that a specific intentional act in its totality instantiates only one of these categories. An intentional act can be a unity of different kinds of intentionality. In such a case we have *mixed intentionality*.

Let us once more use the example discussed in the former section, the perception of a digging man, *C*. When we perceive *C*'s digging we see that we see only one side, the outside of *C* and the shovel. The perception makes the claim that parts of these things are *presented*, but at the same time it makes the claim that other parts are *represented*. It contains a pointing to facts of the type that both *C* and the shovel have back-sides, insides, and so on. *C*'s digging is thus not completely presented even if we disregard its temporal extension. Such a perception contains a mixture of presentational and representational intentionality. The presentation of the thing is only partial, part of the thing is represented by means of its presentation of other parts.

Most perceptions seem to exemplify mixed intentionality, but there are perceptions which are purely presentational. Pains and after-images, as well as everything Husserl calls adequate perception,<sup>8</sup> are purely presentational. Both pains and after-images lack back-sides and insides. They have nothing which is spatially hidden, and are therefore completely presented.

Most novels seem also to exemplify mixed intentionality. But in this case there is a mix of representational and fictional intentionality. Actually, fictional discourse is not purely fictional. A story with fictional characters is usually situated in a real environ-

ment, known places in a known country. Even a genre like science fiction is partially fictional. These stories are situated in our real universe with its stars and its planets. Hypothetical deliberation – as when one thinks: If such and such a thing would happen to me, what would I then do? – is a mixture of representational and fictional intentionality, too.

However, when, in what follows, I discuss cases which actually are partly presentational (perceptions) or partly representational, I shall for the sake of simplicity regard them as purely presentational and purely representational respectively.

## 13.5 INTENTIONALITY AND THE OTHER CATEGORIES

I shall now bring out in more detail the *differentia specifica* of real intentionality, its subcategories, and the satisfaction modality by comparing intentionality with some other categories with which it is easily confused. It is all too easy to think that intentionality is some kind of relation (i.e. external, grounded, or existential dependence) or that it in fact belongs to the category of tendency.

I shall start by discussing the question whether *representational* intentionality can be a relation. In chapter 9 I made the important point that some relations (of existential dependence) *lack mutuality*. They relate one of the relata to the other without thereby necessarily relating the other to the first. Still, *both relata have to exist* in order for the relation to be instantiated. This is a necessary condition for something to be called a relation.

If intentionality is going to be a relation the intentional act and the intentional correlate must be the two relata. Consider the representational intentional act which is my judging that it is going to rain in my home town tomorrow. The presumed intentional correlate, rain-tomorrow-in-my-home-town is both spatially and temporally distinct from the actual intentional act, my judgement. Now, if there is no rain tomorrow there is no correlate; the act is unsatisfied and the intentional act cannot possibly be a relation. The same conclusion, however, is reached even if it rains tomorrow. Both the existence and the identity of my judgement, the representational act, are independent of the rain which will fall tomorrow. The act is instantiated *now*. It can exist without the presumed relata, the correlate, because this is transcendent. This means that representational intentionality, whatever the value of the

satisfaction modality cannot be a relation, neither an external nor a grounded relation nor a relation of existential dependence.

The fact that representational intentionality (or intentionality in general) is not a relation of existential dependence is compatible with the facts that it can both *contain* existential dependence (see below, pages 210–12) and itself in turn *be* existentially dependent upon other categories. In my view, intentional acts are founded upon a material substratum (some sort of body, brain, and nervous system). When I speak of an intentional act I am speaking of something which is a moment of a relatively independent state of affairs constituted by the intentional act and its material substratum. Intentional acts can only exist on upperlying ontological levels, and as such are dependent.

Another point which has contributed to the view that intentional acts are some kind of relation is, I think, a confusion of the intentional act itself with its modality of satisfaction. The latter is really a grounded relation, although of a special kind. It is evident from what has been said that, whether a representational act is satisfied or not is a fact which does not inhere in the act. We have so far met two kinds of grounded relations, i.e. grounded relations with two different kinds of relata. First, relations like ‘taller than’ which are grounded in ordinary properties, then relations like ‘have greater distance between them than’ where the relata are external relations. *When a representational act is satisfied there is a grounded relation between the act and the correlate.*<sup>9</sup> The act and the correlate exist independently of each other, but when they both exist then it follows immediately that satisfaction obtains. Sometimes, but only sometimes, such a grounded relation is a relation of similarity. This is the case in pictures and iconic languages but not in ordinary languages. In the last case there is for the most part nothing at all in the acts which is similar to the intentional correlates.

Intentionality is an irreducible kind of universal. But this does not mean that intentionality is unanalysable. Irreducibility does not entail unanalysability. This was stressed earlier when the category of state of affairs was introduced. A state of affairs is a complex universal constituted by a substance and some properties, and so it can be analysed into substance and property. The irreducibility of states of affairs follows from the fact that this category is a relatively independent universal whereas both

substance and property are dependent categories. What is independent cannot be reduced to what is dependent. Every ontological reduction has to go the other way. I would like to repeat what I said in chapter 3 (see page 34), namely that it is my impression that many philosophers have a strong temptation to connect what is simple with what has independent existence, and vice versa, but that the category of state of affairs breaks with such associations. Now I shall add that the category of intentionality also makes such a break.

I do not intend to try to lay bare the parts (dependent and/or independent) of intentional phenomena – a kind of analysis of which Edmund Husserl is the great founding father. In the *Logical Investigations* the main parts of an act are ‘sensory content’, ‘act matter’, and ‘act quality’.<sup>10</sup> Such analyses are of course ontologically very important, but for the purposes of this theory of categories it suffices to point out that *there is* a category of intentionality; and that it is a complex universal. The addition is necessary in order to avoid the mistake of looking for an intentional act in one of its *simple parts*. With regard to Husserl’s tripartition, I maintain like Husserl, that intentionality is *not* to be found in *any* of these parts, only in their unity.<sup>11</sup>

Now to the question of representational intentionality’s relation to *tendencies*. Here the superficial similarities are considerable.<sup>12</sup> Tendencies point at something and point forward in time. That a thing has a certain velocity is the same as that the thing has a tendency to be, in the future, in other places in the direction of the velocity. The thing points from itself towards these places. The similarity with intentional phenomena can be made even greater if we bear in mind that the tendency category is so wide that it covers Aristotelian physics. The tendencies in Newtonian physics, velocity and acceleration, can perhaps with some justice be said to point more *away from* a place than toward a place. But the Aristotelian tendencies are definitely tendencies *towards* something. Earth, the stuff, has a tendency toward the midpoint of the universe, water to the surface of a sphere with the universe as midpoint, etc. As a consequence, each bit of earth points toward the midpoint of the universe.

The tendency towards the middle of the universe postulated by Aristotle, has as a presupposition that that midpoint exists. And in the same way Newtonian velocity cannot point toward any places if

those places do not exist. This peculiarity is not, however, necessarily connected with the tendency category, which means that the similarities with presentational intentionality can be made even larger. Even if physics up to now has not needed to assume the existence of the tendency speed of colour change, there is nothing in principle which prevents such tendencies existing (cf. pages 102f.). A body which at a certain moment has a certain colour and a certain speed of colour change has a tendency to have another colour in the next moment. This latter colour instance does not exist *in* the first moment; the tendency points towards the *non-existing* colour instance. What distinguishes this tendency from a belief that the object will come to have this colour in the next instant?

Let us assume that speed of colour change is a resultant tendency. Resultant tendencies are characterized by their necessarily being realized if the temporal interval in which they exist is sufficiently long. This means that *resultant tendencies can never point at something which is in principle impossible to realize*. It need not, like the above-mentioned Aristotelian tendencies, point toward something which *actually exists*, but it must point at something which *in principle can exist*. Since the difference between resultant tendencies and partial tendencies is not a difference internal to these, it can be seen as yet another characteristic of tendencies in general, and a characteristic which is a distinguishing mark with respect to representational intentional phenomena. The latter can point at something which is in principle impossible to realize. An intentional phenomenon, but not a tendency, can point at a colour which for physical reasons cannot exist.

This may appear to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that tendency and intentionality are different categories. Did I not use wishes and intentions as examples of tendencies when introducing the tendency category? And of course one can both wish for what is in principle impossible, and have an intention to make it happen! The question can be asked whether I have not directly contradicted myself. In chapter 11 I used intentions as examples of tendencies but in the present chapter I have used them as examples of intentionality. Moreover, I have maintained that tendency and intentionality are categorially distinct.

The problem, however, is not so great. One must remember that certain categories can be exemplified at exactly the same place

simultaneously. The best examples of this are properties and substances, which always coincide in things. In a corresponding way there exist at one and the same time in every (prior) intention instantiations of both tendency and intentionality. Often each category points in its own way to the same thing; and then of course it is not easy to see the difference. But it is there. One can find examples where intentionality is directed toward one thing and tendencies toward another.

What we ordinarily call an intention is a state of affairs which contains instances of both the category of intentionality and the category of tendency, i.e. both an intentional act and inclinations to perform certain actions (cf. section 7.3). This holds true even when the intentional correlate in question is a *perpetuum mobile*. The man who tries to do the impossible nevertheless performs actions.

Intentions point forward in time, but memories point backward. The difference between presentational intentionality and tendency can also be clarified with the help of a discussion of memory as an intentional phenomenon. Memories should thus be compared with so-called hysteresis phenomena.<sup>13</sup> When certain elastic materials are exposed to pressure a mechanical tension occurs in the material; but when one then reduces the pressure the corresponding tension does not disappear but persists. The same phenomenon occurs when one magnetizes a ferromagnetic material with the help of a coil. When the current increases the piece of iron is magnetized, but when the current is then reduced the magnetization does not disappear to a corresponding degree, but persists. It seems as though the materials in question *remember* what they have experienced, as though they remember that they have earlier been exposed to external pressure or a magnetizing current. The mechanical tension and the magnetic flux density is at each point of time a function both of an external force operating at the moment in question and an outer force operating at an earlier moment.

Hysteresis phenomena can perhaps be better understood in the following way. Assume that we have two identical elastic things. The one we subject to a certain pressure for a short while, while the other remains untouched. A little later we subject both things to the same pressure. Due to the hysteresis phenomenon, the thing which had previously been subject to pressure comes to have a higher inner tension than the other apparently identical thing.

Since we do not believe that the past can, without mediation, affect the present, we assume that the earlier pressure changed the inner constitution of the thing in question in a lasting way. It is thus not as though two identical things have been subjected to the same pressure. The changed state of the first thing is a result of earlier occurrences, but it is not a *memory* in the intentional sense. The state does not point backward in time towards an earlier effect.

With these remarks I end my discussion of representational intentionality, the conclusion being that it can be neither a relation nor a tendency. The next topic is presentational intentionality; first the question whether it can be a tendency, then the question whether it can be some kind of relation.

The characteristic feature of presentational intentionality is that it lays claim to be in direct contact with its correlate or, in other words, claims that the correlate is immanent in the act. It claims to include in itself that which it points at. Tendencies make quite the opposite claim. They point *away* from themselves. If a tendency exists now, it points to something in the future. Consequently, presentational intentionality cannot be a sort of tendency.

Similarities between relations and presentational intentionality occur only when the intentional acts are satisfied. In the case of non-satisfaction, the argument for presentational intentionality not being a relation is exactly the same as for representational intentionality. If there is no correlate, one relatum is missing and so there is no relation. When presentational intentional phenomena are satisfied, there is both an act and a correlate, but intentionality can nevertheless not be a relation. The reason is that a satisfied and an unsatisfied presentational act can be qualitatively identical. If intentionality cannot be a relation in the one case, then it cannot because of this identity be a relation in the other case either. Representational and presentational intentionality are neither relations nor tendencies.

That presentational intentionality is not a relation is compatible with the fact that there are relations at work in presentational acts. Take for instance a veridical perception. In such an intentional phenomenon both (part of) the subject and the intentional correlate must, *prima facie*, be considered to be spatial parts of the act. (In such cases I shall not talk of the subject but of the subject *pole* of the act.) This observation implies that there is an external relation, the distance between the subject and the correlate, *within* the act.

Intentionality is however not identical with this spatial distance. Spatial distances lack directedness.

As in the case of representational intentionality, the mistaken view that presentational intentionality is a relation is the result of a failure to keep the intentional act in itself and its modality of satisfaction clearly distinct. We need to look more closely at satisfaction in the case of presentational intentionality. It is advisable to analyse a veridical perception where the intentional correlate is an ordinary material object rather than the case where it is something psychic like a pain. In the former case, but not the latter, the correlate is totally independent (D9.10) of the act, which means that the only dependence relations we have to investigate are those relating the act to the correlate. I shall focus the discussion around the perception of a birch tree.

What kind of act a certain act is, is determined by its inner qualities. A veridical perception of a birch tree and a corresponding mirage of a birch tree are *generically* the same act; they instantiate the same universal but have different values on the satisfaction modality. An immediate consequence of this fact is that even a veridical perception of a birch tree is existentially *independent* (in the sense of D9.2) of the birch tree. Let us therefore consider concrete dependence.

The claim that the act of seeing a birch tree is concretely dependent upon real birch trees, means that it is logically impossible for all, but not some, instances of birch perceptions to exist if some instance(s) of birch trees do(es) not also exist (D9.7). A logical impossibility here would be a neat solution but I find it impossible to detect any such impossibility.

The conclusion this far is that a veridical perception of a birch tree can be neither dependent nor concretely dependent upon the birch tree. The act is *generically independent* (D9.9) of the tree. Is then the curious relation of *individual* dependence (D9.8) exemplified by perception? The perception of the birch tree would be individually dependent upon the birch tree if and only if it is logically impossible for this instance of a birch perception to exist if the birch tree did not also exist.

In my view the same intuitions are relevant here as in the case of efficient causality (see above, pages 184–5f.). Birch-tree perceptions in general can exist without birch trees, but *this* specific perception is logically impossible without the birch tree. The epistemological

test also holds. It is impossible to conceive of this instance of birch perception were the birch tree to disappear. Individual dependence, like some of the other kinds of dependence defined, lacks mutuality. The claim that the birch perception is individually dependent upon the birch tree is consistent with the assumption made that the tree is totally independent of the perception.

When a representational act is satisfied there is a grounded relation between the act and the correlate. The conclusion now is that *when a presentational act is satisfied the act is individually dependent upon the correlate*. Such an act is both directed towards the correlate and dependent for its existence upon the same correlate. But this does not turn the intentionality in question into a dependence relation. Intentionality is in general founded upon a subject substratum, but some satisfied presentational intentional acts are in addition to this (individually) founded upon the intentional correlate. In neither case can the dependence relation bear the burden of an ontological reduction; a reduction means in the first case that intentional acts *are* brain states, and in the latter that intentionality *is* a dependence relation.

At the end of section 13.3 I said that only satisfied intentional acts have correlates and may be relational. The arguments put forward in this section yield the result that intentionality never *is* a relation, but that (a) a satisfied representational intentional act is relational in the sense that there is a grounded relation between the act and its correlate, and that (b) a satisfied presentational act is relational in the sense that there is a relation of individual dependence between the act and its correlate.<sup>14</sup> This, in turn, means that the former kind of acts has transcendent correlates and that the latter kind of acts has immanent correlates. All other kinds of acts lack correlates; see Table 13.2.

The analysis of veridical perception given above according to which such an act is individually dependent upon an immanent correlate, brings out both the similarities and dissimilarities

Table 13.2

<i>Kind of intentionality</i>	<i>Intentional correlate</i>
Presentational intentionality, satisfied	Immanent
Representational intentionality, satisfied	Transcendent
Fictional intentionality and unsatisfied real intentionality	None

between such a relation and efficient causality as analysed in the last chapter. It should be remembered that we are not talking about the substratum level, i.e. the flow of energy from the tree to the subject. We are staying on the upper level where the intentional act as such exists. But even on this level it is tempting to say that the intentional correlate causes the specific act. The temptation should be resisted, but the kernel of truth is that as a veridical perception is individually dependent upon its intentional correlate so an effect in efficient causality is individually dependent upon its cause. But then there are also differences. The effect belongs to the category of tendency, the act to the category of intentionality. Cause and effect are moments of different things, but the act contains the correlate in cases of presentational intentionality.<sup>15</sup>

Another way to approach the specificity of presentational intentionality is to try once again to use the thought operation with whose help the important distinction between inclusive and exclusive qualities was introduced. If one tries to use this operation on ordinary perceptions one discovers that this is impossible, in spite of the fact that the perception of a definite object is a spatially well-defined phenomenon. Think of the perception of a birch. The intentional phenomenon extends itself in space from the subject to the birch (see Figure 13.1). If one now performs the thought operation of cutting off the intentional phenomenon just in front of the birch, neither of the two things which ought to happen were intentionality a quality does in fact happen. Either (a) a new well-defined intentional act with an intentional goal lying in the 'cross-section' ought to come into being, or (b) the entire intentional act




Figure 13.1

disappears. But neither is the case. The cross-section remains empty and is not the goal of any act and the act does not disappear; instead it rather continues to point to the empty cross-section. The result of the cutting-off operation is a presentational intentionality without an intentional correlate; it is not even an example of fictional intentionality. The conclusion of this thought experiment is that the cutting-off operation is quite simply not applicable to presentational intentionality.

There exists, however, a similar yet different operation which can be applied. One can in thought exchange one intentional correlate for another, or move the intentional correlate in space. This operation captures well the peculiarity of presentational intentionality we called 'intentionality at a distance'. If we imagine the birch moved further away, without another object being inserted, then intentionality so to speak 'follows along'. Metaphorically speaking, presentational intentionality extends itself till it hits something, which means that if that something is moved then the intentionality's extension in space is also changed. Presentational intentionality has spatial limits, but they cannot be the same sort of limits that ordinary things and their qualities have.

### 13.6 INTENTIONALITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Intentional phenomena are thus neither relations, nor tendencies, nor genuine properties. Now I shall discuss the question whether intentional phenomena are always phenomena belonging to consciousness. Can there exist *unconscious* (or *a-conscious*) intentionality? The intentional phenomena which are best known are conscious. To believe something, to perceive something, and to remember something are phenomena directly given in our conscious experience. The evidence for unconscious intentionality is indirect. Phenomena like post-hypnotic suggestion and subliminal perception are difficult to reduce to tendencies and hysteresis phenomena. One can imagine a case of post-hypnotic suggestion where a person under hypnosis is ordered to do something which is in principle impossible, e.g. to build a perpetuum mobile. The hypnotized person's actions must then be understood against the background of both an 'intentional intention' and a 'tendential intention', which do not coincide. That subliminal perceptions are intentional phenomena means that they can in principle be

mistaken, i.e. that one can literally speak of subliminal *mis*perceptions. It is not self-evident that unconscious misperceptions are impossible.

Whether one believes in unconscious intentionality or not will depend to a large extent on one's attitude to psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts refer to unconscious intentions, memories, and beliefs. If there is unconscious intentionality, psychoanalysis must be both true (or truthlike) and impossible to reduce to neurophysiological theories which speak only of tendencies and hysteresis phenomena.

Many modern machines are described *as if* they contained intentionality. Some typewriters, tooling machines, and of course computers, are said to have 'memories'. But these 'memories' are not taken to be memories in the literal sense. A typewriter remembers just as little as a stone containing a fossil remembers prehistorical eras. Here 'memory' is a metaphorical characterization of a complicated setup of ordinary properties, relations, tendencies, and hysteresis phenomena. If we bear in mind developments within electronics we may wonder whether claims made by psychoanalysts about the irreducibility of psychological phenomena are really justified. But on the other hand, advanced computers do not prove that unconscious intentionality cannot exist. They prove rather the existence of extremely complicated hysteresis phenomena.

The question posed, that of the relation between intentionality and consciousness, should not be conflated with those of the relations between intelligence and intentionality or between intelligence and consciousness. Modern research in artificial intelligence shows that our concept of intelligence has been much too closely linked to intentionality and consciousness. But, as Searle stresses,<sup>16</sup> this in no way implies the non-existence of intentionality or consciousness, nor that there now exists artificial intentionality or artificial consciousness. Whether the lower left hand square in Table 13.3 is necessarily empty or merely, as a matter of fact, empty today, is something for the future to decide. It might well be the case that intelligence without intentionality and consciousness will turn out to be much more intelligent than intelligence with intentionality and consciousness.

The category of intentionality has been introduced without the help of the concepts of intelligence and consciousness and is, *as a*

Table 13.3

	<i>Intelligence with intentionality</i>	<i>Intelligence without intentionality</i>
Natural intelligence	higher animals	lower animals
Artificial intelligence	?	computers

*category*, neutral with respect to the question whether artificial or unconscious intentionality can exist. And I see no scientific reasons for limiting the category in one way or the other. We may also say that it is intentionality which is the ontologically important category, not consciousness, nor intelligence.

### 13.7 IN DEFENCE OF NAIVE REALISM

Whether one does or does not accept the existence of unconscious intentionality, a classical philosophical problem remains. With the distinctions already made in this chapter, the problem can be formulated in the following way: Can an intentional correlate to which someone has access via conscious presentational intentionality be material? Or, in other words: Can something psychic be in (intentional) contact with something material?

This last question raises the question of naive realism, i.e. the view that, most of the time, we are in some kind of direct contact with the objects we are looking at, objects which exist independently of the onlooker. Naive realism is enshrined in common-sense attitudes, and, very possibly in those of all past cultures. An ontology which conforms to naive realism is on the side of the majority. It also, as we shall see, has strong arguments on its side.

Hitherto in the present chapter, my strategy has been that generally accepted among phenomenologists. One silently assumes a naive realism in one's investigations; perceptions and our '*Lebenswelt*' are analysed as though one did not have to worry at all about whether the state of affairs in question actually exists. Husserl, as is well known, was not so rash. He introduced a conscious methodical approach, which he called '*epoché*'. Phenomenological investigations were to be performed after the world had been 'put between parentheses': phenomenological analyses should remain neutral with respect to the question whether the perceived

world actually exists or not. As a natural consequence of this, the natural sciences were also bracketed. The idea was that phenomenology need not worry itself about results within natural science. In this way phenomenology was to free itself from the difficulty which science actually presents for naive realism.

It seems to me as though surprisingly few philosophers and scientists are today aware of the extent to which science (physics, physiology, and perceptual psychology) implies a world view of an almost Leibnizian type – a monadology, even if it has a materialistic basis. Within contemporary science one assumes that there are material things which emit or reflect some form of energy which moves towards other material things, some of which are so constituted (the higher animals) that when the aforementioned energy hits them, a mental entity appears on the scene, a perception. But this perception is presumed to be completely spatially distinct from the material object which ultimately caused the perception (Figure 13.2). The perception is connected via a body to a certain place in space and time, but is a whole completely closed within itself, which is mental and does not even have a spatial connection with other people's perceptions, even though they often have the same causes. Every person is a monad, on this view, though a monad with a material foundation. We are very far from the '*Lebenswelt*' which both naive realism and today's phenomenology take as given.

The whole problem can be presented very briefly in graphical form as a conflict between the Figures 13.2 and 13.3.

Husserl's epoche involves what is, from a phenomenological point of view, an internal difficulty which phenomenologists tend to skip over. Phenomenology takes its task to be that of giving a correct description of our perceptions, and in order to do this the




Figure 13.2 Perception according to science




Figure 13.3 Perception according to naive realism

world is bracketed. *Phenomenologists thereby avoid taking a position on naive realism.* But if, as is actually the case, the assumptions of naive realism form an integral part of most perceptions, then the epoche method will prevent phenomenology from reaching its goal. If perceptions are not neutral in relation to naive realism, phenomenology ought not to try to be so either. The result has been two tendencies within phenomenology. One is to be found in works by philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz, where the lasting impression, no matter what they explicitly say, is their belief in a form of naive realism. The other tendency is represented by the later Husserl, who was drawn more and more towards a classical idealistic position where the world in the end is constituted by a 'transcendental ego'.<sup>17</sup>

Quite apart from its inconsistency with the goals of phenomenology, the method of epoche is unacceptable within the framework of the present category system. The task of a modern theory of categories must be, as I said at the beginning, to reunite man, nature, and society. And such a union is not possible if one puts the world and natural science in parentheses. What I am going to say about naive realism will be rather brief. But I put it forward as a first step away from the intellectually unsatisfactory situation in which we live today, where science implies a monadology which nobody really takes seriously, or which is not even noticed due to the specialization within the sciences and the language-mania in philosophy.

According to naive realism we can be in direct contact with objects located at a distance from us; when we see a tree we are in direct contact with it in the same sense as when we hold on to it. The difficulties in fitting this view into a materialistic framework are mainly two. One difficulty (A) has to do with what is specific to the category of intentionality itself, the fact that it is normally, even in the case of presentational intentionality, 'intentionality at a

distance'. The other difficulty (*B*) has its basis in the point the scientist makes, according to which all perception of outer objects requires the transportation of energy from the object in question to the subject, from which it follows that the intentional correlate must be temporally and so also numerically distinct from the actual material object. Let us consider these difficulties.

*Difficulty A.* Traditional materialist world views, like the present ontology, are based on a container conception of space and time. All material things exist in space, and the things are characterized not only by their extension but also by their *compactness* in space and time. The latter means that if two thing-bits lack spatial connection, then they cannot be parts of the same material thing; 'thing' is taken in the fundamental sense, i.e. *not* in the sense of aggregate things. The same 'compactness condition' holds for the temporal dimension. If there is a temporal gap between two thing-bits, then those two bits cannot be parts of the same thing.

It is true that some of the categories presented in earlier chapters have diverged from traditional materialistic categories but they have not diverged in such a way that their instances do not fulfil the compactness condition. The divergencies from 'ordinary' materialism I am thinking of are mainly (1) the introduction of universals which are temporally inclusive, (2) the tendency category, and (3) the substitution of 'action by mixture' for 'action by contact'.

- (1) Universals which are inclusive in time are universals which are necessarily extended in time, i.e. which do not like material atoms allow themselves to be thought of as existing at momentary points of time. Instances of such universals must extend through the whole of the time in which they exist. They cannot exist at one time, and then cease to exist only to exist again later. Inclusive universals, like exclusive ones, do not allow their instances to have temporal gaps. They thus satisfy the compactness condition, even if this now concerns compactness in time.
- (2) Tendencies diverge from categories usual in modern materialist philosophies in that they represent a form of pointing which is not usually explicitly included in materialistic ontologies; I have in fact maintained that they must always be implicitly included. But it is a pointing which does not come into conflict with the compactness

condition. An instantiated tendency is just as compact in space and time as instances of every other described universal.

- (3) The division of the category of thing into 'corpuscles' and 'penetrables', which the discussion of the category of efficient causality led to, conflicts radically with traditional materialism. On this view the category of thing is usually defined in terms of occupying a spatial place and hindering other things from occupying the same place. Nevertheless, even the subcategory 'penetrables' fulfils the requirement of compactness in space.

Presentational intentionality, however, unlike inclusive universals, tendencies and penetrables, does *not* fulfil the compactness condition. When a subject perceives a situation, the subject is at a particular place in space and the situation at another. The intentional phenomenon connects the subject and the situation without, so to speak, 'filling out' the space between them. It is this spatial 'hop' which keeps the compactness condition from being fulfilled, and does not permit the applicability of the cutting-off operation. The actual experience of this type of phenomenon is undeniable, it reoccurs in every everyday perception. Nor has anyone directly denied it; but most philosophers have been content to say that it must be a mental phenomenon, as though a simple classification would solve the ontological difficulty. Perhaps there has been a confusion of ontological problems with problems of the special sciences. Ontologically speaking, the bewildering phenomenon 'intentionality at a distance' exists whether or not one calls it material or mental. But if one calls it mental the possibility arises for the special sciences of conceiving it as an epiphenomenon. The point of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities used in laying the foundations of modern Galileian-Newtonian physics was to place all phenomena which did not fit into the category of physical entity into another sphere, and thereby to place them outside science. All 'mystical' qualities are dispatched into the mental sphere. It is time to ask ourselves whether there actually are any reasons for taking such a course.

One of the truly great difficulties for a different (and more correct) understanding of perceptions and presentational intentionality has been the common failure to grasp the peculiarities of

the type of level-ontology which this category system contains. If intentionality exists directly in space, it must be thought of as existing at the same place as material things. The subject-pole (see above, page 210) in intentionality is (when it concerns people) one-sidedly existentially dependent on a thing with a nervous system and brain, but exists at *exactly the same place* as they do. Intentionality must exist on a higher level. Irreductive materialism here cuts through a tangled knot. Where do our dreams, for example, exist? Answer: As an overlying level in the same place as our bodies! With the help of the category of one-sided foundation, the mental allows itself to be placed in the same space as the material.

We are used to thinking that everything which a person perceives in a certain place at a certain time, other people can also perceive in the same place at the same time; blindness and similar phenomena constitute exceptions which seem to prove the rule. If, however, dreams exist in space in the way that I maintain, then ordinary conception must be revised in the name of consistency. That a dream exists at a certain place in space in a dreamer implies that another normal person *cannot* experience that dream in spite of his being able to perceive the actual place where that dream exists. This is an unusual way of thinking, but is actually no stranger than the fact that we can perceive a place where there is air, but not perceive the air; not to speak of the fact that we can have a lot of radio and TV programmes in our bodies without being aware of them (cf. the discussion of 'penetrables' in section 12.5).

If we now accept that the subject-pole of the intentional phenomenon can exist in the same space as material things, then the next question is whether such a subject-pole can be in direct contact with material states of affairs which are spatially separated from the subject-pole. The point of departure must be, as I pointed out earlier, that *every* complete ontology must somewhere have a place for 'intentionality at a distance'. The problem is thus *not* to understand and accept the phenomenon in itself – that has to be taken as given; the problem is rather the phenomenon's relations to the other categories.

In the case of representational intentionality (as in the case of presentational intentionality which does not reach its correlate) intentional phenomena obtain their place in space *only* through

their one-sided existential dependence on that which is the substratum of the subject. But in the case of presentational intentionality which reaches its goal, intentionality is one-sidedly dependent *both* on the subject-substratum (generically) *and* the state of affairs which is perceived (individually). Since intentionality can be conscious and the perceived state of affairs can be material, this existential dependence may hold between something mental and something material. And nothing more need actually be said if one accepts that the subject-pole can be placed in ordinary space. Irreductive materialism itself explains the principal problem of the connection between mental subjectivity and material objectivity.

*Difficulty B.* With this I leave the *general* problem of 'intentionality at a distance' for the *specific* problem, i.e. the problem to which today's science gives rise. In the discussion so far I have silently let 'intentionality at a distance' be equivalent with 'intentionality at a *spatial* distance'. The intentionality of a state of affairs and that state of affairs itself have been understood as simultaneous but spatially incongruent phenomena. If, however, one takes seriously, as I believe one must, the view of today's science that perceptions of external states of affairs are always based on transport of energy from the perceived state of affairs to the perceiving subject, then the discussion must free itself from the presuppositions hitherto made.

Given the 'energy transport thesis', 'intentionality at a *spatial* distance' implies 'intentionality at a *temporal* distance'. Energy transport must be thought of as existing on that level which is the substratum of the intentional phenomenon itself. When we see or hear something, we have an intentional act directed towards that something, but we have no intentional act directed towards the light or sound waves which make up the energy transport which is a necessary existence condition for the perceptions in question. In order for the perception itself to occur, the energy transport must have reached the subject substratum, which means that when perceptions of the state of affairs in question occur that state of affairs no longer exists – the transport of energy takes time. If one wants to maintain that, in our ordinary perceptions, we can be in contact with spatially distant material states of affairs, then one also has to maintain that we perceive not only *across space* but also *across time*. Presentational intentionality becomes 'intentionality at a spatial *and* temporal distance'.

I have chosen the expression 'intentionality *at* a distance' in order to give associations to the classical discussion of 'action at a distance' – otherwise the expression 'intentionality *across* a distance' would be better. When an intentional correlate is reached across space, the space often appears as empty, but not always. When one perceives in the fog one does not only see that distant state of affairs, but the fog itself is also included in the perception. One perceives a state of affairs *through* the fog, i.e. also *through space*. And this description is adequate even when the space itself appears empty. The same description also applies to time. Presentational intentionality is 'intentionality *across* time'. The connecting together of distance in space and time means that if one, for example, perceives an object *through* a lot of panes of glass placed after one another, then the perception of the different panes is extended in time in such a way that the nearer a pane is located in space the closer it is also located in time, and vice versa. The perception extends *through* both space and time.

The difficulty with 'intentionality through time' in comparison with 'intentionality through space' is that in the first case, but not in the second, one is in contact with something which no longer exists. In both cases it of course holds that one is in contact with something which is located at a distance. Space and time are not equivalent dimensions. The 'hop' in space which presentational intentionality involves can be rather difficult to accept, but it is nevertheless a relation between subjects and objects which are simultaneous. A 'hop' in time is a relation which connects the present subject with an earlier existing object. This means moreover, if we assume that a subject can be affected by its intentional correlates, that we are forced to accept that the past, without any hysteresis phenomena, can affect the present. 'Intentionality at a distance' thus leads in the end to a (mediated) 'action at a distance' – in the sense of both 'spatial distance' and 'temporal distance'.

This presents an almost insurmountable problem. But let us take a broader perspective. What point of view are we forced to if we do *not* accept the views just presented? We are nowadays often taught to make choices in terms of alternative costs. The question is not what a thing in itself costs, rather how much it costs in relation to the other *possible* alternatives. One is sometimes also forced to argue in a similar way in ontological contexts. Let us see what the 'costs' of the different ontological alternatives are.

One alternative is to accept that ‘spatial hops’ can only occur in a completely mental sphere, and that the ‘hop’ cannot be temporal. If we dismiss pure idealism, then this alternative, together with traditional perceptual psychology, implies a monadology. Every person is confined within his own mental world. The only connection which exists with other people are causal relations on the material level. If we are not to completely abandon the belief that we live in a common world, we are forced, as was Leibniz, to postulate a predetermined harmony among all of the different separated mental spheres. Fundamentally, we each live in our own mental world, but the worlds have great similarities with one another. Ontologically seen, we are as humans, in contradistinction to clumps of pure matter, completely and helplessly isolated from one another.

The other alternative is to accept an irreductive materialism and ‘intentionality at a distance’ as a special form of connection across both space and time. A connection which, without necessarily being mental, allows ‘hops’ over both spatial and temporal distance. This type of connection is the only type which allows us to retain our conception that, in a literal sense, we live in a common world. It implies, given the view that perceptions require energy transport from the object to the subject, that we normally perceive *backwards* in time.<sup>18</sup> The subject- and object-poles in a perception are not simultaneous. We perceive *through* time (as through space), but only backwards. Such a conception does not upset our everyday conception very much, as does the view that we can perceive *forwards* in time. But there are neither ontological nor scientific reasons for the latter view.

The two alternatives described here are the main two possible alternatives today. The choice consists – to put it more sharply – in either accepting a monadology or in accepting that we can be in direct contact both with distant states of affairs and with the past. It seems obvious to me that the costs of the first alternative are too high. We must begin to accustom ourselves philosophically to the thought we all daily take as implicitly given, namely that we are in at least partially direct contact with both nature and other people.

What is most difficult to accept in this form of naive realism which I am advocating, is of course that part which is not directly in keeping with genuine naive realism, namely the view that one perceives *across* or *through* time instead of *at* a particular moment.

Here one ought to remember that 'through time' is always connected with 'through space', otherwise it is easy to become confused. Intuitions which presuppose that spatial perceptions are *conceived as momentary*, might easily be transferred to the temporal dimension. Think of a perception where a door is suddenly opened out towards nature. If one conceives this perception as momentary, one must regard both the perceived door and all the perceived further distant states of affairs as being simultaneous. The spatial dimension so to speak opens itself out towards more distant but simultaneously existing states of affairs. It is tempting to conceive of intentionality through time via this type of picture, i.e. suddenly time opens itself towards the past; one perceives new, more temporally distant existing states of affairs. These are supposed to be in some way both past and present. The temporal dimension is supposed to function precisely as does the spatial dimension in traditional naive realism. From my point of view *both* of the pictures described are mistaken. Space cannot, in the present sense, open itself towards more distant states of affairs without time's also opening itself – and vice versa. It is an illusion that ordinary temporal perceptions are momentary in time. If one accepts this, then it is not difficult to imagine perceptions through time.

I have pointed out in this chapter that intentionality towards states of affairs which exist in space and time is *normally* 'intentionality at a distance and through a distance'. I shall conclude with a few comments which indicate that this is not only normal, but is a defining characteristic of intentionality. In the case of representational intentionality and perceptions of outer objects and states of affairs, this 'hop in space', as I also call it, is obvious. But the 'hop' is also there in the case of inner perceptions, i.e. perceptions of such things as pains. Here, perhaps, it seems as though there were no spatial distance between subject and intentional correlate. One must however introduce a distinction here between subject and subject-pole, which was not necessary in the earlier examples. A subject is a definite spatio-temporal entity which can have intentionality, normally a body with a brain and nervous system. Such a subject can have presentational intentionality towards parts of this same spatio-temporal entity, which is what happens not only in the case of pains but also when one performs actions such as cutting one's hair or pinching oneself. In

these cases the subject is divided into a subject-pole and an object-part. The intentional correlate thereby becomes, in this case also, distinct from the subject-pole.

Another possible exception to the rule that intentionality is 'intentionality at a distance' is provided by acts of self-consciousness. Here it can really seem as though the subject-pole must coincide with the object-part. But then one has forgotten the temporal features of such acts. I believe that self-consciousness is always consciousness of the moment which is just past, i.e. it is 'intentionality at a temporal distance'. I believe it impossible to notice one's own noticing, other than in the way one notices an earlier noticing. The subject pole is in this case at a *temporal distance* from the intentional correlate. I have earlier defended the possibility in principle of such intentionality.