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Chapter 1

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

Is Ought? What kind of relation is there between facts and norms, between facts and values, and between facts and virtues? Is there a logical and ontological gap between Is (i.e. facts or truth-claims) and Ought (norms, values, virtues), or can Is in some sense sometimes imply an Ought? This book tries to shed new light on the so-called Is-Ought problem.

Normative ethics has often been divided into deontological ethics and axiological ethics, i.e. into theories of norms (or obligations) and theories of values, respectively. In the next chapter I shall discuss the underlying distinction between values and norms. When, as above, I speak about Ought and Oughts with a capital 'O', Ought is intended to cover all kinds of norms and values. Regrettably, there is no special word for the genus of which norms and values, as well as virtues, are species. I think, however, that also the context will help to make it clear when I speak about norms in the genus sense (Ought) and in the species sense (ought).

The question and title of this book, Is Ought?, can also be given another sense. I have consciously chosen an ambiguous title. It can also mean 'Are there really any objective Oughts at all?'. This question, which is the old question of nihilism and relativism, may be called the Ought-existence problem. The answers to the two problems are of course closely connected. To be very brief, the essence of my answers are that, yes, Oughts exist, and that sometimes a change of Is rationally implies a change of Ought.

1.1 The gap between Is and Ought

This is the way the world is; this is the way you ought to act; this is good; this is the kind of man you should be. What kind of relation is there between Is on the one hand and norms, values, and virtues on the other? The general Is-Ought problem is applicable to whatever kind of Oughts mankind puts down; may it be absolute moral norms, democratically decided juridical norms, mere etiquette, or some other values. We may remind ourselves that 'etiquette', etymologically, means small ethics. In a sense even rules of etiquette comprise a moral order. The rules in question are used to evaluate actions. Most discussions of the Is-Ought problem, though, have been centred around ethics and moral philosophy in a narrow sense, and so will most of my discussion be.

Classically, there are two main philosophical camps in relation to the Is-Ought problem. From an old philosophical point of view they can be labelled the atomist and the holist position, but from a broader cultural perspective and the discussion about post-modernism in the eighties, they had better be called the modern and the pre-modern position, respectively.

The atomists claim that there is a logical as well as an ontological gap between the realm of Is and the realm of Ought. A statement describing a fact cannot entail or imply any statement expressing a norm or an evaluation, and vice versa. Facts may exist in the world independently of man, whereas norms, values, and virtues only exist within man. Man gets knowledge about facts through cognitive faculties (observation and reason), but norms and values are grounded in something else like desires and emotional faculties. This view has been the dominant one in empiricist philosophical systems. I call it atomist, not empiricist, in order to stress ontology instead of epistemology. The important point is that facts and Oughts are regarded as isolated bits which are contingently put together.

The atomist position fits the epithet modern because it suits the view that Truth, Good, and Beauty are three non-overlapping areas. Criteria belonging to one area cannot be extended to any of the other. In medieval society it was the other way round. Knowledge, morals, and aesthetics made up an integrated whole under the authority of the church. According to the dominant ideology of the twentieth century, a scientist should not be moral, and neither should an artist. Both of them should follow their own path wherever it would lead. Seek the truth and seek the artistic expression, respectively, and do not bother about the consequences. In the modern society moral has been kept apart from both the sciences and the arts.
The holist position is strong within all Hegelian or Hegelian-inspired systems. It is part of philosophical systems as different as British absolute idealism and marxism. I call this position holist in order to stress that it claims that facts and norms make up an indestructible unity. Ontologically, facts and Oughts are regarded as very intimately fused. Logically, statements of facts and norms are regarded as implying each other.

Hegel's own system is heir of the Enlightenment in the sense that he gives reason a very prominent place, but, nonetheless, his philosophy represents a defence against modernism. He wants to restore some kind of fusion of Truth, Good, and Beauty.

If atomism and holism with regard to the Is-Ought problem can be regarded as two positions on a common line, which I find doubtful, then, anyway, the view to be argued for in this book takes up an intermediate position.

Among other things, I shall maintain that there are different kinds of existential dependence relations between Ises (facts and truth-claims) and Oughts (norms, values, and virtues). Such dependence relations are stronger than the accidental and external relations the atomists believe in, but some of them are looser than the internal relations the holists have defended and relied on. However, let it be said at once that I am firmly convinced that normative statements and value statements, in contradistinction to truth claims, cannot be true or false.

Relating again to a broader cultural context, I want to forestall a possible misunderstanding. I regard the position which will emerge as neither modern nor pre-modern, but that does not mean that it is a post-modernist view. Post-modernism denies both knowledge and morals in any deeper sense. It denies both serious truth-seeking and serious moral discussions; it denies both looking for Is and looking for Ought. In this kind of thinking the Is-Ought problem cannot even be posed since no genuine concepts of knowledge and morals are allowed. This book attempts to transcend the described opposition between modernism and pre-modernism without ending up in the nihilistic views of post-positivism and post-structuralism.

Many a detailed philosophical position has been born as a vague intuition. Whether the reader will find the position of this book well or badly worked out, is for the reader to decide at the end of the book. But since the hunch may be of interest in itself, I shall present it.

In the development of modern Europe two scientists have, for good reasons, become symbols of a conflict between science and ideology, i.e. between truth-seeking and norm-grounding activities. The scientists in question are Galileo and Darwin. In the early phases of modern physics and evolutionary biology, respectively, both of them came into conflict with the church and its norms. These conflicts were not intended by Galileo and Darwin. They merely, each in his own way, wanted to change the Is, not the Ought. The church establishment, however, in both cases conceived the new theories as threats to their moral hegemony. My intuition has been that this reaction from the church was not irrational, although in both cases the church managed to assimilate the new theories and, more or less, officially restore its moral superiority. More precisely, my intuition was that a change in Is may really imply a change in Ought, and so be a threat to the dominant Ought.

The same idea, that a change in Is can rationally imply a change in Ought, has also on several occasions come to my mind when I have been listening to, or have participated in, political discussions. Actually, such discussions are mostly centred around matters of facts. They may be about the income structure, possible budget deficits, work incentives, causes of environmental pollution, and so on. Surprisingly seldom is a norm or a value as such discussed. It might be argued that this is so because the dominant political parties share a common moral goal, the good society, and are divided merely on the issue what means to use in order to reach such a society. I do not think this is true. Political discussions are not merely means-end discussions. What kind of description of one's society one accepts will heavily affect one's political opinions. In some way Is implies Ought. The problem is: How?

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1 I regard post-positivism and post-structuralism as two somewhat different philosophical defences of post-modernism. Post-modernism is essentially a fusion of two opinions: (i) that it is impossible to talk of developments within architecture, arts, literature and politics; (ii) that one might very well juxtapose wholly different styles. Both post-positivism (e.g. Rorty) and post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida) argues, in different ways, that we have to give up the philosophical notions of Truth, Good, and Beauty. Then, of course, it is impossible to believe in any "great" development. However, it is quite possible to be a post-modernist without being a post-philosopher.
1.2 Bridging the gap

Some fundamental ideas which will be put forward in this book are, I think, quite new, but the main idea that there is a non-holist way of bridging the gap between Is and Ought is not new. One attempt to articulate such a position was made by Charles Taylor in his paper *Neutrality in political science*. His main target was the positivist separation between factual study and normative beliefs:

In particular my aim is to call into question the view that the findings of political science leave us, as it were, as free as before, that they do not go some way to establishing particular sets of values and undermining others.

According to Taylor, a theoretical framework sets "the crucial dimensions through which the phenomena can vary". In the social and political sciences, this means that some proposed political norms and values are ruled out as impossible. If, for instance, the theory says that class conflict is unavoidable, then it seems to follow that marxism with a lot of connected norms is ruled out. It not merely seems to follow. It actually follows if one subscribes to the very plausible axiom that ought implies can. That the principle 'ought implies can' really is a bridge principle of some importance, has been argued by K. E. Tranoy, but Taylor wants to say something more. In the paper quoted he discussed S.M. Lipset's book *Political Man* and its thesis that there is an unavoidable struggle between the rich and the poor. The norm that one ought to work for a classless society is then ruled out because the goal is impossible. To propose the norm would, firstly, amount to a violation of 'ought implies can'. But, secondly, according to Taylor also the following is true:

For if we rule out the transformation to the classless society, then we are left with the choice between different kinds of class conflict: a violent kind which so divides society that it can only survive under some form of tyranny, or one which can reach accommodation in peace. *This choice, set out in these terms, virtually makes itself for us.*

Lipset's theoretical framework not only makes something impossible, and so by means of 'ought implies can' implies that some norms should be withdrawn. In some sense it "tends to support an associated value position" or it "secretes its own norms" to use Taylor's phrases. He writes:

Thus the framework does secrete a certain value position, albeit one that can be overridden. In general we can see this arising in the following way: the framework gives us as it were the geography of the range of phenomena in question, it tells us how they can vary, what are the major dimensions of variation. But since we are dealing with matters which are of great importance to human beings, a given map will have, as it were, its own built-in value-slope. That is to say, a given dimension of variation will usually determine for itself how we are to judge of good and bad, because of its relation to obvious human wants and needs.

Now, what kind of relation is actually referred to in the last sentence? Taylor puts forward the question himself and answers it as follows:

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3 Ibid. p 141.
4 Ibid. p 144.
7 Ibid. p 161.
8 Ibid. p 153-54.
Or, to put it another way, does this mean that the step between accepting a framework of explanation and accepting a certain notion of the political good is mediated by a premise concerning human needs, which may be widely enough held to go unnoticed, but which nevertheless can be challenged, thus breaking the connection?

The answer is no. For the connection between a given framework of explanation and a certain notion of the schedule of needs, wants, and purposes which seem to mediate the inference to value theory is not fortuitous.9

According to Taylor, a theoretical framework is, in the social and political sciences, always linked to a certain conception of human needs. This being so, the 'secretion of norms' follows. To my mind, however, this is only a partial answer which pushes the interesting question one step back. The question now becomes: What kind of relation is there between descriptions of human needs and other descriptions within the framework. This question is not answered by Taylor.

Taylor's paper also contains a simple distinction which is worth remembering. A given norm (or value) may be invalidated in two different ways. It may be overridden or it may be undermined. When a norm is overridden we do agree that in a sense the norm is correct, but that the circumstances at the moment are such that the norm cannot be adhered to; some more fundamental norms are also in play. This is what happens when, for instance, an emergency powers act is proclaimed. On the other hand, a norm is undermined when we seek to deprive it of its status as a correct norm; the norm itself is questioned. Taylor writes:

Now what is being claimed here is that an objection which undermines the values which seem to arise out of a given framework must alter the framework; that in this sense the framework is inextricably connected to a certain set of values; and that if we can reverse the valuation without touching the framework, then we are dealing with an overriding.10

I have presented Taylor's paper because I, too, think that a theoretical framework "secretes its own norms". The problem is how to analyse this "secretion". There are at least two questions left unanswered by Taylor: (a) What kind of relation is there between facts and norms inside a theoretical framework?; (b) When a framework is questioned and its norms are being undermined, are then the arguments for the undermining only concerned with facts?

Atomism with regard to the Is-Ought problem is fundamental to the old analytical philosophical view that substantive ethics cannot be a proper part of philosophy. Philosophy, it was said, is a cognitive enterprise whereas the gap between Is and Ought makes ethics a non-cognitive undertaking. Therefore, in philosophy, ethics should be replaced by meta-ethics, which is the cognitive study of ethics. The gap between Is and Ought is here reproduced as a gap between meta-ethics and ethics. Holists, on the other hand, do not believe in any of these two gaps. Of course, the Is-Ought problem itself is a kind of meta-ethical problem, which, consequently, is shared by atomists, holists, and myself. Meta-ethics is inescapable in philosophy.

In the meta-ethical discourse of analytic philosophy, the atomist position has by some moral philosophers been challenged in a way which does not imply holism. I am not thinking of neo-Aristotelians such as B. Williams, M. Anscombe, and A. MacIntyre but of Stephen Toulmin, J.O. Urmson, and R.M. Hare. Their ideas were once called 'New Directions in Meta-Ethics'.11 Toulmin's ideas have also been given the more substantive epithet 'the good-reasons approach'.12 These philosophers have put forward opinions which in some respects come close to those which will be argued for in this book. I will therefore now briefly present these ideas, and I will start with those connected with Toulmin. He has written:

Whenever we come to a moral decision, we weigh the considerations involved - the relevant facts, that is, so far as we are acquainted with them - and then have to make up

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9 Ibid. p 154.
10 Ibid. p 152.
our minds. In doing so, we pass from the factual reasons (R) to an ethical conclusion (E). At this moment, we can always ask ourselves, 'Now is this the right decision? In view of what I know (R), ought I to choose in this way (E)? is R a good reason for E?' When considering ethics in general, therefore, we shall naturally be interested in the question, 'What is it that makes a particular set of facts, R, a good reason for a particular ethical conclusion, E? What is "a good reason" in ethics?; and this will interest us to a greater degree than questions like, 'What is the analysis of "right"?', and 'Is pleasure better than knowledge, or knowledge than pleasure?'

There are, according to Toulmin, *evaluative inferences* by means of which we can pass from factual reasons to ethical conclusions (Oughts). In one sense this is a meta-ethical position. It does not discuss the truth-values of the factual reasons adduced. But in another sense it is not a pure meta-ethical position since it is meant to show that some reasons are, independently of their truth-values, really not reasons.

If there are evaluative inferences in Toulmin's sense, then there is no absolute gap between truth-claims and Oughts. Toulmin claims that a statement which is true or false may be a reason for a statement which expresses a valuation or a norm, i.e. a statement which is not true or false. He comes close to Taylor's thesis that "facts secretes norms". If facts secretes norms there are evaluative inferences; the secretion is the evaluative inference.

Another view of Toulmin which will prop up later is the following three-partitioned thesis. First: "What makes us call a 'judgement' ethical is the fact that it is used to harmonise people's actions". Second: there are two *logically* different ways in which factual reasons may be adduced in favour of ethical conclusions; either a norm is taken for granted and there are factual criteria for it (as in a legal law), or there is a dispute about norms where the factual reasons relate to whether the norms can harmonise people's actions. Third: this logical distinction is mirrored by a historical development. In the early phases of mankind conflicts were prevented because all followed tradition:

In its early stages, therefore, morality boils down to 'doing the done thing': and this is true, both of the way in which a child learns from its parents, and, in social pre-history, of moral codes. Primitive ethics is 'deontological', a matter of rigid duties, taboos, customs and commandments. It prevents conflicts of interest by keeping the dispositions of all concerned aligned, and condemns behaviour directed away from the prescribed aims.

Later on it was recognised that authorities and moral codes may be criticised:

When it is recognised that the members of a community have the right to criticise the existing practices, and to suggest new ones, a new phase in the development of ethics begins. In this phase, it is the *motives* of actions and the *results* of social practices, rather than 'the letter of the law', which are emphasised. The 'deontological' code was at first supreme; the 'teleological' criterion now amplifies it, and provides a standard by which to criticise it.

There is a standard criticism of Toulmin's book to the effect that his position either belongs to descriptive ethics or is a rule utilitarianism in disguise. In the first disjunct, attention is focused on Toulmin's view that the function of ethics is to harmonise people's actions, and in the second attention is focused on his 'teleological' criterion. I think there is more to Toulmin's ideas than this. In my opinion, they point forward to the possibility that there might be a bridge between Is and Ought which we have not grasped clearly yet.

Hare has become famous for several things, one of them is the concept of *good-making characteristics*. Before looking at Hare, however, I shall give a brief presentation of Urmson's idea of what he could well have called *grade-making characteristics*. Both kinds of

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14 Ibid. p 145.
15 Ibid. p 137.
16 Ibid. p 141.
17 K. Nielsen op. cit. p 111.
characteristics, together with bad-making characteristics, belong to a genus which I shall call
Ought-making characteristics. In an article called "On Grading"\textsuperscript{18} (published, by the way, two
years before Hare's \textit{Language and Morals}) Urmson argued that there are non-subjective
factual criteria for assigning value judgements. The example he uses is, from the point of
view of ethics, seemingly very odd. He discusses apple grading and the corresponding labels,
such as 'super grade' and 'extra fancy grade'. However, analogous examples can nowadays be
found in almost every area. Most newspapers now and then presents tests of cars, household
machines, and other things which are graded in the way Urmson talks of apple grading. In
psychological tests even human beings are graded in the same way for their value or
suitability for various professions.

In our context, the interesting claim is the claim that there are grade-making characteristics,
i.e. that there are states of affairs which in some way imply evaluations. Just how this
implication works, however, Urmson never works out. This deficiency has to do with
linguistic philosophy in general. Many philosophers have rested content with an analysis of
how we use our words, but as will become clear, I think we can dig deeper. There is more to it
than the fact that evaluative words are connected with criteria.

Urmson starts by focusing attention on a trivial fact. The grading labels 'super grade' and
'extra fancy grade' have clear cut and explicit criteria for their employment. They can take
different values on the following variables: size, ripeness, shape, blemish, russetting, colour
and condition. Merely by looking at an apple and controlling whether it conforms to the
criteria, a trained worker can decide whether the apple is to be valued as super grade or extra
fancy grade. Being so, Urmson says, there are objective criteria for grading.

This kind of grading, he continues, is not reducible to other kinds of activities. To be able to
grade is something different from being able merely to assess size, ripeness, shape, and so on.
Naturalism with regard to grading is false. The same goes for emotivism. It is obvious that
one may grade apples without any emotional affection. Urmson concludes:

\begin{quote}
At some stage we must say firmly (why not now?) that to describe is to describe, to grade
is to grade, and to express one's feelings is to express one's feelings, and that none of these
is reducible to either of the others; nor can any of them be reduced to, defined in terms of,
anything else.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

A grade is a grade, a norm is a norm, a value is a value. Their differences is compatible with
the fact that they may have the same pragmatic effects. A descriptive statement can arouse
emotions and, to speak with Austin, have perlocutionary effects without ceasing to be
descriptive. And the same is true of grading. Neither descriptions nor gradings are reducible
to such pragmatic dimensions.

Urmson is easily misunderstood, however, if one does not recognize what kind of question
he purports to answer. According to Urmson, and I think he is right, two questions which
ought to be distinguished are often confused. I quote:

\begin{quote}
The first point to be made is that the question whether there are any objective and
accepted criteria for grading and how they function, which we have just left, is a quite
different problem from the problem why we employ and accept these criteria.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

In a sense Urmson's answer to the first question is compatible with a "gap thesis" about
grading (and norms and evaluations). If, as he himself admits, a possible answer to the \textit{second}
question is that we employ the criteria we employ because of majority rule, then we may say
that the criteria are conventional in a sense compatible with the existence of a logical gap. For
each individual there may exist a merely emotional tie between the grading and the grading
criteria. On the social level there is a stronger tie, there is a public decision, but even such a
decision is compatible with a logical gap. These facts notwithstanding, I think Urmson's stress
on the existence of grade-making or value-making characteristics should be noted. It shows us

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{18} References here are to Urmson, "'Good' as a grading Word", in P.W. Taylor, \textit{The Moral Judgement},
pp 211-37.
\textsuperscript{19} Op. cit. p 223.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. p 231.
\end{footnotes}
where to start our discussion. In an obvious sense there are objective criteria for grading, as well as for norms and values in general. The problem is the analysis.

The relevance of Urmson's example becomes more visible if put in the light of Maclntyre's attempt to rehabilitate the Aristotelian concept of virtue. According to Maclntyre, a modern and reformed concept of virtue requires for its logical development three different stages: (1) a concept of practice, (2) an account of "the narrative order of a single human life", and (3) an account of what constitutes a moral tradition. It is the first stage I am interested in here.

Maclntyre's specific concept of practice is best highlighted by one of his own examples. He says that you may learn a child to play chess better and better, not because the child has a desire to excel in chess, but because you reward him by giving him candy or money when he plays well. Such a good is external to the practice of chess-playing. However, there are also goods internal to chess-playing. For those who appreciate only the external goods there are no serious reasons not to try to cheat, but for the one interested in the internal goods, cheating is impossible. Maclntyre writes:

But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands. Now if the child cheats, he or she will be defeating not me, but himself or herself.

In practices such as chess there are internal criteria for a good performance. Practices are always tied to a notion of excellence, a notion which, in turn, sustains the notion of virtue. Those who do not have any experience of participating in a specific practice are incompetent as judges of its internal goods.

A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice. ... In the realm of practices the authority of both goods and standards operates in such a way as to rule out subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgement. De gustibus est disputandum.

Let us now compare Maclntyre and Urmson. Urmson is talking about good apples, Maclntyre about good performances. This difference between things and actions, however, is no essential difference, since it is possible to distinguish good and bad apple-graders as well as good and bad apples. Good apple-graders, of course, are those who are able quickly to apply concretely the objective criteria for the different kinds of apples. Also, Maclntyre says that connected with the excellences of painting, which he regards as a practice, is the excellence of the product, the painting. Obviously, when a practice results in products there is a connection between good workers, good work, and good products.

Maclntyre, however, wants to make a distinction between practices and skills, and I guess he would like to rank apple-grading as a skill. He wants to distinguish between virtues and technical skills. Practices are connected with virtues, but skills are not. I shall not discuss this distinction of his, because it is the similarity between skills and practises which is of interest here. Both skills and practices contain criteria which are impersonal and not necessarily tied to emotions. In both cases there are grade-making characteristics.

R.M. Hare is usually praised for his analysis of the commending and prescribing function of ethical words, but he has also said important things which have nothing to do with the pragmatics of words. I shall focus attention on his emphasis on the concept of supervenience. Here is a quotation:

\[21 \text{Maclntyre, After Virtue, Duckworth: 2nd ed London 1985, p 186-87.}\]
\[22 \text{Ibid. p 188.}\]
\[23 \text{Ibid. p 190.}\]
First, let us take that characteristic of 'good' which has been called its supervenience. Suppose that we say 'St. Francis was a good man'. It is logically impossible to say this and to maintain at the same time that there might have been another man placed in precisely the same circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in them exactly the same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that he was not a good man. ... Next, the explanation of this logical impossibility does not lie in any form of naturalism; it is not the case that there is any conjunction C of descriptive characteristics such that to say that a man has C entails that he is morally good. For, if this were the case, we should be unable to commend any man for having those characteristics; we should only be able to say that he had them. Nevertheless, the judgement that a man is morally good is not logically independent of the judgement that he has certain characteristics which we may call virtues or good-making characteristics; there is a relation between them, although it is not one of entailment or of identity of meaning.24

In his concept of supervenience, Hare fuses three theses which for my purposes are important to keep distinct. They are: (i) good-making characteristics do not entail an evaluation, (ii) an evaluation is dependent on the existence of natural properties (i.e. the good-making characteristics), (iii) two identical sets of natural properties have to be good-making in the same way. (I will discuss the concept of supervenience in detail in chapter 4.2.)

Thesis (i) means that Ought cannot be derived from Is; (ii) means that there is no absolute gap between Ought and Is; and (iii) says that two qualitatively identical entities must be valued in the same way. The last point is the one Hare himself stresses, and one which sometimes has been taken as identical with the concept of supervenience.25 I agree with what is stated in the third thesis, but the first two theses are equally important for the Is-Ought problem. Phrased in another way, they say that both holism and atomism are wrong with regard to the Is-Ought problem.

1.3 Closing the gap

None of the philosophers mentioned in section 1.2 have claimed that it is possible to derive Ought from Is, although they have argued that there is some intimate connection between Ought and Is which is inconsistent with the gap thesis. In this section I shall present the two most interesting modern attempts really to derive norms from facts. The first one was made by John Searle in his Speech Acts26 and the second one by Karl-Otto Apel in his Towards a Transformation of Philosophy.27 Later (chapter 3.4) I shall argue that their derivations have more to do with the constitution of social facts than with the kind of derivation of Ought from Is which philosophers mostly have thought of.

Searle claims that the derivation of the fifth sentence below is (with some implicit assumptions) valid, and that it is a derivation of Ought from Is.

1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars".
2. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
5. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.28

I think even the reader not familiar with the discussion of Searle's derivation can see some *prima facie* objections. Searle himself discusses explicitly seven objections, but I think it is enough to mention only three of them. The first of these is connected with the concept of *overriding* and the second with the concept of *undermining* (see p 6 above).

First question: Isn't it always possible that there may be reasons which make it morally right to brake the promise? Isn't it always possible that a promise may be overridden? Yes, says Searle, it is, but that is beside the point. The point is that this derivation is *internal* to the institution of promising, i.e. there is a norm at work even if it is overridden. Or, put differently, an overridden norm is still a norm. Being so, the derivation at case is a derivation of Ought from Is.

Second question: Isn't there a distinction to be made between the committed participant and the neutral observer? And in that case, the derivation made is valid only for the committed participant. For a neutral observer there is not even a problem of *overriding*. For him the whole institution of promising is *undermined* in the sense that its moral worth is, at the moment, irrelevant. Therefore, the objection continues, for the neutral observer it is not possible to derive the normative statement that Jones ought to pay Smith. Searle answers as follows:

There are two radically different ways of taking the phrase "commit oneself to (accept) the institution of promising". In one way it means something like (a) "undertake to use the word "promise" in accordance with its literal meaning, which literal meaning is determined by the internal constitutive rules of the institution". A quite different way to take the phrase is to take it as meaning (b) "endorse the institution as a good or acceptable institution". Now, when I do assert literally that he made a promise I do indeed commit myself to the institution in the sense of (a); indeed, it is precisely because the literal meaning involves me in this commitment that the derivation goes through. But I do not commit myself in the sense of (b).

The kernel of Searle's reply, I suggest, is this: *There are facts which presuppose norms*. In a sense then, the existence of such a fact entails the existence of a norm. Whether, in the case at hand, (a) Jones sincerely promises and his promise will be kept, or whether (b) he sincerely promises but the promise will be overridden, or whether (c) he promises in order to deceive Smith, there are in all three cases a norm at work. If there are promisings there are norms. You can look at them and you can describe them even though you yourself feel neutral or even abhorrent.

When Searle claims that it is possible to derive Ought from Is, he does not mean any kind of Is. He distinguishes between brute facts and institutional facts, and the derivation in question is a derivation from institutional facts only. He writes:

My tentative conclusions, then, are as follows:
1. The classical picture fails to account for institutional facts.
2. Institutional facts exist within systems of constitutive rules.
3. Some systems of constitutive rules involve obligations, commitments, and responsibilities.
4. Within some of those systems we can derive "ought's" from "is's" on the model of the first derivation.

In chapter 3 I shall replace the distinction between brute and institutional facts with a distinction between natural and social facts. Natural facts are facts which can exist independently of intentionality (or consciousness), social facts is a kind of facts which cannot exist independently of intentionality. The need for such an elaboration is one of the things which I think follows from Searle's attempt to close the gap between Ought and Is. It should be noted that both Urmson's concept of grade-making characteristics and Hare's concept of good-making characteristics pick out properties which belong to natural facts.

29 Ibid. p 188-89.
30 Ibid. p 194-95.
31 Ibid. p 186.
The first objection to Searle's derivation brought in the possibility of overriding a norm and the second objection the possibility of undermining a norm. Both these possibilities are internal to the culture which embodies the norm. The third objection takes into account the anthropologist, the external observer in contradistinction to the internal but neutral observer. The objection is that for such an external person, surely, there can be no norm derived from a promise. Or, as Searle himself states it:

'It seems obvious to me that one can say "He made a promise", meaning something like "He made what they, the people of this Anglo-Saxon tribe, call a promise". And that is a purely descriptive sense of promise which involves no commitment to evaluative statements at all.'

When Searle tries to take account of this objection, he moves to a general level. He claims that with the same kind of argument one can turn even a valid deduction in formal logic into something which is purely descriptive. About such a deduction the anthropologist can always say: "He made what they, the people of this Logical tribe, call a valid deduction." Therefore, Searle says, in such a way absolutely everything can be questioned, and he ends the whole book with the following sentence:

But the retreat from the committed use of words ultimately must involve a retreat from language itself, for speaking a language - as has been the main theme of this book - consists of performing speech acts according to rules, and there is no separating those speech acts from the commitments which form essential parts of them.

Obviously, Searle puts forward an argument to the effect that there are absolute presuppositions for language. He does not say it explicitly, but implicitly he admits that the institution of promising might well be anthropologically neutralized. It is impossible, however, to neutralize all institutions at the same time. Everybody cannot be anthropologists all the time if there is to be a language. The importance of this kind of argument was probably not fully clear to Searle when he wrote the book. It is stated only in a footnote which I shall quote in full length.

Proudhon said: "property is theft". If one tries to take this as an internal remark it makes no sense. It was intended as an external remark attacking and rejecting the institution of private property. It gets its air of paradox and its force by using terms which are internal to the institution in order to attack the institution.

Standing on the deck of some institutions one can tinker with constitutive rules and even throw some other institutions overboard. But could one throw all institutions overboard (in order perhaps to avoid ever having to derive an "ought" from an "is")? One could not and still engage in those forms of behavior we consider characteristically human. Suppose Proudhon had added (and tried to live by): "Truth is a lie, marriage is infidelity, language is uncommunicative, law is a crime", and so on with every possible institution.

From a German point of view, Searle's argument should be described as some kind of transcendental deduction. There is an implicit transcendentalism in Searle. However, what is implicit in the American philosopher Searle is explicit in the German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel. Apel has criticized Searle's attempted derivation of the obligation that Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars, but he has not noted Searle's footnote-transcendentalism. I shall not, however, dwell on Apel's comment upon and relation to Searle. I shall present what I take to be the essential argument in Apel. Whether or not I am really true to Apel, I find the arguments which follow good arguments. I shall use the distinction between undermining and overriding, although Apel himself does not use it.

32 Ibid. p 196.
33 Ibid. p 198; emphasis added.
34 Ibid. p 186.
THE FIRST 'TRANSCENDENTAL' DEDUCTION
1. A fact: There is language.
2. A Kantian question: How is language possible?
3. Answer: By means of (among other things) pragmatic principles.
4. Norm derivation: If everybody lies all the time language breaks down, therefore the
   pragmatic principle and norm You ought to speak the truth is valid. If you try to undermine
   this norm you will undermine your own undermining.36

A norm such as that of truth-telling, is not one of several means whereby language may be
constituted. It is an absolutely necessary condition. The existence of a fact implies the
existence of its necessary preconditions, and in this case one such presupposition is a norm.
An Ought is derived from an Is.

Of course, if everybody stops speaking the norm disappears, too, but that is beside the point.
If there is no language the deduction cannot start. Similar remarks apply to all transcendental
deductions. If there were no world of experience it would be impossible, according to Kant
himself, to make a transcendental deduction of the categories.

THE SECOND 'TRANSCENDENTAL' DEDUCTION
1. A fact: There is critical argumentation (in science, in particular).
2. A Kantian question: How is critical argumentation possible?
3. Answer: By means of (among other things) specific pragmatic principles.
4. Norm derivation: If, by arguments, you try to show that your opponent does not have
equal rights in your discussion, you are undermining your own argumentation, since then, in
principle, there may be arguments overriding your own rights to free argumentation.
Therefore, there is the norm You should in discussions recognize the others as participants
with rights equal to your own.37

According to Apel, neither language in general (first deduction) nor objective science
(second deduction) is conceivable without moral norms. Such fundamental norms he calls 'the
a priori of the communication community'. As Apel himself emphasizes, his point is not so
much to deny Hume's thesis as to put Hume upside down. Apel's main point is that Ought is a
presupposition for Is. Descriptive statements are impossible without the norm of truth-telling,
and well-grounded descriptive statements are impossible without the norm of equal rights for
other persons. In order for us to have descriptive statements from which we can try to derive
norms, there must already be some norms at work.

In chapter 3.4 Apel's deductions will be taken up again. Here, I shall only make a comment
on the norm of equal rights. Contrary to what Apel says, science can work even if everybody
is not given equal rights all the time. Apel moves too far too fast. What actually follows is that
in argumentative discourses one has to regard some persons as participants with equal rights
some of the time. The deduced norm is, I am for myself sorry to say, quite consistent with
elitist thinking. Apel is the victim of a very common fallacy in modern moral thinking. Either
one talks only of individuals or one talks of mankind as a whole. But, of course, there are
intermediary groups or communities ("Gemeinschaften") as well. Apel should have said that
argumentative language presupposes that one recognizes a group where mutual respect is
presupposed. As in Plato's Republic one may opt for elitist egalitarianism. Apel does not
manage to block arguments in favour of elitist mutual respect.

Another of Apel's claims is that even attempts to justify norms presuppose (some more
basic) norms:

Even here a transcendental critique of meaning is able to demonstrate that the
presupposition of the validity of moral norms in general is a 'paradigmatic' precondition
for the possibility of the language-game associated with the justification of norms.38

36Cf. op. cit. p 269.
37 Cf. op. cit. p 271. He also writes: "In short, in the community of argumentation it is presupposed that all the
members mutually recognize each other as participants with equal rights in the discussion." Ibid. p 259.
38 Ibid. p 255.
If the norms which are absolute presuppositions for language are not adhered to, then it would be impossible to discuss norms, values, and virtues. Even contracts which bind and prescribe the actions of two persons would be impossible. Therefore, Apel has to make and makes a distinction between transcendental and contractual norms. Contractual norms presuppose transcendental norms. A fact which we shall come back to in chapter 3.4 when Searle and Apel are discussed once again.

1.4 Denying the gap

If one accepts that in some sense there is a gap between Is and Ought, one can simply accept the gap or try to bridge it or close it. However, one can also try to deny that the gap is real. One may argue that the gap exists merely as a philosophical illusion. I think that this is Wittgenstein's position. Let me give a quotation from Philosophical Investigations.

A doctor asks: "How is he feeling?" The nurse says: "He is groaning". A report on his behaviour. But need there be any question for them whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion "If he groans, we must give him more analgesic" - without suppressing a middle term? Isn't the point the service to which they put the description of behaviour?

"But then they make a tacit presupposition." Then what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition.39

In the context from which the quotation is taken, Wittgenstein is mainly discussing (or trying to dissolve) the mind-body problem. But suddenly he jumps into the Is-Ought problem. In some way he defends the leap from the fact (Is) that a certain person is groaning to the imperative (Ought) that the person must be given analgesic. In my view, Wittgenstein argues that it is quite rational to live and act as though the Is-Ought problem is irrelevant. One lives beneath the distinction.40

Wittgenstein's view is best presented via another quotation which follows closely upon the former one:

Doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt? And doubt may be entirely lacking. Doubting has an end.41

Every infinite regress of the 'child type' (i.e. the child asks: 'Why1?', the parent says: Answer1 - the child: Why2?, the parent: Answer2 - and so on') has to end somewhere. This is true for explanations in the natural sciences as well for the question 'Why do we have to act in this way?'. Where we end we have an ideal of natural order or the kernel of a form of life, not a doubtful tacit presupposition. The term 'form of life' is Wittgenstein's own, whereas I have taken the term 'natural order' from S. Toulmin, who once used it in order to point out the end of explanatory regresses in science.42 In Newtonian physics, the question why particles which are not acted upon by any forces are moving in straight lines with uniform motion, just cannot be answered. This fact represents the ideal of natural order for Newtonian physicists. It cannot be doubted, and it is therefore not a presupposition in the ordinary sense. It behaves like simple mathematical truths. We would not regard '2 + 2 = 4' as a presupposition. Similarly, Wittgenstein can be interpreted to mean that somewhere there are and have to be ideals of natural connections between Is and Ought.

40 I have taken the word beneath from a Swedish philosopher, Mats Furberg, who in a book, Nedom vara och bōra, Thales: Stockholm 1993, (in English I would render it "Beneath Is and Ought") has tried to develop views similar to but not identical with Wittgenstein's. I owe a clear awareness of Wittgenstein's ideas to Furberg's book.
41 Ibid. p 180.
I do not find such a Wittgensteinian position mysterious. The point of it is easy to see in relation to language. In retrospect, we can always make a theoretical distinction between the sounds of our speech acts and the meanings the sounds did convey. But when we are actually talking there is no such gap between meaning and sound. And there cannot be a gap if we are to talk fluently. When we are really talking we are living beneath the distinction between sound and meaning. As everybody knows today, in our international multi-lingual world, the link between sound and meaning is contingent or conventional. There is some kind of gap between sound and meaning, but this gap is not bridged by a doubtful tacit presupposition nor by any kind of derivation. It is a natural order for those who know the language in question.

When we are talking, sound and meaning are fused into an integrated whole, and mostly when we are acting Is and Ought are similarly fused. We do not perceive any difference between Is and Ought (cf. chapter 2.2). Most of the time all of us have to live in this way. Otherwise, everyday life would not function. Some of the consequences of this fact are of interest and have been overlooked in earlier moral philosophy, something which I shall try to remedy.

The fact that Is and Ought are often fused do not, however, solve the kind of problems which arise if one cannot perceive an Ought which is apparent for others. Then there really is a gap. In order to see the whole of the Is-Ought problem it is necessary to get a firm grasp of both the level beneath Is and Ought and the level where the gap really exists. Wittgenstein's views do not dissolve the general Is-Ought problem. Also, contrary to Wittgenstein, it is possible to analyse the fused level and discern an underlying structure. This will be done in chapter 6.3 ("Course Generale' for Oughts"), where I unfold an analogy between Oughts and the structuralist theory of linguistic signs.

1.5 Summary

For those acquainted with the philosophers mentioned in sections 1.2 to 1.4, I hope my overview has given a good picture of what kind of ideas this book once took its departure from. For those not so acquainted, I hope the overview has functioned as some kind of minimum introduction. Whether or not my hopes are fulfilled, here comes a list of the seminal ideas presented.

I fully subscribe to Charles Taylor's idea or intuition that (1) 'facts secrete norms'. Like him, I also believe that, normally, (2) norms and evaluations may be overridden and/or undermined. That a norm (or evaluation) is overridden means that there are other norms (evaluations) in play which cancel the application of the first norm; that a norm is undermined means that there are reasons for contesting the norm as such.

To say that 'facts secrete norms' is not to say whether the step from facts to norms have anything to do with inferences and rationality. But, like Toulmin, I think such steps involve some kind of inference and some kind of rationality. In short, I think that (3) there are evaluative inferences. The distinction between deontological and teleological ethics is well-known. However, Toulmin gave it a new twist by regarding it as linked to (4) an irreversible historical development of morals.

From Urmson and Hare, we have the idea (5) that there are value-making characteristics. Such characteristics can be natural properties and relations, i.e. properties and relations which are supposed to exist in and of themselves independently of man. And these properties are taken to imply, in some sense, evaluations.

During the seventies and the eighties, the concept of supervenience has been a debated concept, especially in North American philosophy. Hare, however, used the concept already in the early fifties, and in relation to ethics. The American discussion has focused on ontology in general. A sixth idea is (6) that both uses of the concept of supervenience are relevant for the Is-Ought problem.

From Searle we get the idea (7) that some social or institutional facts have a peculiar character which makes it possible to derive an Ought from an Is in quite another way than is done by means of value-making characteristics.

Apel put forward the idea (8) that some norms are absolute presuppositions even for having an Is at all, and from Wittgenstein we take the idea (9) that inevitably, there is a level where Is and Ought are fused.
Chapter 2

NORMS, VALUES AND VIRTUES

In chapter 1 I talked of 'norms' in two senses, in a wide determinable or genus sense (Ought, with a capital O) and in a narrow determinate or species sense (ought). The opposite of the determinable 'norm' is fact. When 'norm' is taken as a determinate, the opposite is value. In order to discuss the 'genus gap' between facts (Is) and norms (Oughts), we have to take a look also at the 'species gaps', i.e. the gap between facts and norms in the narrow sense on the one hand and the gap between facts and values on the other. Furthermore, I shall argue, we have to distinguish and discuss two species of values, values which are connected with recommendations and values which are not. The former I shall call just values (or, when needed, values in the narrow sense), the latter I shall call virtues.

Very often one and the same term conveys both a genus concept and a species concept. The distinctions just introduced unfold as follows:

\[
\text{Norms (Ought)} \quad \text{norms (ought)} \quad \text{values} \quad \text{virtues}
\]

2.1 The differences between norms, values, and virtues

During the last decades, Anglophone moral philosophy has witnessed a revival for the concept of virtue. To start with, however, we shall look at three common remarks upon the distinction between norms and values, which, earlier, were rather common.

First, norms do not admit of degrees whereas values do.\(^1\)

Second, norms prescribe or forbid whereas values merely recommend or disrecommend.\(^2\)

Third, norms are in ordinary language tied to concepts like \textit{ought}, \textit{permit}, \textit{prohibit}, and \textit{duty}, whereas values are tied to concepts like \textit{good}, \textit{bad}, \textit{virtuous}, and \textit{evil}. There are also, as remarked by von Wright, concepts which have a 'foothold' in both camps. He mentions the concepts of \textit{right}, \textit{wrong}, and \textit{justice}, and writes: "The three concepts mentioned can be understood in a 'legal' sense which seems to be purely normative. But they can also be understood in a moral sense which relates them to ideas of good and evil and therewith make them value-tinged".\(^3\)

The first remark is, taken literally, plain false. If we look at the ordinary concept of norm, obviously, norms, like values, admit of degrees. A moral norm is one thing, a legal another, and norms of etiquette a third thing, and these different kinds of norms have different degrees of obligation. Most people, I think, may claim that, sometimes, one is morally obliged to do more than one is legally obliged to do, and that legal obligations rank higher than etiquette rules. I am not saying that this is always the case. You may live in a society which you regard as perfect, and where you regard moral and legal obligations as identical; or you may live in a society which you think is so morally corrupt that you regard your rules of etiquette as, in a conflict, superior to the legal order. My point none the less remains: norms do admit of degrees. This is also shown by the fact that terms like 'supererogation' and 'emergency law' would not make sense if we did not admit the existence of a norm hierarchy.

In order to understand why norms, mistakenly, has been conceived of as not admitting of degrees, we should look at a whole communication situation. Assume a person, A, to be the vehicle of the norms, and another person, B, the one who A tells the norms. Now, whether or not A says (i) 'You are morally forbidden to kill', (ii) 'You are legally forbidden to steal', (iii)

\(^2\) Ibid. pp 90-95.
'You ought not to put the knife in your mouth', B has to decide whether to say 'yes' or 'no', i.e. he has to decide whether to act or not to act in accordance with the norm put forward. In this sense there are no degrees. B cannot say 'Yes, to some degree'. But if A says 'This is a good thing to do' or 'It is better to do this than that', then B has not to say 'yes' or 'no'. He can really say: 'To some extent I find it good'.

If both norms and values take degrees, as I maintain, then the question arises if not the distinction between norms and values is in itself a matter of degree. I shall show that in one sense it is a matter of degree, in another it is not.

Norms are always explicitly related to actions, but values are not. It is actions, not things or states of affairs, that are obligatory, permitted, or prohibited. Duties are always duties of action. Values may be ascribed to actions, but also to a lot of other things. One may talk of good persons, good societies, good things, good instruments, good bodily organs, good faculties, good machines, good animals, good food, good states of affairs, and so on.

Logically, 'good' is a predicate, although grammatically it is used attributively or adjectivally. When we say that a thing is good we are logically predicating. When we are making a normative statement, on the other hand, we do not predicate. A normative statement is both logically and grammatically in the imperative mood; it prescribes or forbids actions. Beneath this logic and linguistic difference between norms and values, however, there are similarities. Let us look at R.M. Hare's well-known analysis. According to him, the function of 'good' is to commend. This function, he claims, is built into the word itself, and it is constant. Here comes two quotations from Hare:

To teach what makes a member of any class a good member of the class is indeed a new lesson for each class of objects; but nevertheless the word 'good' has a constant meaning which, once learnt, can be understood no matter what class of objects is being discussed.4

I have said that the primary function of the word 'good' is to commend. We have, therefore, to inquire what commending is. When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order, at least indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people's, now or in the future.5

Hare claims that evaluations are always related to possible actions. An evaluation does not prescribe, but it does recommend a range of actions; commend and recommend are here more or less synonymous. It guides, says Hare, our choices. This, I agree, is often the case. But not always. There is another function of good which need not even indirectly be related to choices and possible actions. When we say that someone has a good memory, we are not saying that someone, if possible, should choose to have such a memory. We are saying that the memory functions well compared with other memories. For the moment, however, we shall disregard this way of using 'good', which is connected with virtues, and continue to look at recommendations.

Norms are tied to or are identical with prescriptions. Positive values are tied to the concept of good, and this concept, in turn, is (often) tied to recommendations. Recommendations obviously take degrees. You can make a strong recommendation, an ordinary recommendation, or a weak recommendation. Therefore, the question whether there is a difference in kind between norms and (values as) recommendations seems to amount to the question whether there is a gulf between weak prescriptions and very strong recommendations.

A recommendation, even a very strong one, leaves a person with a free choice, whereas a prescription tries to bind or constrain a person. Prescriptions and recommendations are connected the way a positive scale is connected with a negative scale. A body may be positively electrically charged or it may be negatively electrically charged. The positive charge may be infinitely small, and so may the negative charge. In that sense they shade off into another, but the difference remains. A positively charged body is repelled by another positively charged body, but attracted by a negatively charged one. And vice versa. In a similar sense, I maintain, there is a zero point which differentiates prescriptions from

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5 Ibid. p 127.
recommendations. This means that norms and values are distinct species or natural kinds of Oughts, but that they none the less continuously shade off into each other.

In this connection one should also notice the existence of something I would like to call contrary-to-preference imperatives (in analogy with R. Chisholm's term 'contrary-to-duty imperative', cf. section 6.1 p 73). Think of recommendations to the effect that if you do not follow a specific recommendation, this recommendation will, in the near future, be turned into a prescription (often with some connected punishments). A good example is afforded by government interference in wage negotiations in countries like Sweden and Great Britain. Often, a government recommends trade unions and employers' associations to keep a wage raise within a certain limit, at the same time making it quite clear that if the recommendation is not followed, then, with all probability, the government will intervene and legislate about the wages. In this way a very strong recommendation is on the brink of becoming a prescription; and it becomes a prescription if people do not prefer to follow the recommendation. Modern parents are often using contrary-to-preference imperatives when they want their children to be helpful. In a sense contrary-to-preference imperatives are something in-between prescriptions and recommendations, but, nonetheless, they presuppose the distinction between prescriptions and recommendations and they make up a specific species of Ought which will not be discussed in this book.

If nobody simply could not act contrary to a specific norm, then that norm would be pointless. The same, of course, goes for recommendations. We would neither have prescriptions nor recommendations if we did not regard ourselves as beings who can act in different ways in ordinary situations. Prescriptions and recommendations both guide actions, but they do it in different ways.

The prescription-recommendation scale also extends to and connects up with the disrecommend-prohibition scales. The question we have to ask ourselves here, is whether this continuum from absolute prescriptions to absolute prohibitions covers all kinds of moralities. I think, as noted above, that contrary-to-preference imperatives is such an exception, but there is another kind as well. Moreover, one that must be taken into account in the context at hand.

Prescriptions and recommendations are something which we choose to follow or not to follow, sometimes after an act of deliberation. In so far as morals are restricted to norms and values (in the narrow sense) morals are focused on choice and decisions. But there are other kinds of moral orders. Some cultures are dominated by the kind of system Rom Harré calls "honour moralities". He maintains, and I agree, that moral philosophy in this century has neglected moral orders where choice and decisions are unimportant. In an honour morality one is not regarded as a person who chooses the code, chooses to be, say, a gentleman or an aristocrat. The problem is not 'Shall I opt for the prescribed or the recommended action?', but 'How shall I do what is required?'. To be a gentleman is to live up to the norms for gentlemen; there is no question of choosing to be either a gentleman or a bad guy.

In an honour morality there are neither prescriptions nor recommendations in the ordinary sense. The concept of good at work in such moralities comes close to the concept of good used when we say that someone has a good memory. In this case 'good' does not primarily recommend since there is no option. We have the kind of memory we have. 'Good' can have a proper application outside any context of decision. Contrary to Hare's analysis and contrary to the second claim about norms and values referred to at the beginning of this subchapter, all values are not tied to recommendations. When we are discussing functions and functional wholes (e.g. how the memory functions) we can speak of goodness (meaning functioning well) even if there are no possible options, choices or decisions. This brings us to the concepts of virtue and aretē.

According to Philippa Foot, virtues have two features. Virtues are (1) "in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of his fellows" and virtues are (2) "corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good". Some modern

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7 This criticism was put forward by Philippa Foot already in *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Blackwell: Oxford 1978, chapter 1.
8 Ibid. p 3.
9 Ibid. p 8.
philosophers have not noted this duality in our concept of virtue. John Casey, in his recent book *Pagan Virtue*, puts all his emphasis on the first ingredient and says that "virtues were those dispositions of character that enabled man to live good and happy lives"\textsuperscript{10}, whereas Franz Brentano a century ago put his emphasis on the second ingredient and said that "Virtues are moral dispositions that are preserved in the face of strong counter-motives (temptations)"\textsuperscript{11}

The complexity in the concept of virtue noted by Foot is to be found already in Aristotle's concept of *areté* when applied to man, but only to man. According to Aristotle, a thing is virtuous when it has a disposition to fulfil its function well. A virtuous knife is a sharp knife. Since a knife lacks consciousness it cannot be exposed to temptations to become dull, and, consequently, its virtuousness has nothing at all to do with choice and decision. In the case of man, however, virtue is more complex.

Man can deliberate and man may be tempted to perform vicious actions. Aristotle does not have a deterministic view of man. Nonetheless he does not oppose the causality at work in non-living beings with a free-floating free will. Kant's gulf between a causality of nature and a causality of freedom is not be found in Aristotle. The clue to the Aristotelian concept of the virtuous man is the concept of habit or *habitual decision* (*hexis*). An action based on a habitual decision is neither deterministic nor spontaneous. It contains a fusion of causality of nature and causality of freedom.

In contradistinction to tools, plants and animals, man can wilfully deviate from or conform to his *areté*, but the *areté*, the virtue does not reside in the will's power to resist temptations. It is a disposition formed by habit. And since it is a habit, it is only by learning, education, and training that a man can become virtuous. In the long run one may wilfully change one's habits and become virtuous or vicious, but in the short run virtue does not consist in a good will.

The moral hero in Kantian and Protestant ethics is the man in which, after a hard fight between strongly felt temptations and a morally (Kant) and a religiously (Protestantism) motivated free will, respectively, the will wins a victory. The temptations, of course, are temptations away from the moral law and God's commandments. Aristotle's virtuous man, on the other hand, is the one who is seldom tempted and when tempted, still the same, out of habit resists the temptations. Really, two different pictures. Aristotelian virtue at one and the same time accepts and neglects choices and decisions. Virtue in this sense is what is honoured in the kind of systems Harré calls honour moralities.

Our modern culture has not been dominated by an honour morality, but it has always contained honour moralities as some kind of sub-moralities. As Harré writes:

> It is worth reminding ourselves that whatever may be the official morality of contemporary society, honour moralities are very much part of the fabric of modern life. The moral order obtaining amongst British football fans involves just such a morality.\textsuperscript{12}

An honour or virtue morality need not be an unquestioned morality, and systems of prescriptions (norm morality) and systems of recommendations (value morality) may be unquestioned. The distinctions I am now working out are independent of the distinction between fallible and infallible systems. The important difference at the moment is that both norms and values, both prescriptions and recommendations, are intimately connected with a concept of choice and *deliberated decisions*, whereas virtues and honour moralities are as intimately connected with a concept of *habitual decisions*.

A recommendation which does not presuppose agency and deliberated decisions is pointless and no real recommendation. In the same way ordinary laws, the ten commandments of the Bible, and other prescriptions and obligations presupposes open decisions. Without a potential law-breaker laws are not real laws. In an honour morality, on the other hand, there is agency but no stress on deliberations. There are people who out of habit are good or bad. We should distinguish three kinds of moralities related in the following way:

A norm is a prescription, and prescriptions aim at binding open decisions. A value statement, on the other hand, leaves, when it functions as a recommendation, the corresponding decision free. However, when a value statement picks out a virtue, i.e. when it honours some character, then open decisions are just left out of account. It is important to note, that, in virtue ethics, free decisions are not denied as they are in modern deterministic world views. Virtue talk is, even today, Aristotelian in the sense that one does not care about an opposition between free will/choice/spontaneity on the one hand and external determination on the other. The distinction is either not seen at all, as in pre-modern cultures, or it is bypassed, as in much everyday modern life.

The reader who has problems with understanding what an honour morality really looks like, might perhaps think of quarrels with someone with which they have lived together. Often such quarrels are about characters. The point which both parties try to drive home is that the other one is not a good person, or, at least, not as good as the speaker. Lurking in the background is the view that since the other is not a good person there are reasons to leave. If the derogated character would be assumed to depend merely upon an open act of will, the quarrel would follow another pattern. It is essential for a lot of family quarrels that there really are character traits.

In *After Virtue* MacIntyre introduced a concept of 'moral character'. I said a few words about it already in chapter one. In a moral character, according to MacIntyre, role and personality is fused, which means that the role cannot be looked upon as freely chosen. Furthermore, he says:

Characters have one other notable dimension. They are, so to speak, the moral representatives of their culture and they are so because of the way in which moral and metaphysical ideas and theories assume through them an embodied existence in the social world. **Characters** are the masks worn by moral philosophies.13

MacIntyre's thoughts are connected with Harré's. Although MacIntyre does not use the concept of honour morality himself, I would say that a moral character is a social role with an honour morality. Our time, says MacIntyre, are dominated by three moral characters, the Rich Aesthete, the Manager and the Therapist. All of them seemingly deny the moral dimension, but all of them puts an honour on this denial. In this sense they none the less embody an honour morality. The aristocrat and the gentleman are other kinds of moral characters.

The one who conforms to a moral character is regarded as a virtuous person. MacIntyre wants to rehabilitate the notion of virtue. Similarly, in her book *General Ethics*, Agnes Heller makes a distinction between commandments or imperative norms on the one hand and virtue norms on the other.14 She does not really work her distinction out, but I think virtue norms are norms essentially connected with moral characters. A virtue norm, then, is a norm saying what is honourable in a moral character.

Where, now, are virtues and virtue norms to be placed on the prescription-recommendation scale earlier spoken of? The answer is simple: Nowhere. The reason is that virtues, as noted, lies outside the sphere of short run choice and deliberated decisions. Virtue ethics is not a kind of ethics which can be situated in-between prescriptions and recommendations. There is though another relevant scale. Virtues are habits, but there are strong and weak habits. I have so far treated habit as if it could be represented by a classificatory concept, but this is not the case. Habits admit of degrees. One may talk about a scale of 'habitivty' in relations to

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decisions. On such a scale, completely determined behaviour constitute the limit at one of the ends, and the open decisions of prescriptions and recommendations constitute the other end. Prescriptions and recommendations have to be placed in the same point on this scale.

So much about the first two remarks made at the beginning of this section, namely (1) that norms do not admit of degrees whereas values do, and (2) that norms prescribe whereas values recommend. In the remaining remark it was claimed (3) that some concepts are tied to norms (ought, permit, prohibit, duty), some to values (good, bad, virtuous, evil), and that some are tied to both norms and values (right, wrong, justice). Obviously, all uses of the corresponding words do not conform to this neat partition. Often the two expressions 'This is a good thing to do' and 'You ought to do this' are synonymous. The word ought is sometimes used in order to make a very strong recommendation. Hare himself, by the way, has argued that the word ought can be used in such a way that it does the work done both by 'good' and by 'right'.

In the third remark it is claimed that the concepts right, wrong and justice does not quite fit a partition into norm-concepts and value-concepts. The former concepts, von Wright says, have a 'foothold' in both camps, but he never explains what his metaphor really means. This I shall try to do now. Of course, it may mean only that these concepts sometimes take on the normative sense and sometimes the value sense. 'This is the right thing to do' may sometimes be taken as a recommendation and sometimes as a prescription. However, this is not the whole truth.

Linguistically, norms are imperatives whereas values are predicates. 'Just', 'right' and 'wrong' are similar to values in that they are predicates, but unlike other value predicates they are predicates connected to systems of imperatives. The man who is just issues good imperatives, and the man who acts rightly acts in accordance with some norms. The former orders that things should be distributed in a certain way, or that somebody should be punished in a certain way. Justice is essentially connected with distribution and retribution, and both of these require imperatives.

A man who conforms to a norm and acts rightly is sometimes regarded a good and virtuous man, which explains why 'right' is connected with both norms and values. But, it should also be noted, this is not always the case. In many normative systems, rule-following is not a good-making characteristic. You have no reason to be proud because you drive on the right side of the road, and you have no reason to be proud because you are not going around killing people. The corresponding rule-breaking would devalue the agent, but the rule-following is reward-neutral. If you conform to a religious or a legal norm you are not virtuous. "There is", to quote Agnes Heller, "no merit in merely performing an obligation."

Norms and values are often connected, connections which will be further analysed in section 2.3. In the next section, 2.2, we shall focus attention on some neglected similarities between norms and values.

2.2 Good-making, norm-making, and authority-making characteristics

There has been a large discussion around the concept of good-making characteristics, but nothing similar seems to have occurred around any analogous concept connected to norms. Good-making characteristics are value-making characteristics in both the determinable and determinate sense of value, which means that the concept also implicitly contains a concept of virtue-making characteristics. Why, there is really reason to ask, has there been no discussion of norm-making characteristics? My answer is that there ought to have been a similar discussion, and, in a sense, that, contrary to appearance, there has been such a discussion.

The discussion of good-making characteristics has taken place within analytic philosophy, and in this tradition there is no corresponding discussion of norm-making characteristics. In analytic philosophy the focus has been on the linguistic moral judgement, and the corresponding discussions may well be described as linguistic phenomenology. In the so-called phenomenological movement, on the other hand, focus has rather been on the moral

15 Ibid. p 186-87.
experience or the moral perception. And within moral phenomenology there are two sub-traditions. One is concerned with values and the other with norms. The two main figures in the value tradition are Franz Brentano and Max Scheler. But it is the norm tradition with its stress on the 'ethical demand' which is of interest now. The main figure in this tradition is probably the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Husserl himself, though, will afford us a quotation where he makes the point I am interested in.

Should a mother make such reflections about the highest practical good, and first of all make considerations?! This whole ethics about the highest practical good, as it was derived by Brentano and accepted by me, cannot be the last word. Essential delimitations are needed! Vocation and inner vocation do not here come out truly. There is an unconditional 'You ought and have to' directed at the person, and the one who experiences this absolute affection does not regard it as put under a rational justification and not as being dependent on the binding force of such a justification. This affection is prior to all rational analysis, even when analysis is possible. "I should give up myself if I acted otherwise", "I would never forgive myself", this is what justification sounds like here. "The well-being of the child is my well-being" is not the proper representation; it is above my well-being; I can neglect my own well-being, but not that of my child. The well-being of the child has been entrusted to me, and I am responsible for it; I am "absolutely demanded" to help it.

Husserl points out that some perceptions put, so to speak, an 'ethical demand' on us. From a phenomenological point of view, there is a duty out in the world which we register just as we register things and properties. Much writing in the latter decades about female ethics and caring has tried to bring home the same point. When, for instance, you see your little newborn child or a close friend crying there is no mere fact of neutral crying, there is in the perception itself a demand and a duty saying 'Help me!'. Such a demand need not be backed by any rational, religious, or transcendental arguments. The natural properties of the situation itself are demanding. They are norm-making characteristics in the same way as natural properties can be good-making characteristics.

Once noticed, it is a trivial fact that everyday perception can contain norms in the same way as they can contain perceptions of goodness. Often we perceive actions and things as if they had a property of goodness inhering in them. Whether such goodness should be regarded as a psychological projection or not, it is a non-disputable fact that we often perceive goodness as a quality inhering in an object independently of us. And, to repeat, the same is true of norms.

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18 Unpublished manuscript quoted from J. Bengtsson's paper, op. cit. p 19.

19 See in particular Nel Noddings, Caring. A feminine approach to ethics and moral education, University of California Press: Berkely 1984. She says (p 82) "Now I am suggesting that the "I must" arises directly and prior to considerations of what it is that I might do."
To perceive duties in the world is phenomenologically no more mysterious than to hear someone saying "It is your duty ...". The question is rather why this perceptual fact has been neglected in analytic philosophy?

In the context of moral linguistic judgements, no one can miss the obvious difference between the predicative form 'This is good' and the imperative form 'Do this!'. The first utterance refers to the world. It pretends to say something about the world; it does not tell us anything about the person making the statement. The second utterance, on the other hand, seems to have a closer connection with the speaker than with the world. In the first case it is easy to abstract the speaker away, but in the second it is hard to neglect that someone orders one to do something. This linguistic difference between norms and values is, however, quite compatible with the existence of the noted perceptual similarity between norms and values.

Another thing which may be misleading is the following. The question 'Why is this good?' seems to require an answer in terms of natural properties, whereas the question 'Why should I do this?' seems to require an answer in terms of authority. You should conform to the imperative because the speaker has authority to tell you what to do. As I shall show, however, there is, even here, a similarity between norms and values. Both norms and values can be connected with authority, but in the ethical end both have to be freed from it.

If there are no natural properties which make something good, then there can be no goodness at all. This seems to be one of the presuppositions behind the concept of good-making characteristics. But I think this presupposition is not true without qualification. Let us try to see whether in some sense there can be goodness without any good-making characteristics.

Good-making characteristics are referred to when a claim that something is good is questioned. Look at the following little conversation:

- These apples are good!
- Why?
- Because they are ripe, of good shape, without blemish, and so on (cf. Urmson on grade-making characteristics, p 7f).

Suppose now that someone questions these criteria and, again, asks why. Why are apples which are ripe, of good shape and without blemish good apples? One possible answer is that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries says so. The ascription of goodness is then backed, not by good-making characteristics, but by an authority.

The next possible question is 'Why is the Ministry an authority in matters of good apples?'. Let us try to analyse this question a little. When we say that someone or something is an authority we are logically predicating, but authority seems not to be a property on par with being red, being large or being angry. The concept of authority behaves rather like the concept of goodness. An authority needs some properties which make him an authority, but being an authority cannot be reduced to having these properties, which means that these properties function as authority-making characteristics. Being an authority supervenes (cf. below section 4.2) on some other properties. If two persons or two institutions have exactly the same properties in the same kind of situation, then if one is regarded an authority then the other has also to be so regarded.

The concept of authority-making characteristics helps us to bring out another similarity between values and norms. Both can be backed by authority.

Values and norms can appear non-verbally in perceptions and verbally in communication situations. We shall now take a look at situations where an authority (the Ought-sender) tells someone (the Ought-receiver) that something is good or that something ought to be done. In a speech act which contains a predication of goodness, the Ought-receiver receives a recommendation. He may very well ask what makes the Ought-sender an authority, but since the Ought is only a recommendation the question what makes the sender an authority need not to be taken too seriously. However, when a speech act contains a prescription things become different. The stronger a prescription is, the more important is the question why one should accept the authority of the Ought-sender. Authority-making characteristics are more important in relation to norms than in relation to values. That is the difference. But in both cases there can be authority-making characteristics.

The last question about authority brings us to the border between philosophy and sociology. And at the border we find one of the grand sociologists, Max Weber. Here is one of his classical statements about authority:
A system of authority can legitimately assume validity in the eyes of those subject to it in a variety of ways: a) by tradition ... b) by virtue of emotional attachment ... c) by virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value ... d) because of a form of positive proclamation whose legality is recognized as being beyond questioning.20

In sociology much has been written about power and authority since Weber, but, in my opinion, there has been no real improvement on this abstract classification of sources of authority. There is, however, more to be said, and I shall myself later on (see appendix to this section) try to elucidate some dark spots in Weber's thoughts.

Authority in general, not only valid (cf. the quotation) authority, can, I maintain, analytically have only four sources or four different kinds of authority-making characteristics:

(1) power,
(2) tradition,
(3) factual knowledge,
(4) trust (or, authority by induction).

These kinds of authority-making characteristics have the same kind of relation to most actual authority systems as particular tones have to melodies. Each authority system is a Gestalt quality which in different ways combines, fuses, and concretizes the different abstract authority-making characteristics.

I shall say a few words about each of the four authority dimensions listed. For sake of brevity, I will mostly speak only of norm authorities. A generalization to value and virtue authorities creates no problem.

Pure and naked power (1) creates conformity to norms by means of rewards and punishments as well as prospects of rewards and threats of punishment. The function of 'ought' is, when backed by power, not only to prescribe but also to threat and promise. Legal norms are obviously connected with punishment, but so are etiquette rules and a lot of other more or less conventional rules. They are backed by an informal kind of power, micro-power, we may say. If you do not follow convention you will get a mild form of punishment. You will suffer shame and contempt.

Punishment may be more or less severe, i.e. punishment takes degrees, which underlines the fact that norms takes degrees. We have a scale going from jail, via fines to social degradation; all three of which allow further degrees.

How can norms be accepted when kept totally distinct from power? In the case of tradition (2), the answer is that norms can lack connection with punishment since actions other than the prescribed ones are unthinkable. In order to understand this remark, however, one has to keep tradition distinct from conservatism, which is an argued defence of tradition. Conservatism gives reasons against competing alternatives, real tradition does not. Confronted with Enlightenment's and the French revolution's concept of reason, Edmund Burke argued that societies are such complicated nature grown organisms, that we cannot, on pain of catastrophe, but rely on tradition.

Relying on tradition in the sense a conservative does, is something quite different from relying on tradition in the sense here at issue. Here it means never ever having been confronted with an alternative. A real traditional society can be compared with an absolutely monolingual community. In such a community the distinction between meaning and sound is almost impossible to draw. When the inhabitants for the first time meet another language, the other language will probably not appear as a language at all. It will sound as mere noice. We should remember that the Greek word for foreigner, 'barbarian', originally meant someone who babbles, i.e. someone who does not really have a language. In a similar sense a community can rely on tradition. When its inhabitants meet another community with other norms, these norms will probably not, at first, appear as norms at all. The norms of the foreigners appear unthinkable, and therefore not as norms. The norms of 'the other' represents merely curious behaviour, if not absolute perversity. Probably, not even the norms of the

domestic society itself appears as norms. They merely represent the way things are done and always have been done; they represent the one and only natural order.

*Norms backed by real tradition do not, from the inside, appear as norms.* There are, of course, also weaker senses of tradition. You may belong to a subculture confronted with the alternatives of the other subcultures, but still not regard them as really thinkable alternatives. One may speak of degrees of 'traditionality'.

As philosophers living today, I do not think we have to take this kind of authority-making characteristic into account in justificatory contexts, even though I think tradition plays a significant role in informal moral orders also in our very non-traditional societies.

When norms are instrumental, i.e. the corresponding imperatives are hypothetical, one may turn persons or institutions into authorities because one knows, or merely believes, that the person or institution in question has more knowledge than oneself has. He/she/it is therefore able to put forward norms which will improve one's egoistic or group-egoistic interests better than oneself is able to do. The essence of conservatism, for instance, is that tradition contains implicit or tacit factual knowledge which we have better rely on. In cases like these, power is not needed to back norms, knowledge is enough. Factual knowledge (3) can, however, be an authority-making characteristic only when the instrumental norms put forward by the authority are instrumental in relation to the goals of those who accept the authority.

Factual knowledge may take degrees; an authority can know more or less about things. This means that authorities which have authority because of their factual knowledge may be ranked as better or worse. Even here, as in the two cases above, we find in the authority-making characteristic a basis for the fact that norms can take degrees. The more knowledge the stronger the prescription.

Let us now compare (presumed or real) normative knowledge with factual knowledge. In the case of normative knowledge, norms are looked upon as proved valid independently, not only of any power structure, but also valid independently of all tradition and all individual interests. Kant's deontological ethical system affords us one kind of presumed normative knowledge, 'ethical demand' philosophies another.

As I understand Kant's categorical imperative, it is meant as an objective principle on a par with logical and mathematical principles. His categorical imperative is formal and *a priori* and regarded as impossible to contest. The one who does not accept duty for duty's sake is illogical. It is, according to Kant, no more possible, or equally possible, to neglect the categorical imperative, than it is possible to neglect the laws of logic. In both cases neglect means inconsistency. Therefore, rational beings can neglect neither logic nor real duty. It is in the nature of rational beings to think and act out of respect for logic and duty, respectively.

An ethical system like Kant's has, somewhat surprisingly, a feature in common with real tradition. In both cases alternative norms are just unthinkable. Of course, alternative norms are unthinkable in Kantian ethics in another way than alternative norms are unthinkable in a real traditional society, but the similarity is there nonetheless.

It is persons and institutions who can have power, can transmit tradition, and can have factual knowledge. Therefore, it is persons and institutions who become authorities by means of the first three kinds of authority-making characteristics. But what about the categorical imperative and 'ethical demands'? The categorical imperative is a kind of objective law, and an 'ethical demand' a property of a situation. Neither is in the relevant sense a property of persons or institutions. Of course, knowledge of the categorical imperative and knowledge of an 'ethical demand' is something that persons and institutions may have. And such knowledge is normative knowledge, but it does not function the way factual knowledge functions. Normative knowledge, I shall argue, cannot, in contradistinction to factual knowledge, be an authority-making characteristic.

When factual knowledge functions as an authority-making characteristic, there exists at least one goal common to the authority (the norm-social) and the norm-receiver. The knowledge in question is used as a means to promote this goal. Whether or not the goal is attained can be seen independently of the means used. Therefore, the receiver can check that his interests are furthered even when he himself does not have, or can grasp, the knowledge the authority has. Such a check, however, is impossible in the case of normative knowledge. The categorical imperative or an 'ethical demand' has by definition no reference to anything outside themselves. Either one grasps the norm and recognizes the duty, or one does not. If one does not, and acts on the norm, one conforms for some non-normative reason. One may
conform because of power, tradition, or because it is in one's interest to conform. When one conforms because of normative knowledge, authority and authority-making characteristics are both superfluous and irrelevant.

In order to find a connection between normative knowledge and authority-making characteristics, we have to introduce what might be called 'authority by induction'. The categorical imperative is, as I have said, on a par with logical and mathematical truths. Let us therefore look at mathematical authority. Either you can follow a proof for a mathematical theorem or you cannot. In the latter case you can either refuse to believe in the theorem or you can trust a mathematical authority. Such a trust may have arisen through induction. With regard to some simpler mathematical truths you can check your authority, and because of that you can decide to trust him also in more complicated cases. We have 'authority by induction'. Obviously, such induction may be possible also with regard to normative knowledge - if there is such knowledge.

The last kind of authority-making characteristic mentioned in the list above was trust (4); and trust means here the same as authority by induction. Such induction is possible in relation to normative knowledge, but normative knowledge cannot in itself be an authority-making characteristic.

The philosopher who most clearly has, in his own way, made the last point is Kant. As Kant himself emphasizes, his system is a system for autonomous rational beings. A person lacking Mündigkeit cannot possibly be moral, just as a person lacking in intellectual capacity cannot understand complex mathematics. Either you can grasp normative knowledge, which means that you are your own moral authority, or you cannot, which means that you do not act out of normative knowledge but out of belief in an authority.

As I have used the concept of normative knowledge, knowledge of both value-making and norm-making characteristics is related to normative knowledge. Kant's presumed transcendental proof of his categorical imperative would, if valid, be a norm-making characteristic. In 'ethical demand' philosophies, on the other hand, it is natural properties which are norm-making. The same goes for all theories about good-making or value-making characteristics.

Ethical intuitionists, value theorists within the phenomenological tradition, and transcendentalists, all of them presuppose that values and norms are something in themselves, and that there is some kind of knowledge of values and norms. In intuitionism and phenomenology, normative knowledge is regarded as similar to empirical knowledge, and natural properties regarded as value-making and norm-making; in transcendentalism normative knowledge is regarded as similar to logical and mathematical knowledge, and it is not connected with natural properties.

The distinction I have made between authority-making characteristics on the one hand and norm-making and value-making characteristics (i.e. different kinds of Ought-making characteristics) on the other, does not, it should be noted, rule out the possibility that one specific characteristic which by some is regarded as norm-making or value-making may, by others, be regarded as merely authority-making. Naked power, for instance, is mostly regarded as only an authority-making characteristic. Nietzsche, however, I would say, treated power as a good-making characteristic.

Appendix: Weber on authority

In this appendix I shall try to use my fourfold classification of authority-making characteristics to shed light on some traditional concepts of authority. I shall comment upon Max Weber's famous writings. First of all, however, I shall say a few words about religious authority.

God is usually assumed to be both omnipotent and omniscient, and since he is also assumed to be good ('omnigood'), he is assumed to further your interest. His omniscience works in your favour. He is the most powerful combination of power and knowledge one can imagine. The close relationship that power and knowledge have with authority, is reflected in the common distinction between being authoritarian and being authoritative. The authoritarian person tries to be an authority by relying on power, whereas the authoritative person relies on
knowledge. In the traditional Judaeo-Christian concept of God these two concepts are indisputably fused.

Another interesting feature of religious normativity is to be found in the following old theologian dilemma: Are the ten commandments good because God ordered them? or, Did God order the ten commandments because they prescribe good actions? Put in a more Kantian way: Can God create moral laws or is he subjected to objective moral laws which exist independently of him? If he has to follow moral laws, then he should be an authority by induction. Trust would be the authority-making characteristic. Essential to religious authority, I would say, is that it hides this problem. As tones are hidden in a melody.

God on earth, the church, gets its authority from being transmitter of God's power, factual knowledge, and normative knowledge. Here, of course, tradition enters the picture, too. Religion usually relies on all four authority-making characteristics.

Now to Max Weber. There is an unresolved problem in his writings about action, power and authority. He said that "social conduct may be determined in any one of the following four ways":21

A1. traditional conduct ("traditionales Handeln");
A2. emotional conduct ("affektuelles Handeln");
A3. goal-oriented conduct ("zweckrationales Handeln").
A4. value-related conduct ("wertrationales Handeln").

He also listed four ways in which "a system of authority can legitimately assume validity in the eyes of those subject to it":22

B1. tradition;
B2. emotional attachment;
B3. legality;
B4. rational belief in an absolute value.

Furthermore, he also made a threefold distinction of authority (or dominance; the German Herrschaft).23 He distinguished between:

C1. traditional authority;
C2. charismatic authority;
C3. rational authority.24

The problem is how to get a coherent picture of the relationships between these three groups of distinctions. The order in each group is my order, not Weber's. I have listed them in such a way that the prima facie connection comes out at once. A1, B1 and C1 belong together, and so on.

Traditional conduct (A1) is conduct which one has been accustomed to by long practice. In itself such conduct does not necessarily imply that what has always existed is regarded as valid (B1), although this is often the case. Weber did not distinguish between what I termed real tradition, i.e. mere lack of thinkable alternatives, and an explicit adherence to tradition. In the latter case there is a commandment saying "Ye shall always do things the ways ye have always done them". This commandment can either be placed in a context where it is argued that ones interests are furthered by relying on tradition, or it can be taken as stating an absolute value. Either we have goal-oriented conduct (A3) or value-oriented conduct (A4).

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21 Ibid. p 59.
22 Ibid. p 81.
23 The French sociologist Raymond Aron has argued that 'dominance' is a better translation of Herrschaft than 'authority', see Sociologiskt tänkande vol. 2 p 242-43. I think, however, that authority works just as well as dominance. The problem arises since the definite meaning varies depending on what dimension of authority/dominance you are talking about.
If (real) traditional conduct (A1) is kept conceptually distinct from (tradition as) goal-oriented and (tradition as) value-oriented conduct, then it cannot correspond to tradition in the sense of B1 and C1 where no distinction is made between real tradition and tradition in the weaker senses. Of course, as Weber himself made clear, there is in traditional societies a fusion of tradition with power and vested interests. I think there is also a fusion with factual knowledge. Probably, within traditional societies, it is as impossible to distinguish between power, interest and pure ethics as it is within religion. It is the outside observers (we) who make the analytic distinctions.

Emotional conduct (A2), of course, refers to actions which spring from emotions. Such conduct is not mediated by values or any kind of reasoning, and it does not spring from tradition. In order to see the connection between emotional action and emotion as validator (B2), it is important to realize that there are, phenomenologically at least, two basically different kinds of emotions. An emotion is either regarded as appearing due to the character of the object it is directed at, or it is seen as depending only on oneself as a person. Fear, for instance, sometimes belong to the first group, sometimes to the other. Sometimes you are afraid because you think there is something in the world which is a real threat, but sometimes you feel afraid without thinking there is any real threat. We should distinguish between objective and subjective emotions, respectively.

In most societies, including the ones known by Weber, subjective emotions have not been validator of norms and authorities. In order to get from A2 to B2, we (and Weber) has to think of objective emotions. In objective emotions, by definition, some properties of the object of the emotion function as, so to speak, emotion-making characteristics. When a charismatic leader becomes an authority, and, through his charisma, gets people emotionally attached to him, this attachment appears as due to specific properties. At bottom, in these cases, I think we always find the authority-making characteristics of (assumed) power, (assumed) factual knowledge which can further ones interests, and (assumed) pure moral superiority.

The charismatic leader is not, like a god, looked upon as omnipotent and omniscient, but he looks powerful and knowledgeable enough to appear as a god on earth. In charismatic authority, as in the case of both religious authority and ordinary tradition, there is a fusion of all, or most, of the aspects which I have analytically distinguished. Actually, all authority-making characteristics which I have distinguished, and different kinds of fusions of them, may be mediated by emotions. There is no reason to connect only charismatic authority with validation through emotions, nor reason to regard emotions as basic the way Weber does.

Subjective emotions are often used in a defence of moral misbehaviour. People say that they ought to be forgiven since they could not have acted otherwise because of their strong feelings. Such emotions have for a long time been used as excuses. Today, it should be noted, subjective emotions have also come to function in the opposite way. They are now often also used as a reason for a conscious choice of conduct. People in a way say that they choose to follow a subjective emotion because one ought to follow such emotions. In such cases the subjective emotion is treated as a norm-making characteristic. In the Western world, today, many people act on the norm 'You should act according to your emotions'. You are told that when you are angry at someone you ought to show it, and that if you fall in love you ought to follow your passion; and so on. This is not the kind of cases Weber had in mind when he wrote about emotional attachment (B2). Really, this modern kind of conduct belongs to the heading B4. The norm 'You should act according to your emotions' should be classified as (in Weber's sense) a rational belief in an absolute value. Reason is assumed to tell us that some subjective emotions are absolute values.

This brings us to goal-oriented conduct (A3) and value-oriented conduct (A4) and their relationships to legality (B3) and rational belief in an absolute value (B4), as well as to rational authority (C3). Around these distinctions there is in my opinion much confusion both in Weber himself, his commentators, and the general philosophical discussion. Behind the distinction between A3 and A4 there is really a four-cornered distinction. Weber, firstly, in his concept of goal-oriented action fused two concepts. An action is goal-oriented if (α) it is not in itself prescribed or forbidden but is merely a means towards a goal distinct from it, and
if (β) this goal is a subjectively chosen goal.\(^{25}\) Secondly, he fused two ideas in the concept of value-oriented action, too. An action is value-oriented if (a) it is in itself independently of context prescribed or forbidden, and (b) the prescription or prohibition is given an absolute worth.\(^ {26}\)

The two distinctions can be crossed and a four-squared matrix created:

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<th>The action is a goal in itself</th>
<th>The action is a means towards a goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The goal is subjective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The goal is of absolute worth</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weber, implicitly, treated this matrix as if only the squares number two (goal-oriented conduct) and number three (value-oriented conduct) are of interest. But that is wrong. In the second square we find all ordinary subjectively chosen means-end actions; in the third one we find categorical imperatives like the ten commandments of the Bible. Independently of situations and goals, you should not kill, you should honour your parents, and so on. Left out of account is square number one, where we find actions which are performed just for the fun of it, and square number four, which is a highly interesting square.

Suppose someone thought that he had managed to give a Kantian transcendental proof for the utility principle. He would then believe in an absolute norm that one ought to act in order to produce the greatest possible amount of pleasure or happiness in the world. It would not be duty for duty's sake but utility for duty's sake. Such a kind of absolute norm, however, would give rise to complicated means-end deliberations, which shows that means-end deliberations are not necessarily confined to subjectively chosen goals. Weber realized this in passing, but he did not let it affect his dichotomy of rational conduct. He only made the following comment:

> The decision between competing and conflicting ends and results may in turn be determined by a consideration of absolute values: in that case, such conduct is goal-oriented only in respect of the choice of means.\(^{27}\)

A system of authority which assumes validity through a rational belief in an absolute value (B4) may contain value-oriented conduct (third square) but it may also contain goal-oriented conduct (fourth square). Likewise, a system of authority which assumes validity by legality (B3) may contain both value-oriented and goal-oriented conduct. Let us take democracy as an example of validity by legality. Democracy in the modern sense (parliamentary democracy) means primarily adherence to a formal procedure. Decisions become authoritative by being made in accordance with certain rules. This fact, in a way, turns the ordinary means-end distinction upside down. Normally, the distinction is taken to imply that the end is logically prior to the means. First you have to decide what you want, then you can try to figure out how you are going to get it. In a democratic decision, however, some means are logically prior to the end. The democratic procedure itself is the means whereby one comes to know what end to pursue. When this end has been decided, then ordinary means-end thinking can start. Democracy contains at one and the same time both value-oriented conduct (towards the decision procedure) and goal-oriented conduct (towards the realization of the decision).

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\(^{25}\) Weber: 'In this instance the classification is based on the expectation that objects in the external situation or other human individuals will behave in a certain way, and by the use of such expectations as "conditions" or "means" for the successful achievement of the individual's own rationally chosen goals.' Ibid. p 59.

\(^{26}\) 'Social conduct may be classified by the conscious belief in the absolute worth of the conduct, as such, independent of any ulterior motive and measured by some such standard as ethics, esthetics or religion.' Ibid. p 59.

\(^{27}\) Ibid. p 61.
2.3 Interrelations between norms and values

Having noted the differences and the similarities between norms (i.e. norm as determinate of Ought) and values (i.e. value as a determinable for values in the narrow sense and virtues), we are in a position to say something about possible interrelationships between them, too. Let us first take a look at Kantian ethics and then a look at utilitarianism.

In Kantian ethics the normative realm is a realm of its own. Duty for duty's sake, as it is said. But the system has a place also for a concept of value, i.e. for what is good. One and only one thing can be good, the will. And the good will is, according to Kant, the will who wants to follow the moral law. This means that the property of willing-to-follow-duties is a good-making characteristic. Such a good will, however, is necessarily connected with a special kind of emotion, namely respect ("Achtung"). There is in Kant an embryonic virtue ethics beneath his duty ethics. A good man, a man to be highly valued, is a man who habitually acts out of respect for the moral law. A norm is not a property and cannot in itself be a good-making characteristic, but having respect for something can be a kind of character trait, and it can function as a good-making characteristic.

Having respect for a duty, though, it should be noted, is a curious kind of trait. Kant himself is eager to point out, rightly I think, that respect for duty is not an ordinary emotion. It is, I would say, similar to respect for logical and mathematical truths or laws. Feeling respect for a person is an ordinary kind of emotion, but respect for logical and mathematical laws seems to be another kind of human attitude. Whatever it is, however, a good logician does not violate logical laws and a good mathematician does not violate mathematical laws. A good person does not violate moral laws. Here, argument ends in a Kantian system.

In Kantian ethics, norms are logically prior to values in the same way as natural properties are logically prior to goodness in Hare's account good-making characteristics. (This notion of logical priority will be explained at length in chapter 4.) If there were no duties, no person could, according to Kant, be good and virtuous. In utilitarianism it is the other way round, values have to be regarded as logically prior to norms. Let us see why.

In Encyclopedia of Philosophy we find the following description of utilitarianism:

UTILITARIANISM can most generally be described as the doctrine which states that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by the goodness and badness of their consequences.

In another dictionary we read:

UTILITARIANISM: (a) Traditionally understood as the view that the right act is the act which, of all those open to the agent, will actually or probably produce the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness in the world at large (this is the so-called Principle of Utility).

To begin with, we can note that when utilitarianism is described there is talk, not of duties (absolutely prescribed actions) or good actions (merely recommended actions), but of right actions. However, as I said at the end of section 2.1, I think that the predicate 'right' presupposes a normative system. Here one talks of right actions because it is tacitly presupposed that the principle of utility represents a duty. Like F. Alberoni and S. Veca I think that utilitarianism has always, explicitly or implicitly, been more than a value theory and a recommendation. The principle of utility is never pictured as something one can merely choose to adhere to if one wants to.

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31 F. Alberoni & S. Veca writes: "A fundamental thought within utilitarianism is that society is obliged not to waste possible utility but to maximize it. It connects very closely the construction of a deontology, which is what
Already H. Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism needs an intuitive foundation. And C.D. Broad, in his penetrating Five Types of Ethical Theories, repeated and tried again to make Sidgwick's point clear. Utilitarianism has regarded the principle of utility as self-evident. And this it has done in the same non-reflective way as logical positivism regarded the principle of verifiability as self-evident. The principle of verifiability says that only statements which are verifiable can be regarded as meaningful, but the principle itself is not verifiable and therefore not accounted for. Empiricism cannot account for empiricism. The principle of utility says that you ought always to do a utility calculation, but the principle itself is not reached by a utility calculation and therefore not accounted for. The principle of utility cannot account for itself on pain of an infinite regress.

That utilitarianism really has been a kind of deontological ethics, not an axiological ethics, can also be seen in the following way. The utilitarian and the aesthete (as portrayed by Sören Kierkegaard in Either - Or and Oscar Wilde in The Picture of Dorian Gray) appear on the historical scene at the same time, and that seems to be no accident. Both the utilitarian and the aesthete emphasize pleasure and a secular kind of happiness. In that sense they are similar to each other and part of the same Zeitgeist. But their different relationships to ethics is just as obvious. The aesthete disavows the whole of ethics, whereas the utilitarian is a moral reformer. Take away the deontological aspect of utilitarianism, and you turn the utilitarian into an aesthete.

Utilitarianism was not a mere recommendation, but neither was it a pure Kantian deontology. It was an ethical system where values functioned as norm-making characteristics. Actually, classical utilitarianism has a three-tiered structure. There is, firstly, pleasures. These are value-making characteristics for the goodness which appears on a second level. This goodness is, in turn, a norm-making characteristic for the utility principle interpreted as a categorical imperative. In utilitarianism we find self-sufficient pleasures which are value-making and values which are norm-making; in Kantian ethics we find self-validating norms which are value-making and pleasures which in themselves are ethically irrelevant.

'Ethical demand' philosophers, as I have called them, emphasize the perceptual fact that we sometimes, so to speak, perceive a norm directly. I think much utilitarian writing should be interpreted as an effort to describe what is good in the world in such a way that the reader perceives an ethical demand to maximize pleasure or happiness. Classical hedonistic utilitarianism argued that pleasure is the fundamental good, and it argued against the norms of both tradition and religion. In this situation, I think, goodness automatically came to function as a new norm-making characteristic.

In relation to utilitarianism we have to distinguish the claim that there are only values and no duties from a position which treats values as norm-making characteristics. In the former case we get axiological utilitarianism, in the latter deontological utilitarianism. The really existing utilitarianism has not made this distinction between the utility principle as a recommendation and as a duty clear and explicit.

The distinction between norms and values has been closely connected with the distinction between deontology and axiology. As I have now used the concepts of deontology and axiology, an axiological ethical system denies the existence of categorical duties, whereas a deontological system contains at least one such duty. Deontological systems, then, can be subdivided into those where some duties are logically prior to all values, and those where some values are logically prior to all duties. Some deontological systems (Kantianism) contain value-making norms and some (utilitarianism) contain norm-making values. This complication, however, is not the only thing which has to be taken into account in order get clear ideas of deontology and axiology.

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32 The reader can also note that Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana/Collins: London 1985, p 178) says similar things about utilitarianism.

In dictionaries and introductions to moral philosophy, the concept of deontology is often not only contrasted with axiology but also with teleology.\textsuperscript{34} I have never seen the structure of this double contrast analysed, so I shall try to afford the analysis myself. One meaning of 'deontology' was captured above, where deontology was defined as a system where some duties are logically prior to all values. The other meaning of 'deontology' is that in a deontological system actions are prescribed because of their internal properties. In a teleological system, on the other hand, actions are prescribed because of their consequences, i.e. because of their external properties. This being noted, we can write down the following matrix (which, in essence, is the same matrix which, in the appendix to section 2.3, was used to shed light on Max Weber's distinction between \textit{Wertrationalität} and \textit{Zweckrationalität}):

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& DEONTOLOGICAL: & TELEOLOGICAL: & \\
& some actions are Oughts & some actions are Oughts & \\
& because of internal properties & because of external properties & \\
\hline
AXIOLOGICAL: there are only values & (1) EUDAIMONISM & (2) HEDONISM & \\
\hline
DEONTOLOGICAL: there are duties & (3) KANTIANISM & (4) UTILITARIANISM & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In squares number three and four we find the distinction already discussed between Kantianism and utilitarianism. Kantianism is doubly deontological whereas utilitarianism is both teleological and deontological. Square number one contains Aristotle's eudaimonism, which, as I interpret it, implicitly says that there are no duties, only values, and that the highest value is the happy life. Eudaimonism recommends the happy life, but does not oblige one to seek it. The happy life consists of activity in accordance with one's essence. Such activities are not means for reaching a certain end state. One is recommended to perform actions which in themselves constitute parts of the happy life.

Another duty free ethics is hedonism. But it values an action from the states it causes. Hedonism is teleological and it is the real opposite of (double) deontological ethics.\textsuperscript{35}

I shall end this subchapter with a good comment about love made by Agnes Heller. Writing about the 18th century 'moralization of sentiments' she notes that:

\begin{quote}
The norm-generating power attributed to empathy, sympathy, benevolence and the like introduces a new element into moral theory. This conception is only remotely related to the traditional injunction that you should love your neighbour and even your enemy, for, if loving is tantamount to obeying a divine commandment, then the feeling of love cannot generate such a commandment.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Love takes on different shapes in different kinds of ethical systems. It makes a lot of ethical difference whether love is perceived as a duty or as a value-making or as a norm-making characteristic.

\textsuperscript{34} Compare for instance 'axiology', 'deontological ethics' and 'axiological ethics' in the dictionary mentioned in note 24.

\textsuperscript{35} There is, besides the two senses of deontological ethics now distinguished, even a third sense in use. Sometimes non-criticisable moral system are called deontological ethics. See for instance the quotations from S. Toulmin in chapter 1 (notes 15 and 16).

2.4 Natural and artificial norms, values, and virtues

Let us compare an artificial language like Esperanto with a natural language. What is the essential difference? In an artificial language, by definition, grammar, phonemes, morphemes, and the meanings of the words are consciously constructed. What I want to stress is that such a construction has to presuppose another language. The reason is that without a pre-existing language it is impossible to have any conceptions of grammar, phonemes, morphemes, and, in particular, it is impossible to talk of meanings as distinct from but related to graphical signs and sounds. Such entities have to be discovered in an already existing language before the artificial language can be constructed. A meta-language is required, and such a language is impossible without an object language. Therefore, all languages cannot be artificial. Or, in other words, the distinction between meaning and sound/graphical sign presupposes their fusion. In order to give a certain string of letters in Esperanto meaning, another language is needed where the meaning in question if fused with a sound/graphical sign.

A natural language is by definition a language which is not intentionally created. Such a definition turns most languages, except Esperanto (I am leaving computer languages aside), into natural languages. However, there is a distinction to be made within the class of natural languages. After the discovery of grammar and the creation of a lot of language analysing concepts, the authorities in many countries have tried, and try, to master the changes of their language. All over the world people are nowadays taught proper grammar and proper meanings of words. At least in one country, Iceland, one tries to master the changes of language in order to make them conform to what is regarded as really Icelandic. New words are created and officially decreed in order to stop, for instance, English words to creep into the Icelandic language. In cases like these, one may speak of artificially promoted natural languages in contradistinction to purely natural languages. It is, of course, quite possible that an artificial language like Esperanto, once accepted, may turn into a natural language. If all speakers forget all the rules which once created the language, then the language will function exactly like a purely natural language.

The remarks now made about natural and artificial languages, have analogies in normative contexts. It is possible to distinguish between natural Oughts and artificial Oughts. On the one hand there are norms, values, and virtues which take shape in an ongoing process of communication and interchange where nobody really intentionally creates what comes to function as norms, values, and virtues, and on the other there are norms, values, and virtues which are intentionally constructed as such Oughts. Oughts in the form of legal laws and religious commandments are artificial Oughts. They are deliberately decreed as norms. Virtues, on the contrary, are often even today natural Oughts, i.e. nobody has consciously created them. Think of the honour moralities spoken of earlier (p 20). Of course some kinds of professionals, e.g. lawyers, have organisations which have consciously agreed to regard some criteria as criteria for good lawyers. But others, like the football fans, have no such explicit criteria. Mostly, I think, such virtues are codifications of already existing virtues or minor modifications of such virtues, which means that they are artificially promoted Oughts.

A purely natural moral system is a system where all Oughts are implicit, whereas an artificially promoted system is a system where there is an interplay between the moral common sense and explicit normative rules laid down by some authority. If all the rules of an explicit system are forgotten as such, but turned into implicit rules, then the artificial system has turned into a natural one. Also in this respect Oughts behave like languages.

Values and virtues are for their existence dependent upon good-making characteristics. Perceptually, they are mostly fused with their good-making characteristics. Since perception is prior to thought, this fusion is prior to the analytical distinction between values and virtues on the one hand and good-making characteristics on the other. This, in turn, means that artificial values and virtues can only be created by someone who can distinguish values and virtues from their good-making characteristics. In order to create an artificial language one must be able to distinguish meaning from pure graphical signs. Before man discovered the distinction between meaning and sign, Esperanto could not have been invented. Similarly, in order to create an artificial value or virtue one must be able to distinguish between values/virtues and facts. The construction consists in relating values and virtues to kinds of behaviour and kinds of actions. Therefore, all Oughts cannot be artificial. Before artificial value and virtue systems can be proposed, there has to be some natural values and virtues.
That is true both for societies and individuals. In order to understand the general words 'ought', 'good', and 'virtuous' one has first to learn specific natural Oughts.

All languages which have recourse to the general words 'ought', 'good', and 'virtuous' contain the possibility to construct artificial Oughts. If all Oughts, then, in such a language are artificially reconstructed what remains of the claim that all Oughts cannot be artificial? Having reached an understanding of the general words is perhaps like having climbed a roof with a ladder. The ladder was necessary for reaching the roof but can be thrown away if we are determined to stay on the roof. When we have made and understood the distinction between Is and Ought, are we then not simply on a higher stage where we can leave all Is-Ought-fusions behind? My answer is: No. Here, there is no proper analogy with the evolutionary way of thinking in stages.

The general word good behaves like the determinable word colour. In order to understand 'colour' we have first to understand determinate colour words like 'red', 'orange', 'yellow', and so on. When we have understood the determinable we can, if we meet a new determinate colour which we have neither seen nor heard of, still the same realize that it is a colour. However, even when we have understood the determinable word we cannot deduce determinates which we have neither seen nor heard of. In a similar way it is impossible for us to understand the general word good if we have not understood expressions like 'good shoes', 'good chairs', 'good man', and so on. Also, when a new kind of thing (call it x-ness) is evaluated we can see that it can be called 'a good x'. However, the mere combination of the concepts of x-ness and goodness does not amount to an understanding of the corresponding value. Let us think of molecules. Ordinarily, molecules are not evaluated. Let us now combine the words good and molecule: 'Here is a good molecule'. Have we now understood what a good molecule is? I do not think so. We have only understood that the molecule is recommended, but we have not understood what makes it recommendable, which means that we have not understood the combination 'good molecule'. If, in some community, there is to be the value 'good molecules' it is not enough merely that some authority makes a verbal decree that a molecule is good. A fusion is necessary.

We have in English the general word 'meaning', which is a determinable for all specific meanings connected with different sounds and graphical signs in English. Having recourse to the determinable, however, does not solve one single interpretation problem. It is one thing to know that there is meaning in a text, quite another to know what meaning there is. If you see a sign in a foreign language you have not understood it until there is a specific meaning fused with the sign. In one sense there is, though, an exception. When there is a word in one's own native language which is synonymous with the foreign word, then one can make an external non-fused connection between the foreign sign and its specific meaning. The sign is perceived and its meaning is thought. But, still the same, the latter meaning is fused with a sound or a graphical sign since thinking is silent speaking or silent reading. Therefore, it is always the case that there has to be a fusion of meaning and sound/graphical sign somewhere. Similarly, goodness has to be fused with good-making characteristics somewhere.

What is true for 'good' is obviously also true for 'virtuous'. The simple combination 'x-ness is virtuous' is as empty as the non-fused 'x-ness is good'. But what about the simple combination 'Actions of the kind x ought to be performed'? Isn't this imperative immediately understandable in its specificity when x is named? Yes, it can be. It is so understandable when it is backed not by norm-making but by authority-making characteristics. Norm-making characteristics needs the same kind of fusion as I have talked about in relation to goodness and virtues. Conversely, it is true that if a value or a virtue is understood as only backed by an authority then there is no need for a fusion of Is and Ought. Otherwise there is such a need. Since imperatives are backed by authorities more often than values and virtues are, it seems as though there is an essential difference between artificial norms on the one hand and artificial values and virtues on the other.

We can now reflect back on chapter 1.4 and Wittgenstein's denial of a gap between Is and Ought. The true kernel of that denial is, I think, the claim just made that all Oughts cannot be artificial, or, in another formulation, that some Oughts have to be natural. People who live in a world of natural Oughts can be described, as I said in chapter 1.4, as living beneath Is and Ought. Such a level, we shall now note, have some peculiarities of importance for moral philosophy.
At the level of natural Oughts it is impossible to formulate Kantian (or Harean) principles of universalizability since they, by definition, are artificial Oughts. In a way, therefore, every case under consideration is contextual. Contextualists, whether in the form of communitarians or feminists, are here absolutely right. Every case should be considered in its own situational specificity in the same way as the meaning of a sentence should be interpreted in its textual specificity. Such a contextualism does not, I want to stress, rule out rational changes. Natural Oughts can very well change, and they can change rationally in spite of the absence of explicit principles. Also, in the light of a new case, older cases can be revised without the formulation of any new principles. The old case is just seen in a new light as when a new sentence in a text sheds light on the earlier ones.

In the kind of culture we live in today there are both artificial Oughts, artificially promoted Oughts, and natural Oughts. In such cultures an illusion can arise to the effect that people may think it possible to make all Oughts artificial. This is the kind of illusion we now, with the help of Wittgenstein, has exposed. Wittgenstein himself, however, together with some communitarians and feminists, seem to have fallen prey to another illusion. They seem to think that all real Oughts necessarily are natural Oughts.
Chapter 3

NATURAL FACTS AND SOCIAL FACTS

Norms, values, and virtues are social facts. They do not exist in nature as such. This, of course, does not imply that all social facts are Oughts. The intricate relationships which exist between Oughts and social facts is the main topic of this chapter. First of all, however, we need a clear conception of natural facts and of facts in general.

3.1 Natural facts

Philosophers interested in a definition of 'fact' often define a fact as an obtaining state of affairs. What, then, is a state of affairs? There are, in the main, two different answers. According to one view, states of affairs are something that makes sentences (or propositions) true; nothing more and nothing less. Such a view fits well into a conceptualist metaphysics where universals and structures (states of affairs are structured entities) are assumed to exist only in language. Those who look upon states of affairs in this way, though, often, just bypass the question of the ontological status of truth-makers, or, in a positivist way, regard the question as unanswerable.

According to the other view, which is the one to be adopted here, a state of affairs is a determinate complex unity which may exist in space and time. When actual, a state of affairs is a fact. Contrariwise, facts are actual states of affairs. Facts in this sense are more than truth-makers, although they also can function as truth-makers. Such a function of course requires mediation by cognitive subjects. Put bluntly, with a Tarskian example, the fact that the snow here is white makes the sentence 'The snow here is white' true. However, the same fact makes the sentence 'The snow here is not red' true as well. One and the same fact can make many different sentences true, and some sentences can be made true by a lot of different facts.

This conception of facts, facts as actual states of affairs, is quite consistent with the view that many facts are language dependent. Whether or not a fact exists independently of language, it exists independently of the specific sentences which it makes true. For instance, the fact that a certain person P is an ironical person is a language-dependent fact, but it nonetheless exists independently of the sentence 'P is an ironical person' which it makes true. Irony is not possible without a language, but it is possible without the concept of irony.

A lot of facts exist independently of all language. Such facts belong to a sub-class of all facts, namely the mind-independent facts, or, in other words, the natural facts. The concept of nature is sometimes used in such a wide sense that it covers everything that exists in space and time; it is then used as a synonym to the concept of reality. Here, however, we shall use 'nature' in such a sense that nature and natural facts only constitute part of reality. Another part of reality is made up of social facts.

All facts, social as well as natural facts, are, in their particularity, constituted by universals. Facts require a structure, and without universals no structure. If there are facts, realism is true. A philosophical realist, necessarily, has to assume two different concepts of identity, qualitative identity and numerical identity. Since two identical facts can exist on different places at the same time, there has to be a difference between numerical and qualitative identity. Two electrons on different places are qualitatively identical although numerically different. Two instances of the volume 5 cm³ are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. They instantiate in re the same universal.

1 For a brief survey, see K. Mulligan, "Wie die Sachen sich zueinander Verhalten" inside and outside the Tractatus', Teoria 5 (1985), pp 145-74.
3 Ontological Investigations, especially sections 1.3, 1.4, 3.1, and 3.2.
Realism does not necessarily imply Platonism or any other kind of transcendent realism. In contradistinction to nominalists, realists maintain that there are universals, and in contradistinction to conceptualists, realists also maintain that there are universals outside language. However, in contradistinction to Platonism, many realists claim, like Aristotle, that there are no transcendent universals, i.e. there are no universals outside space and time. This metaphysical position, immanent realism, is the position of this book, and, I am quite sure, the true position.

There are many different kinds of states of affairs and facts. The simplest possible ones are like Democritean atoms. Even such atoms have a kind of complexity. They have at least two properties, shape and volume. An atom is a complex unity of universals. A more complex kind of states of affairs is the state of affairs made up of two atoms in their relationships with one another (a is longer than b, a is 5 cm away from b, etc.). Other kinds of states of affairs or facts are changes, events and processes. Making a list of all the different kinds is not our concern here, but it is important to know that there are categorially different kinds of natural facts.

Natural facts are, to repeat, a sub-class of the facts which constitute reality; they are the class of mind-independent facts. What then is mind, and what are mind-dependent states of affairs? Let it be said at once that their differentia specifica is not intelligent behaviour. Mind is to be understood by means of the category of intentionality. To have a mind is primarily to be capable of having the kind of directedness which constitutes intentionality. This directedness shows itself both in thoughts and perceptions. Thoughts and perceptions have a directedness which is totally lacking in a thing like a stone, and, I think, is also lacking in an intelligent computer. Stones and other non-intentional entities are, so to speak, enclosed in the space-time they occupy. A man, on the other hand, even an imprisoned man, can both think of and perceive states of affairs that are distinct from him. Of course a stone has a lot of relations to other things, but intentionality is not a relation like 'being at a certain distance from each other' or a relation like 'being larger than'.

Many philosophers define mind by means of consciousness. In my opinion all conscious acts are intentional acts, but I think we should leave the question open whether or not, conversely, every intentional phenomena belongs to the sphere of consciousness. Intentionality, not mind or consciousness, is the basic category.

Since we are perceiving and/or thinking most of the time, we are so familiar with intentional phenomena that their peculiar directedness is easily overlooked. Let me quote a Swedish writer who expresses his astonishment over the phenomena of intentionality. Sometimes we need to become bewildered in order to become conscious of some very prevalent aspect of reality.

What happens when we are reading? Our eye is following black letter signs on a white paper, from left to right, again and again. And beings, nature or thoughts, which another person has thought, recently or a thousand years ago, emerges in our imagination. It is a wonder greater than the fact that a grain of corn from the graves of the Pharaohs has been made to grow. And it happens at every moment.

By means of intentionality we become directed. Sometimes, as in veridical perception, we are directed towards existing states of affairs, but sometimes, as in fiction, we have this kind of directedness without there being something existing which we are directed towards. There is only determined directedness. This latter kind of intentionality I shall call fictional intentionality. Of course, the acts of fictional intentionality exist in space and time, even though their intentional objects do not exist in space and time. The acts are directed towards a fiction, but the acts, as acts, are part of reality. Intentional acts of all kinds are facts but not natural facts, as natural facts are here defined.

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6 Ibid. section 13.6.

Reality contains both natural facts and intentional acts. Natural facts are not, by definition, existentially dependent upon intentional acts. Intentional acts, however, are existentially dependent upon natural facts. In this sense, the realist metaphysics here adopted is also a materialist metaphysics. Intentionality is regarded as an emergent property, a property emerging from and supervening upon something material. Intentional acts cannot exist cut loose from a body; in order to exist intentionality needs something like a nervous system and a brain as its substratum.

3.2 The ontology of the ego

The history of philosophy contains several different ontologies of the ego. Some of them, I would say, are obviously false in every important respect, whereas others contain important partial truths. The view I shall put forward is Aristotelian in outline.

Reductive materialism is obviously false. An ego contains intermittently intentional acts (veridical and illusory perceptions, images, imaginations, dreams, thoughts, etc.), and intentionality cannot possibly be reduced to the kind of categories which make up natural facts. Ordinary materialist properties (like having a certain shape and mass) and relations (like being larger, being at a distance from, and being caused by) do not have the kind of directedness which constitutes intentionality. Not even a velocity has the same kind of directedness as thinking and perceiving have, even though a velocity "points" in space. I agree completely with John Searle when, in his book *Intentionality*, he writes:

> My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that it is routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics. I have seen it claimed that mental states can be entirely defined in terms of their causal relations, or that pains were nothing but machine table states of certain kinds of computer systems, or that correct attributions of Intentionality were simply a matter of predictive success to be gained by taking a certain kind of "intentional stance" toward systems. I don't think that any of these views are even close to the truth ..."\(^{10}\)

Another easily refuted metaphysics is the one which takes intentionality on the one hand and materialist categories on the other to be merely different ways of apprehending the same phenomena. Such a Spinozist multiple aspect theory is reflexively inconsistent. The phrase 'different ways of apprehending' presupposes the category of intentionality. An act of apprehension is an intentional act, which means that a Spinozist view amounts to saying that intentionality and materialist categories relate to the same substance apprehended in different intentional acts. The last use of 'intentional act' cannot be substituted by any phrase containing concepts which only refer to materialist or other non-intentional categories, which means that 'the intentional aspect' as a whole cannot possibly be equivalent with 'the materialist aspect'.

The falsity of ontologies which, like those of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Berkeley, regard the ego as a *spiritual substance* which is categorically different from material substances, is not as total as that of reductive materialism. Such substance ontologies do not deny the existence of irreducibly mental phenomena, but (1) they deny that mental phenomena are existentially dependent upon material substrata. Also, (2) they lack a clear conception of intentionality. In particular, they have not noted a certain feature of

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8 For a detailed argumentation of this irreducibility thesis see *Ontological Investigations*, chapter 13.5.
9 For detailed arguments for this view see my paper 'Intentionality and tendency: How to make Aristotle up to date' in K. Lehrer (ed.) *Essays in Ontology*, Kluwer: Amsterdam 1991.
intentionality, the non-substantiality of the underlying ego, which I would like to credit Heidegger and Sartre\textsuperscript{11} for having brought to our attention.

Heidegger characterises man by saying, among other things, that man's situation in the world is one of "Geworfenheit" (\textit{=} thrownness). Man is in a sense thrown, flung, or casted out in the world. Sartre describes the essence of man as a Nothingness. Both descriptions, at bottom, focus attention on the fact that the directedness of intentionality is in many, perhaps most, intentional acts not apparent at all in the acts themselves. When we are fascinated by something we are observing, we are just 'thrown out' in the object; we do not perceive ourselves perceiving. We are aware only of the perceived object. The same goes for perceptions accompanying concentrated actions. All there is in the action. We are lost in it; we are thrown out in it. Following Sartre, I shall "call such a consciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected consciousness".\textsuperscript{12}

The directedness of intentionality has two poles. One may speak of a 'to-pole' (an intentional object or correlate) and a 'from-pole'. If, now, in a reflective intentional act (i.e. consciousness in the second degree), we try to make the from-pole of an earlier act (i.e. the presumed ego) into the to-pole of a later act, what do we find? When we make an earlier intentional act itself into an intentional correlate, i.e. the 'to-pole' of the present intentional act, we find between the 'from-pole' and the 'to-pole' of the unreflected act nothing similar to the perception of a relation between things. In the latter case - think for instance of a perception of the relation of being larger than - we perceive two things and a relation between them. In an unreflected intentional act directed towards nature we perceive things and states of affairs but no relation between ourselves and the intentional correlates in question. Therefore, it is adequate to say that the to-pole is something, whereas the from-pole of intentionality is nothing. The ego which is assumed to exist in the from-pole seems to be thrown out into the to-pole or to be a kind of nothingness, or, better, emptiness.

It should be noted that when a reflective (second order) intentional act is directed at the from-pole of an unreflected (first order) act and discovers the corresponding emptiness, the reflective act is not directed at its own from-pole. This from-pole has the same emptiness, but in order to see it a third order act which has the second order act as its intentional correlate is needed.

That the from-poles of the intentional acts are empty does not mean that they do not exist. Their existence may be compared to (but not identified with) that of the void (in non-relational conceptions of space). Where there are no things (or fields) in space there is void, but void is not nothing. It is empty space. The from-pole of intentionality is empty but nonetheless it is something. It belongs to reality.

The emptiness or nothingness of the ego is, it is important to note, only an emptiness on the level of intentionality itself. As stressed by another phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, intentionality so to speak radiates from our body\textsuperscript{13}. When in reflective acts we are looking for the from-pole of intentionality we will find a material body. Moreover, our own material body. In this sense we find something, but not what we are looking for. We look for a soul but we find our body. We find a substratum for intentionality. Perceptions are perspectival and they refer back to our body. Only an Aristotelian account of the soul can comprehend this feature of intentionality. Intentional acts presuppose for their existence something which is not part of themselves, namely a body with a nervous system and a brain. The ego, therefore, is neither only a Nothingness nor only a "Geworfenheit". It is a complex unity with both a body and intentionality; the body is substratum and intentional acts are emergent properties.

Looking upon Heidegger and Sartre from this Aristotelian point of view, Heidegger puts too much emphasis on the to-pole and Sartre puts too much stress on the emptiness of the from-pole of the ego. For Heidegger the ego seems to be merely "Geworfenheit", merely the indwelling in the perceived objects and facts; and for Sartre the ego seems to be nothing. The ego is not a pure "Geworfenheit", nor is it merely Nothingness, but neither is it a spiritual or material substance. It is intentionality fused with a body.

\textsuperscript{11} I am thinking of their famous books \textit{Being and Time} and \textit{Being and Nothingness}, respectively. Sartre’s position, however, is more lucid in his \textit{The Transcendence of the EGO}, Noonday Press: New York 1957.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{The Transcendence of the EGO}, p 41.

Since intentionality is part of the essence of egos, egos cannot have the kind of spatial limits which material things have. Material things are enclosed in a space volume, whereas some intentional acts (= veridical perceptions) reach out from the body into the world. Intentionality is not the only phenomena which deviates from the things-with-properties or substance-accidence schema. Relations like 'being larger than' and 'being more circular than' (i.e. grounded relations) are not confined to a compact space volume. Instances of such relations exist in the scattered particulars they relate. The point I want to make, however, is not that intentional acts are some kind of relations. In my view, on the contrary, intentionality is a category distinct from both external, internal and grounded relations. What I want to stress is the fact that reality contains several categories which, from the perspective of a substance-accidence schema, have peculiar spatial limits. Therefore, one should not look for the spatial limits of the ego the same way one looks for the spatial limits of a material thing and its (monadic) properties.

Every ego is a structured, i.e. a complex, unity. It cannot be confined only to the material body or to intentionality alone. It comprises both. By means of intentionality the ego reaches out towards parts of the world. How, then, one might ask, is this 'reaching' related to the intervening material things.

If we have a realist view of seeing, i.e. we regard ordinary veridical perceptions as acts whereby we come in real contact with a mind-independent world, then we have to say that in visual perception we can perceive through the air. We are forced to the conclusion that we perceive through material things. Michael Polanyi has drawn attention to facts about tactual perceiving which amount to the same conclusion. Often, tactualy, we perceive through material things which are not part of our body. When we write with a pen we are not aware of the hand touching the pen but aware of the pen's touching of the paper. Similarly, when we use a hammer we feel the hammer against the nail, or even the nail against the tree, not the hand against the hammer. When we are skiing we do not feel our feet against the ski but the ski against the ground. If the limits of our body were the spatial limits of the ego, then we should only see the air just in front of our eyes and only feel just what the hands and feet actually meet. This, however, is simply not the case. Often we do, to repeat once more, perceive from the body through material things to natural facts. Both the non-perceiving of the from-pole and the non-perceiving of the mediating material objects and structures are essential ingredients of the perception of natural facts.

Some things are easy to think, some things are hard. The spatial limits of material objects are easy to think, the spatial limits of the ego is hard to think. Material objects have rather well defined spatial limits even if the limit, like that of a shrinking balloon, is rapidly changing. But intentionality behaves in a different way. It is not limited by other material objects nor by other intentional acts. In veridical perception the ego is fused with natural facts. The spatial limits of the ego is the spatial limits of its intentional acts. Wherever an intentional act stops and turns the non-perceiving of material things into perceiving, the spatial limit arises. The ego is not spatially confined to the body in spite of the fact that its intentional acts are existentially dependent upon its body. Intentionality makes the ego spatially nebulous.

The common sense distinction between oneself and external things is easily turned into false ontologies of the ego where an inner-outer distinction is wrongly made identical with a distinction between subjective (= mind-dependent) and objective (mind-independent) phenomena. In relation to material things, the distinction between inner and outer is clear. What is within the spatial limit of the thing is inner, and that which is outside the limit is outer. But since intentionality does not have the same kind of spatial limits we are not allowed to think the inner-outer distinction of the whole ego in the same way as we can think the distinction in relation to one of the parts of the ego, its body.

We normally perceive pains as located within our body. The same is true of our heart beats, of tired muscles, of nervous stomachs, and of other similar phenomena. In cases like these, the intentional correlate is both mind-dependent and inside our body. Subjectivity and inwardness here go together. We perceive a lot of ordinary things, plants and animals (except

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14 See Ontological Investigations, chapter 13.5.
15 Ibid. chapter 13.7.
tools which we perceive through; see comments above) as located outside our body. Here, objectivity and outwardness go together. The intentional correlates are both mind-independent and outside our body. However, when we perceive the colours of the things in question, these intentional correlates are both mind-dependent and outside our body. We have subjectivity and outwardness together. The same is true in visual illusions and hallucinations; as well as in tactual illusions like the "phantom pains" of amputated legs. If all mind-dependent intentional correlates are said to be inner in contradistinction to mind-independent correlates which are outer, then 'inner' looses its original contrast with 'outside the body', and, consequently, has to take on a completely new meaning. A meaning which has to turn all intentional correlates into inner entities, and we are back into the ontologies of idealism or dualism. In such ontologies matter can never be perceived.

In some intentional acts (like dreams and imaginations) the intentional correlate (the dream and imagination, respectively) is wholly mind-dependent, whereas in other acts (like veridical perception) some parts of the intentional correlate (for instance a material thing) are mind-independent and some parts (for instance colours) are mind-dependent. In the latter cases there is a fusion of mind-dependent and mind-independent parts. Our egos are not spatially confined within the limits of our bodies, this is the ontological truth to remember.

The ontology of the ego now presented contradicts ordinary psychological (and Humean) projection conceptions, according to which secondary qualities like colours and values are projected onto the world. When, with a projector, we project a picture on a screen, there is a picture inside the projector which by means of a light beam is copied on the screen. However, neither colours nor values do first exist inside our head and are afterwards (or simultaneously) by means of a 'perceptual beam' copied out in the world. Their primary existence is outside our body. The projection metaphor is adequate only in those cases of writing and drawing when we know in advance what to write and what to draw. Here, first there are thoughts and then there are corresponding outward-oriented perceptions.

Let us now turn from the question of the spatial extension of the ego to the question of its temporal extension. Do egos, we have to ask, have genidentity, i.e. do they have across-time identity? Ethics presupposes an affirmative answer. It is concerned with how to act in the future and how to feel about actions already done. Concepts like shame, guilt, responsibility, moral goodness, etc., make no sense if there are only scattered intentional acts. You feel shame or guilt for something you have done in the past; when you take responsibility you are in the future responsible for your present actions; you are morally good because of your past, present and expected future actions. Ethics is inconceivable without an assumption of enduring egos.

Such an assumption of enduring egos is firmly anchored in everyday perception. Memory acts are not just acts which have as their intentional correlates earlier acts. The remembered acts are comprehended as being ones own earlier acts. One perceives ego identity through time. This kind of identity perception is independent of whether one remembers rightly or wrongly. If one realizes that one is wrong, there is still an assumption to the effect that there was something else belonging to oneself which could be truly remembered.

The existence of enduring ego identities shall, in what follows, be taken for granted. Note, though, that such an assumption is quite consistent with the existence of the kind of branching egos which have been discussed so much lately (mostly in relation to Derek Parfit's book Reasons and Persons). The abstract genidentity spoken of only says that the ego has an identity through time. It is silent on the issue whether some of its earlier parts are shared with another now separately existing ego.

Evident though the perception of self-identity or self-awareness may be, it contains an ontological problem. The emptiness of the from-pole of intentionality is a fact in all intentional acts, in memories as well as in acts directed at the present or the future, in wholly mind-dependent perceptions as well as in veridical perceptions of mind-independent facts. If one takes departure from Heideggerian 'thrownness' and Sartrian 'nothingness', one has to ask how self-awareness can ever arise. Self-awareness in the literal sense of momentary self-awareness presupposes self-intentionality, but such intentionality is an impossibility since a from-pole cannot become the to-pole of the same act. In order to grasp this impossibility, one can think of the graphical representation of intentionality, i.e. think of an arrow, →. It points from something towards something. If we try to make it point towards itself, we can bend it back in a half-circle and make it point at itself, but it nevertheless does not point at its
apex, not at its pointing. Also, we can bend it so much that it points from behind at its own end point. But even in this case it does not point at its pointing. It points at that from which the pointing takes place. It is the same with seeing. You cannot see your seeing, nor can you see your eyes directly, but you can look at the body which contains the eyes and from which the seeing takes place.

The impossibility of self-intentionality now explained has an important qualification. It does not rule out social self-intentionality. Think of two arrows pointing at each other: A → ← B. In this case the pointing of A is directed at the apex of B, which in turn is directed at the apex of A. In this indirect way, A now points at its own apex. What an arrow cannot do alone, it can do with a little help from another arrow. An intentional act cannot in itself be directed at its own intentionality. In order to be so directed, it has to be reflected by another intentionality. In other words, self-intentionality is necessarily social. Such an intentionality presupposes another intentionality. This is the ontological truth behind sociological theories which, like G.H. Mead's classic Mind, Self, and Society, regard the concrete ego as a necessarily social product.

When, thanks to the existence of indirect self-intentionality and the concrete interaction it makes possible, an ego has acquired self-awareness and a concept of 'I', a new and important possibility arises. When an ego has acquired a concept 'I', then every intentional act (with its empty from-pole) can be accompanied by or include thoughts like 'I think this' and 'I perceive this'. But before the concept was acquired no such self-awareness was possible. In contradistinction to (one common interpretation) of Kant I do not think that the concept 'I think' (or, as I would have it: 'I have intentionality') accompanies all our conscious acts, not even implicitly. It is only in retrospective descriptions that this accompanying is a necessity. A description is one thing, what it describes another. Our descriptions of our unreflected intentional acts need the concept 'I think' ('I have intentionality'), but the acts themselves do not need it.

One must not confuse the possibility of mediated self-awareness with the impossibility of direct self-intentionality. Such a confusion, I think, is responsible for many overly subjectivistic ontologies of the ego. Consciousness and intentionality are not necessarily social, but direct self-consciousness and self-intentionality is.

Ethics needs enduring and self-conscious egos, but an equally important aspect of egos is the category of spontaneity. I have already referred to Sartre and his partial truths about the nothingness of the ego, another partial truth of his ontology is his stress on the freedom or the spontaneity of the ego. Sartre seems to take it for granted that the nothingness of the ego ensures the freedom of the ego. Implicitly, he connects spontaneity with intentionality and its nothingness and connects causality and inertia with substantiality. This is wrong. Intentionality is not completely free, even though the from-pole is empty. Intentional acts are partly free and partly inertial.

The ego contains at one and the same time both spontaneity and inertia. At most moments we could, due to spontaneity, have done otherwise, but we could not have done, nor even willed, just anything. The concept of inertia is applicable to intentional states, not only to material states. Agency is a fusion of spontaneity and inertia.

At each particular moment the ego is something particular and specific in both its bodily properties and its supervening mental phenomena. It exists in space and time, and it has a lot of determinate qualities, material as well as mental. The existence of spontaneity, however, means that there is a kind of indeterminateness beneath the ego's determinateness. Since we could have done otherwise, and can do otherwise than we actually will do in the future, we must ascribe an ego some corresponding underlying trait in the present. There has to be an instance of the abstract category of spontaneity.

According to the ontology presented, an ego is far from being a simple substance. It is a very complex unity with genidentity containing partly spontaneous and partly inertial intentional acts grounded in a body. Such is the non-changing essence of the ego on the level of highest determinables, i.e. on the level of categories. These determinables, however, cannot exist without determinates. My ontology of the ego is not to be conflated with a theory of a determinate authentic ego. On the level of determinates everything may be changing, which means that on this level there is no authenticity in the strong sense.

Specific egos, as determinate unities of bodies and intentional acts, perform actions. Sometimes agency is reflexive, i.e. there is a conscious intention to perform the action in
question before it is done, but mostly agency is non-reflexive. We merely act. Sometimes more out of inertia than spontaneity; sometimes the other way round.

3.3 Social facts

Natural facts are mind-independent or intentionality-independent facts. Intentional acts make up another kind of facts. Social facts are mind-dependent, but it is not the case that all intentional acts are social facts. What, then, is a social fact? Max Weber's famous definition of a social relationship reads as follows:

The term "social relationship" will be used to designate the situation where two or more persons are engaged in conduct wherein each takes account of the behaviour of the other in a meaningful way and is therefore oriented in these terms.\(^\text{17}\)

This may suffice for a sociologist, but not for our philosophical purposes. Of course, Weber captures something essential, but we have to analyse more in detail what the reciprocal 'taking account of' really means. In view of the popularity of the hermeneutic-philosophical and late-Wittgensteinian view that language and sociality is one and the same thing, I want to say at once that I regard this view as false. Notwithstanding the fact that I think language permeates the social world and, really, creates part of it.

Language presupposes perception. It is not the other way round.\(^\text{18}\) We perceive language meaning, but everything we perceive is not language meaning. Without perception no language, but there is perception without language. This seems to be an obvious truth if perception and language is understood common-sensically. At bottom, I think, the hermeneutical and Wittgensteinian view can only be defended by means of a conceptualist metaphysics. Our perceptions are structured, and structure requires universals. Now, if universals are assumed to exist only in language, then of course non-language perception has, contrary to appearance, to be some kind of language, too. Such a conceptualist view implies that first there is, so to speak, language-in-perception and then there is ordinary language. Ordinary language then is second-order language, i.e. language-in-(language-in-perception). Our realist point of view allows us to stick to the ordinary view of language and perception. A realist position allows the existence of universals both in re and in perception without mediation of language. There is then no problem to solve. Perception is structured, sometimes by concepts, and sometimes by non-linguistic universals.

Language is social but so are most perceptions in a sense now to be explained, and the reciprocity of language presupposes the reciprocity of perception. There is reciprocal seeing and hearing before there is language. Such pre-language reciprocity constitutes a kind of minimum sociality. When two persons are looking at each other, there is a mutual 'taking account of'. In ones own seeing one takes account of the other's seeing of oneself. The intentional act of A is directed towards the intentional act of B which is directed towards A. A comes via B back to himself, and vice versa. A perceives a fact which contains A's very perception as a part, i.e. A is both observer and co-creator of the fact in question. We have the kind of phenomena I want to call nested intentionality.\(^\text{19}\) In nested intentionality we find the essence of social facts. Agents are both parts of and partly constitute the social facts they perceive.

The directedness of intentionality can be represented by an arrow.\(^\text{20}\) If we assume two subjects, A and B, with intentional acts, we can graphically represent an intentional act directed towards an object O by A → O and B → O, respectively. Nested intentionality,

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\(^{17}\) Basic Concepts of Sociology, Citadel Press: Seacaucus, New Jersey 1962, p 63.

\(^{18}\) For the same point see also A. Honneth and H. Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, Cambridge UP: Cambridge 1988, esp. pp 66 and 85; originally in German, 1980.

\(^{19}\) The concept of nested intentionality is introduced in Ontological Investigations, chapter 15.

\(^{20}\) This is also true of of physical vectors, but none the less intentionality is completely different from vectors. See my paper 'Intentionality and tendency: How to make Aristotle up to date' in K. Lehrer (ed.) Essays in Ontology, Kluwer: Amsterdam 1991.
however, is represented by $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$ and $B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$, i.e. A sees that B sees him, and B sees that A sees B. The nestedness can go even further. A can also see that B sees that A sees B, i.e. $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B))$.

The basic social fact (or minimum sociality) is mutual pre-language visual recognition. It is basic in two respects. First, there are only two persons, i.e. the minimum number of persons needed in a social fact. Second, vision is the most important of our senses, at least with regard to our relations to other persons. We see more persons than we hear and touch, not to say smell and taste.

Nested intentionality is quite possible as a category in a deterministic ontology, although, such an ontology is not consistent with the general outlook of this book. If persons cannot choose, norms and values loose their meaning. Without agency both prescriptions and recommendations are vacuous. As being said a number of times now, the existence of agency has to be presupposed when discussing the Is-Ought problem. Otherwise the problem becomes a pseudo-problem.

Agency is not a primitive concept. It fuses spontaneity, inertia, and embodied intentionality (or, better, since intentionality is an emergent property: intentionalised bodies). Spontaneity and intentionality need not by their nature go together (i.e. they are not existentially dependent upon one another), but in agency they do in fact go together.

When I say that agency requires intentionality, I am not saying that every action is a planned action. Before there is an action there need not be an intentional act directed at the action and its goal. Often there is no conscious goal for the action, but nonetheless the action is accompanied by and structured by intentional acts. This is true for routine actions as well as for actions where one finds oneself surprised over what one is actually doing. Surprises presupposes intentionality.

In order to see the structure of ordinary social facts, not just the minimum sociality earlier spoken of, we have to bring in agency and action. The step from seeing to action, however, is not a long one. We have merely to move from seeing to observing. Seeing may in principle be a purely passive uptake, whereas observing implies activity and agency. When one is observing one directs ones actions/movements so that they fit the aims of the observation. The concept of observation presupposes that one could have observed otherwise than one really did.

Two persons observing each other's actions manifest more of ordinary sociality than mere mutual seeing does. Think of two persons which are standing fishing beside each other, and which are observing both the other's fishing and the other's observing of their own actions. In such cases there is intentionality nested not only around intentional acts in themselves but around actions and agency as well. Next, think of two persons which are silently carrying a very heavy sofa through some narrow doors and down a curved staircase. None of them is able to carry the sofa alone. These two persons are not merely observing each other and each other's actions. They observe each other in order to adapt, continuously, their actions to each other. Since, as assumed, they are not talking, they have to observe the other's observations of themselves, too. They adapt through eye contact. Without such mutual observation of each other's actions and observations, the simple action of carrying the sofa would have been impossible. Cooperative undertakings like this carrying are truly social actions and make up truly social facts. They contain nested intentionality in action. Here we can adequately apply Weber's phrase 'each takes account of the behaviour of the other in a meaningful way and is therefore oriented in these terms'.

The sofa example above describes a cooperative action without power relations. Let us now look at an example in which direct personal power is essential. If a person A orders another, B, to perform an action like shutting a door, then the agencies of A and B become nested. The structure presupposed in the imperative 'Shut the door!' is the following one, well known from speech act philosophy:

1. A intends B to shut the door;
2. A intends B to recognize (1);
3. A intends B to shut the door for the reason that B recognizes (2).
A regards B as an agent and, in my terminology, takes it for granted that he and B are nested. If we translate (2) into the arrow symbolism used above, we get $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B))$, i.e. A intends (first arrow) B to recognize (second arrow) that A intends (third arrow) B to shut the door (= Bd). In this formula we find our criterion for nested intentionality, $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$. However, there is no real order giving unless B responds in a certain way. He must, firstly, regard A as an agent, and, secondly, accept A's authority. We get:

1. B recognizes that A intends B to shut the door;
2. B recognizes that A intends B to recognize that A intends B to shut the door;
3. B shuts the door for the reason stated in (2).

In an order giving, as well as in the example with the cooperative carrying, the intentionalities of A and B have to fit mutually. Otherwise there is only an attempted order giving. As Hegel stressed in his master-slave dialectic, power is always power over another power. The power/agency (A) is directed towards another power/agency (B) which accepts the imperatives of the power/agency A. Mutuality in perception and agency are necessary conditions for social facts.

Both in cases of equality and in cases of power, there is a mutuality in perception which takes actions and agency into account. Sometimes this mutuality is mediated by language, sometimes it is not.

In order to get a clear idea of the relationship between language and perception, we have to analyse the relationship between universals in language on the one hand and universals in nature and in non-language perception on the other. We shall investigate the relationship between *de dicto* universals and *de re* universals, respectively. The term 'de re universal' is here used in such a broad sense that it covers non-linguistic perceptual universals, too.

The first thing to be noted is that a *de dicto* universal very seldom directly corresponds to a *de re* universal. This can easily be illustrated by means of our colour concepts. These concepts are conventional in the sense that the boundaries between them could have been drawn, if not at any logically possible way, at least in several different places in the spectrum. This fact, however, does not imply that there are no colour universals outside language. The conclusion is that one conceptual universal does not correspond to one non-linguistic universal. Our *infimae species* of colours do exist independently of language. Actually, the whole argument about colour concepts being conventional presupposes this independence. It presupposes the existence of a continuous spectrum which we, the language users, divide up in discontinuous bits.

The remark just made does not, it is important to note, imply a denial of the view that our language affects our perceptions. We should regard the specific colours as matter and the colour concepts as forms in the Aristotelian sense. Our colour perceptions, then, are unities of form (the colour concepts) and matter (the *infimae species* of colour). In this way language may create a gap in the actual perception where there is no gap in the corresponding pre-language perceptions. This is true also for all those concepts which contain Wittgensteinian family resemblance. The notion of family resemblance can very well be interpreted in a way which makes it consistent with the existence of *de re* universals.

A short reference to Gestalt qualities should be enough to show that there is nothing mysterious with a *de dicto* universal which is united with a lot of *de re* universals which are not, all of them, similar to each other. Even if A is similar to B and B similar to C but A not similar to C, we may create a universal concept, a Gestalt, which covers all three universals. There is then, in cases like these, no pre-linguistic universal which directly corresponds to the universal concept. But this is only a more complicated case of what we found in relation to the colour words. Sometimes universal concepts are constituted by family resemblances and sometimes they are constituted by more simple similarity relations. However, in both cases the universals are made up by a linguistic form (the concept) and pre-linguistic matter (pre-linguistic universals).

Did God create the universe out of nothing or out of pre-existing matter? The theologians have to say yes or no. Do human beings create universal concepts out of nothing or out of pre-existing universals? We can answer yes and no. Sometimes we do and sometimes we
don't. With regard to the colour concepts we do not. The colour spectrum is their matter. But
with regard to performatives we can speak of creation *ex nihilo* of conceptual universals.

When we greet someone we are meeting, a nod and a 'Hello!' may be pragmatically
equivalent. But when we actually say 'Hello!', we are not referring to a nod or to some other
non-linguistic way of greeting. We just perform an action with our language. Language
contains wholly new ways of making greetings. New kinds of actions, i.e. new kinds of
universals, come into being. Performatives cannot be regarded as forms which form
pre-conceptual universals. In this sense performatives are created out of nothing, although, of
course, they presuppose a language.

We do not, to repeat one of the fundamental insights of speech act philosophy, use language
only to describe states of affairs and express ourselves, by means of our language we also
perform actions in a very straightforward sense. When we say 'Hallo!' we make a greeting,
when we say 'I promise' we make a promise. In these cases, we primarily perform actions
even if descriptions and feelings may be involved, too. The important thing in the present
context is that a large part of social reality is constituted by performatives. Think of
expressions like 'I give you ...', 'You are sentenced to ...', 'I certify that ...', 'I hereby admit that
I have received a sum of ...'.

In the third person performatives have a descriptive function ('He promises'), but then the
concepts describe themselves, not something which exists independently of the concepts.
When we say, truly, 'He promises', we are describing someone saying 'I promise'. The concept
of promise used in the third person describes the same concept as used in the first person. This
is a peculiar feature of performative concepts. Their descriptive function presupposes their
performativ function. We can create, in a sense, out of nothing new universals in language;
there are emergent social facts. But, after the event, we can also describe these social facts.
Therefore, a correspondence theory of truth is quite compatible with the existence of social
facts which are created *ex nihilo* in language.

I have exemplified nested intentionality by means of mutual seeing, cooperative work and
order giving. In all three cases a naive realism has been taken for granted, and I think some
words are needed in order to get a proper perspective on naive realism. For the understanding
of ethics it is important to show that not only *de re* universals but that even *de dicto* universals
can be parts of nested intentionalities.

We shall first make a detour to the nestedness of perceptions of natural facts. Nestedness is
defined by the simultaneous existence of $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$ and $B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$, where $A$ and $B$
are subjects. It is only entities capable of intentionality which can really be nested. A natural
fact $(n)$ can never in itself be nested. However, natural facts can become parts, and essential
parts, of certain nested intentionalities. Look at the situation captured in the formulas
$A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow n))$ and $B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow n))$, i.e. $A$ sees that $B$ sees that $A$ sees that $n$, and
$B$ sees that $A$ sees that $B$ sees that $n$. In this case the natural fact $n$ is part of the nestedness of
$A$ and $B$. $A$ and $B$ are nested around $n$. All natural facts exist independently of man, but only
some of them are intersubjective and have a social significance. To be intersubjective is to be
part of a nested intentionality.

Most natural facts, even in our closest surroundings, are, it should be noted, not perceived at
all. We do not, for instance, see the air around us (although we feel some very small part of
it). Most natural facts are not nested. The ordinary things perceived, however, are nested. As a
lot of phenomenologists have rightly told us, we do not just see things. We also see them as
things seen by other persons.

Of course we have to distinguish real nestedness from apparent. A person may see the world
as nested around a certain natural fact $n$, but be mistaken. Some philosophers, like Leibniz
and Locke, have put forward metaphysical systems which imply that *all* nestedness is
apparent nestedness. In Leibniz's monadology the intentionality of every monad is closed
within itself. Nestedness is replaced by the mirroring of the monads. Surely, Locke's ontology
is not a monadology since, according to him, all minds exist in one and the same space.
Nonetheless, each mind is closed within itself, which means that there can be no real nested
intentionality. When you think you are looking into someone else's eyes and sees that the
other is looking at you, you are, according to Locke's ontology, wrong. You cannot be in
direct contact with the other. The other may be a *cause* of your perception, but the other is not
*part* of your perception.
A logically possible, but factually false, position is the claim that all nestedness is real nestedness. There is, according to such a metaphysics, no need to make a distinction between real and apparent nestedness. It would always be the case that when we perceive something and perceive it as perceived by others, we would have veridical perceptions. Normally, we see colours as colours seen by others, and we perceive language meaning as meaning perceived by others. If all nestedness would be real, phenomena like colour blindness and misunderstandings would be unknown.

In order to pursue our discussion of social facts and nested intentionality, we have to commit ourselves ontologically. In another place I have argued that the most reasonable ontology is a kind of naive realism. An ontology which steers a middle course between Leibnizean and Lockean systems with their self-enclosed spiritual substances on the one hand and a never-questioned naive realism on the other.\(^{21}\) In what follows it will be taken for granted that sometimes nestedness is real and that sometimes it is, wholly or partially, an illusion.

Ontologically, ethics requires some kind of naive realism. If there is no real nested intentionality there can be no real social realm and no intersubjective norms, values, and virtues. On the other hand, if there is never apparent nested intentionality, there are no moral conflicts, and the need for an explicit ethics will never arise. We shall now take a closer look at what kind of minimum ontological commitment a philosophy of ethics really needs. Firstly, we shall discuss the old distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

I define primary qualities as mind-independent qualities and secondary qualities as mind-dependent qualities. Usually, this distinction is put within a dualist framework where it is taken for granted that mind-dependent qualities only exist inside mind and that mind-independent qualities only exist outside mind.\(^{22}\) In naive realism there can be no such connection between mind-dependence and being in mind on the one hand and mind-independence and being outside mind on the other. When, according to naive realism, you perceive a thing you are in a sense in direct contact with the thing. This means that your perception (which of course is mind-dependent) in some sense contains what otherwise is outside it, namely the primary properties of the mind-independent thing. Such a perception fuses and contains both mind-dependent and mind-independent moments. Since some parts of such perceptions are mind-dependent, the perception as such must be mind-dependent. It is a mind-dependent entity which contains mind-independent qualities which exist outside mind. This means that mind is not self-enclosed in relation to nature. Even if such entities which fuse mind-dependence and mind-independence look very curious to traditional metaphysicians, they are obvious facts in a reflective common sense.

When two persons are nested around a thing and some primary qualities, they are nested around the numerically same thing and quality-instances. When we are looking at a red thing, we take it for granted, normally, that the redness we see is both numerically and qualitatively identical with the redness other people are seeing. Or we take it for granted that the redness we see exists outside ourselves and can be seen by other people. The question now is whether these assumptions of naive realism can be relaxed, and if we can take into account the fact that redness is a secondary quality, but nonetheless retain the claim that redness can really be nested.

If, contrary to Lockean ontologies\(^{23}\), we assume that there can be real nestedness around an ordinary thing and its primary qualities, a new possibility arises with regard to secondary qualities. If colour is a secondary quality colour cannot, by definition, be numerically the same in two perceptions belonging to two different persons. However, two qualitatively identical colour perceptions can be qualitatively identical on the numerically same spot. Since, according to our assumptions, our egos are not spatially confined to our bodies and perceptions can be fusions of material and mental qualities, a colour instance can be spatially...

\(^{21}\) Ontological Investigations, section 13.7.

\(^{22}\) In Galilei the distinction is identical with the distinction between material and mental properties. However, in Locke, it should be noted, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a distinction within the material realm. Primary qualities are qualities which cause (mental) ideas which are similar to the material qualities. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, cause ideas which have no similarity with material qualities.

\(^{23}\) I am writing Lockean instead of Lockes’s ontology because I think that today's science, in particular physics in combination with perceptual psychology, implies an ontology similar to that of Locke.
fused with a material object. Also, this means that different perceptions which belong to
different persons can be fused with the numerically same material object. Two numerically
distinct but qualitatively identical colour instances can exist in one and the same place. And
that is all we need from an ontological point of view. Such phenomena I shall call objective
nestedness around a secondary quality. If such a nestedness did not exist there would be no
real social reality, or no life world, as phenomenologists like to say.

Language meaning behaves just like colours do. Such meaning is mind-dependent but fused
with primary qualities out in the world. When two persons are reading the same page, there
are at least sometimes two qualitatively identical language meanings attached to each
graphical sign which corresponds to a word. There is then nestedness around both the
graphical sign and the language meaning, since the language meaning is fused with the real
nestedness of the graphical sign. Nestedness around a secondary quality contains features of
both real and apparent nestedness. The secondary quality nested is not numerically the same,
only qualitatively. In such nestedness there is qualitative identity founded on numerical
identity.

We shall from now on take this reflective kind of naive realism for granted. Two persons, A
and B, speaking the same language, are then normally nested in the following way. A sees the
meaning of a term t as a meaning seen (or possible to see) by B, and vice versa for B. But,
furthermore, and equally important: A sees that (B sees that (A sees the meaning of t)). Once
more we recognize the structure A \(\rightarrow (B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow n))\) together with B \(\rightarrow (A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow n))\),
where mt functions like n in the nestedness of a natural fact. A and B are nested around mt,
i.e. they are nested around the meaning of the term t.

In many philosophical traditions there is a wide gap between objective natural facts and
subjective psychological facts. Philosophers who do not believe in such a gap have tried to
bridge it in different ways; some by means of a Wittgensteinian view of language, and others
(phenomenologist philosophers) by 'bracketing' the natural sciences. I think the concept of
nested intentionality is the solution.

There are, of course, different species of nested intentionality. Direct nested intentionality
(as when looking in one another's eyes) is one thing, nested intentionality around a primary
quality another thing, and nested intentionality around a secondary quality still another thing.
A fourth species is monadological intentionality within nested intentionality. Dreams and
feelings of pain (not pain behaviour) are subjective in a strong sense. No one else than you
yourself can dream your dreams and feel your pains. And you cannot dream other persons'
dreams and feel their pains. Empathy is something else. Nor is there any place in space where
dreams and pains are nested the way colours and language meanings are nested. In spite of
this, there is a kind of nestedness also around dreams and pains. You can see that someone
sees that you are in pain, and you can see that he sees that you see that he sees that you are in
pain. A and B can in this way be nested even around a necessarily subjective feeling. The
existence of subjectivity is an intersubjective fact.

We do, as Husserl pointed out, in a sense see even the backside of a thing in front of us, i.e.
we see the thing as a thing with backside. If we walk around it we will perceive not only the
backside in itself, we will also perceive it as that which was hidden before. Pains are both
similar to and different from such backsides. They are similar in that we can see that a person
is in pain (the thing has a backside) though we do not directly perceive the pain (the
backside). The difference, of course, is that the other's pain regarded as a backside is a
backside we never can perceive directly.

Since we can be nested around necessarily subjective facts like dreams, we can be nested
around contingently subjective facts, too. In particular, we can be nested around
misunderstandings. When there is nestedness around a colour, the existence of the colour
takes on the shape of an outside natural fact. Like natural facts, the colour is perceivable by
other people. When there is nestedness around a pain, a difference between the person in pain
and the other person becomes nested. They perceive that, partly, they perceive different states
of affairs. Such is also the case when one understands that one misunderstands one another.
There is much in-between direct real nestedness on the one hand and a complete monadology
on the other. Post-structuralist philosophers of language move to fast from the one to the
other. Even if, in our post-modern societies, we do not really give the same meanings to
words as our neighbour does, or as our beloved one does, this does not annihilate our nestedness with our neighbour. Even in such cases we do perceive each other, and perceive that we perceive each other - with a lot of 'backsides'.

In spite of the colour-blind there are colours in the life world, but the life world also contains colour-blindness. In spite of post-modern moments in history there are intersubjective language meanings in the life world, but the life world also contains misunderstandings. In spite of many hidden intentions we do live together in the same social world. When we discover colour blindness, a misunderstanding or a lie, a formerly presumed real nestedness is so to speak denested. Intersubjectivity is reduced, but not annihilated.

Intersubjective colours are almost species specific, whereas language meanings are merely culturally specific. From an ontological point of view, both colours and language meanings are often parts of social facts. Colours and language meanings exist in the same way. Let me specify and state some of my claims in the form of a list:

1. There is a species specific class of natural facts which human beings can become nested around; these are the natural facts which are socially significant.
2. There is nested intentionality around some almost species specific secondary qualities; colour is the best example.
3. There is nested intentionality around some culturally specific secondary qualities; language meaning is the most obvious example.
4. Every quality which is part of a nested intentionality may become denested. When a culture changes, culturally specific nestedness disappears; if there is a biological change in our perceptual apparatus, then species specific nestedness may disappear. In principle, even the most basic nestedness, i.e. nestedness of ordinary things and persons, may be denested.

If every nestedness breaks down there are no longer any social facts, but there may still be purely subjective intentional acts. If only the culturally specific breaks down, there is still nestedness. There is obviously nested intentionality even in the post-modern condition we now live in, whatever the post-structuralists try to prove. We see each other, and we see that we see each other even when we seriously misunderstand each other. Discovered misunderstanding actually presupposes nested intentionality. It can only take place within a wider frame of understanding.

Post-structuralist thinking has been remarkable in its stress of non-understanding. Even if it is a fact in much modern life that people misunderstand each other also in close relations like love and friendship, it is equally obvious there are space ships and advanced electronic communication. How are such cooperative enterprises possible? Surely, the technological apparatus and accompanying systems are constructed by language-using beings, but how is that possible if language meaning is always deferred in the way claimed by, for instance, Derrida? A metaphysics which cannot explain both understanding and misunderstanding is obviously not an ontology for our world.

3.4 Apel's and Searle's derivations of Oughts

Since all the three species of Ought we have distinguished (norms, values, and virtues) are social facts, they have the same kind of ontological existence as language meaning and colours. This means, to exemplify with a virtue, that when honesty is regarded as good, then there is a nested intentionality to the effect that (I restrict myself as earlier to two persons):

(i) A regards honesty as good, 
   \[(A \rightarrow G_h)\];
(ii) A sees that B regards honesty as good, 
    \[(A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow G_h))\];
(iii) A sees that B sees that A regards honesty as good,
(A → (B → (A → Gh)));

(iv) vice versa, i.e. A and B changes place in (i) to (iii).

If, in the symbolism used above, we substitute Mt (= the term t has the meaning M) for Gh (= honesty is good), we get nestedness of language meaning; if we substitute Co (= the object o has the colour C) for Gh, we get nestedness of colour. When it is a social fact that honesty is a good-making characteristic, goodness is perceived as inhering in honest persons. In the same way duties can be perceived as inhering in situations (see chapter 2, p 23). In this case we should substitute Da (= it is your duty to perform act a) for Gh. There can be nested intentionality around all kinds of Oughts. What applies for norms, values, and virtues in direct perception is also true of norm-words, value-words, and virtue-words in language perception.

In most societies people are confronted by norms, values, and virtues in both direct perception and in language. When, in either case, there is nested intentionality, then the corresponding norms, values, and virtues are social facts. Norms, values, and virtues can be and can appear as norms, values, and virtues, just as language meaning can be and can appear as language meaning. Some social facts, however, contain nested norms, values, or virtues, without being as such norms, values, or virtues. We have to distinguish between norms, values, and virtues as social facts and norms, values, and virtues in social facts. In particular, this is true for norms.

Let us think of a bus line and its time table. For the passengers the time table describes a social fact; it describes where and when the buses go. But for the drivers the time table is a prescription. And, obviously, the prescription and its obeying is a presupposition for the description to be true. In order for a social fact like a bus line to exist, all the people working with the buses have to obey working prescriptions. Otherwise there is merely a hypothetical time table on a bit of paper. Now, whether these prescriptions are adhered to because of internalised norms or because of power relations need not bother us in the context at hand. The point is that bus passengers normally perceive only parts of the social fact described by the time table, and that the perceived parts do not contain prescriptions. This is not curious. Parts of a perceived social fact may have properties which the whole does not have. It is the same with natural facts. When confronted with a forest at a distance, we do not see the trees; when confronted with a pebble, we do not see its molecules.

In relation to many social facts prescriptions function the way atomic and molecular forces function in relation to physical things. They keep the fact together, but they are themselves invisible. An ordinary thing appears as a thing without any forces affecting it, in spite of the fact that there are a lot of forces between the parts of the thing. In a similar manner a social whole may appear as a fact, a pure Is, although it contains a lot of Oughts.

The norms contained in a social fact can be contained in two different ways, explicitly or implicitly. The norms constituting a time table are known to be norms and are explicitly revisable, but the norms constituting language meaning are normally not known and, consequently, not explicitly revisable. Let me explain.

Speech act philosophy has made it quite clear that language cannot function without some pragmatic principles. H.P. Grice's famous cooperative principle says that a speaker should (a) give the right amount of information, (b) try to make his contribution one that is true, (c) be relevant, and (d) be perspicuous.25 For reasons soon to come I will also mention another and very trivial pragmatic language principle which I will call the principle of meaning identity. Its triviality explains why it has been neglected within Anglo-American speech act philosophy, though it has been noted Apel and Habermas.26 It says: You should give language signs the same meaning as your communication partner does, and vice versa. If speakers not normally tried to follow this principle language would break down. In some sense such pragmatic principles are norms, but they are usually not explicitly recognized as such by the language users.

We meet here, in another form, the distinction between real tradition and tradition in a broader sense which was introduced in the appendix to section 2.2 ("Weber on authority"). Real tradition is an order where the members do not see or envisage any alternatives at all.

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They do things the way they do because they cannot think of alternatives. Since they can make no comparisons, they cannot recognize their own norms as norms. When real tradition becomes conservatism, i.e. when tradition is defended by rational arguments purporting to show that a naturally grown society is better than a society reshaped according to Reason, then the original innocence of real tradition is gone and tradition is also in its appearance normative.

In the same way as there is a distinction between real tradition and tradition in weaker senses, there is a distinction between strong and weak pragmatic language principles. When this distinction is noted it becomes obvious that every language has to have some pragmatic principles, in either the strong or in the weak sense. A language is a social fact, but no language can exist without some norms, if only the trivial principle of meaning identity. Language necessarily presupposes norms. From the social fact that there is language meaning, one can derive the existence of a norm. From an Is we can derive an Ought, since this Ought is a presupposition for the Is from which we started.

Most social facts presuppose norms since they presuppose rule-governed behaviour. Or, in Searle's words: "Institutional facts exist within systems of constitutive rules" (see section 1.3, p 11). Once clearly stated, this relationship between Is and Ought takes on the appearance of a triviality, but it is an important triviality. Sometimes the relationship is presented as an empirical generalization based on anthropological and sociological data, but, in fact, it is founded on a metaphysics of spontaneity. If people are not regarded as capable of spontaneous behaviour, social facts cannot be regarded as constituted by rule-governed behaviour. Causal determination is something else than rule-following. If there is possibility of rule-following there is possibility of rule-breaking, and the latter possibility presupposes spontaneity.

In section 1.3 I described Searle's and Apel's 'transcendental deductions'. Now, I have made the same kind of deduction in relation to the principle of meaning identity. There are absolute presuppositions for language and they are no more (or equally) absolute and no more (or equally) mysterious than the absolute presuppositions for a time table or a promise. Such norms of course are presuppositions for all verbal descriptions, and in that sense of Is (= description) Oughts really are logically prior to Is.

The derivation of Oughts from a social Is is a derivation of a part from a whole. It differs though in important respects from the formal-logical derivation of a statement like 'a part of x is four cm' from the statement 'x is five cm'. Let us look at Apel's 'a priori of the communication society', i.e. his version of the norm 'You ought to speak the truth'. Where you find the social fact that there is a language (Is) you will necessarily find this norm (Ought).

A similar remark applies to the pragmatic principle of meaning identity. Language does not break down if people now and then give words peculiar meanings, even though they cannot give them new meanings all the time. Norms which constitute what Apel calls 'a priori of the communication society' do not behave like 'Thou shalt not kill' as understood by a pacifist. The same is true also of norms which constitute social facts like time tables. Time tables exist as social facts even if the bus drivers now and then do not do what they are prescribed to do.

The logic at work here says that one norm-breaking more or less does not matter, but that collective norm-breaking matters a lot. If everybody lies all the time language breaks down, but anybody may lie now and then. If no bus driver cares for the timetable the bus line ceases to exist, but it exists even if some drivers do not care all the time. This is a feature in most social facts. It is the counterpart in ontology to the problem of the free rider so much discussed in the social sciences.

I should perhaps mention that Apel himself does not regard the norm 'You ought to speak the truth' as a deontological norm which is applicable in every situation today. He thinks that it is necessary even for good people to lie now and then. Nonetheless he tries to save the deontological character of the norm by making a distinction between two kinds of ethics, an ethics of communication and an ethics of responsibility. These ethics belong to two different kinds of communities, an ideal and a real communication community, respectively. In the real

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community lies can be admitted but not in the ideal, and lies in the real community must be
done in order to come closer to the ideal community. My remarks about the free rider
problem, however, hits even the argument for the ideal communication community.

The free rider aspect of the norms now focussed attention on has also other implications. If
one person refuses to use ordinary currency, the currency still exists, but if all refuse the
currency in question passes out of being. This peculiarity of social facts explains why such
facts can be regarded as external to individuals. Seen from the perspective of one particular
person, social facts really are external. Since such a fact exists independently of whether or
not this particular person conforms to the norms constituting it, the identity of the social fact
in question is not necessarily linked to this person. There is no internal relation between the
fact and one particular person.

According to Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology, externality is one
of the defining characteristics of a social fact. But Durkheim never managed to explain why
this is so. He never clearly saw the logic pertaining to the free rider. A social fact is
collectively internal but individually external to the agents which constitute it.

If a basic norm is defined as a norm which can neither be overridden nor undermined, then
the norms which are derivable from the existence of social facts cannot be basic. According to
such a definition basic norms do not admit of free riders. Therefore, even though norms can
be derived from social facts, basic norms cannot be so derived.

Apel, as remarked in section 1.3, has argued that contractual norms have to presuppose the
norms which make language possible since contracts presuppose language. From the remarks
made it follows that I agree. Contracts are language-dependent, and languages are
norm-dependent. However, Apel has not seen the distinction between 'free rider norms' and
deontological norms made above and does not realize that there can be a contractual norm
even for truth-telling. When language already exists some people can make a contract never
to tell lies to one another, and never to let this contract be undermined or overridden. But this
contract presupposes the transcendental norm of truth-telling which can be overridden. In this
way a basic norm (of truth-telling) actually presupposes a non-basic norm of (truth-telling). There is, unhappily and contrary to appearance, no Apelian transcendental proof for a
deontological norm of truth-telling.

Apel's and Searle's derivations of Oughts from Ises differs from the derivation of Oughts
from value-making and norm-making characteristics. The first kind of derivation is, so to
speak, a 'top-down procedure' whereas the latter is a 'bottom-up procedure'. In the first case an
Is is inconceivable without the corresponding Ought which is part of it, whereas in the latter
case the Is can exist independently of the supervenient norms and values in question. If, in the
latter case, there is a part-whole relation between Is and Ought, it is the Is which is the part
and the Ought which is the whole.

In relation to the remarks around Searle and Apel made here and in sections 1.3 and 1.5, I
can now put forward the following claims about the relationship between Is and Ought:

(1) Some norms are absolute presuppositions for having an Is at all. But 'Is' here means
merely the existence of a descriptive language. 'Is' here includes descriptions even of natural
facts. No Ought, however, is an absolute presupposition for the existence of natural facts.

(2) Most social facts are constituted by norms. These norms are in each case absolute
presuppositions for the corresponding social facts. Pure reciprocal seeing, however, is a social
fact which is not constituted by any norm.

(3) When the symbol 'Is' represents a social fact, it is really possible to derive an Ought
from an Is. Such a derivation, however, has three specific characteristics which have to be
noticed:
   (i) the derivation is not a formal-logical deduction;
   (ii) the derivation is of another kind than the derivations of values and norms from
value-making and norm-making characteristics, respectively.

29 This has been pointed out R. Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory as Science, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London
1975, pp 188-89.
(iii) the conclusion of the derivation is not absolutely binding for the one who makes the derivation since he can always ask himself whether he should make himself a free rider or not.
Chapter 4

THE CLASSICAL POSITIONS

In chapter one I claimed that, traditionally, there are two main positions with regard to the Is-Ought problem which can be called the atomist and the holist position respectively. In this chapter I shall try to characterize their essential difference. I will not try to view them from, so to speak, their inside. On the contrary, I shall describe them in a way similar to the one mathematicians today adopt when they describe Euclidean geometry. Such descriptions take for granted the existence of non-Euclidean geometries, which gives Euclidean geometry a somewhat different meaning than it had when it was the one and only geometry. My 'non-Euclidean' point of departure will be a specific ontological theory of relations. I will claim that atomists and holists at bottom have different theories of relations, and that both theories are partially false.

4.1 Hume versus Spinoza and Hegel

Nowadays it is a commonplace that different forms of life (to talk with the Wittgensteinians) or different cultures (to talk with the anthropologists) can have moral concepts which are not only different but untranslatable. Talking with philosophers of science, one might call it the incommensurability thesis of moral concepts. However, in ethics, as in philosophy of science, it has to be pointed out that incommensurability is one thing, incomparability another. Bilinguals can compare untranslatable concepts. Actually, if all comparisons of incommensurable concepts were impossible, the incommensurability thesis could never have been advanced. As in language, it is in morals. It is possible to become a moral bilingual and make comparisons of incommensurable concepts.

The bilingual, it is important to note, is not a person who sometimes wholly belongs to one language sometimes to another. Those who only belong to one of the languages at a time cannot compare the languages, but the bilingual can. This means that a bilingual is in a position where he may create concepts which are impossible to create within each of the two languages at hand. Such concepts are often determinable concepts. If we could see only one colour in the world, it would be impossible for us to distinguish between a concept for this determinate colour and the determinable concept 'colour'. In order to create the determinable, comparisons between determinates are needed. Only a 'multi-colour culture' can have a concept of colour in general. Analogously, only cultural and moral multilinguals are in a position where it is possible to create some specific determinable concepts. The important thing now to realize is the fact that two incommensurable - but comparable - determinate concepts may very well be subsumed under a determinable of the kind mentioned. Therefore, as philosophers, we can try to master different metaphysical systems and try to become multi-metaphysicians, and perhaps become able to create new and important concepts.

I do not lay claim to be a real bilingual or multi-metaphysician in relation to the kind of atomist and holist metaphysics now relevant, i.e. the empiricist tradition on the one hand and Spinozist and Hegelian systems on the other. However, I dare say that we today, comparing older metaphysical systems, can create a determinable concept of relation which earlier philosophers were not able to form. By means of that concept we can see that one essential difference between atomist and holist thinking is the way they handle relations. As modern outside observers we can say that the essence of atomism is a denial of internal relations, and that the essence of holism is a claim that all relations are internal.

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From an ontological point of view it is necessary to distinguish between three kinds of relations. We have to move beyond the old opposition between external and internal relations. There are external relations, grounded relations, and relations of existential dependence. Within the latter kind of relation there are some important sub-classes. Internal relations make up one such class.

Let me start my explanation of this tripartition by giving one example of each different kind of relation. The relation 'being ten meters apart' is an external relation, 'being larger than' is a grounded relation, and the relation between pitch and volume in a sound is an internal relation. From these examples we turn to the definitions.2

D1: \( R_{xy} \) is an external relation if and only if it is logically possible that there exist a \( z \) and a \( w \) with exactly the same qualities (substances or properties) as \( x \) and \( y \), respectively, but between which the relation \( R \) does not hold.

Two things, \( x \) and \( y \), may be ten meters apart and two other things, \( z \) and \( w \), consisting of exactly the same substances and having exactly the same properties as \( x \) and \( y \), respectively, may be twenty meters (or whatever you like) apart. The distance relation is external to the things in question. The same goes for association. If two events are merely associated their relationship is contingent and external. If there are only external relations between \( x \) and \( y \), it is impossible to derive \( y \) or some property of \( y \) from knowledge of \( x \) and its properties. If there are only external relations between facts (or truth-claims) on the one hand and norms, values, and virtues on the other, then there is a logical gap between Is and Ought.

D2: \( R_{xy} \) is a grounded relation if and only if it is logically impossible for there to exist a \( z \) and a \( w \) with exactly the same qualities as \( x \) and \( y \), respectively, but between which the relation \( R \) does not hold.

Assume that \( x \) and \( z \) are black, spherical, have a mass of 5 g and a volume of 5 cm\(^3\), and that \( y \) and \( w \) are cylindrical, grey, have a mass of 8 g and a volume of 2 cm\(^3\). Despite this the distance (which is an external relation) between \( x \) and \( y \) may be different from the distance between \( z \) and \( w \). The same, however, is not true of the following relations: 'being of different shape', 'being of different colour', 'having a mass which is 3 g lighter', and 'having a volume which is 3 cm\(^3\) larger'. If \( x \) has another shape than \( y \), and \( z \) is exactly like \( x \) and \( w \) exactly like \( y \), then \( z \) necessarily has another shape than \( w \). The same applies to the other relations mentioned. These relations are grounded whereas the distance relation is external.

An external relation is not derivable from the properties and substances of the relata whereas a grounded relation is so derivable. Both kinds of relations, however, share a common characteristic, namely that their relata can exist independently of each other. Everything that takes the place of the variables \( x \) and \( y \), as well as of \( z \) and \( w \), in the examples above, are independent of each other in the sense that \( x \) (or \( z \)) may continue to exist even if \( y \) (or \( w \)) vanishes, and vice versa. This means that if there is some kind of grounded relation between Is (facts or truth claims) and Ought (norms, values, and virtues), then by definition this relation has to be derived from both the Is and the Ought in question. Grounded relations, like external relations, do not allow a derivation of Ought from Is.

Relations where the relata cannot exist independently of each other, are usually called internal relations.

D3: \( x \) and \( y \) are internally related if and only if it is logically impossible for \( x \) and \( y \) to exist independently of each other.

The pitch of a sound cannot possibly exist if the sound has no volume, and vice versa. According to the definitions then, pitch and volume are internally related. The existence of the one necessitates the existence of the other; i.e. they are for their existence mutually dependent upon each other.

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2 What now follows is an abbreviation of theses put forward in my Ontological Investigations, chapters 8 and 9.
The definitions above can be ordered in the following way:

![Diagram of relations]

The internal relation between pitch and sound is a relation between universals which exist outside language. Is and Ought in the Is-Ought problem, however, mostly belong to the realm of language. Therefore, we have to look at internal relations in language, too. We will then meet a logic of substantial or categorematic concepts.

D4: The concepts A and B are internally related if and only if it is logically impossible to apply A correctly if B cannot be applied correctly, and vice versa.

It is logically impossible correctly to apply the concept of sound volume if it is not, at the same time, possible to apply the concept of pitch. Concepts describing the relata of external and grounded relations, on the other hand, can be applied independently of each other.

When a non-linguistic Ought is internally related to an Is, the concept expressing the Is cannot be applied correctly if not a corresponding concept of Ought can be applied correctly, and vice versa. If there is an internal relation between goodness and good-making characteristics it should be logically impossible to apply the concept of good correctly if not the concepts referring to the good-making characteristics in question can be applied, and vice versa.

From the concepts of external, grounded, and internal relation, it follows that the following three hypothetical statements are necessarily true:

1. If all relations are external and/or grounded, then Ought cannot be derived from Is.
2. If all relations are internal and if there exist Oughts, then these Oughts have to be derivable from Is.
3. If some relations are internal, then Ought may be derived from Is.

The importance of the concept of grounded relations can now be seen in the following way. If, as has happened, internal relations are confused with grounded relations, it really looks impossible to derive Ought from Is. Then, even if one accepts the existence of 'internal' (= grounded) relations, it looks logically impossible to derive an Ought from an Is.

Schematically, traditional empiricism and analytic philosophy can be ascribed the view that all relations are external or grounded (= no relations are internal), and Spinozism and traditional Hegelianism can be ascribed the view all relations are internal. My own view is that some relations are internal and that some are not and that, therefore, it is, on this abstract level, possible that Ought may be derived from Is.

The father of the view that Ought is not derivable from Is, is Hume. However, Hume himself, in contradistinction to modern Humeans, is not explicitly arguing from either logic or a theory of relations saying that no relations are internal. His oft-quoted central passage about the Is-Ought problem in A Treatise of Human Nature reads as follows:

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Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.\(^{4}\)

For Hume himself, the gap between Is and Ought is a consequence of another gap, a gap between reason on the one hand and actions and affections on the other. Reason, in contradistinction to affection, cannot be a propensity for action. The proof Hume refers to when he writes "as we have already prov'd" is not really a proof. Rather, he refers to a kind of self-evident insight:

'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed at it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object:\(^{5}\)

Reason discovers truth and falsity and such discoveries cannot move us to act. Reason is inert, morality is not. Hume is not arguing that since all relations are external or grounded, the relation between Is and Ought must also be an external or grounded relation. But his view implies that there is an external relation between reason and desire/will, and as a consequence of this, that there is also an external relation between Is and Ought. In this way Hume does conform to my thesis that external relations are essential to the 'gap thesis'.

The relation between reason and will/desire which Hume speaks of, is an external relation which is not located within language. But in the modern Humean tradition, i.e. the larger part of analytic philosophy, the Is-Ought problem has been looked upon as a problem completely located within language. Furthermore, it has been placed in the context of formal logic. The question became whether or not by means of formal logic a statement containing an explicit or implicit Ought can be derived from statements which are only descriptive; or whether by some kind of formal-logical definitions normative concepts can be reduced to non-normative ones.\(^{6}\)

Formal logic can be regarded as a theory about logical constants. Logically valid inferences are valid because of the logical constants involved; tautologies and contradictions are tautologies and contradictions because of the logical constants which occur in the statements at hand. Within formal logic it is, I agree with the Humean tradition, impossible to deduce an Ought-sentence from pure Is-sentences. Nor is it possible, I also agree, to give exhaustive definitions of normative concepts by means of purely descriptive concepts and logical constants.

(Above I have spoken about 'pure Is-sentences' and 'purely descriptive concepts'. The qualification pure is necessary because very often apparently descriptive concepts are fusions of descriptive meaning and so-called emotive meaning. Cf. what is said in chapters 1.4 and 2.4 above and chapter 6.3 below.)

Given the presupposition that formal logic captures the only possible relation of necessitation, it does follow that Is cannot possibly imply an Ought. According to such a presupposition, relations between substantive or categoricmatic concepts are either analytical, i.e. they are being made true by definition, or they are external relations. In this way, I maintain, the whole Humean tradition fits into the view that between Is and Ought there are only external relations.


\(^{5}\) Ibid. p 414.

The opposition I am at the moment interested in is the opposition between, on the one hand, philosophers who may be reconstructed as claiming that there are no internal relations and that such necessities exist only in appearance, and, on the other hand, philosophers who may be reconstructed as claiming that all relations are internal and that external relations exist only in appearance. The first great modern Western philosopher who has the latter kind of metaphysics is Spinoza; the second is Hegel; a third one is the British idealist Bradley.

An 'internal relation interpretation' of Spinoza and Hegel is no peculiarity of mine. It has even, in the hands of Richard Rorty, achieved encyclopedic status. But I think this interpretation still needs to be underlined. It is not, for instance, identical with the classic analytical-philosophical interpretation put forward by Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy*. He claimed that:

Spinoza's metaphysic is the best example of what may be called 'logical monism'- the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single substance, none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone. The ultimate basis for this view is the belief that every proposition has a single subject and a single predicate, which leads us to the conclusion that relations and plurality must be illusory.

In Russell's interpretation, Spinoza's system implies that, really, there are no relations at all. This, of course, follows if one thinks that all real relations are either external or grounded. But not otherwise. Spinoza's metaphysics does not rest on a mistaken belief about language, that propositions necessarily has a single subject and a single predicate. In my view, his essential mistake is a step from 'some' to 'all'. Some relations are internal, but not all as Spinoza thinks. Starting with his one-substance, Nature and God, Spinoza argues in his *Ethics* that he strictly deduces both what nature is like and what the good life is like. If all relations would be internal such deductions would be possible.

For historians of philosophy who think that logic is identical with formal logic, Spinoza's derivations are permeated with missing axioms and postulates. This is the way one such historian describes Spinoza's system:

Although he sought to avoid the formal errors of Descartes, his own system is logically as loose as Descartes's had been. Spinoza, too, repeatedly—and unconsciously—relies on new premises which are not listed as being either axioms, postulates, or definitions. In the same way that Spinoza's entire system appeals primarily to our feelings and to our visionary conception of the world, so his axiomatic method appears almost like a verse form.

Spinoza's metaphysics is deterministic, but it is a determinism which is stronger than causal determinism. It is a kind of logical determinism, or, more specifically: determinism by means of internal relations. From a modern point of view this makes his title *Ethics* paradoxical. Since he does not allow for the phrase 'could have done otherwise', he cannot allow for a real ethics. There is no real agency in his system. True, he discusses what is good and what is bad, but the good and the bad has nothing to do with recommendations. They have more the character that pleasurable things happen and painful things happen, and are determined to happen. And they appear as good or bad only from a limited point of view. From the point of view of eternity, which, really, is the (material) logical point of view, everything just is.

What, at first, looks like a derivation of Ought from Is, is in fact a reduction of Ought to Is. This notwithstanding, Spinoza gives the impression, testified by every commentator, that one ought to live a life free from a lot of ordinary emotions like anger and envy. This impression, however, cannot be an immanent part of the system. It is the impression his system gives to people who regard themselves as agents.

If all relations are external or grounded we get the Is-Ought gap, and if all relations are internal we seem to get, as in Spinoza, no ethics at all. When Ought is derived from Is in the Spinozistic way, then, actually, Ought is transformed to Is since agency and real subjects are

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proclaimed illusions. Already Hegel criticized Spinoza for not bringing in the subject category:

This /Spinoza's/ Oriental view of the unity of the substance certainly gives the basis for all real further development. Still it is not the final idea. It is marked by the absence of the principle of the Western world, the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of Leibniz.10

As is well known, however, this does not mean that Hegel allows for subjects/individuals in the modern sense. It is only his World Spirit or God which has real agency. Ordinary individuals are as determined in Hegel's system as they are in Spinoza's. Ordinary agency is an illusion. We have the famous 'Cunning of the Reason'. There is a logical determinism even in Hegel, in spite of the fact that he substitutes a Subject (the Absolute spirit) for Spinoza's Substance (Natura naturans). The differences between Spinoza and Hegel are differences within a frame where all real relations are internal. Although to analytic philosophers Hegel's so-called Logic is as much a misnomer as Spinoza's Ethics, I find the title adequate. Hegel does not identify logic with formal logic. In Spinoza we find a material substance-logic, in Hegel a material subject-logic. The major flaw of both systems is that all relations are taken to be internal. A metaphysics which creates space for a concept of agency has to claim that at most some relations are internal.

F.H. Bradley might, from an ethical point of view, seem to be more interesting than Spinoza and Hegel. In his Ethical Studies he put forward the famous formula of 'my station and its duties'.

What is it then that I am to realize? We have said it in 'my station and its duties'. To know what a man is (as we have seen) you must not take him in isolation. He is one of a people, he was born in a family, he lives in a certain society, in a certain state. What he has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is, and that all comes from his station in the organism.11

At first, this may seem just like Hegel; his 'Sittlichkeit' merely being dressed in other words. Your obligations are already existing in your station. You ought to bring about what already exists, and, therefore, there is no gap between Ought and Is.12 However, such an interpretation does not really fit Bradley. First, already when propounding his thesis he makes explicit references to choices and weakness of will, references which seem to invoke the idea of agency. For instance: 'I may choose my station according to my own liking',13 'To be moral, I must will my station and its duties',14 'nor must we say of any man that he can not perform his function better than he does, for we all can do so, and should try to do so'.15 Second, after having claimed that my station is my duty, Bradley, in a concluding subsection, suddenly says that he has not succeeded in resolving either 'the opposition of the outer world to the 'ought' in me' or 'the opposition of my particular self to the 'ought' in general'.16

As stressed by at least Richard Wollheim,17 Bradley, actually, does not intend to give a definite positive ethics. He rejects different false views only in order to come closer to the true one. He regards the doctrine 'my station is my duty' as much superior to both utilitarianism and Kantianism, but not as the final position. In fact, he is of the opinion that there is no final moral position: 'Morality is an endless process, and therefore a self-contradiction'.18 Morality is for Bradley to be fulfilled in religion, and religion is not the same

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13 Bradley, op. cit. p 176.
14 Ibid. p 180.
15 Ibid. p 182.
16 Ibid. p 203.
17 See his introduction to Ethical Studies, ibid. p xv.
18 Ibid. p 313.
as morality. Neither is God for him the same as his Absolute. Where Spinoza has the
One-Substance and Hegel the One-Subject, Bradley has the One-Absolute which is neither
Substance, nor Subject, nor God.

The point I want to make emerges from these sketchy remarks. Internal relation
philosophers have not, contrary to some appearances, really from Is derived the kind of Ought
we are looking for. This, it should be noted, is true even if one accepts the existence of
internal relations. Whereas external and grounded relations are too weak to allow a derivation
of Ought from Is, internal relations are too strong. By means of such relations we can never
really leave the sphere of Is. Strictly speaking, according to Humeans there is a logical gap
between Is and Ought, and according to Spinozists and Hegelians there is only illusory
Oughts; in essence there is only Is.

4.2 Supervenience and one-sided dependence

In Anglo-American philosophy the concept of internal relations is well known, but it has
usually a negative ring. For most analytic philosophers it is merely the kind of relations which
Russell and Moore (presumably) showed to be impossible. Another well known Anglo-
American philosophical concept is that of supervenience. As mentioned in chapter 1, it was
given prominence by Hare. As far as I know, no one has tried to relate the concepts of internal
relation and supervenience to each other. But, as I shall try to make clear now, there is an
important relationship. Both the concept of internal relations and that of supervenience
involves the idea of existential dependence relations.

What, then, is existential dependence? The idea was first worked out by the German
philosopher, Edmund Husserl, but I shall not try to give an historical survey. I will rely on a
view of existential dependence which some modern philosophers, and I myself, have tried to
expound.\cite{19}

The basic relation of existential dependence is defined in the following way (A and B are
arbitrary universals):

\textbf{D5:} A is \textit{existentially dependent} upon B if and only if it is logically impossible for A to exist
if B does not exist.

If A is not dependent upon B, A is independent of B:

\textbf{D6:} A is \textit{existentially independent} of B if and only if it is logically possible for A to exist even
if B does not exist.

These two definitions, in turn, give rise to the definitions D7 and D8.

\textbf{D7:} A and B are \textit{mutually dependent} if and only if A is dependent upon B and B dependent
upon A.

\textbf{D8:} B is \textit{one-sidedly dependent} upon A if and only if B is dependent upon A but A is
independent of B.

Pitch and volume of a sound are mutually dependent, and so are shape and size. Pitch
without volume is impossible, and vice versa; shape without size is impossible, and vice
versa. A heap, on the other hand, is only one-sidedly dependent upon its pieces. The pieces of
a heap can exist independently of the heap, but the heap not independently of the pieces.
Likewise, in my opinion, mental acts are one-sidedly dependent upon some matter, i.e. upon
brains and nervous systems.

\cite{19} Johansson, \textit{Ontological Investigations}, chapter 9. For a historical survey see B. Smith and K. Mulligan,
My claim in the context at hand is that mutual existential dependence captures the idea of internal relations, and that one-sided existential dependence is an essential ingredient in the concept of supervenience.

We shall first analyse the concept of supervenience, and then look at the important difference between mutual and one-sided dependence.

In the quotation from Hare in chapter 1 (p 10), where the concept of supervenience was introduced, it is said that it is logically impossible to claim that St. Francis was a good man and at the same time maintain that another but similar person in the same situation would not be a good man. The concept of good is such that, in a sense, it is contradictory to claim that two entities may be qualitatively identical in all respects except that one is good but the other is not. 'Good' refers to a supervenient property. Hare has claimed that all evaluative predicates, including the aesthetic ones, are supervenient in this sense.

Donald Davidson introduced the concept of supervenience in another area, that of the mind-body problem. He argued that two persons, or two states of the same person, cannot possibly be such that they are physically qualitatively identical but differ in some mental respect. The ensuing discussion has tried to capture a generalized notion of supervenience. Jaegwon Kim, one of the main figures in the debate, has in an encyclopedic article written the following summary:

The core idea of supervenience then was this: things that are exactly alike in respect of the 'base' or 'subvenient' properties must be alike in respect of the 'supervenient' properties.

Two desiderata, however, have come to be closely associated with supervenience. First, supervenience is to be a relation of dependence or determination in the sense that what supervenes is dependent on, or determined by, that upon which it supervenes; and yet, second, it is to be a non-reductive relation, one that does not entail the reducibility of supervenient properties to their base properties.

When this idea of supervenience is applied to goodness (moral supervenience), it says that goodness is dependent upon or determined by natural properties, and that goodness is not reducible to natural properties. Applied to mental acts (psychophysical supervenience), it says that mental acts are dependent upon or determined by physical states and processes, and that mental acts are not reducible to physical states and processes. The second of Kim's desiderata, non-reducibility, I will take at face value, but his first desideratum requires further analysis. Actually, it contains two ideas, not one. He should have talked about dependence and determination, not about dependence or determination.

No one who accepts the concept of one-sided dependence will, I think, deny that this concept is part and parcel of the original intuitions about moral and psychophysical supervenience. Goodness is one-sidedly dependent upon some natural properties and mental acts are one-sidedly dependent upon some specific kinds of material substrata. This kind of dependence, however, is missing in Kim's exposition. He says in the quotation above that "things that are exactly alike in respect of the 'base' or 'subvenient' properties must be alike in respect of the 'supervenient' properties". What is left out of account is (a) the question whether the subvenient properties has to have supervenient properties at all, and (b) the question whether or not the supervenient properties can exist without the subvenient ones. Kim talks only about what has to be the case when there are both supervenient and subvenient properties. In that case the same subvenient properties always appear together with the same supervenient properties. I shall, however, adopt Kim's usage and call this 'the core idea of supervenience'.

In relation to moral supervenience we get from the remarks above the following two questions: (a) are there natural properties which always have to be good-making?, and (b) can goodness exist without any natural properties at all? Both questions should in my opinion be given negative answers, which means that goodness is one-sidedly dependent upon natural properties. In relation to psychophysical supervenience we can similarly ask (a) whether a specific neurological substratum always has to cause mental acts, and (b) whether mental acts may exist without any neurological substratum whatsoever. Here, too, the answers are in the

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negative, which means that there is a relation of one-sided dependence. A physical world without goodness is possible, and so is a physical world without mental acts. But goodness, as well as mental acts, are impossible without the physical world. The concept of supervenience has always had an implicit materialist leaning and has been adverse to Platonic goodness as well as to idealism in general.

One-sided dependence, it should be noted, entails non-reducibility. If B is one-sidedly dependent upon A, then A is independent of B; and independence is inconsistent with reducibility.

The one-sided dependence which is implicitly present in both moral and psychophysical supervenience is a dependence on the level of determinables. Goodness in general requires natural properties in general, and the mental in general requires the physical in general. The relations of existential dependence involve logical impossibilities, and in the cases at hand such impossibilities cannot be found among the corresponding determinates. It is, I think, logically impossible for mental acts to exist without a material substratum, but it is not logically impossible that mental acts of the kind human beings have could be connected with some other kind of material substratum. In the realm of goodness, the same point seems even more obvious. If there is no absolute goodness, then goodness may be supervenient on many different natural properties. In short: A supervenient property is only on the level of determinables one-sidedly existentially dependent upon the subvenient properties.

Let us now turn away from dependence and look at the other explanatory concept in Kim's exposition, that of determination. In relation to goodness and mental acts determination takes place at the level of determinates, not determinables. At the level of determinates we find laws, and different laws in the two different cases mentioned. With regard to mental acts we find laws of emergent qualities, i.e. a kind of nomological natural laws saying that specific types of material substrata cause mental acts. It is logically possible that a law of emergent qualities could have been different or even non-existing. This world, however, with its given nature is such that mental acts are caused in a specific way. A law of emergent qualities entails supervenience in the 'core sense' since if, in our world, one particular kind of material substratum causes mental acts, then it has to cause the same mental acts always and everywhere. That follows from the concept of natural law.21

With regard to goodness and its relation to good-making characteristics, we may also speak of a law of an emergent quality. This time, however, the emergent quality is not a natural quality but goodness. The law, therefore, cannot be a natural law. It has to be some other kind of law; let us call it a kind of moral law. It shares, though, with natural laws the feature of being weaker than existential dependence (i.e. the negation of the law is logically possible) but stronger than association. Therefore we can say: A supervenient property is on the level of determinates caused or determined by the subvenient properties.

A natural law is world-relative, and a moral law of good-making characteristics is system-relative. The latter kind of law exists only in relation to an ethical system. As we can think of Newtonian physics as true of one possible world and relativity theory as true of another, we can think of different laws of emergent qualities as true in different possible worlds.22 Epistemologically, such a view implies that empirical knowledge is needed in order to establish particular laws of emergent qualities but not needed in order to establish the core idea of the principle of supervenience. A law of emergent good-making characteristics implies the core idea of supervenience in a moral system. If, in a specific moral system, some specific particular natural properties are good-making, then all such properties have to be good-making in the system. Empirical knowledge is needed to come to know particular ethical systems, but the core idea of supervenience follows from the moral law of good-making characteristics itself. That is the reason why the principle of supervenience seems to be an a priori principle.

21 Actually, there is very much to be said about the concept of cause (see my Ontological Investigations chapter 12), but I think a simple reliance on an unanalysed concept of cause and natural law will suffice for the purposes at hand.

22 I am using the expression 'possible worlds' in order to adapt to some influential definitions soon to be reproduced, not because I like the expression. Actually, I think there necessarily is one and only one world (see Ontological Investigations, p 148). My talk of possible worlds is merely a way of saying that this world could have been different.
The principle of supervenience, as we have now seen, contains beneath its core idea two essential concepts: the concept of one-sided existential dependence and the concept of laws of emergent qualities.

If B is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon A, and some determinate kind of A causes or determines some determinate kind of B, then it is entailed that this determinate B is supervenient upon, and non-reducible to, this determinate A.

The principle of supervenience should be given the following definition:

D9: One determinate of B is supervenient upon a determinate of A if and only if (i) B is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon A, and (ii) when B and A both exists, then the same determinate B exists everywhere where a determinate A exists.

In my opinion, the concept of supervenience has functioned as an unsatisfactory substitute for the more basic concepts of existential dependence and law of emergent quality. Let me indicate in what way these basic concepts are important for the Is-Ought problem.

The concept of one-sided dependence makes a materialist but non-naturalist ethics conceptually possible. Goodness can be regarded as being dependent upon natural properties without, for that sake, being identical with them. One-sided dependence on the level of determinables, however, is one thing, dependence on the level of determinates another. The determinable-dependence I am speaking of, leaves a lot of space open for different relationships, i.e. laws of emergent qualities, between determinates. Our concepts afford us a general framework within which it is possible to investigate the more concrete play between Is and Ought and between changes of Is and changes of Ought.

In chapter 2.2 I generalized the notion of good-making characteristics and talked about both norm-making, value-making, and virtue-making characteristics. Everything that now in this section has been said about supervenience and existential dependence relations with regard to goodness and good-making characteristics can similarly be generalized to be about norms, values, and virtues.

When something is regarded as good it is regarded as good because it has some specific properties, and when someone is regarded as a virtuous person he or she is so regarded because of some specific character traits. Goodness and virtuousness are one-sidedly existentially dependent upon properties and character traits. They are also one-sidedly dependent upon the existence of agency, since according to our assumptions, there are neither values nor virtues where there is no agency. In these respects values and virtues are similar to language meaning which also rests on both the kinds of one-sided dependence mentioned. Language meaning depends upon some kinds of signs and upon beings with intentionality. There is also another similarity. Values, virtues and language meaning are all perceived as inhering in objects out in the world outside our body. Existential dependence can go together with different kinds of spatial relations, but both values, virtues and language meaning are spatially fused with one of the states of affairs upon which they are existentially dependent; be it a thing, a person, or a sign. It can be noted that in all the classical examples of supervenience, the supervenient property is perceptually fused with the subvenient ones. Perhaps this fusion should be built into the definition.

In one relevant respect, however, values and virtues differ from language meaning. The meaning of a sign does not refer to the signs (sound or graphical sign) it supervenes upon; it refers to something else. It can be properties or states of affairs out in the real world or it may be fictional entities. Values and virtues, on the other hand, refer back to the properties they supervene upon. A thing's goodness is its good-making properties, and a person's virtuousness is his or her virtue-making characteristics. Value-making and virtue-making characteristics create supervenient properties which, in turn, refer back to these properties which they are existentially dependent upon. It is a peculiar kind of circle which is not found in other supervenient properties like language meaning and mental acts.

In the last paragraphs I have only talked about values and virtues, not of norms. The reason is that values and virtues always seem to contain the circle just pointed out. However, when norms are regarded as due to norm-making characteristics, then everything said about values and virtues applies just as well to norms. In all these cases Ought is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon some Is with which the Ought is spatially fused and is referring back to.
As explained in section 3.4, many social facts contain norms as constituent parts. In the
terminology now at hand it means that many social facts are existentially dependent upon
norms. Such an Is is existentially dependent upon Oughts. The question is whether this
dependency is one-sided or mutual. The social fact that there is a time table for a certain
bus is existentially dependent upon the existence of work prescriptions, i.e. upon norms. But
does the instantiation of these norms necessarily amount to the existence of the social fact of
the time table? Does Ought here imply Is?

A group of workers can very well obey all their working instructions in order to get their
salary without bothering about the overall system which they constitute. They do not then
perceive the social fact made up of the system, but this social fact nonetheless exists. Social
facts can exist even if they are not perceived as such. There has to be nested intentionality
somewhere among the parts, but not necessarily a nestedness around the social fact itself. In
this respect social facts can be like natural facts. They can be discovered by someone who is
not part of the fact in question. This also means that if a social fact is constituted by norms,
than there is a mutual existential dependence between Is (i.e. the social fact) and Ought (the
norms creating the fact). In such cases, Ought implies Is and Is implies Ought. Is and Ought
are parts of a common whole, a whole which, of course, has no necessary existence.

Once again I want to stress that relations of existential dependence between Is and Oughts
can be of two fundamentally different kinds. One kind is exemplified by the one-sided
existential dependence (and supervenience) of goodness upon good-making characteristics;
the other kind is exemplified by the mutual existential dependence which exists between a lot
of social facts and norms, or, to speak with Searle, between institutional facts and constitutive
rules.

Mostly, in the philosophical literature, good-making characteristics are exemplified with
natural properties, but properties of social facts can also be good-making. Goodness can
supervene upon both natural and social facts. Or, to make the last point simple. There are
good time tables and there are bad ones.

Appendix: Weak and strong supervenience

Since I have contrasted my analysis of supervenience with Jaegwon Kim's article on
supervenience in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, I would like to add some further
comments on this article. Kim distinguishes three forms of supervenience: weak, strong and
global supervenience. I do not think global supervenience is of interest in our context, so I
will confine the comments to weak and strong supervenience. His definitions are the ones
quoted below ; A and B are two non-empty sets of properties closed under Boolean
operations. Note that A and B has changed place in relation to my definition of
supervenience. In a logical sense supervenient properties come after the subvenient ones, and
as B comes after A I think we get better associations if we let B be the variable for the
supervenient properties. But here is Kim:

A weakly supervenes on B iff necessarily any two things that have the same properties in
B have the same properties in A (that is, B-indiscernability entails A-indiscernability).

A strongly supervenes on B iff for any x and y and any possible worlds w_i and w_j if x has
in w_i the same B-properties that y has in w_j then x has in w_i the same A-properties that y
has in w_j.

The Anglo-American discussion of supervenience has taken place, by and large, within a
nominalist or conceptualist setting, which explains the need to talk about sets and possible
worlds. From my realist position Kim's distinction comes close to my distinction between
laws of emergent qualities and existential dependencies. Strong supervenience is
supervenience in all possible worlds whereas weak supervenience is a kind of necessitation in
one world. In weak supervenience the modal operator ('necessarily') can be either
nomological and world-relative or moral and system-relative. In both cases we have laws of

23 Kim, op. cit. p 878.
emergent qualities. Relations of existential dependence are *a priori* and, therefore, if you talk about possible worlds, true for all possible worlds. The concept 'true for all possible worlds' is in possible world ontologies the counterpart to the concept of existential dependence in a realist ontology. So, after all, I am not departing much from Kim's concepts.
Chapter 5

METHODS OF VARIATION

In this chapter different methods of variation are to be presented. Without a presentation of these methods many of my claims may falsely appear as relying on some kind of intuitionism. It is a very short presentation made in order to relax epistemological doubts with regard to the chapters to come. The subsections of the next chapter (6: "Moral- Epistemological Areas") are parallel to those which now follow.

5.1 Variation in physics and formal logic

Physics and formal logic has played a prominent part in much 20th century philosophy, and many philosophers did for a long time advocate the presumed positivist methodology of physics as a universal schema for empirical investigations. In the empiricist traditions, philosophers have usually regarded themselves as, in Locke's phrase, 'underlabourers' in relation to science. Formal logic and conceptual analysis remained for the philosophers, but neither activity were supposed to give knowledge about the world. Therefore, in order to get a proper perspective on methods of variation, I shall start by saying in what way it is possible to talk about methods of variation in physics and formal logic.

In a physical experiment factors may be varied both in order to isolate a certain kind of phenomenon and in order to discover causal relationships and numerical laws. Nowadays, when children begin to make experiments even the first year in school, and when there are special 'experiment bags' for children, no one seems to need a philosopher to lay bare the structure of experimental method. A century ago, things were different. Experimentation was still to be established as the method. Let us take a quick look at John Stuart Mill's famous 'Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry'.

Only one of the four methods which Mill lists is called a method of variation ('the method of concomitant variation'), but at least two of the others also deserve this name. Following Mill himself, I shall call presumed causes for A, B, C, ..., and the corresponding presumed effects for a, b, c, ... . In the method of agreement one varies phenomena around A (i.e. B, C, ...) and observes if a occurs independently of whether A is accompanied by B or by C, and so on. If A and a always occur together, i.e. they agree, then A may be regarded as the cause of a. In the method of difference one varies phenomena in such a way that in the one case one has ABC and abc and in another only BC and (presumably) only bc. The method of concomitant variation is used when one tries to find numerical laws. The numerical values of one variable are varied and the variations in the others are observed.

In this way it may be argued that experiments are species of the genus method of variation. Experiments are usually performed in a laboratory, but, of course, it is also possible to look for the variation in nature itself. Actual variation, whether artificially or naturally produced, is needed in order to corroborate assumed causal relations and numerical laws. Sometimes variation is needed also in order to find such relations and laws.

Formal logic may, like physics, be regarded as species of the method of variation. Let us look at a tautology like (p v ¬p) or a deductively valid inference, for instance the following. Premises: (All H are M) and (Some B are H); conclusion: (Some B are M). Formal logic may be characterized as a discipline concerned with theories of logical constants, or, concerned with theories of inferences whose validity or invalidity is determined exclusively by the logical constants involved. One way to prove the logical truths of logical formulas, is to derive the latter as the former from fundamental axioms. In order to prove these axioms, however, it may well be argued that the parts of the formulas which are not logical constants have to be varied. In order to see whether (p v ¬p) is a tautology one should vary p, i.e. one should make every conceivable substitution. If the formula remains true independently of the

1 Mill, A System of Logic, book III chapter 8, several editions.
way p varies it is a tautology. Logical formulas necessarily contain both logical constants and variables. A logically true formula is true whatever value the variables are given. Conversely, such formulas may be proved by variation or substitution in the variables at hand.

As far as I know, only one logician has tried to do something systematic around the idea of a method of variation. Bernard Bolzano tried to create a variational logic. Whether or not he failed, I am not the one to tell, but there is, as remarked above, an obvious intuition to the effect that there might exist a method of variation also in formal logic. A method which should then yield formal-logical a priori truths.

5.2 Variation in ontology

In chapter 4 I introduced the concept of relations of existential dependence. One of the examples used was that the volume and pitch of a tone are mutually existentially dependent upon one another. A tone volume cannot be instantiated if a pitch is not instantiated, and vice versa. Such truths are a priori, but they have nothing to do with formal logic. Since they relate universals, and universals structure the world, such truths constitute a material logic.

The truths of material logic are established by means of a method of variation. Applied to our example it means the following. In thought you shall vary the instances of volume and pitch and note the result. You then discover that every time you make the volume zero, the pitch necessarily disappears. And if you remove the pitch the volume becomes zero. This method of variation is not concerned with producing actual variations in the world (as in physics), neither is it concerned with making variations in the non-syncategorematic parts of sentences or propositions (as in formal logic). It is concerned with universals and their necessary connections. The variation in question is a variation in thought of universals, and it was so regarded already by Husserl himself in Logische Untersuchungen.

The last method of variation was implicitly used both when I claimed that some Oughts are one-sidedly existentially dependent upon some Is (the bottom-up relation) and that some Oughts and Is are mutually existentially dependent upon one another (the top-down relation). If we have something which we regard as good, we can in thought vary its good-making characteristics and see what happens with its goodness. If we think away all the natural properties of the thing, we will find that, necessarily, the goodness disappears, too. If we have a social fact which is partly constituted by norms, we can in thought try to remove the fact but retain the norms. If we think it through we will find that it is impossible.

The truths in material logic are investigated by thinking and they are truths about universals. Since the method of variation used does not rely on observations and experiments, the truths it yields are a priori. Usually, a priori knowledge is regarded as absolutely secure knowledge. That, however, is not my view. I regard a priori knowledge as fallible. You can think wrongly in both formal logic, mathematics and material logic. The fact that the entities you think of are eternal (i.e. eternal in the sense of immanent realism, which for me only means that it does not matter whether the universals in question are instantiated or for the moment merely exists as fictional objects) does not imply infallibility. The history of geometry, with its discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, teaches us that fallibility in mathematics cannot be explained away as merely due to lack of mathematical competence.

This is not the place to make a long detour into epistemology. I have just stated my view in order to make it clear that I am ready to accept that I may be wrong about some particular relation of existential dependence. There may be variations which I have not managed to see.

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4 Edmund Husserl, who worked out the main ideas of existential dependence is, by the way, via Franz Brentano connected with Bernard Bolzano. There is a causal connection between Husserl's and Brentano's methods of variation and Bolzano's thoughts around a variational logic. About these connections, see K. Mulligan, 'Exactness, Description and Variation: How Austrian Analytic Philosophy Was Done', in J. Nyiri (ed.), From Bolzano to Wittgenstein, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1986, pp 86-97.
5.3 Variation in linguistics

In linguistics there is still another method of variation. One which also is relevant for the purposes at hand. The method I am thinking of is not, however, called a method of variation by the linguists themselves. They call it, in phonology, *commutation test*. But 'method of variation' would also be a proper name. By means of commutation tests one does not discover causal relations (as in physics) or *a priori* truths (as in formal and material logic), but phonemic structures.

What is a phoneme and how is it discovered? A phoneme in a language is, to be brief, a smallest meaning-distinguishing sound-unit. Compare the words *bill* and *pill*. If the sounds /b/ and /p/ are here substituted or commuted for one another, a change of meaning will occur. The sounds make a phonemic difference. Such a difference does not occur if you substitute a /b/ with a hard stress on your lips with a /b/ with a light stress. Other phonemic differences than /b/ and /p/ may be found by inserting different sounds for x in the substitution frame 'x-ill'. We can investigate kill, mill, gill, till, etc. In this way we will begin to discover some of the consonant phonemes. Of course, this procedure does not in itself prove that /b/, /p/, etc. are the *smallest* meaning-distinguishing sound-units. There may, within these sounds, exist even smaller differences which give rise to meaning changes. Each sound /b/, /p/, etc. can be pronounced in several ways, and all these ways have to be investigated.

In order to proceed with the investigation hinted at, one has to *vary* the pronunciation of b in *bill* and see whether any meaning change occurs. When this is done - the answer being 'no' - other variations are needed. In order to proceed, we can use the substitution frame b-xxxx. If we should find a word b-xxxx where two different pronunciations of b makes a meaning difference, then /b/ would not be a phoneme. Using such a method of variation or commutation test, linguists have come to the conclusion that English contains 46 different phonemes (24 consonants, 9 vowels, 3 semivowels, and some different pitches and stresses and intonations).\(^5\)

Of special interest here is the structuralist linguistic tradition running from the Swiss F. de Saussure via N. S. Trubetzkoy and R. Jakobson (the Prague school) to the Dane L. Hjelmslev and his 'glosssematics'.\(^6\) All these structuralist linguists share a certain view about the relationship between the meaning of a word and the corresponding sound. An acoustic sign, they say, has *necessarily* two sides, a meaning and a sound. Neither Saussure nor Hjelmslev uses the terms meaning and sounds, the former talks about the signified (= the meaning) and the signifier (= the sound) and the latter about the content (= the meaning) and the expression (= the sound) of a sign. But their fundamental idea is the one I am going to describe. They are discussing spoken, not written, language. Otherwise, they, of course, should talk not only of sounds but also of graphical patterns (and even tactile patterns, as in braille).

Their view which I share is, more concretely, that the specific meaning units of a language are determined by specific sounds, and that these sounds, in turn, get their *specific identity as meaning-giving units* by the specific meaning units of the language. This means that each distinct sign of a language is regarded as, so to speak, carved out from a meaning-level which in itself is a "shapeless and indistinct mass"\(^7\) and from a sound-level which in itself is continuous in various dimensions. The discontinuous identities on the sign-level is generated by a *mutual* relationship between meanings and sounds.

Saussure seems to regard the meaning-level in itself as a kind of unstructured substance. It can exist in and of itself, but it is only in its unity with sounds that *definite* meanings arise.\(^8\) Hjelmslev objects to this.\(^9\) He seems to regard the meaning-level as a kind of Aristotelian prime matter. Unstructured meaning has then only potential existence. Meaning has actual existence only in its concrete forms as part of a sign. However, whether or not *indefinite*
meaning can exist as actuality (Saussure) or merely as potentiality (Hjelmslev), both claim that definite meaning can only exist together with a sound. This means that, at the level of determinables, definite meaning is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon sounds.

The structuralist view of the sign entails a certain view of phonemes and commutation tests. A phoneme does not get its identity only through a bunch of rather similar sounds. Since a phoneme is a smallest meaning-distinguishing sound-unit, its identity is two-tiered. The meaning-level has to be taken into account when the sound-unit is determined, and vice versa. That is why in a commutation test when one varies the sound, the meaning of the sign sometimes changes, and vice versa.

The relations which turn certain sounds into a phoneme are not relations of existential dependence. Other sounds could have been meaning-distinguishing in the same way, and the first-mentioned sounds could have been distinguishing between other meanings. Phonemes are in this sense conventional and a posteriori. Commutation tests do not give rise to a priori knowledge even though it may be said the tests are variations in thought. Strictly speaking, however, it is a kind of observation. Such tests are not like Husserlian variation directed at relations between universals, they are directed at one's own language. The one who makes a commutation test is, so to speak, performing experiments on himself and his language. He is observing himself, and the knowledge he gets is therefore a posteriori.

It is a well known complaint against all forms of structuralism that they cannot explain changes. Structuralism only lays bare synchronic structures. Commutation tests in phonology give us knowledge about the phonemes at a particular moment. They do not tell us how phonemes necessarily look, nor do they afford us predictions about how the phonemes will change.
Chapter 6

MORAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL AREAS

The Is-Ought problem cannot be solved if not implications of different epistemological kinds are distinguished. This differentiation is the topic of this chapter. As, in my view, there is no infallible knowledge, I claim that the differences which are to be described relate to other dimensions than the distinction between fallible and infallible knowledge.

6.1 Oughts and formal logic

There are two areas which, rightly, have been called formal ethics, i.e. deontic logic\(^1\) and preference logic.\(^2\) Taking into account the distinction between norms, values, and virtues, deontic logic could also be called the formal logic of norms and preference logic the formal logic of values and virtues. Both the logics mentioned will be given a brief and very elementary presentation. Readers familiar with it can skip it, but I have to make this presentation in order to say what formal ethics really is about. There exists, as I said in chapter 5, both formal logics and material logics, but even a material logic is in a sense formal, or, more precisely, abstract. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish what is abstract from what is formal.

In section 2.1 I argued that the distinction between norms and values is a matter of degree. Now we shall look at the question whether also the distinction between deontic logic and preference logic is in some sense a matter of degree. My answer, which is yes, will be outlined at the end of this section.

What is deontic logic? It tries to uncover the logical relations which arise when a norm operator operates on sentences describing actions (in some deontic systems the sentences are also describing states of affairs). If we want to transform a concrete norm like 'Thou shalt not kill' into the formal realm of deontic logic, we can do as follows. In a first step we re-write it into 'It is obligatory that: not (you should kill)'. Then, in a second step the phrase 'It is obligatory that:' is symbolized \(O\), 'not' is replaced by the ordinary corresponding formal-logical symbol \(\neg\), and the description of the action is replaced by a variable for descriptions of actions, \(p\). We then get \((O\neg p)\), which means 'It is obligatory to abstain from the action \(p\).

In the same way we can produce formulas like \((Pp)\), meaning it is permissible to do \(p\), and \((Ip)\), meaning that it is indifferent from a deontological point of view whether one performs \(p\) or not. The three operators \(O\), \(P\), and \(I\) are easily seen to be interdefinable:

(i) \(Op = \neg P\neg p\)
(ii) \(Ip = Pp & P\neg p\)

By means of the logical constants of traditional formal logic, one can easily produce more complex obligations and investigate whether they are logically true or not. Suppose it is your duty to do \(p\), and suppose also that it is your duty to do \(q\) if you have done \(p\). Are you then logically obliged to do \(q\)? Is the following formula logically true?:

(iii) \(If (Op & O(if p then q)) then Oq\)

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\(^1\) Sometimes it is also called the logic of obligation. See for instance S. Danielsson, *Preference and Obligation. Studies in the Logic of Ethics*, Filosofiska föreningen Uppsala: Upppsala 1968.

Another easily represented case is the question whether an obligation to do an action entails that the action is permissible. Is formula (iv) below logically true?

(iv) If Op then Pp

Formula (iv), however, is, see (i), equivalent to:

(v) If \( \neg P \neg p \) then Pp

If formulas (iii) and (v) really are, as they seem to be, logically true, then their truth is a consequence of the deontic operators and the ordinary logical constants involved. A deontic-logical truth must not be dependent on the value of the variable \( p \). Whether or not the operators should be called logical constants can be discussed, the important thing is to note that the operators anyhow can function the way logical constants do. Deontic logic may therefore be regarded as a kind of formal logic. Or, as D. Föllesdal and R. Hilpinen have formulated it:

In accordance with Bolzano and Quine's definition of logical truth, deontic logic can be defined as the study of those sentences in which only logical words and normative expressions occur essentially. Normative expressions include the words 'obligation', 'duty', 'permission', 'right' and related expressions. These expressions may be termed deontic words, and sentences involving them deontic sentences. A deontic sentence is a truth of deontic logic if it is true and remains true for all variations of its non-logical and non-deontic words (that is, expressions which are not logical or deontic words).\(^3\)

What, then, is preference logic? It tries to lay bare the logical relations which arise out of two 'ethical connectives'\(^4\) which connect sentences describing states of affairs (\( p, q, r, \) etc.). One connective is is preferable to (or is better than), 'P', and the other connective is is equally good as, 'S'. When the states of affairs described are character traits, what is preferred can be said to be virtuous in relation to that which is not preferred. We then have a formal logic of virtues; otherwise preference logic is a value logic.

The three most simple basic principles of preference logic are the following:\(^5\)

(vi) If \( (pPq) \) then \( \neg (qPp) \)
(vii) If \( ((pPq) \& (qPr)) \) then \( pPr \)
(viii) \( pPq \iff (p \& \neg q)P(\neg p \& q) \)

Formula (vi) reads: 'If \( p \) is preferred to \( q \) then it is not the case that \( q \) is preferred to \( p \). The other formulas should be read in a similar way. If these formulas are really logically true, then their truth is only dependent on \( P \) and the logical constants involved. \( P \), like the deontic operators, functions as a logical constant, and preference logic can, just like deontic logic, be regarded as a kind of formal logic.

The implications which can be found in deontic logic and preference logic are obviously all of them implications between Ought sentences. In formal ethics an Is does not imply an Ought, nor does an Ought imply an Is. None of the four following implications is logically true:

(ix) If \( p \) then Op
(x) If Op then \( p \)
(xi) If \( (p\&q) \) then \( pPq \)
(xii) If \( pPq \) then \( p\&q \)

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\(^4\) 4 Hallén, op. cit. p 16.

\(^5\) 5 See von Wright, op.cit. p 40.
So much for the Is-Ought problem within deontic logic and preference logic. Now to the question whether these two kinds of logics, within themselves and in relation to each other, can be ranked as to degree. In preference logic such a ranking is obviously possible. P can be regarded as a variable as well as a constant. In one system P may mean 'strongly preferred' (Ps) and in another 'weakly preferred' (Pw). I do not know if any interesting logical truth will appear if one investigates the relation between Ps and Pw, but Ps must be closer to obligations than Pw.

With regard to deontic logic, I shall first comment upon A.R. Anderson's attempt to reduce deontic logic to alethic modal logic. He defines obligation (Op) in the following way:

\begin{equation}
\text{Op} = \text{def. N(if } \neg p \text{ then S)}
\end{equation}

That p is obligatory means, according to this definition, that it is necessarily the case (N) that if p is not done then there are sanctions (S). I do not think this works as a reduction, since, as I argued in chapter 2.2, norms backed only by power are not really deontological norms. Formula (xiii) does not represent a reduction but a specific kind of obligation. And this kind of obligation admit of degrees since there are degrees of punishment. In the formula (xiii), S can be treated as a variable for stronger and weaker punishments. The weaker the punishment, the closer one is to mere recommendation.

Several systems of non-reductive deontic logics has been conceived of, and some of them are, intuitively at least, farther away from recommendations than others. Systems with only absolute obligations (Op) are farther away than systems starting with conditional obligations (If p then Op). And systems which allow only ordinary conditional obligations are, in turn, farther away from recommendations than those who allow so-called contrary-to-duty imperatives, i.e. duties which follow when one has not conformed to a duty. If you do not follow your duty and performs p you are obliged to do r:

\begin{equation}
(\text{If (Op } \& \neg p) \text{ then Or})
\end{equation}

The last formula can be compared with the following, which might be called a contrary-to-preference imperative:

\begin{equation}
(\text{If ((pPq } \& \neg p \& q)) \text{ then Or})
\end{equation}

If you do not follow the recommendation and prefer p, then you are obliged to do r. If someone would make a system of deontic logic which allowed this type of conditional obligation, then we would have a system which is even closer to preference logic. In chapter 2 (p 19) I mentioned a kind of recommendation, often used by governments and parents, where a strong recommendation is used with a threat of changing the recommendation into an obligation. This is a special case of a contrary-to-preference imperative, namely the following where we have Op instead of Or:

\begin{equation}
(\text{If ((pPq } \& \neg p \& q)) \text{ then Op})
\end{equation}

If time is taken into account, formula (xvi) turns into: If (pPq \& \neg p until t) then Op after t. As far as I know, imperatives like these have not been investigated in deontic logic. But it is a possible undertaking.

These remarks show, I hope, that the existence of deontic logic and preference logic does not contradict the claim of chapter 2.1 that norms and values can be placed on a common scale.

I want to end this section by repeating one of the claims made: In formal ethics an Is does not imply an Ought, nor does an Ought imply an Is.

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6 For a short survey see Föllesdal & Hilpinen, op. cit. pp 19-21.

7 Contrary-to-duty imperatives were originally used by R. Chisholm in order to criticize G.H. von Wright's absolute deontic logic. It made von Wright create a new kind of system. For a survey of this story, see Föllesdal & Hilpinen, op. cit. pp 8-15 and 21-31.
6.2 Oughts and ontology

To my mind an ontology is either (positively) a theory of the most abstract universals in the world, or (negatively) some kind of denial of the existence of universals. As is clear from chapter 3, I do not regard my views on the Is-Ought problem as ontologically non-committed. I have elsewhere tried to work out an ontological system which takes into account and relates, with the aid of different kinds of existential dependencies (see chapter 4.2), the fundamental categories of the world. What I am mainly trying to do in this book is to find some similarly abstract relations of existential dependence where norms, values, and virtues are involved.

As being said before, I regard consciousness as one-sidedly existentially dependent upon matter, more specifically upon matter organised as brains and nervous systems. And where there is no consciousness there are neither language-meaning nor evaluations and norm-settings. Like language-meaning, evaluations and norm-settings are secondary qualities and belong wholly to the realm of intentionality. They are human creations, and have the same kind of ontological status as language-meaning, which also means that they exist as nested intentionality. The 'Is' in the Is-Ought problem is either a perceived fact, a fact thought of, or a descriptive statement. It is not a natural fact in itself. 'Is', too, is necessarily connected with intentional phenomena.

Relations of existential dependence fuse different ontological categories into complex wholes; they unite universals. Universals can exist both as primary and as secondary qualities. There are universals in re as well as universals de dicto. The fact that the Is-Ought problem exists on the level of intentional acts does not affect the possibility of relevant relations of existential dependence. Being so, we have to ask ourselves whether there are any relations of interest for ethics which belong to a material logic.

Knowing, believing, or perceiving that something is the case, do not in themselves entail or imply any 'Ought'. The converse, however, is not true. A norm, a value, or a virtue have to be about something in the world. There can be no norms, values, and virtues if there are no truth claims. In language, the dependence of norms upon truth claims is mirrored by the fact that the expression 'Thou shalt' does not in itself make up a proposition. Something has to be added. In deontic logic the operators has to operate on something. O is a nonsense formula, but Op is not. In preference logic, in a similar way, the 'ethical connective' P has to be complemented by sentence variables into pPq. Both norms, values, and virtues are one-sidedly dependent upon truth claims. In these cases Ought implies Is, but Is does not imply Ought.

The fact that an action p is possible we shall symbolize by Mp. The old claim that ought implies can may then be symbolized:

(a) If Op then Mp

Is formula (a) a logically true statement? It remains true independently of the way we vary the action p, but it cannot be a formal-logical truth. O cannot be defined by means of M and ordinary formal-logical constants, and formula (a) cannot be true due to the constant 'if... then ...' in itself. If the formula is a logical truth, this truth has to be contained in the relationship between O and M. Here, what I call material logic supplies us with what we need. We have found a relation of existential dependence: O is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon M. On the linguistic level it means that the concept of O cannot be applied correctly if not the concept of M can also be correctly applied; the converse, though, is possible. That ought implies can is a material-logical truth even if it as such can be placed as an axiom together with formal-logical truths of a deontic logic.

'Ought implies can' is a special case of 'Ought implies Is'; Op implies the truth claim that p is a possible action. In a similar way pPq implies the truth claim that p and q are possible states of affairs:

If \( p \land q \) then \( M_p \land M_q \)

You cannot rationally prefer or not prefer a state of affairs which you regard as contradictory, just as you cannot rationally order someone to do something which you think he cannot do.

Norms, values, and virtues all of them presuppose truth claims about what is the case; the phrase 'is the case' taken in such a broad sense that \( de re \) possibilities are included. Of course this fact does not rule out the existence of Oughts in fictional discourse. It merely means that also such an Ought presupposes a kind of truth claim, namely the \( Is \) of fictional discourse. As there is a distinction between real and fictional \( Is \), there is a distinction between real and fictional Ought. The \( Is \)-Ought problem of fictional discourse is analogous to that of real discourse.

A complete moral philosophy should contain both formal-logical and material-logical truths. I find it misleading to call them meta-ethical truths. They are not above ethics or after ethics, they are merely abstract. Because of their abstract character, they need not be of immediate interest in ordinary everyday substantial disputes about norms, values, and virtues. But they can be.

Hitherto in this section, I have only given two examples, (a) and (b), of truths which I regard as belonging to the ontology of ethics and to material logic. Other truths of the same kind as \( ought \) implies \( can \) are to be found in some classical value theories and some theories about norms.

In his book General Theory of Norms Hans Kelsen, who is famous within legal philosophy, makes some claims which I look upon as claims about existential dependencies.\(^9\) He maintains, for instance, that there are no norms without a will, no norms without a norm-positing authority, and no norms without an addressee.

Most intuitionists have put forward theses which, to my mind, belong to the area of material logic. Henry Sidgwick is a good representative for that which I am thinking of. He argued both that it is impossible to reduce goodness to pleasure, and that a utilitarianism without some self-evident principles is impossible. To me these principles are material-logical truths. There are, according to Sidgwick, six such principles, namely the following:\(^{10}\)

(i) If an action would be right when done by A and wrong when done by B in precisely the same circumstances, there must be some qualitative dissimilarity between A and B which accounts for this.
(ii) If an action would be right when done by A to B and would be wrong when done in precisely similar circumstances by A to C, there must be some qualitative dissimilarity between A and B to account for this.
(iii) Any general rule ought to be applied impartially to all persons who come within the scope of the rule.
(iv) Mere difference in the date in one's life in which any good is to be enjoyed makes no difference to its value.
(v) The good of any individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the equal good of any other.
(vi) It is my duty to aim at good generally, so far as I can bring it about, and not merely at a particular part of it.

I am not going to discuss the content of these principles and whether they are true or not. They are quoted only in order to concretize what I mean by presumed material logical truths within ethics. If they are true, their truth is not dependent on the logical constants which appear in their formulation.

Last but not least, some unfairly short words about Franz Brentano's and Max Scheler's value theories. My views are in some general respects very similar to those of Brentano and Scheler. Scheler, of course, can be said to be the first great philosopher to talk about a material logic in ethics. I am thinking of his book Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die

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\(^{10}\) Or, to be cautious, according to C.D. Broad's exposition of Sidgwick's moral philosophy in Broad's Five Types of Ethical Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1930, which I am relying on. See in particular pp 223-27.
materiale Wertethik. In spite of this fact I shall not try to summarise their views. I shall merely reproduce some statements which they regarded as being a priori true but substantially relevant for ethics.

Brentano argued that there are necessary connections between pleasure and goodness. Chisholm, in his book about Brentano's value theory, has extracted eleven principles which express such connections:

1. Pleasure in the good is good;
2. Displeasure in the good is bad;
3. Pleasure in the neutral is intrinsically good;
4. Displeasure in the neutral is intrinsically bad;
5. Pleasure in the good is preferable to pleasure in the neutral;
6. Displeasure in the bad is preferable to pleasure in the neutral;
7. Pleasure in the good is preferable to pleasure in the bad;
8. Displeasure in the bad is preferable to displeasure in the good;
9. Pleasure in the bad is bad;
10. Displeasure in the bad is good;
11. Displeasure in the bad is preferable to pleasure in the bad.

Scheler has claimed that the following two classes of four ethical statements each, contain material-logical truths:

I.1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.
I.2. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value.
I.3. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value.
I.4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a negative value.
II.1. Good is that value in the sphere of the will which adheres (haftet) to the realisation of a positive value.
II.2. Evil is that value in the sphere of the will which adheres to the realisation of a negative value.
II.3. Good is that value in the sphere of the will which adheres to the realisation of a higher (or highest) value.
II.4. Evil is that value, which in the sphere of the will, adheres to the realisation of a lower (or lowest) value.

As the principle ought implies can does not give us the content of any Ought, the principles of Kelsen, Sidgwick, Brentano, and Scheler do not give us such content. Nevertheless they belong to a material logic not to a formal logic since their (real or imagined) truth is not supposed to be grounded on logical constants. The emptiness of the principles emerges from the fact that they state existential dependencies between determinables. Relations between determinates will be discussed in the next subsection. In chapter 7 ("Essentially connected emotions"), however, I hope to show that there are some other relations of existential dependence between determinables which are a bit more substantive than those pointed out by the philosophers mentioned.

Let us now take a look at the Is-Ought problem in relation to the examples of material-logical statements given. In statements (a) and (b) an Ought implies an Is, and the same is obviously true of the three Kelsen-examples. Equally obvious is that all of Scheler’s claims (I.1 - II.4) are concerned only with relations between Oughts. One kind of Ought implies another kind of Ought. Sidgwick's and Brentano's principles are harder to classify.

All of Brentano's principles are similar in that they relate pleasure and goodness, and I think it is enough to discuss one of them. What in the context at hand is true of one is true of all. Let’s look at the first one: Pleasure in the good is good. It is meant in such a way that it can be re-written as 'Pleasure in the good implies goodness', which, in turn, can be written 'Pleasure

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13 Quoted from Ron Perrin, Max Scheler's Concept of the Person, MacMillan: Hampshire 1991, p 60.
in the good implies Ought'. The question is what 'Pleasure in the good' stands for. We have earlier (in section 3.4, in particular) noticed that an Is can contain an Ought, and in that sense also imply it. We have something similar, but not identical, here. When an Is like a social fact implies an Ought, the Ought in question is part of the Is. The fact (Is) that someone takes pleasure in the good has of course goodness as a part, but it is not this goodness which is implied. The goodness implied is the goodness of taking pleasure in goodness. 'Taking pleasure in goodness' functions as good-making characteristic.

Ordinarily, in discussions of good-making characteristics the fact (Is) that there are some good-making characteristics is a fact which only contains natural properties. It may be called a simple Is. A fact like that of someone taking pleasure in goodness could then be called a complex Is. It contains both Ought and Is as parts. In the case of Brentano's principles we must say that an Is-with-an-Ought implies another Ought.

Sidgwick's first two principles quoted were these: (i) If an action would be right when done by A and wrong when done by B in precisely the same circumstances, there must be some qualitative dissimilarity between A and B which accounts for this; and (ii) If an action would be right when done by A to B and would be wrong when done in precisely similar circumstances by A to C, there must be some qualitative dissimilarity between A and B to account for this. In both cases a difference in two Oughts implies a difference in two corresponding Is. It may be seen as a special case of Ought implies Is.

The third principle (Any general rule ought to be applied impartially to all persons who come within the scope of the rule) and the fifth one (The good of any individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the equal good of any other) I will not discuss, since they involve complicated analyses of rules in general and the concept 'from the point of view of the Universe'.

His fourth principle was that mere difference in the date in one's life in which any good is to be enjoyed makes no difference to its value. In analogy with the other implication-patterns described this must be a case where a difference in time of an Is-with-an-Ought does not imply a difference in the same Ought. Even more abstractly put, it says that Is-with-an-Ought implies Ought.

The last of Sidgwick's principles read was the following: (vi) It is my duty to aim at good generally, so far as I can bring it about, and not merely at a particular part of it. Here, obviously, we have a principle which follows the same pattern as Scheler's principles: One kind of Ought implies another kind of Ought. Duty implies duty at good generally.

As a summary, I would say that in material logics of ethics we may find at least three different kinds of implications between Is and Ought:

(1) Ought implies Is
(2) Ought implies Ought
(3) Is-with-an-Ought implies Ought

Lacking is the implication Is implies Ought.

6.3 "Course Generale" for Oughts

The title of this chapter is meant to give the reader associations to Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralist linguistic classic *Course Generale de Linguistique*. I mentioned the book in section 5.3, when the method of variation which is used in linguistic commutation tests was described. Here I shall develop an analogy between structuralist linguistics and one kind of moral-epistemological area. I shall work out the analogy in relation to ethical language, but it holds true for ethical perception as well. My main claim (hinted at in chapter 1.4) is that determinate norms, values, and virtues (Oughts) relate to truth claims (Is) as meanings relate to sounds.

One qualification, though, is needed at once. The analogy does not work for all kinds of Oughts. It works well for all kinds of values and virtues, but not for all kinds of norms.

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Value-words and virtue-words are logically predicative; something or someone is said to have value or to be virtuous. Values and virtues are presented as inhering in entities. This way of speaking corresponds well with our perceptions of values and virtues. We perceive value and virtuousness in the same way as we perceive properties. Norm-words on the other hand are not logically predicative, and imperatives are in our culture seldom presented as inhering in things or persons. And in these cases the analogy below is not applicable. However, in 'ethical demand situations', as I have called them, norms function the way values and virtues always function. The norm in question supervenes in perception upon natural or social facts and is perceived as inhering in some kind of entity. When this is the case the analogy works for norms, too.

Let me now start by presenting a list of concepts which displays the analogy. Meanings corresponds to Oughts, and so on downwards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistics</th>
<th>Normative contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>meanings</td>
<td>norms, values, virtues (Oughts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sounds</td>
<td>truth claims (Ises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homonyms</td>
<td>Ought homonyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synonyms</td>
<td>Ought synonyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morphemes</td>
<td>Ought morphemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phonemes</td>
<td>Ought phonemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phonologically distinct features</td>
<td>evaluationally distinctive truth-claims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As definite meaning is one-sidedly dependent upon sounds (or graphical signs), so the concepts of norms, values, and virtues are, as determinables, one-sidedly dependent upon the determinable truth claim. Now, however, we shall look at determinates. A determinate truth claim can be a statement to the effect that a certain thing has some specific characteristics. When such a truth claim is contained in an evaluation it specifies value-making or virtue-making characteristics. A determinate value and some determinate value-making characteristics with its corresponding truth claims give each other mutually identity as this determinate value and these determinate value-making characteristics. They behave just like meanings and 'meaning-making sounds'.

Taking departure in Saussure's terms for the distinction between meaning and sound, i.e. the signified (= meaning) and the signifier (= sound) of a sign, one could talk of the Ought-signified (= norms, values or virtues) and the Ought-signifier (= truth claims) of an evaluation. When, for instance, someone is evaluated as a courageous person, there is both a positive appraisal (the person has a good character trait) and a kind of behavioural description. In analogy with Saussure's famous picture of the sign we get a corresponding picture of an evaluation:15

Linguistic sign:  

![Linguistic sign diagram](image)

Ought concept:  

![Ought concept diagram](image)

This kind of ontology of signs and evaluations is a form-matter metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense. The form (the signified and the Ought, respectively) is, as a determinable, one-sidedly dependent upon some matter (signifier or truth claim), but the determinate unity is a mutual penetration of form and matter.

Roman Jakobson of the Prague school has made the following remark about the unity of meaning (Signified) and sound (signifier) in relation to phonology:

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15 Ibid. p 114.
In order to be able to interpret and classify the diverse actions of our phonatory organs it is essential that we take into account the acoustic phenomena that these actions aim at producing, for we speak in order to be heard; and in order to be able to interpret, classify and define the diverse sounds of our language we must take into account the meaning which they carry, for it is in order to be understood that we seek to be heard.\(^\text{16}\)

It is possible to study mere sounds, but in order to understand ordinary language the identity-creating connection between sounds and meanings has to be borne in mind. Now, something similar can be said with regard truth claims. It is possible to try to discover and describe facts independently of moral and ideological considerations, but in order to understand ordinary truth-seeking contexts the connection between Oughts and truth claims has to be borne in mind. I think we can rewrite Jakobson in the following way:

In order to be able to interpret and classify the diverse actions of our knowledge seeking it is essential that we take into account the truth claims that these actions aim at producing, for we seek knowledge in order to lay claim to truth; and in order to be able to interpret, classify and define the diverse truth claims of our culture we must take into account the evaluation which they carry, for it is in order to influence that we seek truth.

As our concepts of colour each of them encompasses a lot of different shades of colours (i.e. the infimae species of colour), and out of a continuity creates discontinuity, so many truth claims create discontinuities. This explains the mutual dependence between an Ought and the identity of some facts. For instance, what counts as generous behaviour is not a behaviour which actually gets its identity from the behaviour alone, the identity is also given in order to fit the evaluation. There is a continuous multi-dimensional scale of different behaviours, and where the limit for generous behaviour should be drawn is not prescribed by the different behaviours themselves. The different kinds of behaviour referred to are good-making characteristics for the goodness of generosity. As such they exist independently of this goodness, but their identity as generous behaviour does not exist independently of the supervenient goodness.

In *The Varieties of Goodness* G.H. von Wright presented a riddle which gets its solution by the relation between goodness and good-making characteristics now presented. He wrote:

It seems to me certain that the forms of goodness are not related to a generic good as species are related to a genus. (This is why I speak of 'forms' and not of 'kinds' or 'species' of goodness.) But I do not know how to argue conclusively for my opinion.

No attempt will be made in this work to make clear the notion of a form which I use when speaking of the forms of goodness. The relation of a form of \(X\) to \(X\) is not that of

\[\text{causeally} \text{,} \text{ logically} \text{,} \text{ occurrence} \text{,} \text{ disposition} \text{,} \text{ token} \text{,} \text{ type} \text{,} \text{ individual} \text{,} \text{ universal} \text{. Which the relation is, we shall not discuss.}^{17}\]

In my view, von Wright had a correct intuition when he chose to speak of forms of goodness. Every determinate evaluation is a unity where 'the good' is a form superimposed on the matter made up of the good-making characteristics. Von Wright's mistake was to think that there is an opposition between being a form and being a species. A particular kind of goodness is both a form and a species of the genus goodness.

A form-matter metaphysics contains relationships which are neither logical nor causal in the ordinary sense, i.e. the relationship between a form and its matter is neither formal-logical or material-logical or physical-causal. In the book just quoted von Wright also writes:

Writers, who has employed the term 'good-making property', have in general not distinguished between such properties, which are causally, and such which are logically related to the goodness of a thing. Once the distinction has been noted, the question may be raised, to which kind of property the term 'good-making' should apply. This question is here answered by calling the causally relevant properties good-making. We could equally


\[\text{17 The Varieties of Goodness, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1963, p 13.}\]
well have decided to call the logically relevant properties by that name, or even let the term cover both kinds of properties. The important thing is not, how we understand the philosopher's term 'good-making', but that we should be aware of the two different ways, the causal and the logical, in which a 'naturalistic' property can be relevant to the goodness of something.\textsuperscript{18}

The relationship between Ought and Is which I am trying to expound by means of the analogy with the structuralist ontology of the sign, is, to say it once again, neither causal nor logical. It is structural. And structural relationships make up a species of their own.

In language there are homonyms, i.e. different meanings 'inhabit' the same sound as in 'blade' (of a knife, of an oar, as a leaf). Approximately at least, in a similar way different Oughts can 'inhabit' the same truth claims. For instance, words like 'psychologist' and 'headshrinker' have just about the same cognitive meaning but differ nonetheless in evaluation. In statements (cf. 'He is a psychologist' and 'He is a headshrinker') they seem to represent identical truth claims but different emotive meanings.\textsuperscript{19} If this is true we have 'Ought homonyms', i.e. different Oughts which are connected with the same truth claims. I have stressed 'approximation' and 'seeming' because I think that, mostly, a closer analysis of Ought homonyms reveals hidden differences in the totality of truth claims. However, Ought homonyms is clearly a logical possibility. If we should bring in aesthetcs and talk also of aesthetical Oughts, then I think we should find a lot of Ought homonyms.

Linguistic homonyms may give rise to interpretative conflicts but they need not. When in one and the same sentence a word is given different meanings there is an interpretative conflict, but if the word takes on its different meanings only in different contexts there is of course no conflict. The same is true of Ought homonyms. When the same behaviour in one and the same situation function both as a good-making and as a bad-making characteristic, there is an evaluative conflict, but if, for instance, the concepts of psychologist and headshrinker are applied only to different persons there is no real conflict.

How do we know that 'psychologist' and 'headshrinker' have (almost) the same cognitive meaning but different emotive meanings? Answer: By the (linguistic) method of variation. We can test the claim by means of the substitution frame 'He is x'. We insert for x different logical predicates which have the same cognitive meaning ('psychologist', 'headshrinker', etc.), and notes whether the evaluation varies. Of course, such substitution frames can have many different looks. Here is another one found in a philosophy book: 'The church is an x for the congregation'. Try to substitute the words 'place of refuge', 'haunt', 'meeting-place' for x and see whether anything of evaluative interest happens.\textsuperscript{20}

If we look merely at one particular person and his relations to homonyms, then linguistic homonyms get their determinate meaning from the context and usually there is no problem of interpretation. Also, when one and the same person connects one specific truth-claim with different evaluations, the evaluations in question tends to be contextual. If, for instance, anger is sometimes regarded as a bad-making and sometimes as a good-making characteristic, then, with all probability, anger is regarded is bad-making in one kind of situation and good-making in another kind of situation.

When two words are synonyms the same meaning inhabits different sounds as in 'brother' and 'male sibling'. You can discover them by exchanging the sound and note whether the meaning remains identical. When there are Ought synonyms the same evaluation is connected with at least two different kinds of truth claims, i.e. with two different samples of norm-making, value-making or virtue-making characteristics. Sometimes forgiving behaviour is regarded as a good-making characteristic for good parents, sometimes putting forward prohibitions is regarded as good-making characteristics for good parents. From the point of view of being a good parent the different behaviours are synonyms, although they should be used in different situations. However, even linguistic synonyms have a contextual aspect which often makes them in fact not really substitutable.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p 26.
\textsuperscript{19} The example is taken from J. Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1973, pp 51-53.
\textsuperscript{20} See J. Andersson och M. Furberg, Språk och påverkan, Doxa: Lund 1984, p 133.
Next question: What is an *Ought morpheme*? An ordinary morpheme is a smallest meaning unit. The word 'bills' may for instance be divided into two morphemes, 'bill' and 's', the meaning of 's' being the plural. However, if we divide 'bill' into smaller parts, e.g. 'bil' and 'l' these parts will carry no meaning. There is only sounds left. 'Bill' is a smallest unit of meaning, a morpheme. Similarly, too detailed descriptions loose their function as descriptions of good-making characteristics. If one wants to describe a person as generous, one should not give an account of exactly how much money he spends in different situations. Such an exactness is beside the point, which means that Ought morphemes exist. A simple example of Ought morphemes is the marks the children get in school or similar labels in other areas, i.e. labels like excellent, very good, good, fair, etc. There is simply no evaluation which is contained as a proper part in, for instance, the mark good. Sometimes the labels are numbers. When this is the case it is tempting to say that there is no smallest unit, since it seems possible to add decimals infinitely. But this is a wrong impression. Too detailed a grading scale loses its point, too. Some of the criteria behind such numbers are usually purely qualitative. In other words, such numbers are ordinal numbers not real numbers.

The analogy between linguistic morphemes and Ought morphemes can also be put in the following way. When we reach parts of linguistic signs which are smaller than the morphemes, there are not letters or phonemes enough to carry a meaning. When we come to parts of evaluations which are smaller than the Ought morphemes, there are not Ought-making characteristics or truth claims enough to carry an Ought.

Ought morphemes can also be illustrated by means of Urmson's old and simple example of apple grading (see section 1.3). Urmson, in his discussion, can be said to have focused attention on two Ought morphemes, Super Grade apples and Extra Fancy Grade apples. One criterial dimension was size. Super Grades should be not less than 2.50 inches in diameter, whereas Extra Fancy Grades should be not less than 2.25 inches. Another dimension was shape. For a tray of apples to be Super Grade it was required that each apple was of good shape, whereas for a tray to be of Extra Fancy Grade it was required that no apple was mishappened or malformed. These criteria are conventional. They are decided upon and laid down by an authority. None the less they exist, and when they exist they constitute Ought morphemes. Like the marks in school it is here meaningless to ask for smaller value units. A quest for smaller morphemes is meaningful only as a pray for a different grading system just like in language a quest for smaller morphemes is a quest for a transformation of the language.

A morpheme, be it linguistic or normative, has the kind of two-tiered ontological structure which was described at the beginning of this section. This structure explains some peculiar features of goodness. One of Saussure's famous statements is that "in language there are only differences without positive terms", a statement which he some lines later on qualifies in the following way:

> But the statement that everything in language is negative is true only if the signified and the signifier are considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, we have something that is positive in its own class.21

These remarks apply to Ought morphemes as well. If we look at goodness (= the Ought-signified) apart from good-making characteristics (= the Ought-signifier) then the only thing we can say is that being good amounts to not being bad, and that being bad amounts to not being good. There is only a difference. The one thing is not the other and vice versa. Similarly when there are several degrees. In Swedish schools there are marks from one to five. Looking at the marks abstractly, we can only say that having a three amounts to not having one, two, four or five, and so on with all the different combinations. There is no positive content; everything is negative. However, just like Saussure says, when we consider evaluations in their totality, i.e. in their fusion with good-making characteristics, we have something that is positive in its own class. We have good people, good carpenters, good washing-machines, a specific mark in a specific subject in school, and so on. If, like G.E. Moore we would like to say that goodness is a non-natural property, then we would have to

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21 Ibid. p 120.
add immediately that this non-natural property has no positive identity apart from natural properties.

Back to Urmson again. If we look at the values Super Grade and Extra Fancy Grade totally apart from any good-making characteristics or criteria, then here, too, the values are wholly negative. Super Grade is merely not Extra Fancy Grade and vice versa. The only positive content is that Super Grade ranks higher. In a similar way a truth claim such as 'x has a diameter of 2.4 inches' is wholly negative as a good-making characteristic until it is related to Super Grade and Extra Fancy Grade via the truth claims 'x has a diameter of no less than 2.5 inches' and 'x has a diameter of no less than 2.25 inches'.

Continuing our analogy, we should now look for Ought phonemes, i.e. something in between Ought morphemes and pure truth claims. What a linguistic phoneme is was explained in section 5.3. It is a smallest meaning-distinguishing sound-unit. Even if sounds which are smaller than a morpheme do not carry a meaning in themselves, some of them can nevertheless be meaning-distinguishing. When a phoneme is substituted for another then, by definition, the meaning which is partly carried by the phoneme is changed. If, to repeat my example, we substitute /p/ for /b/ in 'bill' we get a new meaning, whereas if we substitute a /b/ with a hard stress for a /b/ with a light stress in 'bill' we get the same meaning. The difference in stress is not a phoneme, but /b/ and /p/ are.

Now, a general definition of Ought phonemes is easily obtained: An Ought phoneme is a smallest Ought-distinguishing set of truth claims. The question is what this definition concretely amounts to?

Let us once again return to Urmson and exploit the simpleness of apple grading. Linguistic phonemes can be classified into groups like consonants, vowels, and semivowels. The counterpart to this in grading contexts is the criterial dimension, i.e. in our case truth claims about size, shape, ripeness, and so on. The Ought phonemes are the specific criteria laid down within each dimension. A truth claim with regard to an apple can be represented by the formula 'This apple is x', and in relation to this formula we can ask which substitutions in x will gives us a new evaluation? If, for instance we start in Super Grade, when do we move into Extra Fancy Grade? The answers give us Ought phonemes. Here is a list of such phonemes written with /.../ as in linguistics:

/size a/ = an apple being no less than 2,50 inches in diameter
/size b/ = an apple being no less than 2,25 inches in diameter
/ripeness a/ = an apple being ripe
/ripeness b/ = an apple which will ripe of itself
/ripeness c/ = an apple which is not ripe and will not ripe
/shape a/ = an apple having good shape
/shape b/ = an apple which is malformed a little
/shape c/ = an apple having bad shape
/blemish a/ = an apple with no blemishes
/blemish b/ = an apple with blemishes which do not affect quality
/blemish c/ = an apple with serious blemishes
/colour a/ = an apple with closely uniform colour
/colour b/ = an apple with reasonably uniform colour
/colour c/ = an apple not uniform in colour

With this phonemic alphabet at our disposal we can write down the Ought morphemes of Super Grade and Extra Fancy Grade in terms of the phonemes they contain. As the word 'bill' is written /bil/ in the ordinary phonemic alphabet we here get:

'Super Grade' = /size a, ripeness b, shape a, blemish a, colour a/
'Extra Fancy Grade' = /size b, ripeness b, shape b, blemish b, colour b/

The Ought statement 'This apple is Super Grade' supervenes upon the truth claim (A) 'This apple is over 2.5 inches in diameter, will ripe of itself, has a good shape, has no blemishes, and is closely uniform in colour'. The truth claim functions as an Ought-signifier. It signifies 'Super Grade', which is the Ought (or Ought-signified) in question. However, a truth claim like 'This apple is more than 2.5 inches in diameter' is no Ought-signifier. It makes only a
truth claim since the predicate is smaller than the Ought morpheme. Still the same it is an Ought phoneme since if it is exchanged for 'This apple is less than 2.5 inches in diameter' in the truth claim A above, then the Ought statement 'This apple is Super Grade' does no longer supervene upon A.

With regard to anthropological, historical and sociological studies of ethical systems, my impression is that they, in the terminology of this section, have never really focused attention on Ought phonemes. Usually a list of the different virtues in a society is listed, and the author tries to convey the differences between the virtues studied and those we are familiar with. Something which, by the way, may be a hard task. Philosophers not acquainted with such studies can think of all the books about Plato's and Aristotle's views of virtues and the problem of translating the corresponding Greek words. Really, there are no exact translations. I shall quote the author of one sociological study of a contemporary moral system. In the book *Sudanese Ethics* Tore Nordenstam says that:

On the whole, it would seem wise to keep Arabic terms as technical terms and avoid translations in the case of ird, sharaf, and karâma. But it is sometimes convenient to use translations. I adopt the convention that the standard translations, for the purpose of this book, of ird, sharaf and karâma shall be "decency", "honour" and "dignity", respectively. The reader will have to decide for himself in how far these translations are misleading.

I think that the Arabic terms in question describe some of the Ought morphemes in the culture in question. I also think that it would be possible to study the corresponding Ought phonemes, i.e. the underlying criterial dimensions. Surely, starting from scratch it would be hard work. But that is equally true of phonological studies of an alien language.

We have now reached the last concepts in my list, i.e. 'phonologically distinctive features' and 'evaluationally distinctive truth-claims'. The first term is coined by Roman Jakobson, founder of the Prague school in linguistics. He argues that the system of phonemes is not arbitrary, and that the phonemes are not the ultimate phonetic elements. There is a structure hiding even beneath the phonemes. Here we find the distinctive features. Some sounds constitute oppositions, and these oppositions can be combined in different ways which yield the different phonemes. Jakobson writes:

Overall there are five oppositions of distinctive features at work in the French consonantal system: (1) presence or absence of nasality; (2) complete or incomplete closure going together with weaker or stronger air friction; (3) tense or lax articulation together with absence or presence of the voice; (4) centrifugal or centripetal character; (5) buccal resonance chamber undivided or compartmented. These five oppositions are all that is required to constitute the fifteen consonants which we have just examined; these five oppositions of qualities are enough for the functioning of the entire French consonantal system which in the French language has a considerable functional load: in short, in French it is the system of consonantal oppositions which is employed to a very large extent in the differentiation of words, and this whole system is based on only five oppositionive features. As was pointed out at the beginning of these lectures, the problem was to extract the ultimate phonic elements endowed with a sense-discriminating function. These elements are precisely the distinctive features, qualities which are isolated by dissociating - or to put it metaphorically, by breaking up - the phoneme into its quanta. The formula which Saussure sought to apply to phonemes is fully applicable to the differential elements only. The differential elements are clearly and uniquely 'oppositional, relative and negative entities'.

The last phrase is typical of structuralist phonology. That an entity is negative means for Jakobson that it has no positive content of its own; its function is merely to distinguish among entities with such content. Being 'relative' means the same as being conventional. The

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23 Ibid. p 93.
ultimate phonic elements may distinguish different meanings in different languages. The term ‘opposite’ is Jakobson's term for mutual existential dependence. Nasality, for instance, can only be defined in relation to absence of nasality. Distinctive features behave as correlative pairs like left-right.

The question which the analogy with structuralist phonology brings to moral sociology is, whether beneath the Ought morphemes there is some further kind of hidden structure among the morally relevant truth claims. Are there really Ought phonemes and evaluationally distinctive truth-claims? Is there a structuralist Ought phonology waiting to be discovered? I think it is.

Now, whether or not this hunch of mine is true, there is an obvious intuition to the effect that changes in normative structures behave like language changes structurally understood. Such changes are neither purely contingent nor wholly determined by the pre-existing structure. They are like Aristotelian matter, i.e. the structures can, like a marble block, be formed in innumerable new ways but still the same they cannot be formed in all logically possible ways. There are both openness, inertia and limits at the same time.

Structuralist linguistics lays bare synchronic structures. Structuralist philosophy, on the other hand, has sometimes had a longing also for a diachronic structuralism, i.e. a belief in structures which are deterministic like the natural laws of Newtonian mechanics. In particular, this is true of Louis Althusser and his concept of structural causality, but neither Claude Lévi-Strauss nor the early Michel Foucault can be completely freed from a similar accusation. The ontology of this book, like every ontology which contains a concept of agency, contradicts such a philosophic structuralism. Agency and deterministic structures are incompatible, but agency and synchronic structures are compatible.

Since, to repeat, synchronic structures are both open and inertial, they set limits for the agents but do not determine their actions. This means that changes of structures, linguistic as well as moral, cannot be predicted. There is knowledge only after the event. In contradistinction to the a priori knowledge of deontic logic, preference logic and the ontology of ethics, knowledge of Ought synonyms, homonyms, morphemes and phonemes and their changes are a posteriori. Linguistics can never determine all the possible meanings and their changes, and no philosophy can never determine all possible specific norms, values and virtues and their changes. These are unpredictable. Norms, values and virtues will probably continue to change just like language changes. New meanings come into being and old ones pass out of being, and the same is true for norms, values and virtues.

A paradigm example of a creator of new language meaning is the poet. He gives words to emotions and situations which so far have lacked conceptualisations. Such creations do not follow predetermined rules. Most people are now and then in the same way parts of an ongoing process of language change, although these everyday changes are more invisible because they are smaller and oral. In substantive morals it is just the same. Here a paradigm example of the creative changer is the lawgiver, the great statesman who manages to enforce radically new laws. He creates artificial Oughts. But most people in an ongoing process of gossip, talk, reflections and quarrels change their views of norms, values and virtues. They create natural Oughts. (See chapter 2.4 for the distinction between natural and artificial Oughts.)

In chapters 1.4 and 2.4 I spoke about a necessary level beneath Is and Ought, a level where Is and Ought are fused. What has being said in this chapter means, among other things, that this level contains synchronic moral structures.
Chapter 7

ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED EMOTIONS

Norms, values, and virtues are imbued with emotions. We shall discuss whether there are relations of existential dependence between different kinds of ethical concepts and systems and different kinds of emotions. Anthropologists have long distinguished between 'guilt cultures' and 'shame cultures'. In a similar manner we shall distinguish between guilt-connected and shame-connected ethical systems, and we shall try to find out what such a connection really amounts to. We shall also discuss other morally relevant emotions and their relationships to different ethical systems. But in order to do all this we need a categorial map of the mind.

7.1 Mind in general

Many philosophers, from Plato onwards, have made a fundamental tripartition of different kinds of mind-phenomena, and so will I. But different philosophers have made different tripartitions. Plato distinguished between reasoning, desiring and willing; Descartes distinguished between thinking/having ideas, judging and willing/feeling. Brentano's distinction between presentation, judgement and interest is close to Descartes', whereas Kant's distinction between cognition, feeling and desire is more like Plato's. What is regarded as species and highest genera, respectively, is not without its consequences.

The tripartition which I think is generically basic is best conceptualised by means of the concepts of cognition, affection, and conation. Most emotions, I shall claim, have both a cognitive, an affective, and a conative aspect (or moment in the sense of Husserl's Moment). Cognition, in the determinable sense here intended, includes not only propositions or judgements (i.e. representational intentionality) but also perceptions, memories and introspective data (i.e. presentational intentionality). It even includes assumptions and imaginations. In all cognitions we are directed towards something; intentionality is at the heart of cognition, but, as will become clear, intentionality is not restricted to cognition.

I hope it is clear from this short presentation that my concept of cognition covers both having ideas (Descartes), mere presentations (Brentano) and judgements. Neither does it differentiate between what is given to a subject (like a perceived thing) and what is created freely by a subject (like an imagination). It might be tempting to call only the former class cognitions, but this temptation should be resisted. Even though subjective imaginations are created spontaneously by a will, they are nonetheless phenomenologically given for the subject. An imagination is both created and cognized by a subject. There is a distinction to be made here, but that is a distinction between passive and active cognitions. Ordinary perceptions are passive and imaginations active. It is only in the case of passive cognitions that we can (with Searle) speak of a 'mind-to-world direction of fit'. Only in this kind of case we can want our minds to fit the structure of the world.

There is of course, to put it mildly, much more to be said about the structure of cognitions. The distinctions between presentational and representational intentionality and between active and passive cognitions delineate only two of several dimensions. Cognitions also differ with respect to what might be called their epistemic and modal tone, respectively. The state of affairs cognized may be epistemically cognized as more or less believable or known, and it may (to follow Kant) be modal cognized as possible, real or necessary. Also, there are wholly different kinds of states of affairs which are cognized, and, furthermore, states of affairs which constitute intentional correlates may be placed in the future, in the present or in the past.

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1 For the distinction between representational and presentational intenionality, see Ontological Investigations chapter 13.3.
Affection in the determinable sense here intended has two modalities. With C.D. Broad I shall talk of pleasantness and unpleasantness. The distinction between pleasant and unpleasant affection is similar to, if not identical with, Spinoza's distinction between joy and sorrow, Hume's distinction between approval and disapproval, Kant's distinction between pleasure and pain, and Brentano's distinction between love and hate. As elsewhere in this book we have here the problem that the concept which is used to denote the determinable, is usually used to denote a determinate of the determinable. The same problem, of course, applies to Spinoza's, Hume's and Brentano's corresponding concepts. We shall not, therefore, think of pleasantness and unpleasantness in the ordinary sense. A pain for instance is usually not unpleasant in that term's determinate sense, only unpleasant in its determinable sense. An unpleasant affection, in the determinable sense, may be very intense as in a severe pain or it may be weak as in a mere contemplation of something one does not like.

Let me say at once that the problem whether there is only one intrinsic value (in the sense of pleasantness) or a lot of different intrinsic values, is not solved by the concept of affection introduced. Affection is, to repeat, a determinable which may have many determinates or merely one. Experience, though, speaks clearly in favour of a pluralism with regard to values. Monism with regard to values is as impossible as monism with regard to meaning. Graphical signs are all imbued with meaning in the determinable sense, but that of course does not imply the absurd view that every sign means the same. With few exceptions, different meanings go with different signs and, similarly, different kinds of pleasantness go with different cognitions.

Conation is distinct from affection even though there are some strong similarities. Conation has, like affection, seemingly two modalities: desire and aversion. Really, however, they should not be called modalities. A desire is a conation to get something and an aversion is a conation to get rid of something. It is not a difference in the conative aspect itself, it is a difference in the state of affairs the conation is directed at. Conations can be directed at both positive and negative states of affairs. The difference between pleasantness and unpleasantness, on the other hand, is not a difference between affections directed at, in this sense, positive and negative states of affairs, respectively. A mistaken temptation to identify conation and affection arises, I think, from the fact that a lot of conations include affections as parts. We often desire what is pleasant, and we often have an aversion towards that which is unpleasant. Inclusion, however, is one thing, identity another. We shall soon take a closer look at the relation between affection and conation.

Both conations and affections are one-sidedly existentially dependent upon cognitions. Obviously, there can be neither desires nor aversions without perceptions, imaginations, thoughts or similar intentional acts. Conations and affections supervene upon and fuse with cognitions. In a pleasant affection you either like something external which you are intentionally directed at or something internal which you are intentionally directed at. Mostly, but not necessarily, conations have a world-to-mind direction of fit (to use Searle's phrases again). In most conations we want something in the world to fit our desires or aversions, but we can very well also desire certain imaginations. In the latter case we want our (future) mind, not the world, to fit our mind.

Like cognitions, conations can be divided into active and passive. Volitions, i.e. conations created by the will of the subject, are active, whereas conscious needs, drives, desires, and impulses are passive conations. Affections, too, can be both active and passive. Today we regard most affections as passive, i.e. as given, but in ancient times the moulding of affections was regarded important. Of course, we should here remind ourselves of the extreme positions of Spinoza and Sartre. According to Spinoza no emotion is created spontaneously, according to Sartre every emotion is so created. The distinction between the actively given and the passively given cuts across the tripartition between cognition, affection and conation. With regard to the relationship between the latter three, I have already noted that both affection and conation are one-sidedly

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3 Broad op. cit. p 229. Another possible word for the determinable affection could also have been taken from Broad, namely 'hedonic tone'.
4 Compare McTaggart op. cit. paragraph 449, p 138.
5 Since I have referred to McTaggart a couple of times I want to say that he uses 'volition' as I use 'conation'; op. cit. p 132.
existentially dependent upon cognition, now we shall look at the relationship between affection and conation.

As already being said, affection and conation are distinct features of egos in the world. To be pleasant is not the same thing as to be desired; similarly, unpleasantness is not the same as being an object for aversion. Conation and affection are not existentially dependent upon each other. When a present state of affairs is regarded as pleasant it is not desired since it already exists. The same goes for past pleasant states of affairs. Since such states of affairs are logically impossible to get there is no meaning in desiring them. Affections can supervene on cognitions which are directed both at the past, the present and the future, but conations are necessarily future-directed. This means that there can be affections (pleasantness and unpleasantness) without conations (desires and aversions).

There are also conations without affections. I am sure the reader have experienced such conations. The paradigm example is affectionless action. Sometimes one is totally absorbed in an action. One desires a goal to be achieved, but one experiences neither pleasantness nor unpleasantness. Just as there are cognitions without any affections, there are conations without any affections. The thesis that all conations are directed at future pleasure (or reduced displeasure) is false and idealistic, and, I think, not without ideological consequences. From an evolutionary point of view it is an obvious fact that some conations, for instance those for food and sex, first existed as purely bodily tendencies without corresponding consciousness. Then when consciousness had emerged, consciousness experienced these tendencies as conations.

Having concluded that, on the level of determinables, conation and affection are existentially independent, we shall take a look at some more determinate cases. Our first question is whether cognitions directed at future pleasantness (positive affection) are necessarily connected with conations toward that pleasantness. The answer is 'no'. We can have cognitions directed at possible future pleasantness where no corresponding conation supervenes in the present. We can think of ourselves as in the future being in a pleasant state, without, for that sake, trying to reach this state. In other words: Day-dreaming is possible. That a conation (or an affection) supervenes on a cognitive act is one thing, that a cognitive act is directed at an affection is another thing. It is important to keep these things distinct. Psychological hedonism is doubly false. First, there are affectionless conations and, second, not even the prospect of future pleasantness does in itself necessarily imply a conation.

In many cases, of course, a pleasant affection supervenes on a cognitive act because the act is directed at a future pleasant state. When people think of themselves in future situations where they feel proud, they usually get a pleasant feeling also at the moment of thought. In this case both the act as act and its intentional object contain pleasantness. But even such an act does not necessarily contain a conation toward the future pleasant state. For most people there is perhaps such a conation, but not for the day-dreamer.

In relation to the phenomenological exploration we are concerned with here, we should make a fourfold distinction. We must keep distinct (a) the intentional object of a conation, (b) the exciting causes of a conation, (c) what will in fact satisfy a conation, and (d) the collateral effects of satisfying them. Broad has made the same distinctions vis-à-vis impulses. He took pity as one of his examples:

The exciting cause is the sight of another person, particularly a friend or relation, in distress. The aim or object of it is to relieve the distress. The collateral effect of its exercise are the gradual relief of the distress, feelings of gratitude in the sufferer's mind, and so on. Lastly, in so far as we are able to exercise the impulse, there is a pleasant feeling of satisfaction in our minds; and, in so far as we are prevented from doing so, there is an unpleasant feeling of frustration.

Many conations of course are conations for pleasure (or reduced displeasure), but there are other kinds of basic conations as well. If, on the level of determinables, we try to classify - in relation to which kind of intentional objects they have - the basic conations of man which common sense, biology and psychology nowadays seem to take for given, we will find, I
think, as many conations as there are players in a football team, i.e. eleven. This number, I want to stress, is neither a priori nor based on a secularized kind of number mysticism. It is an empirically contestable kind of philosophical anthropology. It is at one and the same time an interpretation and an empirical generalization. Here comes a short presentation of each of the conations which, today, I think are basic for man. In my opinion, these conations are both logically and chronologically prior to values as well as to self-consciousness.

(1) Conation for affections:
There are of course conations for determinate affections of pleasure and reduced displeasure (see point 4), but sometimes there is a conation for affection in itself; having any affection whatsoever seems better than having no affections at all.

(2) Conation for cognitions:
Cognition is not only a presupposition for conation, there seems also to be a drive to have cognitions. Any cognition is better than no cognitions at all. The most primary form of cognition is sense perception and, according to perceptual psychology, if external stimuli are removed then we create perceptions from within.

(3) Conation for conations:
There is a distinct second order conation to have conations. In particular, it appears in that special phenomena of weariness which is called acedia. Acedia is displeasure caused by lack of conations. In acedia one longs for desires. These three kinds of conations are conations for staying alive as conscious beings, i.e. they are all of them conations for having intentional acts. The eight kinds of conations (4 - 11) which are to be presented do not, in contradistinction, focus on the intentional acts themselves but on their objects or correlates, i.e. not on life as such but on the contents of life. Because of their disregard of the intentional object, the first three kinds of conations represent 'the blind will to live'.

(4) Conation for pleasant affections:
Under this heading belongs conations for both bodily and mental pleasures, as well as conations for reduced displeasure. A reduction of displeasure is pleasurable. This conation seems in some situations to be able to counteract 'the blind will to live'. When their future looks impregnated with intense unpleasant affections, some people commit suicide.

(5) Conation for food:
This conation is more accurately described as a conation for eating food, which here includes drinking. It shows itself as hunger and thirst. It must not be confused with the conation for the kind of pleasant sensations which can accompany eating and drinking. The conation for such sensations is a determinate subsumed under the conation for pleasant affections (4). Often, these two kinds of conations exist simultaneously, in which case they phenomenologically fuse with each other. Sometimes, however, they exist each on their own. Sometimes when we are hungry we eat unpleasant food; poor people even eat disgusting food. Now and then when we are full we go on eating for the pleasure of it. Gastronomic eating has nothing to do with hunger.

(6) Conation for sex:
This conation shows itself as lust. Here the tendency to lose the conation out of sight for an accompanying conation for pleasure is even stronger than in the case of food. The reason is of course the more intense pleasure connected with sex. Mostly, these two kinds of conations are fused. For our analytical reasons, however, we need to keep them separate. Sometimes they also exist separately. Frigid women seem to have a conation for sex still the same, and, at least today, sexually satisfied couples have what might be called 'gastronomic sex'. A kind of sex which is merely for the pleasure of it. Such sexual activity relates to the conation for sex

8 I think it is impossible to draw a line between metaphysics and science or between speculation and observation. They are interdependent. Since this is not the place to discuss epistemology, I have to refer to my book Ontological Investigations, chapter 16.3 "Empirically Criticizable Metaphysics".
as gastronomic eating relates to the conation for food. If gastronomic sex or gastronomic eating becomes impossible there is no frustration comparable to that which arises when the satisfaction of the conations for sex and food are made impossible.

(7) Conation for shelter:
The conation for shelter often appears as a desire for being warmer or being colder, but also as a desire to be physically and mentally safe in different ways. Such states as being not too warm, being not too cold, and feeling safe are usually not states of feeling pleasure. Rather, they are affectively neutral states. This fact, by the way, is further evidence for my view that conations are existentially independent of affections.9

(8) Conation for activity:
In a sense the conations for food and sex are conations for activities, i.e. for eating and having intercourse. Apart from that, however, we also have a need just to be active now and then. This general conation for activity is particularly obvious among children. They want to play for the sake of activity. Some such activities may be accompanied by affections but there is no necessary connection since there are affection-less actions. The satisfaction of the conation for shelter can be a relation between the soul and its body, as in coming in from the cold, but it can also belong purely to the soul, as when a threat disappears. A duality of the same kind exists in relation to the conation for activity. It can be a conation for bodily as well as a conation for mental activity. We can note that even elderly people like to take walks, and that there is a conation for intellectual problems not only among intellectuals. There are intellectual problems of many kinds. If we look for very popular intellectual activities, we should today think of cross-words and quiz.

In order not be misunderstood, I want to stress that these last four genera of conation (5-8), like all other conations, belong to the realms of intentionality and consciousness. I am stressing this because these genera have obvious counterparts among a lot of animals which seem to lack consciousness. Even animals without consciousness eat and drink. They seek sex and shelter, and as young animals they are playing, i.e. they are active without no specific goal. In my terminology there are in these cases corresponding tendencies but no real conations. Conations are not identical with bodily needs, although they are overlapping. We have a bodily need that our heart beats, but we have no corresponding conation; we have a bodily need for air, and sometimes a corresponding conation (for shelter); we have no bodily need for pleasure, but often conations for pleasure. The next kind of conation is, like the conation for pleasant affections, more spiritual in its essence than the conations for food, sex, shelter, and activity.

(9) Conation for confirmation:
This conation shows itself as a longing for people. To be confirmed is to be confirmed by another consciousness. Confirmation is on the spiritual plane what food is on the material plane. It may be called 'spiritual food', if that term is taken in a purely secular sense. We need confirmation in order to survive psychically, as we need ordinary food in order to survive bodily. As we can hunger for a sandwich and a cup of coffee, we can also hunger for a kind and encouraging look, some tender and nice words, a clap on the shoulder or a pat on the cheek. Sometimes we desire a huge meal and sometimes we desire a declaration of love. Today, though, we seem to be more aware of our general conation for material food than we are of our general conation for confirmation. I hope this difference will disappear in the future. The importance of confirmation can be paradoxically expressed by saying that disconfirmation is confirmation, too. It is better to meet angry looks than no looks at all, and it is better to hear bad words than to be totally neglected. The paradoxical aura disappears when we note that disconfirmation in the determinate sense (where its opposite is confirmation in

9 The conation for shelter can be of two kinds. You can be in an unpleasant or unsafe situation and strongly feel a desire for shelter. In that case, when you get shelter it is pleasant, i.e. there are positive affections. But you can also desire to remain in shelter when you already have shelter. That conation need not be connected with pleasantness or unpleasantness. It can be, as when you are frightened of something, but the point is that this kind of conation need not this connection in order to exist.
the determinate sense) is confirmation in the determinable sense. The conation for confirmation in the determinable sense is a need to be seen and heard by other human beings. I have said before that the different conations listed often are to our ordinary conations as tones are to a melody. The conations fuse and create chords. In particular, the conation for confirmation fuses with many other conations. For instance, what is called sexual desire is from our analytical point of view usually a mixture of three conations: a conation for sex (6), a conation for pleasure (4), and a conation for confirmation (9). Disregarding raping and sex with prostitutes, i.e. cases where one human being treats another human being merely as an instrument for his own satisfaction,10 sex contains in a sense a gift. When two persons freely give each other sexual satisfaction they give each other their bodies, and in this they confirm each other. Similarly, there is simultaneous satisfaction of three conations when you eat a dinner you have been freely invited to, namely the conations for food (5), for pleasure (4), and for confirmation (9).

The conation genera 4 - 9 are all of them egoistic. One desires in all these cases something specific for oneself. This is not true for the next conations which are directed at other people. Without such conations to relate to other people there would in my opinion be no ground for ethics. If all conations were egoistic, moral philosophy would have to face the trilemma of religion, natural rights, and nihilism.

(10) Conation for benevolence:
There exists, and this is very important to note, now and then a non-reducible desire to satisfy the desires of at least one other conscious being (human or animal). This conation is most apparent in the case of parent-child relationships. It then takes the form of a conation for caring.11 Once more we meet the difficulty of finding a proper term for the determinable at hand. As a determinate, caring can be contrasted with a weaker and more passive (determinate) conation for benevolence, but caring is nonetheless to be subsumed under the determinable of benevolence. Benevolence, it should also be noted, is not an altruistic conation in the sense that it is directed at every other human being. Nor is it a total subordination of one's own desires in relation to another being's desire, but that is not needed for benevolence. All the other kinds of conations listed can be the object of benevolence. For instance, one may merely want to give another human being food (5) or to confirm him as such (9). The conation for benevolence must not be confused with (to speak with Hume) feelings of sympathy and humanity. Such feelings are affections, and although they often give rise to benevolent conations, they nevertheless belong to the category of affections, not to that of conations. Nor must the conation for benevolence be confused with conations for the pleasures which may accompany acts of benevolence. Thomas Hobbes's famous view, that people (including himself) give alms only because they find pleasure in satisfying the poor, is guilty of this confusion. As I have distinguished gastronomic eating and play sex from the real conations for food and sex, respectively, I want to distinguish between amusement benevolence (which is a conation for pleasure) and the real desire to be benevolent. Some people, I have noticed, are reluctant to call benevolence a desire or a conation. They want to restrict these terms to egoistic desires and conations. However, I have found no better terms to use. Theologians sometimes distinguish between two kinds of love, eros and agape, where eros represents man's desire to reach god whereas agape is god's unmotivated love of man.12 In eros something is wanted, in agape something is given. Analogously, I want to distinguish between egoistic conations from the conation of benevolence. The conation for benevolence, whose intentional object is an end in itself, has to be kept distinct from instrumental benevolence. In the latter case "benevolence" is merely a means to satisfy egoistic conations.

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10 Most cases of raping seem to be a fusion of the conation for sex with the a specific conation for confirmation, a need to feel power over women. A woman which is being raped is used as an instrument for the satisfaction of two desires.
11 For a heavy stress on caring as a basic category, see Nel Nodding, Caring. A feminine approach to ethics and moral education, University of California Press: Berkeley 1984.
'If I help him, he will probably help me', that is the pattern of reasoning behind instrumental benevolence.

(11) Conation for malevolence:
Sometimes there is, as an end in itself, a desire to frustrate some desire of at least one other conscious being (human or animal). This conation for malevolence should not be confused with sadistic impulses which are a peculiar kind of conations for positive affections (4). A sadistic impulse is a conation for pleasure caused by frustrating someone; an impulse of anger, on the other hand, is just a conation to frustrate someone. Its satisfaction may be accompanied by either pleasure, displeasure, or merely the emptiness of a gone conation. The conations for benevolence and malevolence are, like the other conations, often accompanied by pleasant affections at the moment of satisfaction. However, association is one thing, identity another. Benevolence (10) and malevolence (11) are not desires for positive affections (4). I want to remind the reader of the distinctions made earlier between (a) the intentional object of a conation, (b) the exciting causes of a conation, (c) what will in fact satisfy a conation, and (d) the collateral effects of satisfying them. In malevolence, the intentional object is to frustrate somebody in some way. At the moment of existence, malevolence is an end in itself. It may as such even be stronger than egoistic conations. Hate is a form of malevolence, and hate can cause a lot of egoistic losses. To the distinctions a-d, another one may be added, namely (e) an evolutionary explanation of a certain kind of conation. Taking into account the vulnerability of newborn human beings, homo sapiens would probably have been an extinct species if it had not contained impulses of benevolence towards friends and impulses of malevolence towards enemies. The conation for malevolence, whose intentional object is an end in itself, has to be kept distinct from instrumental malevolence. In the latter case "malevolence" is merely a means to satisfy egoistic conations.

The eleven fundamental conations which we as human beings experience can profitably be grouped into three groups.

A. THE BLIND WILL TO LIVE:
1. Conation for affection
2. Conation for cognition
3. Conation for conation

B. EGOISM:
4. Conation for pleasant affections
5. Conation for food
6. Conation for sex
7. Conation for shelter
8. Conation for activity
9. Conation for confirmation

C. ALTERISM
10. Conation for benevolence
11. Conation for malevolence

Several kinds of comments can now be made. If I am allowed to be a speculative psychologist for a moment, then I will put forward the hypothesis that every basic conation which is deeply frustrated in our childhood, not only those for sex and confirmation, will try to take revenge later in life. This is so, I think, because basic conations are not subject to the will. We cannot choose them away. Sometimes, we may just drop a wish or an intention but that is not possible with a basic conation. Basic conations always strive for satisfaction. When we think we have killed them with our will, they only strive for satisfaction in a new way. And there are many ways open. An innumerable number, it seems.

Often in psychology there is talk of a 'need staircase'. It is said that there is a ranking of the needs, and that we want some needs to be satisfied before we seek the satisfaction of the others. Abraham Maslow is famous for his list with food and sex at bottom (1), then shelter
(2) and on the third level belongingness and love (3). On top we find a need for esteem (4) and self-realization (5). I do not believe in this. Since conations can fuse we can try to realize our selves (= the presumed top need) at the same time as we try to satisfy our needs for food and sex (= the presumed bottom needs). The point then is to get food and sex in a way which we find confirming and in which we feel at home. I even think that some suicides are made as a kind of confirmation of oneself. The person in question commits suicide in order to show that other persons really ought to have felt sorry for him which they did not. He felt under-valued and felt that a suicide would change this. If this is true then we have cases where top needs literally kill the bottom needs. In several cultures I think that the confirmation structure has had such a character that some woman, for instance some medieval nuns, have tried to abstain from sex in order to get better satisfaction of other needs. There is no natural predetermined order among the different conations listed.

Hunger and lust are the most obvious conative expressions, and there is often a tendency to model, wrongly, every conation and its structure of satisfaction after a structure which the conations for food and sex have in common. Both of them express themselves as a lack or want of some external object. Their structure of satisfaction has a double means-end character. First, some activity is needed as a means to get the desired object, i.e. food in the case of hunger and a human being of the opposite sex in the case of heterosexuality. Second, the desired objects are not ends in themselves but means for eating and having sexual intercourse.

The conations for food and sex have also another feature in common. In themselves, i.e. when free from external pressure, they have a pulsating temporal structure. After satisfaction, for a while, there is no conation, but sooner or later the conation arises again and a want is experienced. We seek satisfaction again and it all starts anew.

This pulsating structure also explains aversions towards food and sex. We can, especially when forced, become over-satisfied. At bottom there are not two conations with regard to food and sex, desire and aversion, only one pulsating conation. This is easily neglected since, usually, people are not forced to eat more than they want. However, when it happens a negative conation, an aversion, arises. Such aversion is well known among children in the rich countries. It shows itself as disgust; the food just looks disgusting. A similar phenomena arises if people in some way or other are forced to have sex. Then an aversion towards sex arises.

The blind will to live (conations 1-3) has a pulsating rhythm, too. When we become over-satisfied with life, we want to sleep. We do not want to die, but we want that our conations should rest. In this sense there is an aversion towards life. Consciousness should go. The blind will to live is one pulsating conation which includes the will to sleep. Of course, when I am talking about sleeping here, I am talking about dreamless sleeping. The one who wants to go to sleep in order to dream wants life; he desires both cognitions and affections.

The conation for shelter has a temporal structure which differs from that of hunger and sex. There is not a wave-like pattern where a desire for shelter is followed by a desire for non-shelter (which, it has to be noted, is something else than a desire for activity) in the way desires for food and sex can be followed by desires for non-food and non-sex. Our conation for shelter can be continuously satisfied without being over-satisfied. We might say that this conation has a resting point or natural place. It is a conation to be in a state, and such conations can only arise when we are moved (or when we imagine ourselves as being moved) outside that state. Its temporal structure is occasional instead of pulsating. However, when the conation for shelter is occasioned, it often has a structure of satisfaction similar to that shared by the conations for food and sex. When we are freezing we desire clothes and to be warm, when we are wet we want a house where we can become dry, and so on. We have to work in order to get some objects by means of which we can get the shelter which is an end in itself. Sometimes, however, we do not need external things for shelter. It is enough for us to move to another place where there is a more fitting weather and better surroundings.

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13 I would like to remark that I think that the pulsating rhythm has specific bodily existential dependencies. There are people who never sleeps, and there are people who have to eat more or less continuously (they are said to suffer from Median Chain Acyl Coenzym Adehydrogenasdefect). Therefore, the rythm of the different conations is probably not unchangeable.
In order to satisfy the conations for pleasant affections, food, sex and shelter, most people have to work or to be active. This fact explains, I think, why only a minority of modern philosophers (the greatest among them are Marx and Hegel) have clearly seen our conation for activity. Our conation for activity becomes satisfied when we are working in order to get the means to satisfy our conations for pleasant affections, food, sex, and shelter. It is, however, easily detectable in children's play. Children have an obvious desire to be active even when the other desires are satisfied. The activity typical for the conation for activity is not work but play. Playing is not a means for some end. It is an end in itself. If the conations for pleasant affections, food, sex and shelter mostly is experienced as a lack or want, the conation for activity is experienced as an abundance; there is an abundance of energy.

The conation to use all our different powers and to be active has, like hunger and lust, a pulsating temporal structure. After a while there is satisfaction, but later on, without any external changes, the desire to be active arises again. If, on the other hand, one is forced to be active in such amounts that the conation for activity is over-satisfied, then an aversion towards activity appears; there is an intense desire for rest. For the lower classes in history, this desire has, because of their working conditions, led to the formulation of utopias where the conation for activity is totally absent. For the slave-owning ancient Greek philosophers, on the other hand, the conation for activity was an obvious fact.

Phenomenologically, play is an end in itself. From an evolutionary point of view, it is a means for the survival of the species, but that is another thing. It seems obvious that if there have existed species who did not have this conation for activity, they did not develop their powers and capacities as they otherwise would have done, and so they got a disadvantage in evolution. The individual, however, plays for playing's sake. The same remark, I want to repeat, applies to the conations for benevolence and malevolence. Since homo sapiens is a herd animal, benevolence inwards towards the primary group and malevolence outwards towards other groups have been, for our species, evolutionary profitable, but that is quite compatible with the fact that for each individual benevolence and malevolence can be an end in itself.

Our alteristic conations, i.e. those for benevolence and malevolence differ in their temporal structures. Benevolence is like the conation for activity, whereas malevolence is like the conation for shelter.

Benevolence has in itself a pulsating structure, but like that for activity it often functions also as a means to satisfy other conations. A lot of people have so many caring duties that they do not simply realize the existence of their conation for benevolence. From the actor's point of view the satisfaction of the real conation may be called play-benevolence. Like the real conation for activity it shows itself not as a lack of something but as an abundance of energy.

The conation for malevolence, like that for shelter, does not pulsate. Both have an occasional temporal structure, i.e. for both of them there are situations in which they can rest content continuously. In order to arise they need to be occasioned. Pulsating conations are of course not situation independent either, but they are nevertheless in and of themselves such that they independently of situation do pulsate. Our conation for shelter, on the other hand, never arises if we always have shelter. And something similar is true for malevolence. It arises, perhaps, only when the psychic part of our ego is deeply threatened. This does not imply, it should be noted, that malevolence is a means for something else, and so not a basic conation since there is no intentional object which has to do with survival. (A similar remark applies to the conation for shelter.) Also, think again of hate, which is a determinate of our determinable malevolence. Assume that you hate somebody and wish him bad luck for having stuck your happiness in some way. Such hate is seldom a means for getting the wanted happiness. It has become an end in itself. That it has been caused by something does not alter this fact.

What I have now said about the conations for benevolence and malevolence represents my answer to the old question whether we human beings are by nature good or bad. In a sense we are both, i.e. there are basic conations for both benevolence and malevolence, but there is a difference which can be said to tilt the metaphysical balance in favour of the good (benevolence). Since the conation for benevolence has a pulsating structure it will in and of itself show itself now and then. In other words it cannot be continuously resting which the conation for malevolence can be.
All conations are, let it be said once again, mental or conscious. Machines, plants, and lower animals do not have conations. Often, however, conations supervene upon and fuse with the corresponding physical tendencies which exist also in lower animals, but a pure physical tendency is not a conation. One conation, however, stands here apart, and that is the conation for confirmation. It does not fuse with the body as intimately as the other conations. When you are confirmed by a friendly glance, it is your soul rather than your body which becomes warm, even if the latter is affected, too. Confirmation has another specific characteristic which also makes it differ radically from the other conations.

When the satisfaction of the conations for food, sex, and shelter involve other people, they may all of them be satisfied through force, threat and violence. Robbing and raping are only too well-known phenomena in relation to the desires for food and sex to need further discussion. But let us now look at confirmation. Here things are different. What I am going to say is intimately connected with Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic in *The Phenomenology of Mind* and some of Sartre's analyses in *Being and Nothingness*, although I shall not repeat their words exactly.

The peculiar thing with confirmation has to do with the category of spontaneity, i.e. the view that we as human beings are (partly) free. I will here, as elsewhere in the book, take it for granted that we are not totally predetermined and therefore sometimes can act otherwise than we will act. Now, confirmation is necessarily freely given confirmation. Confirmation is a gift from another human being, even though the giver does not in any sense become poorer. You cannot get it by means of threat, force, and violence; it is impossible to get a gift by robbing someone. Gifts which are not freely given are not gifts. In a deterministic world there can be no gifts at all.

Let us look at a possible counter-example. An authoritarian person, A, threatens another, B, into obeying his orders because he gets confirmation from being obeyed. It may now seem as if A gets his confirmation by force and not as a gift from B. The point, however, is that B freely gives in for the threat. Even if it would have been disastrous for B, he could have acted otherwise. Therefore, in a sense, B's obeying is a gift to A. The authoritarian A would not have been confirmed by ordering a robot to do the same things. A would not even have been confirmed by B if B would have shown contempt for A while performing the ordered action.

The master, according to Hegel, wants the slave both absolutely subordinated and freely acknowledging the master's superiority, and that is a contradiction. Sartre makes a similar point with regard to love. In love you want to the other to be magnetized by you and attached to you by a kind of natural law, a natural force experienced as a passion. At the same time, however, you want the beloved to have chosen you freely, but you cannot have it both ways at the same time. Sartre thinks that all human relationships contain insoluble conflicts of such kinds, but that is wrong. Such conflicts are not necessarily linked to confirmation in general.

We can very well just long for confirmation as a gift freely given to ourselves by some of our fellow-beings.

I have claimed that the conations for food, sex, activity and benevolence have a pulsating temporal structure, and that the conations for shelter and malevolence have an occasional structure. The conation for confirmation (like that for pleasure) seems to have a much more indefinite temporal structure. Some people seem to long for a steady and continuous flow of confirmation so that they experience an almost constant longing for company. Other people, however, seem to long for intense moments of confirmation followed by loneliness; some artists are conspicuous examples.

Confirmation is always confirmation for something, if only for one's mere existence. According to most psychologists, children need such reasonless confirmation. Mostly, however, people are confirmed for their actions or for some character trait. These facts taken together imply that it is impossible to seek confirmation directly. If one is confirmed because one merely exists it is pointless to seek the corresponding confirmation, and if actions or character traits are appraised one can only seek confirmation by trying to perform confirmation-giving actions or by trying to get confirmation-giving character traits. Since confirmation is always freely given confirmation, confirmation is necessarily a by-product of something else.
Some of the things I have said about man's conations can be put together in a table in which deviances in structure from the conations for food and sex are easily visible. In the table the blind will to live is disregarded, and it looks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONATION</th>
<th>RYTHM</th>
<th>FORM OF APPEARANCE</th>
<th>FORM OF SATISFACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant affections</td>
<td>indefinite</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>pulsating</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>pulsating</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>occasional</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>pulsating</td>
<td>abundance</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation</td>
<td>indefinite</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>pulsating</td>
<td>abundance</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malevolence</td>
<td>occasional</td>
<td>lack</td>
<td>direct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our conation for food link us necessarily with objects in the world, our conation for sex link most of us with other subjects (as subjects or as pure sex objects), but our conation for confirmation link us necessarily with other subjects as subjects. Our conations for benevolence and malevolence link us necessarily with the conations of other subjects. The conations for confirmation and benevolence are the stuff which our social nature is made of. Confirmation has a peculiar form of satisfaction, and benevolence has a peculiar form of appearance. An effort is needed in order to get a clear and distinct idea of them.

7.2 Emotions in general

In order to discuss possible relationships between emotions and ethical systems we need a metaphysics of emotions. I take it for granted that, today, it is not necessary to discuss the reductive views which identified emotions either with sensational feelings in the body (e.g. William James) or with bodily behaviours and dispositions (e.g. Gilbert Ryle). It seems to be generally agreed nowadays that emotions normally are very complex unities which contain as essential parts both cognitions and other kinds of intentional acts. In my analysis of emotions I shall once more employ the concept of one-sided existential dependence. This brings some order into a somewhat chaotic area. I will use 'emotion' in a determinable sense where it subsumes both emotions in the ordinary sense and feelings.

I shall, to begin with, use Spinoza as a foil. My views on emotions are in certain respects similar to his, although the classic philosophers which, in my opinion, have said the most accurate things about emotions are John McTaggart och C.D. Broad. Among modern philosophers I would like to mention William Lyons. According to Spinoza, emotions are complex and structured entities. Like a musical chord different kinds of emotions contain specific and necessary parts which constitute their identity or nature.

Spinoza's classifications and definitions of the different kinds of emotions are explicitly put within a deterministic framework. He says that emotions can only be studied if they are deterministic entities. In this, however, he is wrong. The concept of agency is compatible with the view that emotions are complex entities which, within themselves, contain necessary relations. Let me argue by analogy. That a certain tone exists at a certain moment is a contingent fact. Nonetheless there is in the tone a necessary relation, a relation of mutual

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existential dependence, between pitch and volume; no pitch without a volume, and no volume without a pitch. In a similar way it is a contingent fact that a certain emotion, e.g. fear, exists, but within this contingent emotional unit there are necessary relations. Fear is necessarily directed towards the future. The one who fears something in the past is contradicting himself as much as the one who thinks that both p and non-p is the case. If you desire to avoid the past you contradict yourself. Also, as we shall see later on, there are necessary connections between kinds of emotions and kinds of agents. Even such relations are compatible with the existence of agency.

In Spinoza's metaphysics everything material has a mental aspect, and vice versa. Emotions, consequently, has both a bodily and a mental aspect. If we fear something, we do not only consciously experience something fearful. Our face and our body will take on rather specific expressions and postures, and we will act, or tend to act, in certain ways to avoid what we fear. Probably, we will also experience our body in fear-specific ways. Emotions are, I agree with Spinoza, necessarily connected with bodily behaviour, but, and here comes the second deviation from Spinoza's views, I do not think that bodily behaviour necessarily has a mental aspect. There are animals with emotion-like behaviour which seem to lack consciousness and intentionality. As I said in section 4.2, I regard intentionality and mental phenomena as one-sidedly existentially dependent upon a material substrate. Spinoza, on the other hand, assumes a relation of mutual existential dependence.

For Spinoza, the mental and the material are different aspects of the same thing (modi). According to the view of irreductive materialism which I am unfolding, the mental fuses with the material. The body and its possible behaviours become essential parts of the intentional object of many emotions. In such emotions we are not merely directed at a state of affairs. We apprehend the state of affairs as, to use an apt phrase, something in the world 'to be x'd', i.e. something to be acted in relation to. Emotional perception is then practical perception. Let me quote J. Casey.

In that case my consciousness of my emotion would seem to be a reflective consciousness of a state of myself. My self would necessarily be the object of my consciousness when I am conscious of an emotion. Yet it is characteristic of an emotion that I am conscious of an object under a certain description - 'to be fled', 'to be attacked', 'to be kissed' - and that this consciousness is not mediated through a consciousness of myself. In other words, my emotional consciousness is a consciousness of the world as 'to be x'd'. Sartre expresses this by saying that fear does not begin as consciousness of being afraid, 'any more than the perception of this book is consciousness of perceiving it. The emotional consciousness is primarily consciousness of the world.' It is because 'the emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis' that the emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world.16

Here I would like to refer back to chapter 3.2 about the ontology of the ego. There it was argued that the ego cannot be confined to the body. From an ontological point of view, emotions are not cut loose from the ego merely because they also can be directed at objects out in the world.

The fact which Sartre drew attention to, that 'emotional consciousness is primarily consciousness of the world', is of course quite consistent with the fact that persons who have emotions are, by others but not by themselves, perceived as having distinct bodily characteristics. In particular one can think of the facial expressions of emotions like joy, sorrow, and anger. Psychologists have studied them.17 Such facial expressions have a communicative function. Body language exists. In ordinary language emotions are often expressed and communicated by means of things like pitch levels and intonations.18

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18 Let me quote from a linguistic study: "Just like in most other studies to date, the parameters of pitch level, pitch range, loudness, and tempo were considered. This inventory was extended, however, to include the perceptual ratings of lip rounding, lip spreading, laryngeal tension, laryngeal laxness, creak, tremulousness,
Notwithstanding the important role our body plays in all our emotions, we shall, like Spinoza, mostly confine our analyses of emotions to their mind-aspect. Relating to section 7.1 we can metaphorically say that mental space is made up of three categorically different dimensions, i.e. cognitions, affections and conations. We shall now try to locate emotions within this space. The mental space delineated is wide enough to contain even emotions which are different from those we are used to in our culture. When anthropologists talk of 'unnatural emotions' they nonetheless speak about emotions which consist of cognitions, affections and conations, although of course determinate ones. Every emotion defined on the level of determinables may be realized in a lot of different ways. That is part and parcel of the determinable-determinate distinction. Take for instance Spinoza's characterization of love. "Love is joy (pleasure) with the accompanying idea of an external cause". When you love a woman love is realized in one way, when you love some kind of food love is realized in quite another way. Both ways, however, are determinates of Spinoza's determinable love. It is not merely that your 'idea of the external cause' of your pleasure/joy is different. The different objects affect the loving. On this determinate level I will not delve. "Thick descriptions" I have to leave to the anthropologists and the novelists.

The first thesis we can put forward is that (1) every emotion contains a cognition; mostly a complex and structured cognition which contains beliefs about the world. Emotions have directedness, i.e. intentionality, and they are normally directed at something in the world. You are not just angry, you are angry at somebody; you do not merely feel guilt, you feel guilt for something; and so on. Even simple feelings like pains contain cognitions. When you feel a pain you are directed towards a pain in something. Possible exceptions like life anxiety and general euphoria are no real exceptions. They are directed at everything, and they are therefore not directed at anything specific; something which can mislead one to believe that in these cases there are no cognition contained in the emotions.

According to Spinoza, every emotion is a combination of desire with joy or sorrow. In every emotion you want something, and an emotion is either positive (joy) or negative (sorrow). 'Desire', 'joy' and 'sorrow' are here determinables and more or less synonymous with my concepts of 'conation', 'positive affection', and 'negative affection', respectively. I do not think, however, that Spinoza is quite right. In my opinion the next two statements which complement the first theses (1), capture the truth.

(2) Every emotion contains an affection, either positive or negative. All emotions have, to speak with Broad, a hedonic tone. Love and pride, to take two examples, contain positive affection whereas hate and shame contain negative affection.

(3) Some emotions contain a conation, some do not. In love you desire the object you love, in hate you want to hurt somebody or to get rid of something. If one is ashamed, and think one deserves to be ashamed, there is not necessarily any desire to get rid of the shame or
something else. There is probably a wish that one had not done the shameful thing. But a wish that the past should have been different is not a conation.

The things now said means that emotions are complex unities which contain cognitions, affections, and (often but not always) conations. Within such unities affections and conations are one-sidedly existentially dependent upon cognitions. In this, by the way, we leave Spinoza behind again. He has no notion which corresponds to that of one-sided existential dependence.

It is important to note the way affections fuse with cognitions. Their intimate relationship is best illustrated by the still on-going discussion of pains: 'Are pains necessarily unpleasant?', as one author calls a paper. The position that they are not, can be empirically backed. It is a fact that people who are given morphine have reported that they still have the same pain sensation but that this sensation is no longer unpleasant (one might even say 'painful') any more. Pains, then, according to our method of variation, are sensations which normally but not necessarily are fused with a negative affection. Emotions contain more complex cognitions which, in a similar way, have affections of different degrees supervening upon and fusing with them. Or, put in a somewhat different way: Emotions are Gestalt qualities which always can be analyzed into at least one cognitive and one affective moment. The analysis, though, has to take place, so to speak, after the event. Living through an emotion is one thing, analyzing it is another.

The relationship between affection and cognition is, like that between Oughts (e.g. goodness) and truth claims (e.g. good-making characteristics) structurally similar to that between signified and signifier as explained in chapter 6.3. As we spoke of Ought-signified and Ought-signifier we can now speak of Affection-signified and Affection-signifier. When, for instance, we are afraid, we cognize something as fearful. As an auditory sign, although experienced as a unified whole, consists of a signified (meaning) and a signifier (a sound) which signifies the signified, an emotion, although experienced as a unified whole, has an affective quality (being fearful) signified by a cognition (that which is fearful).

Affections supervene on and fuse with cognitions as meaning supervene on and fuse with visual or auditory patterns. This analogy contains another important feature, too. The basic postulates of Hermeneutics apply to affections as they do to meanings. As a word gets its meaning from the whole context, a certain state of affairs gets its affective quality from the whole situation. It is a fact that we can have and do have positive affections towards states of affairs which as parts contain states of affairs towards which, in themselves, we have negative affections. There is an addition problem for affections as there is one for meaning-units.

Neither reading nor perceiving affections are like building a house stone by stone. In the latter case each unit (stone) has its shape, weight and colour independently of the other; in the former cases the units are context-dependent. There is no general one-to-one relationship between cognized states of affairs and supervening affections. However, like meaning and sound, there are often some frequent correlations. Dictionaries are useful, and there is a kind of dictionary for emotions, too. Let me give an example. According to Harré, the following is true of jealousy:

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24 Broad thinks the same: "We must begin by remarking that it is logically impossible that an experience should have no characteristic except hedonic quality. It is as clear that no experience could be merely pleasant or painful as that nothing could be black or white without also having some shape and some size." Ibid. p 235.


26 There is also an addition problem for conations. Now and then most of us have desires which are in conflict with each other. To do adventurous things and stay healthy, follow erotic impulses and be faithful to the one one loves, or, in general, as the saying goes: to eat the cake but have it. Now, I would say that whereas affections add like meanings, conations add like forces. We can have conations in opposite directions which cancel each other; we can have two or more conations in the same direction which add up to a more intense conation; and we can have conations which allow for compromises and, in a way, add like a force parallelogram. No conation really wins and the result is a conation towards something inbetween.
B is *jealous* of A if the following conditions obtain: (a) A has acquired or achieved something, X, to which he has no better right than B; (b) B wants X. Since B believes he has as good a right to X as A his defensive strategy must be to deprive A of X.\(^{27}\)

In the revival of analyses of emotions which took place in the eighties, one distinction made was that between 'identificatory beliefs' and 'explanatory beliefs'.\(^{28}\) The cognition contained in an emotion often contains in turn a belief about what causes the emotion. Sometimes the identificatory belief and the explanatory belief have the same intentional object. When you fear, say, a dog in front of you, you think that it is his fearful appearance which causes your fear. The fearful appearance is thought to explain the emotion of fear directed at the fearful appearance. Sometimes, however, a fear is regarded as a projection, i.e. regarded (explanatory belief) as caused by something else than the fearful thing. A person suffering from claustrophobia may honestly believe that his fear in front of the open place is caused by himself and not by the fearful appearance of the place. In such cases there is a kind of 'split cognition' in the emotional experience. We can make a distinction between two kinds of fear, objective and subjective fear. In general, we can make a phenomenological distinction between *objective emotions* and *subjective emotions*; often subjective emotions are called feelings.

Emotions have in their cognitive aspect several kinds of variants. Many emotions can for instance be both reflective and unreflective. One can be absorbed in emotions like joy and fear in such a way that there is no awareness that *I am* glad and that *I am* afraid, respectively. But one can also experience the same emotions accompanied by such self-awareness. Sometimes there is an oscillation between the two variants and a concomitant subtle modification in the emotional perception. Some emotions, however, are necessarily reflective. Pride and embarrassment, for instance, are impossible without a cognitive reflective part saying 'I am proud' and 'I am embarrassed', respectively. In the discussion of moral emotions which follows in the next section we will meet other *necessarily reflective emotions*.

In my discussion of social facts and nested intentionality (chapter 3.3) I remarked that there is nested intentionality around both (almost) species specific secondary qualities like colours, and around culturally specific secondary qualities like language meaning. I also pointed out that there is nestedness *around* necessarily subjective facts like feelings of pain. Emotions have complicated relations to nested intentionality. Emotive expressions (facial, bodily, and verbal) are usually nested. Some of them, e.g. facial expressions for joy, anger, and sorrow, seem to be almost species specific whereas others, like phonetic patterns, seem to be culturally specific.

I shall now bring in a concept which must not be confused with that of nested emotions in general, and that is the concept of *necessarily social emotions*. Some emotions necessarily bring in other people. For instance, we can only feel shy for people who in some way are intentionally directed at ourselves. Shyness is therefore necessarily social. The same goes for jealousy. Joy, on the other hand, is *not* necessarily social. We can be glad for natural events. Neither is sorrow necessarily social. Of course we can feel sorry for another person intentionally directed at ourselves, but we can also feel sorrow for ourselves or for events like the weather.

Before leaving emotions in general, I would like to say some words about the issue of the rationality or irrationality of emotions. If one believes in a reductive feeling theory of emotions or a reductive behaviourist theory of emotion, then of course emotions cannot be rational. The whole cognitive aspect is in both cases reduced away. But what about the analysis of emotions here put forward? Does it imply anything about the rationality of emotions? There is no immediate answer since the concept of cognition is much wider than that of rationality. In our culture the concept of an *emotional person* has two main contrasts: the thoughtful person and the alienated person, respectively. Let me quote C.A. Lutz:

> Emotion stands in important and primary contrast relationship to two seemingly contradictory notions. It is opposed, on the one hand, to the positively evaluated process of thought and, on the other, to a negatively evaluated estrangement from the world. To


say that someone is "unemotional" is either to praise that person as calm, rational, and deliberate or to accuse them of being withdrawn or uninvolved, alienated, or even catatonic. Emotion is, at one time, a residual category of almost-defective personal process; at others it is the seat of the true and glorified self.29

There is in much Western common sense a kind of 'middle-way thinking' about emotions. One should not have too much emotions nor too little. Exactly where the proper middle should be situated is of course hard to tell. Like many critics of the Protestant culture, I think emotions have been unduly devalued. My point now, however, is only to say that the categorial analysis here is not an attempt to solve this particular problem. We are at the moment moving on a very abstract level. Three remarks, however, can be made.

First, since the affective aspect of an emotion supervenes on the cognitive aspect, it is always relevant to ask whether the intentional object of the emotion is the right object or not. If it is, then the emotion is within itself rational, otherwise it is irrational. Second, when emotive expressions have a communicative function, they can, like any kind of message, be either adequate or not. And to be adequate is to be rational in a straightforward sense. The concept of rationality includes more than planning and calculation. Third, affections can very well supervene on planning and calculation without, for that sake, changing the subvenient instrumental rationality into irrationality. It is plain false that it is always impossible to calculate correctly when one is furious or is in some other affective state.

7.3 Moral emotions

In this section we shall take a look at three different kinds of emotion which may lay claims to be called moral emotions.30 I shall call them (a) virtue-making (or good-making) emotions, (b) moral emotions (proper), and (c) moral-grounding emotions, respectively. Guilt and shame are the paradigm examples of moral emotions proper, i.e. emotions which as an essential part in themselves contain a moral evaluation. Typical moral-grounding emotions are feelings of sympathy and humanity, i.e. emotions which in themselves do not contain a moral evaluation but may lay claim to be necessary pre-conditions for moral evaluations. They are what Adam Smith (but not Hume) called moral sentiments. Virtue-making emotions, are simply emotions which are regarded as being virtuous and typical for good persons. Such emotions can, but need not, in themselves contain a moral element. Also, a virtue-making emotion can, but need not, be a moral-grounding emotion.

Having the right kind of emotion in the right kind of situation is the mark of the virtuous person. In different cultures different emotions are virtue-making. Proper anger has been a pagan virtue and humility a Christian virtue. When emotions (or actions) are seen as springing from a person's dispositions, the character of the person is evaluated simultaneously with the emotion (action). If emotions (actions) are, as in some existentialist thinking, regarded as subject to the will, then the will is evaluated simultaneously with the emotion (action). Actions and emotions can be at the centre of the evaluations of persons independently of whether actions and emotions are regarded as character traits or as arising spontaneously from the will. Think of Kant's ethics. In his deontology emotions are not in any sense good-making, but that depends on a specific feature of the Kantian system. It contains only rules (maxims) for actions, not rules for how to feel. Therefore, the good person is the one whose will is directed at good actions. If Kant had allowed rules for adequate emotions, he would have had to say that a good person is the one whose will is directed at good emotions. A good person intends to perform good actions and intends to have good emotions. Emotions in the sense of virtue-making emotions are as central to ethics as actions are.

Sometimes the differences between kinds of emotions are very subtle. There are at least two kinds of anger, personal anger and moral anger. We can be angry without having any thought whatsoever of moral qualities, but we can also be angry and feel morally justified in our anger. In the latter case we perceive our anger as being due to an immoral action. However, in

29 Unnatural Emotions, p 55-56.
30 The word 'moral emotion' is, I would say, remarkably absent in most philosophical dictionaries.
both cases we can *by others* be regarded as virtuous persons because of adequate anger. Both personal and moral anger can be virtue-making emotions but only moral anger is a moral emotion proper.

Some virtue-making emotions can be both reflective and unreflective. A reflective virtue-making emotion is an emotion in which we feel as good persons because we have the emotion in question. Moral anger is not necessarily, but often in fact, reflective. The one who feels moral anger can regard himself as a virtuous person because he has the moral anger. Some virtue-making emotions, however, are necessarily unreflective. Humility is one of these. When humility is regarded as virtue-making, other persons can regard an humble person as virtuous, but the humble person himself cannot regard himself as a virtuous person since, if he did, he would not be humble.

Let us now look at the classical examples of moral emotions, shame and guilt. In shame and guilt either one's own self, actions, intentions, emotions, or thoughts are valued negatively. Both emotions are self-directed; they belong to the class of *necessarily reflective emotions*. Guilt is directed towards the past; one feels guilt over something oneself has done, intended, felt or thought. Shame is directed towards the present; one is ashamed over who one *is*. Fear, to present a contrast, is a future-directed emotion. Shame and guilt are emotions after the event, when the event is disrespect of a norm or a value (virtue). Closely connected, although very different from shame and guilt, are *fear of shame* and *fear of guilt*. These, like all fears, are future-directed emotions.

To be precise, we should say that guilt and shame are primarily directed towards the past or the present, respectively. Secondly, they may contain a future-directed moment, a wish to get rid of the guilt and shame, respectively. This last moment can take many forms. One kind of guilt contains a wish to be punished in order to get rid of the guilt; another kind of guilt contains a craving for being forgiven; a third kind contains a wish to trade good for bad. The most extreme kind of shame is connected with a need to kill oneself in order to get rid of the shame, as in the honour morality which incorporates hara-kiri. In milder forms there is a future-directed need simply to be ashamed for some time. The action which lead to the shame is seen as repaid by being ashamed, and so there arises a longing for being ashamed in order to stop feeling ashamed. So much for the similarities between shame and guilt, now to the differences.

The fact that shame and guilt are not future-directed has no necessary connection with the fact that they are devaluating emotions. Pride is similar in structure to shame. Primarily, a proud person is proud over what he has done or what he is and has been, even if proudness normally also contains an implicit prediction that the proud person will continue to be able to feel proud.

Guilt and shame are perspicuous examples of self-directed negative moral emotions. Western culture seems to have focussed attention on negative moral emotions, on feelings of degradation. But there are positive moral emotions of self-assessment as well. Pride is the best example; to be pride is to be morally pride. It seems natural to regard pride as the positive opposite of the negative feeling of shame, but some philosophers (e.g. David Hume) regard humility, not shame, as the opposite of pride. However, I do not think this is a serious problem. There are two concepts of pride, one having shame and one having humility as its opposite. G. Taylor has distinguished between pride the passion and pride the character-trait and I want to make a similar distinction. Instead of pride as a character-trait, however, we shall put pride the mood. My claim is that shame is the opposite of pride the passion and humility the opposite of pride the mood.

The pair humility-pride (the mood) represents steady and long-lasting feelings of being of low and high worth, respectively. A pride person regards many of his routine actions as of high or noble worth, whereas the humble person ranks many of his routine actions low. The persons in question themselves in a pre-given hierarchical framework. In an egalitarian society this kind of pride and humility cannot exist. There is though a closely connected kind of humility where the humble person regards himself as of ordinary worth. The opposition

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31 Much of what I shall have to say is to be found in other or similar words in G. Taylor's *Pride, Shame, and Guilt. Emotions of Self-Assessment*, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1985.

32 Ibid. p 38. Although Taylor makes this distinction she does not realize that this makes it possible to regard humility and shame as opposites to different kinds of pride.
here is not between the low and the high, but between the ordinary and the extraordinary. Such a humility is compatible with egalitarianism.

The pair shame-pride (the passion), on the other hand, represents responses to actions which are regarded as not belonging to the normal repertoire. In order really to feel proud of an action, one has to regard the action as being beyond one's routine achievements. When one is ashamed of an action, one looks upon one's action as being below what one could expect of oneself. Shame and pride (the passion) are not, therefore, states contained in a personal character. They are more like emotions such as anger and joy. They last for a while, but they are not everlasting. In an egalitarian society shame and pride would be possible. Of course, they presuppose a norm system but not necessarily a hierarchical system.

The opposite of shame, then, is pride (the passion). But what about guilt? It seems to lack a real opposite. There is only absence of guilt. At the end of chapter 2.1 I touched upon this seemingly peculiar difference between shame and guilt. I noted that there is usually no merit in following legal and religious obligations, but you may feel guilt if you brake the rules. Now, I shall try to explain this difference between shame and guilt.

When a universal norm is laid down, it is taken for granted that people are able to follow the norm; ought implies can. Acting in accordance with the norm should not be regarded an exceptional achievement. That, I think, is the reason why there is no merit in performing obligations, and why there is no real positive opposite to feeling guilt. Having noticed this, however, we should notice also the exception to the rule. In situations with great temptations, one can, having resisted the temptations and followed the norm, feeling a kind of proudness. Such situations are border line situations. But at the border 'ought implies can' is not necessarily true.

Shame and guilt are both self-directed emotions, but there are also moral emotions which are other-directed. Examples of such emotions are indignation, hate, and anger. That indignation contains a moral element is obvious, but the same can be true for the other emotions as well. When we hate somebody, we usually look upon him as really worth hating. Anger does not always contain a moral ingredient, but, like Sabini and Silver, I think that often it does. When we are angry at someone, we normally think we have a right to be angry. Shame has an other-directed counterpart which guilt lacks. Contempt is towards others what shame is towards oneself. It is the same kind of person-devaluation. In contempt someone is not merely looked down upon; he is morally looked down upon. In order to explain this second difference between shame and guilt we have to connect it with a third difference.

Shame is, like shyness and jealousy, a necessarily social emotion, but guilt is not. Already Spinoza wrote that 'Shame is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which we imagine people blame'. Sartre claimed that 'shame is shame of oneself before the other', and recently Gabriele Taylor has written that 'shame introduces an observer or audience'. There is great consensus to the effect that shame necessarily brings in other persons. One cannot feel shame if one does not regard oneself as in some way being observed by some other subject, be it merely, as remarked by Sartre, one's super-ego. Shame is both a necessarily reflective and a necessarily social emotion. When one is ashamed one is looking upon oneself, but one looks upon oneself as being seen by others. Guilt, however, is not necessarily social. In guilt the contained cognition is directed at an impersonal law or norm, not at other people. An intentional act directed at a law is more like the perception of a natural fact than like the perception of another person's eyes.

The explanation of the fact that shame has an other-directed equivalent, contempt, whereas guilt has not, is the following. Shame can be said to be contempt of oneself before someone else, whereas contempt can be said to be contempt of someone else before oneself. In both shame and contempt there is a relation between at least two persons. In the case of guilt, however, since the relation exists between a person and a norm it cannot, so to speak, change its terms.

34 Ethics, third part, the Affects def. XXXI.
36 Op. cit. 57. Taylor argues, by the way, that pride does not in the same way involve an audience, but here I think she is wrong. There is no solitary pride as there is no solitary shame.
So far, the only things that the proper moral emotions we have looked upon (guilt, shame, contempt, and pride) have in common are that they are internally moral and that they are oriented towards the past or the present. As an identificatory trait they contain an evaluation, i.e. an Ought, and this Ought supervenes on cognitions whose intentional object is predominantly past or present. The same goes for moral anger, i.e. anger permeated with a feeling that one, objectively, ought to be angry or has a right to be angry. Are there, we have to ask, no future-directed moral emotions? Are there no moral emotions before the event? These questions amount to the question whether there are moral emotions which make us conform to morals.

All past-directed proper moral emotions are existentially dependent upon future-directed intentionality. If, after the event, we say that we ought to have done otherwise, then, on pain of consistency, we have to presuppose that before the event there was something which told us how we ought to have acted. The question is whether this necessarily future-directed intentional act has to be a moral emotion or if it can be something else. We shall here remember that we often live in a state where Is and Ought are fused, and in such states there are future-directed intentional acts which tell us how we ought to act but which nonetheless contain no emotions (see chapters 1.4 and 2.3). Before turning directly to a discussion of future-directed moral emotions, we shall, however, look at moral-grounding emotions.

A lot of well-known feelings or emotions like compassion, pity, sympathy, etc. have something in common which make them determinates of a determinable. With Adam Smith and Hume I shall call this determinable sympathy; Hume interchangeably also talked of fellow-feeling and feeling of humanity. Sympathy is primarily a kind of affection; sometimes it is a positive affection as when one partakes in a friend's joy, sometimes it is a negative affection as in compassion. The affection of sympathy should be kept distinct from benevolence, which primarily is a conation, even though they often appear together. If one is affected by someone's suffering there is often but not always a conation to try to remove the suffering, especially since one at the same time removes one's own suffering, too. A perceptual act with a Gestalt saying 'my-child-is-in-pain-I-feel-displeasure-I-want-to-help-my-child' can be analyzed into three moments which here relate to each other as layers or levels. At bottom there is a cognition 'my-child-is-in-pain'. On this cognition a negative affection 'I-feel-displeasure' supervenes and creates the feeling of sympathy 'my child-is-in-pain-therefore-I-feel-displeasure'. As a third level, on top of both the other, the benevolent conation to help supervenes and creates the experienced whole. The conation of benevolence, however, can also supervene directly on a cognition. It is quite possible to experience 'my-child-is-in-pain-I-want-to-help-my-child' without any affection. As stressed in the first section of this chapter, there are affection-less conations. Both the following figures, where the arrow represents one-sided existential dependence, represents real possibilities:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{benevolence} & \downarrow \\
\text{sympathy} & \downarrow \\
\text{cognition} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{benevolence} & \downarrow \\
\text{cognition} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Moral systems must, by definition, I would say, contain a possibility of conflict between an Ought and a conation. An ought need not in fact come in conflict with a person's conations, but a conflict must be regarded as possible. This is true not only for deontological ethical systems, but also for eudaimonistic and hedonistic systems where the Ought is merely a recommendation to promote one's own happiness. Such happiness is a deliberated long-term happiness which in principle can conflict with short-term impulses.

Our egoistic conations now and then conflict with each other. You want to finish your work now but you are also tired and want to rest at once; you want to help your friend who needs help this particular night but you also want to go to the party you are invited to; and so on. Buridan's ass seems to have an eternal life. A similar kind of conflict often also arises between short-term and long-term conations. If the conation for immediate satisfaction is acted out, then the conation directed towards something in the future can be impossible to satisfy. Conative conflicts can be solved intuitively, but, obviously, they may give rise to
attempts to calculate a solution. Such calculations, however, are, by definition, made by the cognitive and not the conative faculty, a fact which, as we soon shall see, creates a problem.

Cognitive intentional acts can have conations as well as ordinary facts as their intentional objects; that a desire exists is a fact which can be cognized. Obviously, a cognition that another person has a desire is neither in itself a desire nor need it cause a desire in oneself. Similarly, when one becomes aware that oneself has a certain desire, this cognition is neither a new desire nor need it cause a change in one's conative pattern. When an ego tries to calculate its resultant conation there must of course exist a desire to make a calculation. But this calculation, with its comparisons and additions of different conations, is in itself only a cognitive enterprise. Although there is a desire to calculate the best action there need not arise a corresponding desire to perform this best action after the calculation. Hume's problem that reason cannot motivate action arises already in this purely egoistic sphere.

A theoretical addition of one's conations can, but it need not, be accompanied by a corresponding interaction among the actually existing (and cognized) conations. Happily or unhappily, there is no pre-established harmony between the cognitive addition and the conative interaction. We all know that sometimes the conation we act on is in conflict with what we think really is the best thing for us to do. Spontaneous egoism, whether short-term or long-term, is one thing, deliberated or theoretical egoism another. A bridge is often needed in order to get from the Is of the theoretically calculated conclusion that the action A is my resultant conation to the Ought of a real conation to perform A. When there is a gap between a theoretical and a practical conation, if I may call them so, then the bridge has to be an emotion. However, I shall argue, it is not any emotion discussed by Hume. It is the emotion of respect (Achtung) as analysed by Kant.

Kant found his concept of respect when, actually, he was making an attempt to exclude emotions from the grounding of ethics. Duty for duty's sake ought of course to exclude emotions. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* he explained his concept of duty by saying that "Duty is the necessity to act out of respect for a law". He tried to counter the obvious objection that he is then not grounding duty in reason but in an emotion, namely respect; but this Kant did only in a footnote. He tried to suppress his own insight; in the footnote he wrote:

> It might be urged against me that I have merely tried, under cover of the word 'respect' to take refuge in an obscure feeling instead of giving a clearly articulated answer to the question by means of a concept of reason. Yet although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept, and therefore specifically distinct from feelings of the first kind, all of which can be reduced to inclination or fear. ... Respect is properly awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love. Hence there is something which is regarded neither as an object of inclination nor as an object of fear, though it has at the same time an analogy with both. The object of respect is the law alone - that law which we impose on ourselves but yet as necessary in itself. Considered as a law, we are subject to it without any consultation of self-love; considered as self-imposed it is a consequence of our will. In the first respect it is analogous to fear, in the second to inclination. All respect for a person is only respect for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that person gives us an example.

In order to understand Kant we should look for a similar kind of respect somewhere else. Let us ask ourselves why we should be logical and follow the laws of formal logic. Why, for instance, should we not contradict ourselves and claim that something both is and is not the case? It is hard to find a sense-given inclination to be logical and, mostly, we have not much to fear if we are a little illogical. Like duty for duty's sake we may speak of logic for logic's sake. We can be illogical but (at least as philosophers) we do not want to be. Why? The simple answer is, I think, that we are logical because of respect for formal logic. Formal logic puts constraints on our speech acts, constraints which we are able to break through or neglect. But out of respect for logic we constrain ourselves. A person may be logical in the sense that

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37 *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Harper Torchbooks: New York 1964, p 68. I have made a change in the translation of *Achtung* and instead of 'reverence' written the more common translation 'respect'.

38 Op. cit. p 69; again 'respect' instead of 'reverence'.

he always makes speech acts in accordance with the law of contradiction without ever having thought of the law (he talks \textit{in accordance with} logical principles), or he may try to avoid contradictions only because his teacher in logic has told him to do so (he then makes speech acts \textit{on} logical principles), but such a person is not really logical. Logical is the one who has grasped logic and then speaks logically because of this. If he are to be appraised for being logical he shall have no other motive than respect for logic; he then makes speech acts \textit{for} logical principles. Respect for a logician, in turn, is only respect for 'the laws of which that person gives us an example'. Kant wrote that "neither fear nor inclination, but solely respect for the law, is the motive which can give an action moral worth",\footnote{Op. cit. p 107.} and we can write 'neither fear nor inclination, but solely respect for logic, is the motive which can give a speech act logical worth'.

In my opinion Kant's concept of respect is important and denotes a specific feeling or emotion. There is no reason to follow Kant and restrict the term 'feeling' to feelings 'received through outside influence'. Even self-produced or spontaneous feelings are feelings. Like most emotions, respect always has a specific object. Respect is always respect \textit{for} something. We can speak of respect for logic, respect for imperatives, as well as respect for other things. In respect, like in other emotions, a conative and an affective moment supervenes on a cognition. It is possible to study formal logic and to see its necessary relations but nonetheless don't care about these relations when speaking. Hitherto, nobody seems to have been troubled by it, but, in fact, there is an Is-Ought gap in logic as well as in ethics. A logical person makes two things simultaneously. He both cognizes necessary relations and respects them. This respect bridges the Is-Ought gap of logic in the same way as respect bridges Kant's gap. In the Kantian system there is both a cognition of a categorical imperative and respect for this imperative.

Why, one may ask, has the Is-Ought gap been noticed in ethics but not in relation to logic? The answer is, I guess, the following. The gap brings in the pragmatics of language, and, in general, there has been no clear grasp of the pragmatic principles of language until quite recently. In particular, the concrete speech acts of logic has not been studied.

Respect is a future-directed and action-constraining emotion, but it is not in itself a moral emotion. It becomes moral only when it is conjoined to a moral content. However, in all cases that which is respected is to be conformed to.

If we now turn back to our earlier remarks about calculated resultant egoistic conations, we shall first of all note that the calculations in question are reflexive. I ask myself what I ought to do in order to satisfy \textit{myself} in the best possible way. How shall I be st take account of all my conations? Sometimes, of course, there is no gap between the calculated resultant conation and the actual interaction between the really existing conations. But that situation is uninteresting. When there is a gap, what are we to do? What is at stake in such situations is a conflict between a cognized imperative 'I ought to do A' and one's actual resultant conation. Our philosophical problem is to find an entity which can turn the cognition of the imperative into a corresponding desire. As far as I can see, a Kantian solution is the only possible one. Respect for one's ego can turn the mere cognition of the imperative into an operative imperative. Cool self-love means respect for one's self. Without such respect cognitive adherence to the imperative is an action-empty attitude of a spectator, even though the spectator and the spectacle is one and the same complex unity, I myself.

Respect for one's ego is not the same as disrespect for one's conations. It is respect for conations in situations of conflict. However, in one peculiar sense it might be called disrespect, but the proper label is \textit{distancing}. As claimed in chapter 3.2, most actions are non-reflexive, i.e. there is no ego-awareness in them. One dwells in the action and is intentionality-directed only at that which one is aiming at, not at one's self. In particular, this is true of actions intended to satisfy strong conations. Therefore, it is a noteworthy modification when a conation also becomes an intentional object and is looked upon as a conation-of-\textit{mine}. There is then a kind of distancing from the conation. A theoretical attitude necessarily contains a distancing from its object, but the same is true for the emotion of respect. Kant was coming close to this view when he wrote that "although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling \textit{received} through outside influence, but one \textit{self-produced} by a rational concept" (from quotation above).
The same kind of remarks which I have now made in relation to egoistic conations and cool self-love, can also be made in relation to alteristic conations and cool benevolence. Like egoistic conations, conations of benevolence can conflict with each other and so create a need for deliberation and calculation. The most common example is a parent who wants to be kind to two of his kids simultaneously when this is impossible; a mild kind of tragic situation. Benevolent desires lend themselves to calculation just as much, or just as little, as egoistic desires do. In order to get from a resultant calculated action of benevolence, as cognized by reason, to the corresponding real tendency to act, a bridge is needed. Once again the emotion of respect supplies what is needed. If we respect a theoretical calculation of how to be benevolent, then we have a desire of cool benevolence. The intentional object of this respect is some other person's (or animal's) well-being. It is not our benevolent conations as conations which we respect; it is the intentional objects of these conations. In cool self-love, similarly, we do not respect our given egoistic desires; it is our ego which we respect. In cool self-love, our conception of our own well-being functions as a norm; in cool benevolence, our conception of other's well-being functions as a norm.

Respect for norms differs from situations of ethical demands (see p 23) in being reflexive. When we perceive an ethical demand we live beneath the distinction between Is and Ought. The Ought in question is as immediately out there in the world as any Is is. There is simply no question of how to relate the Is to the Ought; there is not even the question 'Ought I really?'. As stressed by philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre (cf. chapter 3.2), we very often act without any self-awareness. In such cases we are phenomenologically just acting towards a terminus, and we can be so acting without any emotions at all. Ethical demands require no self-awareness and no bridge between the Is and the Ought. Is and Ought are fused from the start. In a way, respect fuses with its intentional object, too. But from a Kantian point of view there is still a difference. To follow an ethical demand means to act in accordance with or on a norm, but not to act for a norm. The last kind of action requires that the actor is self-aware and has distanced himself from the norm. He sees himself as standing in front of a norm. The emotion of respect does not cancel the distancing which appears in a calculation of one's desires. On the contrary, respect necessarily requires a distance to its intentional object. Respect excludes self-forgetting fascination.

Neither respect in itself, nor conations of benevolence, nor calculated resultant benevolence, are moral emotions. But the combination of respect and cool benevolence constitutes such a moral emotion, i.e. a conation-constraining emotion concerned with other conscious beings. In order for respect to be morally relevant, it has to be directed towards something with a morally relevant content; and in order for benevolence to be morally relevant it has to be connected with something which can be conation-constraining. This future-directed emotion of respect also functions as a bridge between Is and Ought. It turns the Is of the theoretically calculated resultant benevolence into a real conation and tendency to act. Instead of Kantian respect for a certain maxim, we have found respect for others' conations; benevolence is directed at the satisfying of conations of other beings.

Both respect and cool benevolence are needed in order to get a moral system in which we do not live beneath the distinction between Is and Ought. Hume and Kant are the outstanding thinkers among the modern philosophers who first tried to ground ethics independently of religion. Both of them made important insights but their insights have to be connected. Hume came closer than Kant to the view just put forward. For Hume, sympathy and benevolence do not amount to morals. Disinterestedness, he claimed, has to be added, and his concept of disinterestedness is similar to the concept of cool benevolence here used. Such a disinterestedness, however, cannot solve the Is-Ought problem since it does not explain how the corresponding moral conation can arise. Here, respect is needed.

The view put forward cannot for two reasons be considered a Kantian solution to the Is-Ought problem. First, Kant himself suppresses the very important fact that respect is an emotion. Second, I have not argued that we shall adhere to Kant's moral law 'Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that some of the criticism that has been levelled against the law is devastating. In particular, I am thinking of all the nowadays well-known problems with the so-called free rider. No relation of cognitive necessity can turn you from an individualist into a collectivist who acts out of solidarity with others. There is an I-We gap in ethics which no rational universalization can bridge. Benevolence is needed.
The most important conclusion of this section is not, of course, that the Is-Ought gap can be bridged by emotions. This has ever since Hume's days been regarded a common-place. My point is that a lot of emotions bridge the gap by turning a person confronted with the gap into a state where he acts beneath the distinction between Is and Ought, but that there is one emotion which bridges the gap without cancelling the theoretical and distancing attitude which is essentially connected with the perception of the gap.

Another important point to note is the following. Respect for theoretical benevolence is existentially dependent upon practical benevolence, i.e. upon real desires to be benevolent. Benevolence is a moral-grounding conation. It can be part of moral-grounding emotions, as well as, itself, be caused by moral-grounding emotions like sympathy. The concept of benevolence now used is a determinable concept. This means that there can be a lot of different determinate moral-grounding conations of benevolence. Everything from love and intense desires of caring to weak tendencies to help are determinates of the determinable benevolence. This, in turn, means that two persons who both show respect for their theoretical benevolence can differ enormously when it comes to their moral-grounding conations. Of course, respect for theoretical benevolence works better when the corresponding grounding conations are intense.

I shall end this section with two quotations from Francesco Alberoni and Salvatore Veca's book *Moral och kärlek* which has inspired much in this section.

> It has never been the cold argumentative reason which has made it clear to us which way we ought to go and what our ultimate goal is, nor is it today. Only confronted by dramatic events do we discover what is essential to us and what has more value than we ourselves have. This is the way values and morals are born anew all the time.

> Here, however, we have only one of the roots of modern ethics. The other one is represented by reason. Without reason revelation can become a wild raving and our impulsive generosity turn into a thoughtless and harmful action. Ethics originate only if reason takes care of intuition and leads the affectionate and generous impulse towards a good goal.\(^{40}\)

> Therefore, we should draw the following conclusion: it is true that reason is empty without altruism, but it is also true that altruism without reason is blind. When altruism and reason are combined they produce something more, namely ethics. Sometimes ethics can get along without altruism by acting as if, but now and then it has to return to altruism in order to find its emotional roots if it shall not stray.\(^{41}\)

### 7.4 Moral emotions and moral systems

We have now laid bare the abstract structure of both emotions in general and moral emotions. Next we shall try to connect different emotions with different kinds of moral systems. In chapter 2 (p 17) we made the following distinctions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Norms (Ought)} & \iff \text{nongors (ought)} \\
\text{values} & \iff \text{values} \\
\text{virtues} & \iff \text{virtues}
\end{align*}
\]

We shall first look at past-directed moral emotions and then at future-directed moral emotions. My first claim is that guilt is essentially connected with prescriptive ethics and shame with virtue ethics. Both guilt and shame are emotions after the event. They are responses to norm breaking and virtue breaking, respectively. There is also a past-directed


\(^{41}\) Ibid. p 75.
emotion which can be a response to the "breaking" of a recommendation. It is feeling stupid. When we do not follow a recommendation and afterwards realize that it would have been wise to do so, the adequate feeling is neither guilt nor shame, but feeling stupid.

This connection between guilt and norms and between shame and virtues is not a direct connection. It is mediated by conceptions of the self. Certain emotions are existentially dependent upon different kinds of egos, and there are connections between different kinds of egos and different moralities. The latter claim, i.e. that there really are interesting relations between ego conceptions and ethical conceptions, has been argued especially by Jürgen Habermas in his article 'Moral Development and Ego Identity'.

Habermas distinguishes between natural identity, role identity, and ego identity. He takes his departure form the cognitive psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who in his classic The Philosophy of Moral Development distinguished and studied empirically six different stages of moral consciousness. These stages were grouped, two and two, into three levels (a preconventional, a conventional, and a postconventional level), and it is these three levels which Habermas has associated with the three different kinds of identities mentioned. Every child is first pre-reflectively egoistic. On this level a child has no awareness of norms opposing his conations, it merely seeks pleasure and avoids displeasure. It can understand and follow behavioural expectations, but inhibitions are only understood in terms of punishments and withdrawal of rewards. Habermas writes:

When the child leaves its symbiotic phase and becomes sensitive to moral points of view - at first from the perspective of punishment and obedience - it has already learned to distinguish itself and its body from the environment, even though it does not yet strictly distinguish between physical and social objects in this environment. The child has thereby gained a "natural" identity, as it were, which it owes to the capacity of its body - as an organism that maintains boundaries - to conquer time.

When, later on, a child has achieved a role identity it can distinguish between Oughts and wants, and it can follow reflexive behavioural expectations. At this second level the child understands what it means to be a good boy or a good girl, and it knows and understands rules. Kohlberg says that the first level (which Habermas connects with natural identity) is characterized by punishment-obedience orientation and instrumental hedonism, whereas the second level is characterized by good-boy orientation and law-and-order orientation. This kind of Ought-orientation, however, is not Ought-reflexive, i.e. the child is not able to reflect on virtues and norms. Ego-reflexiveness is one thing, Ought-reflexiveness is another. Only on the third level it becomes possible for a person to discuss the validity of norms, values, and virtues. Here, Kohlberg talks of social-contractual legalism and ethical-principled orientation. According to Habermas, such legalism and orientation require a specific kind of ego, namely ego identity.

Only at the third level are the role bearers transformed into persons who can assert their identities independent of concrete norms and particular systems of norms. We are supposing here that the youth has acquired the important distinction between norms, on the one hand, and principles according to which we can generate norms, on the other - and thus the ability to judge according to principles. He takes into account that traditionally settled forms can prove to be mere conventions, to be irrational. Thus he has to retract his ego behind the line of all particular roles and norms and stabilize it only through the abstract ability to present himself credibly in any situation as someone who can satisfy the requirements of consistency even in the face of incompatible role expectations and in the passage through a sequence of contradictory periods of life. Role identity is replaced by ego identity; actors meet as individuals across, so to speak, the objective contexts of their lives.
In order to bring this kind of thinking forward, we need to reconsider its starting point, i.e. Kohlberg's three levels and six stages of moral development. That there is some kind of tripartition like Kohlberg's between a preconventional, a conventional, and a postconventional level, is not a new insight. Already Aristotle said that moral education and development necessarily consist of three steps. First, norms are followed only because of the fear of punishments and the prospects of rewards. Consequently, the norms have to be externally imposed. On the second level there is conscious recognition of Oughts and conscious rule following, but the norms are followed out of fear or habit. Aristotle, I think, somewhere says that "one heeds them as one heeds one's father". On the third and last level, however, the norms are adhered to because of insight. A corresponding logical tripartition is Kant's implicit distinction (cf. p 104f) between (1) actions in accordance with a maxim, (2) actions on a maxim, and (3) actions for a maxim. A person can out of fear and tradition act in accordance with a norm without having any awareness at all of the norm in question. It is also possible to be aware of a norm, but nonetheless conform to it out of mere habit. In such cases one acts on a norm. One acts for a norm only when one has consciously taken a decision to the effect that one ought to act on the norm. Where Kant has a purely logical division, Aristotle and Kohlberg find some kind of developmental necessity; Kohlberg also a sociological necessity. He writes that "My finding that our two highest stages /the third level/ are absent in preliterate or semiliterate village culture, and other evidence, also suggests a mild doctrine of social evolutionism".46

Some of Kohlberg's thoughts about the different levels and stages can be summarized in the following schema:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of moral consciousness</th>
<th>Idea of the good and just life</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Punishment-obedience orientation</td>
<td>Maximization of pleasure through obedience</td>
<td>Punishment (deprivation of physical rewards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Instrumental hedonism</td>
<td>Maximization of pleasure through exchange of equivalents</td>
<td>Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Good-boy orientation</td>
<td>Concrete morality of gratifying interaction</td>
<td>Shame (withdrawal of love and social recognition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Law-and-order orientation</td>
<td>Concrete morality of a customary system of norms</td>
<td>Shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social-contractual legalism</td>
<td>Civil liberty and public welfare</td>
<td>Guilt (reaction of conscience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ethical principled orientation</td>
<td>Moral freedom</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stages 1 and 2 make up the preconventional level (I), stages 3 and 4 make up the conventional level (II) and stages 5 and 6 the postconventional level (III). All of them are in need of rethinking and modification. According to the view of conations put forward in section 7.1, not even small children are only seeking pleasure. They try to satisfy all their conations, and the conation for pleasure is only one among eleven conations. This means that on stages 1 and 2 "maximization of pleasure" should be replaced by "maximization of conation satisfaction". Children strive for food, sex, shelter, activity, and confirmation, too. Such a substitution brings with it some other changes. Punishment is then no longer restricted to deprivation of physical rewards. In particular, there are also deprivation of spiritual rewards (e.g. withdrawal of positive confirmation). Furthermore, the preconventional level can no longer be regarded as a purely egoistic level; there is also benevolence. The last thing is noted by Kohlberg but never really taken into account in his discussion.

46 Kohlberg ibid. p 128.
Conations can conflict. One kind of conflict is constituted by conflicts between the conation of benevolence and the egoistic conations. This means that the preconventional level contains a source for moral self-education. External punishments can put constraints on egoistic conations, but so can rules created in order to solve conative conflicts. As I have said before, I regard, by definition, morals as something which can be conation constraining. Benevolence is, it should be remembered, a determinable which has caring and love among its determinates. The conventional level need not arise only out of fear. Fear and the desire for caring can, despite the gulf between them, mix and together lay the ground for conventional morality.

Conventional morality is an absolute morality. At stage 3 in the schema, i.e. where Kohlberg speaks of good-boy (and nice-girl) orientation, we have, in the terminology of this book, absolute virtue moralities. Here there are informal Oughts which tell people what kind of man or woman they ought to be. When they have broken the Oughts in question they are ashamed. Shame is an emotion which is both necessarily social and necessarily reflexive. It presupposes a self-conscious ego which one is ashamed of. Its substrate is the conation for confirmation; to be ashamed is to accept disconfirmation. In this way our theory of conations affords us a mediation between the preconventional and the conventional level since disconfirmation and withdrawal of confirmation is possible also in relation to the unreflective egos on the first level.

Law-and-order orientation is in my terminology an expression of absolute norm moralities. Here we find explicit rule systems which lay claim to absolute subordination. When, as on stage 3, norms are informal, then sanctions have to take their departure from other people. Shame is shame of oneself before the other, to repeat Sartre's words (cf. p 102). However, when, on stage 4, norms are explicit rules, one can as a norm-breaker perceive a direct relation between oneself and the norm. And when the norm is regarded as absolute, then a norm-breaking has to be regarded as an affair between oneself and the norm. Therefore, the adequate emotional “sanction” in relation to law-and-order orientation is guilt, not shame as Kohlberg claims. Kohlberg has too vague a conception of the different moral emotions. Guilt as a sanction should in the schema be moved from stages 5 and 6 to stage 4.

If we move guilt from the postconventional to the conventional level, does this mean that the postconventional level contains no emotional "sanction" which can function the way shame and guilt functions on the conventional level? No, it does not. Kohlberg calls shame and guilt sanctions, but they are not ordinary sanctions, they are self-sanctions. They are negative moral emotions after the event. The question is whether the postconventional level can contain an emotion which is a self-sanction after an Ought-breaking.

For Aristotle and Kant, the third level contained insight into moral non-fallible knowledge of absolute Oughts. For us, too, the third level contain insights about morals. The difference is, however, that we think that Aristotle and Kant are wrong. They did not have moral knowledge. According to our postconventional insight, all Oughts are fallible and man-created. Today, we have to write about the third level from new insights.

Neither Aristotle nor Kant have discussed moral emotions in relation to the third level. Probably, both of them thought that where there is insight there can never be blame. A man with moral insight acts rightly (Aristotle) or will try to act rightly (Kant), and there is then nothing which such a man can blame himself for. For us, however, things are very different. According to our point of view, having moral knowledge is quite consistent with acting and willing in ways which are morally wrong.

In my opinion, there can be no emotions of shame and guilt where there are no absolute virtues and norms. When one breaks norms which one regards as man-created and fallible, one feels remorse. On the postconventional level in Kohlberg's schema, the emotion of remorse should be substituted for the emotion of guilt.

Among the philosophers who have discussed the difference between guilt and remorse, Gabriele Taylor has, in my opinion, done the best analysis. Remorse is like shame and guilt reflexive; in remorse one is directed at oneself. Also, like shame and guilt, remorse is felt about an event which the agent regards as an action of his. Such an action, however, is in remorse related to the ego of the agent in another way than in shame and guilt. In shame the negative action reflects back on and degrades the whole person; when ashamed, one is

ashamed over one's person. Guilt, on the other hand, puts the whole focus on the
guilt-evoking action in the sense that it is only as the agent of this deed the person feels guilt.
Remorse, concentrates even less on the agent. Even though remorse, like shame and guilt,
contains a self-assessment, it is other-regarding and focuses the attention on the action's
effects on others. Usually, shameful and guilt-creating actions are not thought of as something
that can be 'undone', but in the case of remorse this is the natural attitude. Actually, there can
be no feeling of remorse without a thought saying that one has done something wrong which
one ought to try to repair. Shame and guilt are inward-directed, whereas remorse is
outward-directed. Therefore, in case of remorse, the 'healing-process' is concerned with other
people, not with oneself. G. Taylor puts it this way:

In particular, neither of these emotions /shame and guilt/ is moral in the sense of being
other-regarding, for the agent's chief concern is for himself. Remorse, on the other hand,
seems to be moral in just this sense; ... As it concentrates on the action rather than the
actor it also seems the healthier emotion.48

In remorse the actor is detached from his action in a way which is impossible in both shame
and guilt. This fact, however, does not turn remorse into a non-moral emotion.

As a moral emotion it /remorse/ has in common with guilt and shame only the feature that
it requires a sense of value on the part of the agent, an awareness, more or less developed,
of moral distinctions, of what is right or wrong, honourable or disgraceful.49

There is though a non-moral emotion which in several respects is similar to remorse, and
with which remorse must not be conflated. That emotion is regret. The most conspicuous
difference between remorse and regret is that one can feel regret about an event for which one
is not responsible. Another difference is that regret is not internally related to attempts to
repair the action which caused the regret.

If we re-write Kohlberg's schema so it fits all the comments now made, the schema looks as
follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of moral consciousness</th>
<th>Idea of the good and just life</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Punishment-obedience orientation; non-reflective egoism and alterism</td>
<td>Maximization of conation satisfaction through obedience</td>
<td>Punishment (deprivation of rewards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Instrumental hedonism, reflective egoism</td>
<td>Maximization of conation satisfaction through exchange of equivalents</td>
<td>Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Good-boy orientation; absolute virtue ethics</td>
<td>Concrete morality of gratifying interaction</td>
<td>Shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Law-and-order orientation; absolute norm ethics</td>
<td>Concrete morality of a customary system of norms</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social-contractual legalism</td>
<td>Civil liberty and public welfare</td>
<td>Remorse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ethical principled orientation</td>
<td>Moral freedom</td>
<td>Remorse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have already mentioned Habermas' view that different kinds of ego identities are
necessarily connected with the different levels in Kohlberg's schema. The preconventional
level (stages 1 and 2) is, Habermas claims, internally related to natural identity; the
conventional level (stages 3 and 4) is internally related to role identity; and the

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48 Ibid. p 101.
49 Ibid. p 107.
postconventional level (stages 5 and 6) is internally related to ego identity. I am very much in agreement with these claims, but I think there are strong reasons to split the concept of role identity into two, into thick role identity (which will be connected with stage 5) and thin role identity (which will be connected with stage 6).

Behind the distinction between thick and thin role identity there are in fact degrees of thickness. A vast amount of anthropological and historical research has explored the rise of Western individualism. As I understand it, one can say something like the following. In a feudal society individuals could not free their egos from 'their station'. They looked upon their social role in the same way as we look upon, for instance, our length. A peasant could wish to be a king as I can wish to be longer, but in both cases it is just a wish. It is a natural fact which it is not within one's power to change. The modern individual is different. We are something beyond or behind the social roles. We can distance ourselves from our role and regard it as external in a much more thorough-going way than the pre-modern individual could. The fewer social roles one is able to distance oneself from, the thicker is one's role identity; the more roles one is able to distance oneself from, the thinner is one's role identity.

The kind of 'distancing' I have referred to must not be confused with cheating. A feudal peasant could, I take it for granted, try to behave like a noble man and pretend that he was one, but still the same regard himself as a peasant, a cheating peasant. Cheating and lying presupposes a distinction between an inner real ego and a deceptive outer appearance.

A social role is a social fact. It is constituted by nested intentionality. (We disregard the pathological cases of purely imagined social roles.) Most social roles are impregnated with values and connected with functional wholes. The values in question are virtues, i.e. they are ascribed to individuals independently of whether they express deliberated decisions. It is a person's habits which are valued. There is always an audience connected with a social role. A thick role identity is always part of a "gratifying morality of concrete interaction". Thick role identity goes together with "good-boy orientation" and virtue ethics. Essentially connected with the value of a social role is the emotion of shame; a fact which fits the last schema perfectly. The thicker the role identity of one's ego, the more there is to be ashamed about.

Let me repeat once more that in shame the whole person is degraded, not only the person in a given situation. In guilt, on the other hand, a specific action is focussed. Shame and guilt are both self-directed, but self-directed in different ways. Shame is directed towards the whole person as a character even though it is an action which triggers it, but guilt is directed merely towards the action as such. The ashamed person asks himself 'How can I be such a person?', but a person feeling guilt asks himself 'Why the hell (or: God) did I do it?'. Shame presupposes a thick ego. Without such 'thickness' there would be nothing to degrade.

As soon as a negative action reflects back on the social identity of the agent, there is shame. Guilt, therefore, needs a thin role identity. The norm breaking action must not be internally related to one's identity. In guilt it is not a person's character, but his freedom, that is related to the negative action in question. It needs a thin role identity to feel guilt. This complies well with the fact that shame has an opposite (pride) whereas guilt lacks such an opposite. When one feels proud one might say 'What a person I am!', but when one has followed a norm there is no proper corresponding exclamation at all since it is presupposed that everyone should be able to choose and to follow the norm. Of course, a person with a thin role identity can also feel shame since the 'thinness' spoken of is not absolute.

When an Ought relates to one's freedom and not to one's identity, this Ought must be explicit. It must be something that one is externally confronted with since it is not interwoven with one's identity. A thin role identity goes together with a "law-and-order orientation" and a "concrete morality of a customary system of norms". The thin role identity is essentially connected with stage four in the last schema, whereas the thick role identity is essentially connected with the third stage.

An ego with a thin social role identity differs from an ego which has what Habermas calls ego-identity. The latter kind of ego regards itself as part of a law-giving community, whereas a thin ego understands itself as being ruled by absolute Oughts. A person with ego-identity looks upon himself as creative in relation to Oughts. Passively received or given social roles can be thicker or thinner. The contrast now, however, is between the morally active and the morally passive. Ego-identity is active whereas role-identity is passive. Remorse, therefore, is connected with ego-identity, since remorse is the adequate emotional sanction when an Ought which is regarded as man-created is not adhered to.
Habermas believes that there is some kind of transcendental necessity at work behind his and Kohlberg's schemas. I do not believe in transcendental deductions, but, as is clear from chapter 4.2, I do think relations of existential dependence exist. I also think that claims about transcendental dependencies often in their substantive content come very close to claims about relations of existential dependencies. Habermas' view can be de-transcendentalized. He should have said that ego-identity is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon role identity, and that role identity, in turn, is one-sidedly dependent upon natural identity.

In my 'translation' Habermas says something like the following. A role identity cannot possibly exist without a language, and a language requires some minimum kind of self-perception, which means that role identity is one-sidedly dependent upon natural identity. It also means that the moral consciousness on the conventional level is similarly dependent upon the preconventional level. The postconventional level can contain, by definition, discussions about moral principles. Consequently, this level is dependent upon the existence of a language; but since there may be languages without moral discussions, it is a one-sided dependence. Therefore, the third level presupposes the other two, but not vice versa. Since, as Habermas claims, discussions of Oughts also presuppose a dissociation of ego and role, ego-identity is one-sidedly dependent upon role identity.

The "transcendental" arguments Habermas has put forward have been very much concerned with language, whereas I would like to argue for the corresponding existential dependencies from features of intentionality. As explained in chapter 3.2, "The ontology of the ego", intentionality is at the heart of our concept of ego, but self-intentionality necessarily presupposes intentionality (and nested intentionality). This is in my view the real reason why role identity is existentially dependent upon natural identity. Role-identity is a kind of self-intentionality, and self-intentionality is one-sidedly dependent upon intentionality, whereas intentionality is sufficient for natural identity. Likewise, the existential dependence between ego identity and role identity can be seen to be founded on features of intentionality. In order to be able to discuss one's self and the norms bound up with it, a capacity which by definition is part of ego identity, there has to exist some kind of identity which this intentionality can be directed at and have as its intentional object; and that is role identity. As without mathematics there can be no meta-mathematics, without role-identity there can be no meta-discussion of role-identities.

The existential dependencies mentioned, both one-sided (\(\Rightarrow\)) and mutual (\(\Leftrightarrow\)), can be fitted into the following schema:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical point of view</th>
<th>Identity type</th>
<th>Moral emotion (as a sanction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'hedonism'⁵⁰</td>
<td>(\Leftrightarrow)</td>
<td>natural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute virtue ethics</td>
<td>(\Leftrightarrow)</td>
<td>thick role identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute norm ethics</td>
<td>(\Leftrightarrow)</td>
<td>thin role identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fallible ethics</td>
<td>(\Leftrightarrow)</td>
<td>ego-identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We shall now move on to the question whether there are any moral emotions which are both future-directed and action-inducing and which can be related to the schema above. Let us start at the bottom of the schema since, here, actually, we have already supplied the answer. Respect for others' well-being is internally related to fallible ethics, ego identity and the possibility of remorse. If moral systems are regarded as man-created (in contradistinction to man-discovered) and as fallible, they cannot be grounded on anything else than benevolence, and in order to get from benevolence to morals the emotion of respect is needed. If you break

⁵⁰ Hedonism is really not a proper label since hedonism is concerned with long-term pleasure. But I know of no other well-known label which, like 'hedonism', gives at least some association in the right direction.
such an Ought which you respect, you will feel remorse. The Ought in question is in its content directed at others' well-being, and so is the remorse.

Shame and guilt lack this other-directedness. Because the virtues and norms behind shame and guilt, respectively, are absolute, these virtues and norms stand above people's conations. They function like natural facts as external forces. External natural facts determine our actions in the sense that we adapt our actions to them. Of course we can become very excited and affected over natural facts, and sometimes treat them almost as human beings. You kick the stone you cannot move and you shout 'Damned stone'. Nonetheless such facts determine our actions independently of our emotional outburst. It is as facts as they have their determining character. And so it is with absolute virtues and norms. They are determining because we regard them as facts. There are simply no other way out than to adapt to them. In shame-cultures and guilt-cultures one lives beneath Is and Ought, and no action-inducing (proper) moral emotion is needed in order to create conformity with the Oughts in question. Since Ought appears as an Is, no emotion is needed. The Is-ness, if I may call it so, of the Ought is enough.

With regard to the first (preconventional) level in the last schema, it is trivially true that there can be no moral emotions proper before the event, since at this level there can be no moral emotions at all. An ego with mere natural identity is not capable of having moral emotions. We can write down the following schema:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical point of view</th>
<th>Moral emotion (as Ought-creating)</th>
<th>Moral emotion (as a sanction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'hedonism'</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute virtue ethics</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute norm ethics</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fallible ethics</td>
<td>⇔ respect</td>
<td>⇔ remorse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some remarks are necessary in relation to fallible ethics. Such an ethics can contain either virtues or norms or both. But it cannot, by definition, contain absolute virtues or norms. Therefore, I have to say something about how fallible virtues and fallible norms are related to moral emotions. A fallible virtue is a virtue which we respect because we think that it promotes others' well-being. Similarly, a fallible norm is a norm which we respect because we think that it promotes others' well-being. However, as I have stressed before, it is impossible always to have the distanced attitude which respect requires. In fact, we have to live beneath the distinction between Is and Ought most of the time. This means that a really existing fallible morality is, so to speak, a part time ethics. When we reflect on it, we regard its virtues and norms as fallible, but mostly when we act on such virtues and norms they function, momentarily, as if they were absolute. Therefore, a person who regards all Oughts as man-created and fallible need not be free from feelings of shame and guilt.
Chapter 8

WHEN CHANGES OF IS IMPLIES CHANGES OF OUGHT

Before entering the first section of this chapter, I will recall some of the conclusions about the Is-Ought problem I have reached this far. First, in formal-logical ethics an Is does never imply an Ought; nor, by the way, does an Ought imply an Is (cf. p 73). Formal logic, however, is not the only kind of logic. There are relations of existential dependence, too, i.e. there are material-logical relations as well. Now, second, since there are internal relations (= relations of mutual existential dependence) then Ought may be derived from Is (cf. p 57). But if one takes a look at the writings of philosophers who (explicitly or implicitly) really have believed in a material logic, then one does as a matter of fact find only cases where either an Ought implies an Is or where one kind of Ought implies another kind of Ought. One never finds an Is which implies an Ought (cf. p 77).

Third, in one specific area, really, there are Ises which imply Oughts, namely Ises which are social facts. Some Oughts (norms) are even absolute presuppositions for the existence of a descriptive language, which means that as soon as there are Ises in the sense of truth-claims, then we can derive (by material logic) some Oughts which every language has to presuppose. Most social facts (Ises) are in a similar way constituted by norms (Oughts), and from these Ises the corresponding Oughts can be derived. The Oughts of the conclusions of such derivations, however, are not binding for the one who makes the derivation. He is either an outside observer or an inside participant who can always ask himself whether or not he should make himself a free rider in relation to the social fact at hand (cf. p 54).

In the preceding chapter it was claimed that there are internal relations between ethical systems, moral emotions, and types of personal identity. This means, four, that if the existence of a certain type of personal identity is regarded as an Is, then we have an Is which implies Oughts (by a material logic). Also here, however, there is a problem with the binding force. We have hitherto merely looked upon these internal relations as outside observers. Something which has to be changed before the book ends.

So far, five, we have found only one real bridge over the troubled water between Is and Ought, and that is the emotion of respect for others’ conations (cf. p 106), but respect cannot be derived from the Is-side. Another important insight, six, is that the gulf between Is and Ought cannot be discovered unless there already exists a level where Is and Ought are fused (cf. p 35). Either we live in a state where Is and Ought are fused and then there is for us no Is-Ought problem, or we regard Ought as distinct from Is and we bridge the gap by the emotion of respect. There are two kinds of connection between Is and Ought, connection by fusion and connection by respect. In neither case do we have the kind of implication between a static Is and a static Ought which philosophers have been looking for, but in both kind of cases, I shall now show, seven, that changes of Is can rationally imply changes of Ought.

8.1 Authority changes

Mostly, Oughts are backed by authority. Authority, however, is not simply given. It has sources of its own. As claimed in chapter 2.2, there are four genera of authority-making characteristics: (1) power, (2) tradition, (3) factual knowledge and (4) trust (authority by induction). In what follows, I shall regard the existence of an authority with its authority-making characteristics as a kind of Is; more specifically, I shall regard them as a kind of social facts. Let us see what can happen when there is a change in such an Is.

If an Ought is adhered to because of a certain power structure, then, of course, if this power structure changes it is rational to rethink every associated Ought. But this is a means-end rationality of a trivial kind and of no relevance for the Is-Ought problem. In a real traditional society (cf. p 25f) one lives beneath Is and Ought in the strongest sense possible. A change in tradition must, by definition, be imperceptible if the society in question is still to be called traditional. Therefore, it is of no interest in our context. The next kind of authority-making
characteristic, factual knowledge, cannot, it was argued in chapter 2.2, function as an authority-making characteristic when it comes to moral knowledge. This source of authority is of no concern here either. Left is only trust.

Let me make a detour. Karl Popper once argued in his paper "Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance" (1960) that both rationalism and empiricism are false. Neither reason nor observation can make truth manifest. Reason and observation are merely two fallible sources among other fallible sources of knowledge. Other sources are things that we hear and things that we read. Popper now and then calls such reliance 'tradition', but I think it had better be called trust. It is only those parts of what we hear and what we read that we trust. Popper now and then calls such reliance 'tradition', but I think it had better be called trust. It is only those parts of what we hear and what we read that we trust, which are sources of knowledge. Of course, we can trust where, with hindsight, we shouldn't have trusted, but we can also make false observations and think wrongly. As soon as we drop the requirements that knowledge has to be infallible and that truth be manifest, trust no longer becomes suspect as a source of knowledge. Trust is one among several sources of knowledge, sources, who, by the way, can conflict with each other. Therefore, trust does not take on the absolute value which tradition usually is ordained.

In today's philosophy of science, it seems to be a common-place that knowledge is fallible and that explicit knowledge relies on tacit presuppositions, or, to speak with the hermeneutic philosophers, relies on 'prejudices'. Trust must be recognized as of importance for epistemology. Trust is no longer mysterious within epistemology, and neither should it be in moral philosophy.

Trust may be called authority by induction (cf. p 25). In relation to norms, values, and virtues, trust in this sense means that one regards oneself as being able to judge some norms, values, or virtues as valid or not, but that for some norms, values, or virtues one have to trust someone else, i.e. the authority. By induction one has come to think that the authority is able to judge where one regards oneself as lacking this ability. A change of such trust into distrust must, in order to be of interest here, be based on a case where the authority makes a different moral judgement than oneself does. Because of this case one withdraws the inductive conclusion and no longer regards the authority as an authority. The change of Is then, in its turn, rationally implies a rethinking of all the Oughts which once was based on the authority in question.

The kind of implication just laid bare between Is and Ought is in no sense mysterious. It follows well known patterns of means-end rationality; one uses the authority as a means to get better judgements. It has been neglected merely because trust has been neglected as a source of knowledge.

I have now discussed the four sources of authority one by one, as if those who believes in an authority keeps them distinct. Usually, however, this is not the case. The sources are fused into one Gestalt, the authority. Power, tradition, factual knowledge, and trust melt together. This fusion of authority-making characteristics means that a change in one characteristic spills over into the other ones. If, for instance, there is a loss of power in the authority, the authority diminishes as a whole. Consequently, also the trust in its moral knowledge diminishes, even though, from an analytical point of view, they are separate. In a similar way a loss of factual knowledge on behalf of the authority may be looked upon as a loss of moral authority, too.

It might be argued that such a "spilling over" has nothing to do with rationality. For the analytical mind there are four factors which, each of them, can be discussed rationally (which we have already done), but to think that a loss in power should affect trust must, it is claimed, be irrational. There is, though, a kind of rationality which is possible here. A kind which has been studied formally quite a lot recently, and that is the rationality of belief changes. In such studies one first assumes that a specific change has occurred in a certain belief system, and then one asks what other changes are rational as a consequence of the initial change. As a formal-logical derivation is valid or invalid independently of the truth-values of the premises, a secondary change in a belief system is rational or irrational independently of the rationality of both the initial system and the initial change.

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1 Published in Popper's Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1963.
Assume that we have a belief system which, among all its beliefs, contains the (false) belief that authority is a simple non-analysable property which take degrees. Our system, we also assume, contains the belief that the church is the supreme authority. Let us now assume that there is a change in the system. The belief that the church knows how the world was created is changed into its opposite, namely the belief that the church does not know how the world was created. In this situation, we can ask ourselves if there are other changes in the system which should, from a rational point of view, follow from the initial change introduced. Obviously, some different kinds of changes are all rational. One move, of course, is simply to reject the belief that authority is a simple property. But another possible move is to diminish the authority of the church. Given the other beliefs, if it diminishes, it diminishes in all respects. This means that the normative power of the church should be diminished, too. In this way there is here a rational path leading from a change of Is (i.e. the change in authority) to a possible change of Ought. A knowledge-loss on the part of the church rationally implies a rethinking of the norms of the church.

At the beginning of this book, I said a few words about the intuitions which once made me start working on the Is-Ought problem. One of them was that it really was rational for the Church to regard its Ought structure threatened by the new conceptions of the world, i.e. the new Ises brought about by modern physics (Galileo) and evolutionary biology (Darwin). We can now see clearly the logic at work here. Galileo and Darwin only changed, and only meant to change, what was regarded as factual knowledge. This change, however, automatically meant a knowledge-loss for the church. And, because of the fusion of authority-making characteristics, this really implied a diminished authority tout court, and the Oughts of the church became - rationally - threatened as well. Apart from formal logic and material logic there is also a logic of belief revision.

The rationality pattern for belief revision presented above is at work in most families. When kids discover that their parents do not have the power, or do not know all the things which the kids have thought they knew, there is an authority-loss for the parents even in moral matters. And that second change is a rational change, given the first change and a fusion of all the different kinds of authority-making characteristics.

8.2 Classification changes

When, apart from authority, Is and Ought already are connected, by fusion or by respect, then there are different ways in which an Is can change and imply a change (or a rethinking) of an Ought. An Is is for us either a truth claim or a veridical perception. Every truth claim contains some kind of classification, i.e. a descriptive concept is applied to the world. Such classifications are, unhappily, fallible, and reclassifications are now and then needed. A reclassification is the same thing as a change of Is. There are at least three different kinds of classification problems: (1) the problem of application, (2) the problem of understanding, and (3) the problem of interpretation.

The application problem shows a trivial way in which a change of Is really implies a change of Ought. When we apply an explicit norm which we respect, we may apply it wrongly. A judge, for instance, condemns someone to jail for driving a car when drunk. Later, however, it turns out that the presumed Is (the fact that the driver had been drunk) was not really an Is (i.e. the driver had been sober). This change of Is implies a change of Ought. The judgement that the driver ought to be in jail should be withdrawn. Obviously, all explicit norms are susceptible to this kind of change. This is not a change in the norm itself, it is a change in its application in the individual case. Nonetheless it is a change in an Ought. A judgement to the effect that here and now one ought to behave in a specific way towards one particular person, is a normative judgement. It is an Ought.

Cases like these can, like some authority changes, also be described as rational belief revisions. 'Belief' is then understood in such a wide sense that it includes all kinds of Oughts as well as all kinds of cognitions. Assume the simple belief system consisting of the factual belief 'P drove his car when he was drunk' and the three norms 'Drunken drivers ought to be sent to jail', 'Sober drivers ought, ceteris paribus, not be sent to jail', and 'P ought to be sent to jail'. Take away the factual belief and replace it with 'P did not drive his car when he was
drunk'. Ask then yourself whether some other belief in the system ought to be revised as a consequence of the introduced change. The answer is obvious. Consistency requires us to revise the belief that P ought to be sent to jail.

Formal studies of rational belief revisions have, mostly, been concerned with changes of epistemic states. Philosophers working within this field has noted the possibility to extend the study of belief changes from epistemic states to normative systems like legal codes, and there are also a few such investigations made. But no one, as far as I know, have noted the obvious extension I just have pointed out where changes in factual beliefs rationally imply revisions of norms believed in. (I think, by the way, that these kinds of rational belief revisions very well captures Toulmin's idea of evaluative inferences, cf. chapter 1.2.)

The application problem is most easily seen in relation to norms which we respect, but the problem exists also in relation to perceptions of ethical demands. A simple example will show it. If you see a child crying for help in a lake, you may perceive the situation as an immediate duty to save the child from drowning. Suddenly, however, something in the voice of the kid tells you that it is merely an attempt at a joke. Immediately, there is a subtle shift in your perception and the ethical demand is gone. In case of explicit norms which we respect, the change of Is mentioned (drunk-sober) rationally imply a change in the corresponding Ought. In the case of moral perceptions, the change of Ought which follows upon the change of Is is, with hindsight, equally rational. It is a case of tacit knowledge. People living beneath Is and Ought in the sense explained in chapter 1.4, can change their Oughts in a rational way. There is no reason to restrict the term tacit knowledge to manual know how. Tacitly and intuitively, people have made logical derivations long before the logicians turned all the different derivation rules into explicit knowledge. And most people continue to make derivations in this way since they have no knowledge of logic.

The remarks just made about norms, are equally valid in relation to values and recommendations. Think again of Urmson's apple grading example (cf. pp 6f and 77) and assume that we are the graders. There are explicit criteria for good apples, but we may apply them wrongly. Surely, if we discover that an apple which we have called Super Grade does not in fact meet the corresponding criteria, then our value judgement in question has to be revised. This kind of change is as clear-cut an example of rationality as anything can be. It is a rational value revision.

If, instead of explicit value criteria, we have values which are fused with their value-making characteristics, nothing is in principle changed. The application problem remains. When, for instance, a certain situation is suddenly seen in a new light, a perceived value can equally suddenly disappear from one's perception. For the person living the change there is merely a change in the value perception, but for the analytical observer the change is analogous to the one described in relation to explicit values.

Perhaps "the fused case" can be best understood by means of a virtue. If someone is regarded as courageous, people have implicit assumptions about his actions. They may, for instance, think that he is willing to risk his own life in order to save others or willing to risk his good reputation for a good cause. People can very well regard him as courageous without being able explicitly to note these virtue-making characteristics. Nonetheless, they will withdraw the classification 'courageous' if they will come to know that, in fact, "the hero" has never been willing to risk his life or reputation. The change of Is, tacitly, implies a change of Ought.

There is an application problem connected with any Ought-concept, be the Ought in question a norm, a value, or a virtue. If it is discovered that the Ought-making characteristics have been wrongly applied, then, of course, this discovery and change of Is rationally implies a rethinking of the corresponding Ought.

The next kind of reclassification is connected with (2) the problem of understanding. Sometimes a certain kind of phenomena turns out to be fundamentally misunderstood. Mostly, such a misunderstanding means that one considers an old concept as wholly inapplicable in this world of ours. Really, we say, it should never have been applied at all.

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4 Gärdenfors, ibid. pp 101-03.
Therefore, it is here misleading to say that something is wrong in each singular application, there is a more fundamental flaw. There is something wrong with the whole concept. The kind of scientific change which Thomas Kuhn and a lot of other philosophers of science call paradigm shifts, involve this problem of understanding. I will exemplify it with Descartes' redefinition of non-human animals.

According to Descartes, animals are mechanical systems without souls, whereas human beings are mechanical systems connected with a soul. Descartes did not try to change the application (i.e. the extension) of the concept of animal, nor that of 'human being'. He tried to redefine these concepts. Soul is not for him, as for Aristotle and the medievals, an activity principle. He identifies soul with thinking consciousness, and claims that only human beings have consciousness. When one moves from an Aristotelian view of man to a Cartesian view, there is a change of Is. What man really is becomes different. From the new point of view, one had not earlier understood what a human being really is.

Such a change of understanding (of an Is) can of course also imply a change of some Oughts. Instead of different souls, like the principles of nutrition, of movement and perception, and of reason (i.e. the vegetative, the animal, and the human soul, according to the Aristotelians), Descartes claims that there are different mechanical systems on the one hand and consciousness on the other. Pleasures and pains belong to consciousness, and animals, which can feel neither, suddenly seem to fall outside the domain of morals just as plants and stones do. Since non-human animals have no consciousness, they cannot, according to the Cartesian view, suffer. Consequently, the argument goes, we can do whatever we like with them. Animal experiments are as legitimate as plant experiments and machine experiments. Consciousness not only becomes the essence of man, it also becomes central in ethics.

For many people, the Cartesian view conflicts with their spontaneous moral perceptions. Confronted with animal experiments, one easily perceives them as being morally wrong. For a true Cartesian, theory here tells us to neglect, or to try to change, our spontaneous Ought perceptions. The new Cartesian truth-claims about animals (a change of Is) imply a change of Oughts.

(In the last decades, the Western world has witnessed a minor anti-Cartesian revolution. Animal liberationists say that the received conception of the higher animals is wrong. Higher animals have consciousness and should therefore be treated more like human beings. This Ought switch, however, is not a problem of understanding. It conforms to the first pattern, the problem of application. Where there is consciousness one ought to avoid unnecessary suffering. The animal liberationists claim that there is consciousness where the Cartesians cannot find any. The Cartesians are accused of not applying well understood concepts where they ought to be applied.)

Before we turn to the third kind of classification problem, the problem of interpretation, we shall take a look at both one special kind of the problem of application and one special kind of the problem of understanding. The former problem has to do with the semantic feature called vagueness, and the latter problem with that of open texture.

Let us regard the norm 'Thou shalt not kill' as a valid imperative. 'Killing' here means taking human lives. Life, however, is a vague concept. Mostly, there has been a consensus to the effect that an unfertilized ovum is not a living being, whereas a newborn child surely is. But where, in the spectrum from the newly fertilized ovum via the different stages of an embryonic child to the newborn child, does life come into being? The concept of life is vague and has application problems. This problem, however, is of no ethical relevance as long as we cannot intervene in the vague area, i.e. as long as there are no abortion methods. It is the change of Is which consists in the invention and use of such methods which creates the moral problem.

Let me repeat. Sometimes an application problem becomes morally relevant because of a new human invention. A new invention introduces new facts (Ises) in the world. Such new facts can create intense Ought debates. And for rational reasons. The invention of the modern abortion methods and the associated discussions are illuminating examples.

With regard to the colour spectrum and our colour concepts, we can draw the line between, for instance, yellow and orange wherever we want within a rather broad area of the spectrum. The only important thing to remember is that everybody should know where the line is drawn, so that communication functions well. With regard to the concept of life, however, such a conventionality is not possible because of the normative problem. If we want to retain the
norm 'Thou shalt not kill', the concept of human life cannot be delimited by a convention. We can here see clearly a thing pointed out in chapter 6.3, namely that a lot of concepts get their identity from both a factual and a normative level. I wrote that "what counts as generous behaviour is not a behaviour which actually gets its identity from the behaviour alone, the identity is also given in order to fit the evaluation" (p 79). It is the same with the concept of life. A factual and a normative interpretation have to be made simultaneously.

When there is an application problem of this kind, a debate often gets going because one part simply denies that there is a problem. There is no vagueness, they say. In the abortion case, the conservative side has always maintained that fertilized ovums are living human beings and that, therefore, abortion is murder.

The concept of life is vague in both its ends, so to speak. We do not know exactly when life starts, nor when it ends. Life is usually thought of as something which gradually fades off, even if there is a discontinuity where it disappears completely. Consequently, it is very hard to say at which precise moment death comes. This fact, however, is not what created the problems with the concept of brain death. (At least in Sweden there has been a big public 'Ought conflict' centred around brain death.) On the semantic level the problem here is not that of vagueness but of open texture.6

That a concept has open texture means that there are situations for which it has not in any sense been delimited. Open texture must no be conflated with vagueness. Our concept of mountain is vague, which means, among other things, that we have drawn no precise limit between mountains and hills. It is also vague in the sense that we do not know exactly where a mountain ends and the flat land begins. Let us now assume that we are in front of something which surely is a mountain and not a hill, but that this mountain suddenly begins to move. Is it then a mountain or not? If we can entertain the idea that perhaps we should call it a mountain after all, then our concept of mountain has open texture. We have so far merely not taken a possible capacity to move into account in the concept because there has been no need for us to do that. Note that the conceptual problem envisaged is not solved by saying that since we do not regard mountains as animals (or plants) but as dead matter, our moving mountain cannot be a real mountain, i.e. a 'dead matter mountain'. Animals do not only move, they also perceive and have nutritional functions. In one sense our conceptual problem is easily solved; we can of course speak of 'self-moving mountains'. But then another conceptual problem arises: Is a self-moving mountain a kind of matter, a kind of plant, a kind of animal, or something else?

The concept of brain death behaves in several respects like the concept of self-moving mountains. A brain dead person has a body which fulfils nutritional functions in spite of the fact that the brain is not functioning and cannot function any more. To be brain dead is to be in a certain state, not in a process heading towards death. This means that the problem of brain death is not a problem of vagueness. In one sense there was no conceptual problem connected with this new kind of fact; almost immediately a new concept was invented, namely 'brain death'. However, as with moving mountains, the genus problem remains: Are brain dead persons dead or alive or do they constitute a third kind of genus?

If brain dead persons are regarded as living human beings in the old sense of living, then the old norms connected to the life of human beings apply; organ transplantation, for instance, is ruled out. On the other hand, if brain dead persons are regarded as really dead, other well known norms apply. If neither is the case, the distinction between life and death is no longer regarded as a dichotomy and there are no known norms to apply. Our old understanding of death has to be regarded as incomplete.

Sometimes we meet new phenomena where we immediately realize that no known concept is applicable. Sometimes we want to withdraw a classification, not because of a simple misapplication and not because there is another concept which can be substituted for the old one, but because we suspect that a completely new concept has to be created. We then meet (3) the problem of interpretation. The problem of application is concerned with the relation between a concept and the world, the problem of understanding is primarily concerned with the relation between two competing concepts, but the problem of interpretation is concerned with the relation between the world and our concept creating ability.

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6 This point was made by Mats Furberg, "Om dödsbegrepp och definitioner", Filosofisk Tidskrift 1/1987, pp 1-10.
The problem of interpretation reminds us of a trivial fact. Before the problems of application and understanding can arise, there must have been a process where the concepts were created and/or were learned.

A situation in which one finds oneself confronted with a new kind of Is, is of course also a normatively open situation. The interpretation process has to be finished before it is possible to talk of a determinate Ought which is implied by the new Is. This being so, there is not much to say about the interpretation problem in the context of this book. One thing, though, should once again be noted. And that is the mutuality between Oughts and Ought-making characteristics which was analyzed in chapter 6.3. Since many concepts are fusions of Ises and Oughts, interpretation processes are such fusions, too.

The distinctions put forward between application, understanding, and interpretation of descriptive concepts, must be rightly understood. I have explained the distinction as if there are three wholly distinct activities, but that is not really the case. In order to have an application problem, one must, first, decide that the interpretation problem is not relevant, and, second, decide that nor is there a problem of understanding. Of course, these decisions are mostly made implicitly, but that does not alter the fact that application always has a relation to understanding and interpretation. When there is a problem of understanding one has already decided that there is no problem of interpretation, and when one understands a concept one must be able to apply the concept in at least some cases. Understanding is always related both to interpretation and application. Interpretation, in turn, always has a relation to understanding and application, since one always interprets in order to understand and apply a concept.\(^7\)

The distinction between application, understanding, and interpretation is in itself vague. When there is an application problem which is due to vagueness (as in abortion discussions), we are on the brink of having a problem of understanding; and when there is a problem of understanding due to open texture (as in brain death debates), we can with good reasons call it an interpretation problem since we are then confronted with a radically new phenomena. I have chosen, however, to draw the lines the other way so that abortion discussions become application problems and brain death discussions become problems of understanding. My reasons are the following. In vagueness we have already understood the vague dimension, and that was the case in the abortion debates. In open texture there is an intimate connection with an already existing concept, and that was the case in the brain death debates.

At the end of chapter 1.1, I remarked that political discussions are mostly centred around matters of fact, and that I once found this puzzling. We are now in a position to see why questions of fact can have such a prominent role in politics. Many facts are by most parties regarded as Ought-making characteristics. I am thinking of things like low unemployment, low inflation, no budget deficit, no pollution, and so on. If one party claims that another party has made a mistake in its application of such concepts, then the argumentative pattern is connected with the application problem. This pattern says that if one changes one's beliefs about which Ought-making characteristics there are in the world, then it can be rational also to revise one's beliefs about which Oughts one should adhere to. It is rational if the different Ought-making characteristics in question imply different Oughts. (Remember that the static relation between Ought-making characteristics and Oughts is not now under discussion.)

Political parties may, despite their different ideologies, in a lot of cases regard exactly the same properties as Ought-making characteristics. A debate about the rate of unemployment is often, implicitly, a debate both about how to value the deeds of the government and about what has to be done in the future. These evaluations need not to be mentioned. They are supplied by the context. The explicit discussions can be purely factual because most people intuitively make rational belief revisions of the relevant Oughts.

\(^7\) I guess that those readers who are familiar with so-called hermeneutic philosophy will now think of Gadamer's claim in *Truth and Method* (Sheed and Ward: London 1975, chapter II:2) that application, understanding, and interpretation are merely three moments of the same activity. This is O.K. for me. I have not mentioned Gadamer in the text because I do not want to engage in a discussion of his famous book. The threefold distinction made has of course also strong similarities with Kant's distinctions between the faculty of determinant judgement (cf. application; subsuming particulars under universals), the faculty of understanding (cf. understanding; creating categories), and the faculty of reflective judgement (cf. interpretation; mediating between the world of phenomena and regulative ideas).
It should be noted that the relation between Ought-making characteristics and "their" Ought, is not that of some means to an end. Means are spatially and/or temporally distinct from the end, whereas Ought-making characteristics are constitutive parts of their Oughts. In the cases referred to above, politicians are not discussing means towards a common specific goal, the good society. They have different conceptions about the good society, but these conceptions are overlapping and so are some Ought-making characteristics.

All political debates centred around facts are not, however, related to the application problem. Some bring in the problem of understanding. When I presented the problem of understanding, I said in passing that it can be understood by means of paradigm shifts in science. Thomas Kuhn, who coined the term paradigm, has stressed that different paradigms are incommensurable. Incommensurability must not be identified with incomparability. A person who really takes the time needed to learn two different and competing paradigms can compare them. But he does not find an independent concrete standard or measure which can be used to decide which paradigm is most truthlike (or most fruitful for normal-scientific research). Different paradigms pattern the world differently, and the choice cannot be made by a pre-determined standard.

A similar kind of incommensurability is at work between fundamentally different conceptions about how society is structured and how it works. And such conceptions are part and parcel of the great modern ideologies. Let us look at liberalism and socialism. The 'Ought-essence' of liberalism is the view that the good society should maximize individual freedom, whereas the 'Ought-essence' of socialism says that in the good society should everybody be equals and live in community. The 'Is-essence' of liberalism contains an atomist view of man and the belief that the market mechanism, in the long run, is the most effective producer of welfare. Classical socialism (i.e. non-market socialism) contains a non-atomist view of man and the belief that a commonly owned planned economy, in the long run, is the most effective producer of welfare. In both cases, the 'Is-essence' is an Ought-making characteristic for the 'Ought-essence'. The mutuality between the Ought and its Ought-making characteristics mentioned earlier, here looks as follows. Liberalism: since every man is an island and the market mechanism functions so well, individual freedom ought to be maximized, but, conversely, individual freedom contains the contractual freedom of the market. Socialism: since man has a social nature, and a commonly owned and planned economy functions so well, man ought to live in community and equality, but, conversely, community and equality are incompatible with egoism and inequalities, but the latter, in turn, are inseparable from the market mechanism.

Because of their different views of man's nature, liberalism and socialism do not have exactly the same concept of welfare. For the socialist a sense of community is a realization of man's deepest nature, whereas for the liberal it is merely a contingent feeling felt by an individual. Welfare is for the socialist essentially connected with community; for the liberal there is no such connection. The concepts of socialist welfare and liberal welfare can be compared, but they are incommensurable.

If a liberal turns socialist, or a socialist turns liberal, such a change can very well, in retrospect, be described as a rational Ought revision. First there is a change in belief about man's nature, and then there is a rationally implied revision of Oughts. Such an account, however, leaves the conversion process completely out of account. And mostly, in such processes, it is impossible to distinguish between changes of Ises and changes of Oughts.

The comparison made between the 'Is-essences' of liberalism and socialism is of course oversimplified. It is abstract in order to make the problem of understanding clear. Usually, the problem of understanding is intimately linked with the problem of interpretation and is much more concrete. The liberal has really to make an effort in order to interpret what the socialist says about man's nature and about how societies work; and vice versa for the socialist.

In chapter 1.2 I mentioned Charles Taylor's opinion that in some ideological discussions "facts secrete norms". In my view, such a description is very fitting for the kind of interpretations which are going on when one tries to understand a foreign ideology. Taylor's phrase, however, should be taken to mean that "new basic facts secrete new basic norms". The existence of norms is taken for granted, the secretion in question does not bridge the logical gap between Is and Ought. What, really, is experienced, is the simultaneous emergence of new Oughts and new Ought-making characteristics.
8.3 Ought collapses

According to sections 8.1 and 8.2, authority changes and classification changes can rationally imply norm, value, and virtue changes. And such changes may affect life in a thorough-going way. However, there are some authority changes and classification changes which are so deep-seated that they deserve a special discussion and a special name. I would like to call them Ought collapses, and it is to such changes that we now turn. In these cases the change of Is is of such a character that it usually, at first, looks as if there after the change can be no Ought at all.

I have several times spoken of tradition and made a distinction between real tradition and tradition in the Burkean sense (see chapter 2.2). Real tradition is by definition not recognized as tradition. People living in a real tradition cannot even think of alternatives, which means that they cannot look upon their way of life as traditional in contradistinction to other possible ways of life. In the introductory chapter I quoted S. Toulmin, saying, among other things, the following:

In its early stages, therefore, morality boils down to 'doing the done thing': and this is true both of the way in which a child learns from its parents, and, in social pre-history, of moral codes. Primitive ethics is 'deontological', a matter of rigid duties, taboos, customs and commandments. --- When it is recognised that the members of a community have the right to criticise the existing practices, and to suggest new ones, a new phase in the development of ethics begins. (cf. p 7)

What Toulmin calls 'doing the done thing', I have called real tradition. In chapter 2.2, I pointed out that there is a surprising similarity between real tradition and Kant's rationalistic deontology, namely that both make normative alternatives unthinkable. Toulmin indicates similarity and difference between them by using scare quotes when he calls primitive ethics (real tradition) 'deontological', i.e. deontological but not really deontological.

As soon as people start to question what has hitherto seemed impossible to contest, real tradition collapses. Such a change is a change of Is. Something that was impossible, criticism, has now become a social fact. The world has changed. When real tradition brakes down, one kind of authority breaks down totally. This change is very fundamental and it may seem as if everything suddenly is allowed. If man is able to criticise everything, how can then objective Oughts be possible?

Instead of tradition, or after tradition, there is often a God. Hitherto, in world history, most moral systems have had a religious backing. The concept of real tradition is more an ideal type in Weber's sense than an ordinary descriptive concept. Mostly, a God has been the presumed end of all questioning. The infinite justificatory regress (Why do this? - Because of that. - Why? - Because - Why? - and so on) is stopped by God. God is the absolute authority. A Gestalt that fuses all authority-making characteristics. He is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnigood. If now, suddenly, God dies, what happens? That God dies means of course that we come to regard God as only a human construct, not as a being with a man-independent existence whom we refer to by means of the concept of God. The disappearance of God is an authority change, but a very special one. What we discover is that, in fact, mankind have invented something that we thought existed independently of us. When real tradition breaks down, it must, similarly, in retrospect be looked upon as a human creation instead of as the one and only inevitable way of acting.

In monotheistic religions there is God versus man. When God dies, man is left alone. Therefore, every Ought may suddenly look as fortuitous as a daydream. And if they are, they are not real Oughts. Oughts must have some kind of objectivity.

Real traditions and monotheistic Gods are probably the most absolute authorities possible. Both of them, however, have collapsed in modern philosophy. In the world outside philosophy, religion still dominates quantitatively, but secularized views are more widespread than ever before in history.

Natural rights philosophies claim that they have an authority free grounding of Oughts. In such philosophies, Oughts are regarded as primary qualities, i.e. as parts of natural facts.
When, from this kind of position, it is discovered that, in fact, Oughts are secondary qualities, there is a change of Is. Since Oughts, according to both views, are facts in the world, although different kinds of facts, we have a case of reclassification. But not an ordinary classification change. Here, too, there is an Ought collapse. If, suddenly, all Oughts are regarded as purely subjective phenomena, then ethics seems to be as dead as when real tradition and God died. In all the three changes mentioned, Oughts seem to become man-created in such a way that they wholly lose their action-constraining character.

By definition, an Ought collapse puts the Ought-existence problem on the agenda. The secularized part of the world is today living with this problem, and I will end the book (chapter 9) with a discussion of it. But I want to make one remark at once. All attempts to ground Oughts in man's egoism, has been shown to be invalid quite independently of the philosophical anthropology which I argued for in chapter 7.1. Neither Hobbesian nor Lockean thinking, i.e. arguments to the effect that everybody is better off with some ethical system than with none, can have a binding force on oneself as an individual person. No such arguments can show that it is irrational to be a free rider.

8.4 Ego discoveries

A specific kind of social facts can be called 'identity types for persons'. In chapter 7.4, I claimed that there are internal relations between (a) thick role identity, absolute virtue ethics, and feelings of shame, between (b) thin role identity, absolute norm ethics, and feelings of guilt, and between (c) ego-identity, fallible ethics, and feelings of remorse. This means, among other things, that a person cannot change identity type without making an Ought revision, too. We have, once again, a change of Is which implies a change of Ought. Such an Is-change is a classification change, but a very special one.

Ought collapses are intimately connected with discoveries about the human ego, but not necessarily with changes between thick role identity, thin role identity, and ego-identity. When real tradition breaks down it is discovered that the human ego has a critical faculty; when God dies the possibility of alienation is discovered; when Oughts become secondary qualities a projective faculty is discovered.

The belief in and use of a critical faculty is consistent with a belief in absolute morals and a thick role identity. A person can believe that his critical faculty has discovered, firstly, that tradition is wrong, and, secondly, that there is another source of an absolute ethics. Criticism does not in and of itself imply fallibilism. It may change one thick role identity into another, at the same time as it replaces one absolute virtue ethics by another and, simultaneously, replaces one kind of shame with another. The internal relations at work relate determinables, not determinates. When real tradition collapses it becomes necessary to exchange one thick ego for another, but not necessarily more.

Religion is compatible with both thick and thin egos, although, of course, one gets different kinds of religion in the two cases. From what was argued in chapter 7.4, it follows that a religion which puts stress on feelings of shame will get thick egos, whereas one which puts the stress on feelings of guilt will get thin egos. When religion disappears completely, it is discovered that God is only a human construct and that such a product mistakenly can be regarded as something which stands over and above human beings. Hereby, a capacity of the human ego is also discovered, namely the capacity to misconceive a product of its own as something wholly alien. The discovery of religious alienation, however, does not in and of itself imply the emergence of ego-identity and a fallible ethics. As remarked earlier, secularized philosophers may take recourse to a philosophy of natural rights. And some sets of rights are compatible with a thick role identity and some with a thin role identity.

When it is discovered not only that tradition and God are man-created, but that natural rights are man-created, too, then there is necessarily a change of identity-type into ego-identity. It is quite a change when man starts to look upon himself as a law-giver to himself, instead of a being which is deemed to follow wholly external norms, values, and virtues. Conversely, when we discover that we have an ego-identity we also discover the Ought-existence problem. And this problem is part of the philosophical situation now before the turn of the century, as it was before the last turn.
Chapter 9

**OUPT IS!**

What are we to do to today in moral philosophy? Tradition is gone, God is dead, and Oughts are man-created but the Free Rider is immortal. Can there in this our situation exist anything worthy of the names norm, value, or virtue? I think so.

9.1 Objectivity versus subjectivity

If Oughts are worthy of their name, they must in some sense be objective. We have to see whether we can find a contrast between objectivity and subjectivity which is of such a character that it makes adequate objective Oughts possible. One kind of objectivity can be ruled out from the start. Since Oughts are man-created, they cannot possibly be objective in the sense that natural facts are objective, i.e. as having a wholly man-independent existence. Another kind of objectivity arises when objectivity is identified with *provability*. Kant is here a good representative. According to him, although we cannot know anything about things in themselves, we can prove some propositions to be necessarily true for the world of experience. We can also prove the moral law. But taste and aesthetics is different. They are not wholly subjective; they are not like pains I would say. If one feels pain, one feels pain. No one can contest it, apart, of course, from someone who accuses one of being a liar or who starts a discussion about what causes the pain. But the pain in itself is wholly subjective. Judgements of taste, however, admit of real quarrels and they contain arguments, although nothing can be really proved. When Kant lived, it was commonly thought that knowledge is secure and that moral principles are absolute, but that aesthetics has another relationship to objectivity. Kant wrote in his preface to the *Critique of Judgement* that:

This perplexity about a principle (whether it is subjective or objective) presents itself mainly in those judgements that we call aesthetical, which concern the beautiful and the sublime of nature or of art.¹

Today, the situation is very different. The perplexity Kant is speaking about is nowadays as vigorous in relation to science and to morals as it is in relation to taste. This so-called postmodern condition, is of course easily taken to imply that, finally, everything has been reduced to subjectivity and play. I think, however, that despite the fact that fallibilism is true within the realms of both knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics, there are big differences between the realms. Differences which are important if one wants to understand the kind of objectivity which is adequate for ethics. Below, I am picking out, it might be said, some distinctions from Kant's *Critiques* which I de-transcendentalize and inject with fallibility. The relevant Kantian distinctions are the following:

(a) Things in themselves - not knowable at all.
(b) Basic knowledge about nature - provable.
(c) Basic moral principles - provable.
(d) Basic aesthetical judgements - arguable.

Instead of this, I propose a list which contains neither provability nor absolute objectivity. Where Kant has provability I have replaced it by arguability, and where he has arguability I have something which I call semi-arguability. The fifth row which is

added I find trivial, and I take it for granted that Kant would have no qualms about it. My list looks like this:

(a) Man-independent nature (pure objectivity);
(b) Fallible but arguable knowledge (epistemic objectivity);
(c) Fallible but arguable ethics (normative objectivity);
(d) Subjective but semi-arguable phenomena (semi-objectivity);
(e) Subjective and non-arguable phenomena (pure subjectivity).

Usually, in my opinion, the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity get their context-specific intensions from an implicit ontology. With regard to the concepts of objectivity, subjectivity, arguability and non-arguability which I shall posit, I shall try to make the ontology explicit. The ontological positions outlined in chapter 3 ("Natural facts and social facts") will now be given a new importance. This book has a realist position. It is taken for granted that there is a nature which exists independently of man. The kind of objectivity which nature represents in itself, is, by definition, an objectivity beyond man. I shall call it pure objectivity. All the other kinds of objectivity mentioned has to do with arguability and they cannot be explained apart from an analysis of arguability.

Arguability has some absolute presuppositions which we encountered in passing in chapter 1.3, when some of Karl-Otto Apel's views were discussed. Arguments are, Apel has claimed, always arguments in a language, and every language presupposes some pragmatic principles (e.g. 'You ought to speak the truth') and every critical discussion requires a specific principle, namely 'You should in discussions recognize the others as participants with rights equal to your own'. These principles, however, need not be discussed here. Instead, I shall put forward what might be called an outline of a phenomenology of arguability.

In everyday life there is a close connection between what is regarded as arguable and what is perceived as outer in relation to our human bodies. What kinds of material things there are, and what properties they have, can be argued about. But whether someone feels pain or not cannot really be argued about. Pains are normally perceived as existing inside our body. Here we should note a subtle distinction between the intentional correlate as a whole and one of its parts, namely the perceived (or thought) causes of the intentional correlate. Let me explain.

When a non-reflective consciousness has ordinary things as its intentional correlates, the things are also regarded as causing the perception of it. Such causal accounts are part and parcel of the phenomena themselves, and can, therefore, not be 'bracketed away' from a phenomenological description. The distinction I am aiming at becomes clear in cases where the correlate and its cause are not perceived as identical. When phantom pains (e.g. a pain in a non-existing amputated leg) are perceived as phantom pains, then the intentional correlate (the pain) is placed outside the body but the cause is placed inside. The pain in itself, which is outside the body, has a reference to something outside itself, namely causes inside the body. It is important to note that intentional correlates sometimes have such a further reference as a part.

We can now make some observations about arguability. When both the intentional correlate and its main causes are regarded as outer (as in perceptions of ordinary things), one can argue about the correlate and its properties, but when both the correlate and its causes are regarded as inner (as with ordinary pains), arguments are not possible. The underlying ontological assumption is that we cannot perceive other people's inner experiences. Because of this we can have no opinion of our own about them. In the little table below, the first row is connected with arguability and the second with non-arguability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intentional correlate</th>
<th>Main causes</th>
<th>Paradigm examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) outer</td>
<td>outer</td>
<td>things in veridical perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) inner</td>
<td>inner</td>
<td>pains</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The kind of arguability which is connected with the first row defines what I want to call *epistemic objectivity*. By epistemic objectivity, i.e. (b) in my list, I mean only rational arguability for truth-claims. A theory is epistemically objective if it can be argued for. Within a fallibilist frame stronger conceptions of objectivity are just impossible. Epistemic objectivity presupposes a common belief in the existence of a man-independent nature. Otherwise, epistemic discussions have to be regarded as rhetorical exercises. Epistemic objectivity is ontologically committed. It presupposes the existence of pure objectivity (a) but is not identical with it.

Of course, there can be no real arguments where there is nothing to argue about. Something which exists independently of the arguments. But epistemic objectivity requires more than that. It requires that this something (i.e. the intentional correlate referred to in the discussion at hand) both exists outside the discussing persons and is being caused by something which is outer.

The so-called incommensurability thesis in the philosophy of science is compatible with epistemic objectivity if the thesis is connected with a realist philosophy. Even though different paradigms or basic theories in the natural sciences are incommensurable, they are informally comparable and can be argued about. Someone who contests another one's paradigm can, even if he does not understand it completely, point out anomalies. He can notice that there are outer empirical data which prima facie seems to refute the other paradigm. It is also possible for him to point out what he finds to be category mistakes or other fundamental theoretical flaws in the other paradigm. A defender of the contested paradigm can try to show that what looks like anomalies are not really anomalies and that what looks like category mistakes is merely a new way of thinking. He can also himself attack and point to anomalies and what he regards as theoretical flaws in the other one's paradigm. For a realist, an anomaly can be nature's way of saying that the paradigm is wrong. Thus, there is arguability, but no provability. This is what fallibilism amounts to.²

The second row in the table contains pure subjective phenomena, tooth-aches, pains in the stomach, and so on. All of them are intentional correlates which are inner in relation to our body and are regarded as mainly caused by states or processes in our body. In such cases it is not possible to argue about the existence of the phenomena in question, nor about its properties. Of course, it is possible to argue about the causes of a pain (is, for instance, migraine a psychosomatic pain or not?), but that is another thing. Also, one can very well beg someone to pay more attention to a pain of his and ask if he has really given an accurate description of it. However, to wonder and to ask somebody about something is one thing, to argue that the other one is wrong is another thing. We take it for granted that we cannot perceive the same numerical pain as another person, that is the reason why there is nothing to argue about. Pains are monadological, although monadological within an intersubjective frame (cf. p 49).

Both arguability and non-arguability, and, as a consequence of this, epistemic objectivity, rest on ontological commitments. It is an ontological assumption of ours that a certain phenomena is purely subjective and so not arguable, just as it is an ontological assumption of ours that something has epistemic objectivity and can be argued about.

In chapter 3.2, I claimed that the common sense distinction between oneself and external things is easily turned into false ontologies of the ego; ontologies where the inner-outer distinction is wrongly made identical with the distinction between mind-dependent (subjective) phenomena and mind-independent (objective) phenomena. However, the distinction between pure objectivity (a) and pure subjectivity (e), is extensionally equivalent with the distinction between phenomena which are outer and phenomena which are inner in relation to the body. Pure objective phenomena are always wholly outer and pure subjective phenomena are always wholly inner. But the table above is incomplete. Phantom pains, for instance, have no place in the table since they combine outer intentional correlates with inner causes. In other cases it is the other way round, i.e. the intentional correlate is inside the body but the cause is perceived as

² My views on this issue are elaborated in my *Ontological Investigations*, chapter 16.
being outside. An example might be someone who really believes that he hears the voice of god in his head; a 'phantom voice' it might be called.

With regard to the two distinctions I have introduced there are four possible combinations. The first distinction is between those intentional correlates which are outside the body and those which are inside; the second distinction is between those intentional correlates whose main causes are perceived as existing outside the body and those which are perceived as existing inside. We have to say 'main causes', because as human beings we are of course always ourselves a partial cause of all our perceptions; a recipient always has to be a cause in the sense that it allows the reception of that which is received.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) outer</td>
<td>inner</td>
<td>phantom pains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) inner</td>
<td>outer</td>
<td>phantom voices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) inner</td>
<td>inner and outer</td>
<td>taste sensations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) outer</td>
<td>inner and outer</td>
<td>language meaning (reflective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) inner and outer</td>
<td>outer</td>
<td>objective emotions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What, then, can we say about arguability in relation to the third and the fourth row of the table? If the causes of a phenomena which belongs to someone else are inner, then we cannot perceive the intentional correlates even if the correlate is outer in relation to the other one's body. Nothing can cause us to have the same correlate since our bodies are not the same. Therefore, it is no more possible to argue about phantom pains than about real pains. Nor is it possible to argue about phantom voices and other phenomena where the correlates are inner but the main causes are outer. Since in such cases the correlates are wholly inner we cannot perceive other's correlates. The fact that the main causes are outer makes no difference. Both the third and the fourth row should be connected with non-arguability and subjectivity.

I hope I have now made it clear in what sense everyday arguability and everyday non-arguability rest on specific ontological presuppositions. Presuppositions which have to do with the inner-outer distinction as unfolded in the last table. This is first-order arguability. However, there is also a second-order arguability. Happily, at least for philosophers, it is always possible to discuss whether a certain kind of intentional correlate belongs to the realm of arguability or that of non-arguability. In our non-reflective lives we regard colours and language meaning as having their causes outside our bodies, but science tells us that this cannot be the case since the non-conscious part of reality contains neither colours nor language meaning. If science is right colours and language meaning cannot be placed in the first row together with things and their properties. If, for instance, they are placed on the third row, then it is no longer possible to argue about them. It is always possible to argue (second-orderly) about (first-order) arguability and non-arguability. Second-order arguability is always with us. But the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity which I am now trying to articulate relate to first-order arguability. Therefore, back to our phenomenology of arguability.

Hitherto, I have spoken as if intentional correlates are always either outer or inner, but that is a false assumption. Some intentional correlates make up a unified whole of both inner and outer parts (or moments). Likewise, the main causes are sometimes both inner and outer. These two possibilities can be combined with the other ones, and the new combinations can be added to the former table. The complete table looks as follows:
We shall continue to move down the rows in the table. Next row to discuss is the fifth one, where we find taste sensations as the paradigm. Here, in contradistinction to feelings of pain, a kind of argumentation is possible. If, in a dinner conversation, there is disagreement about whether the wine is dry or not, the one who tastes "wrongly" can be asked to pay more attention to his taste. He is asked to take another drink and be more attentive. Surely, his taste sensation - the intentional correlate - is inside his body, but so is the wine when it is tasted. However, the wine is not part of the body and should not be regarded as an inner cause. Phenomenologically, the tongue seems to be a cause, too; it appears as a cause in a way in which the eye does not appear as a cause of visual perceptions. We cannot possibly see our eyes, but we can feel our tongues when tasting. The main causes of taste sensations are both outer and inner, but the intentional correlate is wholly inner. If, which is usually the case, it is taken for granted that our perceptual systems are similar and function in the same way, then it is reasonable to ask the other to taste the wine anew. The wine is there as a pure objectivity and acts causally in the same way as before. Since also the perceptual system of taste is assumed to be similar, the earlier 'deviation' must be due to lack of attentiveness. It is quite rational to say 'Concentrate on what you taste and you will find that I am right!'..

The kind of arguability which exists in relation to taste, I shall call semi-arguability; the corresponding kind of objectivity will analogously be called semi-objectivity. Its ontological commitments are two-fold. The pure objectivity of the outer cause is assumed, and so is the similarity of our perceptual systems which acts as inner cause. Despite the fact that the intentional correlates of row five are inner, a kind of arguability is possible here.

The sixth row is exemplified by language meaning. Language, especially written language, is perceived as being outside our body. With regard to its causes, it is mostly perceived in the same way as things are in veridical perception, i.e. as outer. When this is the case it is possible to argue about the interpretation. But sometimes for some of us, perception is modified in such a way that we regard the graphical signs as having outer causes and the meanings as having inner causes; it is this case - reflective language meaning - which is exemplified in the table. This combination of inner and outer causes creates an ambiguity about the ontological status of texts, which, in turn, creates an uncertainty around arguability. From a phenomenological point of view, it is here simply uncertain whether language meaning is arguable or not. The ambiguous, as Merleau-Ponty has stressed, can be a real positive phenomenon. Seemingly, but only seemingly, there is a simple way out, namely the following. That part or aspect of the text which has outer causes, i.e. the pure signs, is regarded as arguable, whereas that part or aspect which has inner causes, i.e. the meaning in itself, is regarded as purely subjective and non-arguable. What blocks this solution is the fact, explained in chapter 6.3, that the language meaning of a text is one-sidedly existentially dependent upon the graphical signs. That part of the intentional correlate which has inner causes cannot exist, and cannot be identified, without that part which has outer causes. This is, I think, the ontological reason why hermeneutics is such a messy area.

However, as soon as one makes the assumption that people have the same kind of linguistic ability, then language meaning becomes, just like taste, semi-arguable. Semi-arguability rests upon the assumption that people have some kind of faculty in common which makes their subjective phenomena similar and therefore possible to argue about. The faculty for taste sensations is species specific, whereas the faculty for a certain language of course is only culturally specific. There is both similarity and difference between these two cases of semi-objectivity.

All the remaining rows, (7), (8) and (9), are exemplified by different kinds of emotions. All of these, however, are reflective emotions. Such emotions (see p 99) have as one of their parts a self-awareness of the emotion in question. Therefore, their intentional correlates are unified wholes which embrace entities both outside and inside

the body. Let me, again, as example take fear in front of a dog. In such a fear you not
only see a fearful dog out in the world, you also feel the fear in your whole body.
Furthermore, you are not able to separate the feelings in your body from the perception
of the dog outside you. They are perceptually fused which means that the intentional
correlate is both inner and outer.

An objective emotion (row 7) is an emotion where the identificatory belief (this dog is
fearful) and the explanatory belief (this dog causes my fear) have the same reference. In
most fears, I think, we regard the fearful thing as explaining our fear, but we can regard
a fear as caused by some neurotic internal states and the outer fearful perceptual object
as merely a projection. When this is the case we have a subjective emotion (row 8).
Note that there even in the subjective emotion of fear is a perceptual fusion of the
fearful thing and the fears in our body. The thought that we are projecting does affect
our perception, but not so much that the unity of the outer and inner aspects of the
intentional correlate breaks up. The intentional correlate of objective fear can be
described as saying 'I am adequately feared by this fearful fact'; the intentional correlate
of subjective fear can be described as saying 'I am non-adequately feared by this
"fearful" fact'.

When two persons regard fear as an objective emotion they can argue about whether
something is fearful or not. This is so because both the cause and an essential part of the
intentional correlate is then regarded as outer. When two persons regard fear as a
subjective emotion they cannot argue about it because the main causes are regarded as
wholly inner. Objective emotions are arguable, subjective emotions are not. Both cases
conform to what was said about first-order arguability in relation to the first four rows
in the table. In relation to emotions, however, second-order arguability plays a
prominent role even in everyday life. There are often discussions about whether an
emotion, for instance a fear, should be regarded as objective or subjective, i.e. adequate
or neurotic.

The ninth and last row of the table contains, as its paradigmatic example, something
special that I would like to call split emotions. Respect is such an emotion; if there are
other such emotions I do not know. In chapter 7.3 I presented and made some comments
on Kant's views about respect. Now some further words can be added.

Let us assume a case in which one respects a desire that another human being has, for
instance his hunger. There is then not an ethical demand saying 'I-have-to-give-him-food'. We are not beneath the Is-Ought gap. Rather, the proper description of the moral
perception at hand is 'I will choose to give him food because he is hungry'. Kant's
remark that "although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside
influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept" stresses the same fact. Respect is
perceived as being caused (or freely created) by oneself. Nonetheless, it makes up a
unified whole with that which is respected, in the case at hand the hunger of another
person. This means (i) that the intentional correlate is at the same time both outer and
inner (which is true of objective and subjective emotions as well), and (ii) that there is a
kind of split in the middle of the correlate; a split which is due to the fact that the main
causes are separated into an outer and an inner part, too. In objective emotions the main
causes are perceived as wholly outer and in subjective emotions as wholly inner. In
respect they are split. Therefore, respect is a split emotion. Now, what about its
arguability?

Let me summarize what I have said about arguability this far. Two different cases
have been shown to be connected with non-arguability: wholly inner correlates and
wholly inner causes. Arguability is connected with the cases where both correlates and
causes are outer; semi-arguability is connected with cases where (i) the causes are both
outer and inner, and (ii) the inner cause is due to a common faculty. Objective emotions
are arguable despite the fact that part of the intentional correlate is outer and subjective
emotions are non-arguable because the causes are wholly inner. If, in the last table, we
substitute the paradigm examples by their kind of arguability we get the table below.
There are many kinds of respect which can be placed in row nine above, but only respect for others' conations, i.e. respect for others' well-being, will be discussed here. Of course, it is possible to argue about the fact whether somebody else is well off or not. Such a fact exists, just like other natural or social facts, outside ourselves. Epistemic objectivity is possible since both correlates and causes are assumed to be outer. But the real question is whether the facts at hand should be respected. The answer, however, is now equally obvious. As soon as it is assumed that everybody in a group have the same emotional faculty of respect, there is semi-arguability. Within the group it makes sense to ask someone else to take a closer look at the conations discussed and try to be more attentive; if that is done respect will arise.

The semi-arguability of respect for others' conations differs in an important respect from the semi-arguability of both taste and language meaning. The split of the causes of respect into inner and outer is represented in the intentional correlate, which means that the arguability of others' well-being is of relevance for the semi-arguability of respect in itself. There is in the split emotion of respect for others' conations real arguability within a frame of semi-arguability. Such an arguability is not possible in relation to taste sensations since here the intentional correlate is wholly inner. The taste (inner) is not separated from the feeling of taste (inner) as that which is respected (outer) is separated from the feeling of respect (inner). Nor is such an arguability possible in relation to reflective language meaning, since the meanings (outer) are fused with the signs (outer). It seems only to be the peculiar features of respect which makes it possible to have arguability within semi-arguability.

### 9.2 Normative objectivity

What now about the concept of normative objectivity? There are, I have claimed, two kinds of connections between Oughts and Ises, connection by fusion and connection by respect. Where there is connection by fusion, Oughts behave like properties of ordinary things. They seem to inhere in the world around us (row 1 in the table) and seem to have epistemic objectivity. In this respect they are like non-reflective language meaning. Furthermore, our knowledge that Oughts are man-created alters our perceptions just as much as the fact that one knows that language-meaning is man-dependent alters language perception. As first stressed in chapter 3.2, the distinction between subjective and objective phenomena does not run parallel with the distinction between inner and outer phenomena. Another similarity between language meaning and Oughts can also be noted in this context. The emergence of language meaning can be explained evolutionary by our need to communicate, and the emergence of norms, values, and virtues can be explained evolutionary by a social need to harmonise actions.

It can also, of course, be said that whatever ontological status Oughts have, and whether or not the evolutionary explanation of the existence of Oughts is right, Oughts do function as action harmonisers. As long as we live in societies with some kind of scarcity of conation satisfaction, there will be a need to harmonise both egoistic and alteristic conations of different people. Probably, this kind of scarcity will never
disappear completely, which, in turn, means that there will always be some kind of Ought perceptions. In other words, there will always be connection by fusion of Oughts and Ises. But that fact does not solve the Ought-existence problem.

When Oughts and Ises are connected by respect for others' well-being, we have, as pointed out in the last section, arguability within semi-arguability. This kind of semi-arguability is not universal. Those who have left the level beneath Is and Ought, but are unable to feel respect for other people, are simply beyond argumentation in moral matters. That follows trivially from the concept of semi-arguability. Nonetheless, my claim is that the semi-arguability of respect, combined with arguability around facts of conation satisfaction, has such a character that it can be said to create normative objectivity.

Normative objectivity is, firstly, far away from the non-arguability and pure subjectivity of pains. As noted, it also differs from the semi-objectivity of taste sensations and reflective language meaning. What still remains to judge is, thirdly, how close normative arguability is to epistemic arguability.

As with all phenomenology, my phenomenology of arguability was centred around perceptual situations. Arguability in itself was not the concern; it was the presuppositions for arguability in different kinds of perceptions that was described. Language and logic was tacitly and wrongly regarded as unproblematic. In order to make the resemblance between normative and epistemic arguability visible, I would like to highlight a remark I made in chapter 7.3. I claimed that there is an Is-Ought gap in logic as well as in ethics. A logical person not only cognizes necessary relations between propositions, he also respects them. If he does not, he can contradict himself as much as he likes. Arguability, however, breaks down if contradictory statements are allowed. A person who wants to argue has to conform to the law of contradiction. If he has noted the fact that it is possible to know the law of contradiction but nonetheless not conform to it, then he has to respect the law and make speech acts on it. A logical person not only knows logic, he respects it, too.

Without respect for logic there can be no epistemic objectivity. Epistemic objectivity, like normative objectivity, rests upon the emotion of respect. This remark is, it is important to note, wholly distinct from all traditional arguments for epistemic relativism. It is independent of all those arguments which are based upon the subjectivity of our sensory organs and cognitive faculties. And it has to be, since the point of the phenomenology of section 9.1 was to sidestep such issues. We are looking for fallibilistic objectivity. If we allow ourselves to talk of fallibilistic epistemic objectivity, we can very well allow ourselves to talk of fallibilistic normative objectivity, too. Ought is!

Even though the existence of fallible Oughts and their kind of objectivity is granted, someone may perhaps want to say that there is another flaw in the argument: Respect is to weak an emotion to be able to constitute morals. Such a counter has missed my claim that there has to be a tacking between connection by respect and connection by fusion of Ises and Oughts. From a theoretical point of view, it is impossible to deny that there is a gap between Is and Ought. From a practical point of view, on the other hand, it is necessary to deny the gap, i.e. it is necessary to fuse Is and Ought. This means, in turn, that the theoretical attitude has to accept this limitation and, theoretically, allow the practical denial. Philosophers have to realize that the distanced attitude of respect is not enough. We have to live beneath the distinction between Is and Ought most of the time. When we live beneath Is and Ought we perceive the Oughts in question as immediately morally binding. If we respect a certain Ought, then we should train ourselves in such a way that the same Ought becomes immediately perceived in everyday action. When such a process has been successful, a fallibilistic Ought has become action-constraining in the strong sense, and there can be no complaints to the effect that such an Ought cannot constitute morals.

According to the arguments of chapter 7.4, the following is true. When an imperative with its connected norm-making characteristics turns from being connected by respect to being connected by fusion, there is necessarily also a change in the "punishing" moral emotion. Remorse must be replaced by guilt. Similarly, when a virtue with its connected virtue-making characteristics turns from being connected by respect to being connected
by fusion, remorse must be replaced by shame. The life beneath Is and Ought is a life
constrained by Oughts which always, for the moment, are absolute. However, these
Oughts are not, so to speak, absolutely absolute. As soon as one leaves the fused level,
the absoluteness disappears and guilt or shame is replaced by remorse. Soon, however,
we are back on the fused level, and guilt and shame appear again. Actual life will not be
freed from guilt and shame just because one has realized that there is no absolute ethics
and that remorse is the most adequate emotional moral sanction.

Really existing fallible Oughts, if that phrase may be used, exists as a tacking between
connection by fusion and connection by respect. And that tacking does not leave the
connection by fusion exactly as it was before the tacking began. It affects the level
beneath Is and Ought a little. What happens is similar in structure to what happens when
one meets a figure like Jastrow's duck-rabbit. First I see, say, only a rabbit's head and
nothing else. Then, second, I manage to see the duck's head, too. Third, I learn to
alternate between seeing a duck and seeing a rabbit. My claim now is that there is a
small but noticeable difference between the rabbit-seeing in the first and in the third
phase. In the first phase we just see a rabbit-picture; in the third we see 'a-rabbit-picture-
which-may-be-turned-into-a-duck picture'. The possibility of alternation has crept into
the perception and modified it just a bit. In my opinion, there is a similar little
modification in the emotions of shame and guilt when one has accustomed oneself to
the fact that moral judgements are fallible.

One problem still remains to be solved. We have to leave the point from nowhere
where we have discovered that fallible Oughts can be objective. It has to be shown that
'Ought is for me!', where 'me' is a variable whose values are I myself and you the reader.
In my present cognitive position I think that Oughts exist, but I also have to ask myself
if I cannot disregard their existence. It is the free rider problem in relation to the
Ought-existence problem. And here, but only here, it can really be solved, or, rather, be
shown not to exist. In the free rider problem some conations of mine are in conflict with
a norm which is founded teleologically; deontological norms have no free rider
problem. The norm is regarded as valid because of its consequences, but the
consequences are, at least from a practical point of view, the same whether or not I
conform to the norm. There can be a free rider problem for me only when I look upon
myself as having an ego which is in conflict with an Ought. The free rider does not deny
his ego, he affirms it. My simple thesis now is that if I try to be a free rider in relation to
the pure existence of Oughts in general, I will deny myself. Let me explain.

At present, I understand my ego through the anthropology put forward in this book. It
means, among other things, that I regard my self-awareness as socially constituted, that
I think that I necessarily need confirmation from other people and that I have a conation
for benevolence. I also think that I have a capacity to have moral perceptions and to feel
respect for other people's conations. These things, I believe, are parts of the abstract
structure of my ego. In order to deny that objective Oughts need to exist for me, I have
to deny my conation for benevolence and my respect for other's conations. I have to
claim that I am wholly egoistic in every conceivable situation. I have to deny myself in
order to experience the free rider problem. But then I have no free rider problem, and
Oughts in general exist for me. Really, Ought is!