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Four Kinds of “Is_A” Relations: genus-subsumption, determinable-subsumption, specification, and specialization.

Ingvar Johansson

Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science (IFOMIS),
Saarland University, Postbox 151150, 66041 Saarbrücken, Germany
ingvar.johansson@ifomis.uni-saarland.de

Abstract. Is_a relationships play a prominent role in both information and computer sciences. It is argued that there are good reasons to distinguish between four kinds of is_a relations: genus-subsumption, determinable-subsumption, specification, and specialization. They behave differently in relation to definitions and so-called inheritance requirements. The distinction between single and multiple inheritance is of importance both in information science ontologies and in some programming languages. In the former, single inheritance is a good thing in subsumption hierarchies and is inevitable in pure specifications; multiple inheritance is often proper in is_a graphs construed by means of specialization and in graphs that combine different kinds of is_a relations.

1 General Introduction

In many corners of the information sciences, in description logic, and in some object-oriented programming languages, the so-called “is_a” relation plays a prominent role. I will argue that there are both material and formal reasons to distinguish between four kinds of is_a relations: subsumption under a genus, subsumption under a determinable, specification, and specialization. (The “part_of” relation and the “instance_of” relation are not “is_a” relations at all [1, 2, 3], even though in natural languages one can say things such as “It *is a* part of the play” and “He *is a* Swede”.)

Genus-subsumption is the traditional way of creating classificatory trees of natural kinds; in particular, of creating the famous hierarchies of plants and animals in biology. However, it is also used in more practically oriented classifications of kinds such as citizens, patients, furniture, clothes, and vehicles. In the conceptual realm, this kind of subsumption is usually mirrored by relations between nouns. Determinable-subsumption, on the other hand, is not concerned with natural kinds but with qualities (properties) of different generality; for instance, scarlet is as a determinate subsumed under the determinable red. In such cases, we find on the conceptual level relations between adjectives.

Even though today in the information and computer sciences, the two expressions “*a* is a specification of *b*” and “*a* is a specialization of *b*” are quite often used as synonyms to “*a* is_a *b*”, the terms “specification” and “specialization” will here be given more restricted meanings. In fact, these restricted meanings come close to the pre-computer world meanings of these terms. Whereas subsumptions typically are concerned with natural kinds and qualities, specifications and specializations are typically concerned with activities and processes. Prototypical specifications come out on the conceptual level primarily as relations between a verb-plus-adverb expression and a verb: “painting carefully” is a specification of “painting”. Analogously, specializations come out primarily as relations between a verb plus a whole adverbial adjunct clause and a (mostly transitive) verb, which, substantivized give: “painting a table” is a specialization of “painting”. Of course, when the verbs are substantivized, nouns and adjectives can be used to represent specifications and specializations, too (see table 1).

The *is_a* relation can have as its relata real classes, concepts, or terms for concepts. Unfortunately, the terms “set” and “class” are nowadays often used as synonyms, but here they will be kept distinct (cf. [3, 4, 5]). Many sets can be constructed by means of an enumeration of spatiotemporal particulars (e.g., the set of my neighbor’s three cats), but no real class such as the class of cats can be so delineated. A (real) class is a collection of entities that (i) has a general language-independent feature (a universal or a type) in common, or (ii) is delineated by means of a combination of an artificially created boundary and some naturally related language-independent universals. In the latter case, it even makes sense to speak of “partly fiat classes”, i.e., classes such as the class of red instances, which, although it comprises instances from several color hue universals that resemble each other, is nonetheless conventionally separated from the classes of instances of orange and purple color hues. In a semantic definition of a class, be it of the absolute kind (i) or the partly fiat kind (ii), universal concepts are central, but many sets can be defined arbitrarily merely by means of proper names (or individual concepts of some other kind).

There is only one null set, but, in the sense of “class” here spoken, the development of science forces one to reckon with several distinct “zero classes”, i.e., classes that lack members. Famous examples of such classes from the history of science are “phlogiston”, “planets that move around the earth”, and “electron particles that orbit around a nucleus”. To every non-zero class there is a corresponding set, but (as noted in the last paragraph) to every non-zero set there is not a corresponding class.

With respect to time, the remarks made imply that “classes, but not sets, can remain identical even while undergoing a certain turnover in their instances [4].” Let me summarize:

- from a semantic point of view, no class can, in contradistinction to many sets, be defined by means of only an enumeration of spatiotemporal particulars;
- from an ontological point of view, there can be only one zero set, but there can be many zero classes;
- from a temporal-ontological point of view, even though both classes and sets are timeless entities, certain kinds of sets can be tied to temporally located particulars.

There are classes of activities and processes just as there are classes of objects and quality instances. In table 1 below, I have related some is_a expressions to some corresponding ordinary language sentences. In all is_a expressions, verbs are substantivized.

Table 1. Examples of is_a relations

is_a expressions	corresponding ordinary sentences about one individual case or about classes of cases	corresponding ordinary sentences that are (at least seemingly) directly about universals
cat is_a mammal	a cat is a kind of mammal; cats are mammals	the cat is a mammal
mammal is_a animal	a mammal is a kind of animal; mammals are animals	
sailing ship is_a ship	a sailing ship is a kind of ship; sailing ships are ships	
ship is_a vehicle	a ship is a kind of vehicle; ships are vehicles	
scarlet is_a red	a scarlet thing is a kind of red thing; all scarlet things are red things	scarlet is a red hue
red is_a color	a red thing is a kind of colored thing; all red things are colored things	red is a color
running is_a activity	to run is to perform a kind of activity; all cases of running are cases of activity	running is an activity
painting is_a activity	to paint is to perform a kind of activity; all cases of painting are cases of activity	painting is an activity
careful painting is_a painting	painting carefully is a way of painting	careful painting is painting
house painting is_a painting	to paint a house is to paint (a certain kind of thing)	painting a house is painting
outside painting is_a painting	to paint an outside is to paint (a certain part of a thing)	painting an outside is painting
summer painting is_a painting	to paint in the summer is to paint (at a certain time of the year)	painting in the summer is painting

In relation to this list, I will introduce a distinction between *the realist mode of speech* and *the conceptual mode of speech*, respectively. When the man in the street, or a scientist, asserts either “a cat is a mammal” or “all cats are mammals”, he is talking about something that he takes it for granted exists independently of his assertion, but when an information scientist says (or, rather, writes) “cat is_a mammal”, he may take himself to be talking only of concepts. The man in the street talks in the realist mode and the information scientist in the conceptual mode of speech; whereas the former may be said to “look *through* concepts (and at the world)”, the latter may be said to “look only *at* concepts” (cf. [6]). In everyday discourses, people switch from the realist to the conceptual mode when they are reading dictionaries and are reflectively translating between languages. The assertions “The German word ‘Baum’ means tree” and “The German word ‘alt’ means old” are assertions in the conceptual mode of speech; each is in effect saying that a German and an English word have a concept in common. Assertions such as “Dieser Baum ist alt” and “This tree is old” belong to the realist mode of speech.

The distinction now presented has affinities with Rudolf Carnap’s classic distinction between the material and the formal mode of speech (in German: “inhaltliche und formale Redeweise”) [7]. In fact, it can well be looked upon as Carnap’s distinction having been separated from its original positivist-conventionalist setting and then being tied to a realist framework.

The left column of table 1 can be read in both the conceptual and the realist mode of speech. The assertion “cat is_a mammal” can be read either as “the concept of ‘cat’ is a concept that is subsumed under the concept of ‘mammal’” or as “the class (of) cat(s) is subsumed under the class (of) mammal(s)”. Note that even though cats have (“inherit”) all the properties which mammals have, the concept “cat” does not have all the properties that the concept “mammal” has. About the is_a relationship, *The Description Logic Handbook* says:

The IS-A relationship defines a hierarchy over the concepts and provides the basis for the “inheritance of properties”: when a concept is more specific than some other concept, it inherits the properties of the more general one. For example, if a person has an age, then a woman has an age, too ([8] p. 5).

The quotation is understandable, but it conflates the realist and the conceptual mode of speech. Neither the concept of “person” nor that of “woman” has an age; but what can be referred to by means of these concepts have. As will be shown in what follows, I think that in order to become clear about the is_a relation in the conceptual mode of speech, one has to investigate some corresponding assertions that belong to the realist mode of speech. Sometimes I will tell explicitly when I switch between these modes of talking, but mostly I will trust that the context makes my mode of speech clear.

2 Genus-Subsumption versus Determinable-Subsumption

Classes of natural as well as artificial kinds (e.g., atoms, molecules, plants, animals, furniture, clothes, and vehicles) may stand in subsumption relations, but so may classes of qualities (e.g. colors, volumes, masses, and dispositional properties). As the class of cats is subsumed by the class of mammals, which, in turn, is subsumed by the class of animals, the class of scarlet instances is subsumed by the class of red instances, which, in turn, is subsumed by the class of color instances. With respect to individual things and spatiotemporal quality instances, these subsumptions imply:

- necessarily, if a certain particular is a cat then it is a mammal, and if it is a mammal it is an animal;
- necessarily, if there is an instance of being scarlet then there is an instance of being red, and if there is an instance of being red there is an instance of being colored;
- necessarily, if a certain particular is an animal, then it has to be an animal of a certain kind;
- necessarily, if there is an instance of being colored, then there is also an instance of some specific color hue.

Early in the twentieth century, the Cambridge philosopher W. E. Johnson made it clear that, for instance, there is in the two triple-subsumptions cat-mammal-animal and scarlet-red-color not one single subsumption relation that relates different kinds of entities, natural kinds and qualities, respectively; there are two different kinds of subsumption relations [9, 10]. Genera-species hierarchies differ radically from what Johnson termed determinable-determinate hierarchies, even though, of course, they also have the class inclusion relation in common. The difference comes from the fact that species and genera (and all natural and artificial kinds of things) have monadic qualities by means of which they can be characterized, whereas determinate and determinable qualities cannot be so characterized. They can only be characterized by means of their similarity *relations* to other qualities. The class of mammals can be defined as belonging to the *genus* animals, and as such having the specifically differentiating feature (*differentia specifica*) that the females are normally able to produce milk by means of which, normally, their offspring are first fed. The class of red instances cannot similarly be defined as colors (which would be the genus) that have in common a certain *differentia specifica* that is distinct from just being red. John Searle describes this difference between species and determinates as follows:

In short, a species is a conjunction of two logically independent properties—the genus and the differentia. But a determinate is not a conjunction of its determinable and some other property independent of the determinable. A determinate is, so to speak, an area marked off within a determinable without outside help ([11] p. 143).

When mammals are defined as (for short) feeding-offspring-with-milk animals, the concepts of “feeding-offspring-with-milk” and “animal” are treated as being logically independent of each other, i.e., they can neither be defined nor subsumed by

each other. Even though there are no plants that produce milk, such plants are not logically impossible. One can then adequately say, with Searle, that mammals are “marked off” from other animals “with outside help”. But one cannot similarly “mark off” red from color (and scarlet from red) “with outside help”. The need to distinguish between the genus-species distinction on the one hand and the determinable-determinate distinction on the other hand becomes, I think, even more obvious if one considers several subsumption levels at once.

Let us take a look at a subsumption schema that consists of four levels of classes; the classes on *each* level are mutually exclusive, and, jointly, they exhaust the classes on the level below; this entails that no class is subsumed by more than one class on the level above. The schema ranges from a highest class (genus or determinable) via two intermediate levels to the lowest classes (species or determinates). All classes on the intermediate levels are species or determinates *in relation to* the higher and subsuming classes, but genera or determinables *in relation to* the lower and subsumed classes. Only the highest genus/determinable is a genus/determinable in a non-relative sense, and only the lowest species/determinates are species/determinates absolutely. Note also, that it is only for the sake of expositional simplicity that each class in table 2 is divided into exactly two subclasses.

Table 2. A formal class subsumption schema

Level 1	Highest Class: class A(1)							
Level 2	class A(2)				Class B(2)			
Level 3	class A(3)		class B(3)		class C(3)		class D(3)	
Level 4	class A(4)	class B(4)	class C(4)	class D(4)	class E(4)	Class F(4)	class G(4)	class H(4)

This schema for class subsumption must by no means be regarded as identical with the similar schema for set inclusion, table 3:

Table 3. A formal set inclusion schema

Level 1	set A(1)							
Level 2	set A(2)				set B(2)			
Level 3	set A(3)		set B(3)		set C(3)		set D(3)	
Level 4	set A(4)	set B(4)	set C(4)	set D(4)	set E(4)	Set F(4)	set G(4)	set H(4)

Let me in relation to the tables 2 and 3 repeat some of the things already said about the class-set distinction. If none of the lowest classes of a subsumption schema is a zero class, then a corresponding set inclusion schema with the same number of sets as classes can always be constructed. One has only to regard the instances of each class as members of a corresponding set. However, the converse operation is far from always possible. Let, for example, the set A(4) be the *set* of cats that corresponds to the class of cats, and let B(4) be the *set* of red instances that corresponds to the class of red instances. The set A(3) is then simply the union of the sets A(4) and B(4), but there is no corresponding class A(3). Why? Answer: every class has to have some

kind of internal coherence, but there is no such coherence between the class of cats and the class of red instances.

In philosophy, much has been said about what, if anything at all, can constitute the kind of internal coherence or unity now spoken of, and the debate is still going on. Mostly, the opposing positions are called realism, conceptualism, and nominalism; the view put forward here might be called realist (there are completely mind-independent classes) with a stroke of conceptualism (some classes are partly fiat; more about this after table 5 below). However, for the purposes of this paper, it is enough if the reader accepts some conception of “internal coherence” that makes the distinction between class subsumption and set inclusion viable. Here are some more examples that, hopefully, like the ‘cat and red’ example, can clarify the intuition behind such a conception:

- there is a set whose members consist of all temperature instances and of all mass instances, but there is no corresponding class;
- there is a set whose members consist of all molecules and of all cells, but there is no corresponding class;
- there is a set whose members consist of all red instances and of all green instances, but there is no corresponding class.

This being said, I will at first let table 2 represent natural kinds of some sort. For simplicity’s sake, I will abstract epistemology away and talk as if all examples represent subsumption relations between non-zero classes. Genus-subsumption schemas represent the way biologists have traditionally been classifying plants and animals; and such schemas are still used outside of phylogenetic taxonomy. When a genus-subsumption taxonomy has become established, it can be used to lay down so-called Aristotelian “real definitions”, i.e., definitions that are primarily definitions of classes not of concepts. Philosophers who claim that *only* concepts can be defined are doing one of two things: they either (explicitly or implicitly) deny the existence of language-independent universals, or they restrict the term definition in such a way that many definitions in the natural sciences cannot be called definitions.

In complete Aristotelian definitions, one starts from the highest genus and presents, stepwise, the definitions of the lower classes until the lowest classes (species) have been defined. In each such step the subsuming class is divided into two or more subsumed classes by means of some quality or property requirements. The classic Aristotelian example is “man =_{def} rational animal”; meaning that the subsumed class “man” is defined by means of a more general subsuming class (“animal”) plus a quality requirement, namely that the class “man” should have the quality “rationality” as its specific difference in relation to the other classes on the same level. The definitional route just described is used in much programming, too. For a formally elaborate exposition of Aristotelian definitions and of relations between species and genera, see [4]. Below, in table 4, some features of importance for this paper are highlighted.

For the sake of simple exposition, I will introduce symbols for what might be called class intersection (\cap) and class union (\cup), respectively. It merely means that instead of “man =_{def} rational animal”, I can write “man =_{def} rational \cap animal”; and instead of “red =_{def} dark red or light red” I can write “red =_{def} dark red \cup light red”; it does not mean that I regard classes as being extensionally defined. Let us now assume that we have one highest genus, and fourteen quality classes (a, b, c, ..., n), one for

each *differentia specifica*. All the classes, except the highest one, can then be defined as in table 4.

Table 4. The formal structure of Aristotelian definitions of genera and species

class A(2) = _{def} A(1) ∩ a
class B(2) = _{def} A(1) ∩ b
class A(3) = _{def} A(2) ∩ c = A(1) ∩ a ∩ c
class B(3) = _{def} A(2) ∩ d = A(1) ∩ a ∩ d
class C(3) = _{def} A(3) ∩ e = A(1) ∩ b ∩ e
class D(3) = _{def} A(3) ∩ f = A(1) ∩ b ∩ f
class A(4) = _{def} A(3) ∩ g = A(1) ∩ a ∩ c ∩ g
class B(4) = _{def} A(3) ∩ h = A(1) ∩ a ∩ c ∩ h
class C(4) = _{def} B(3) ∩ i = A(1) ∩ a ∩ d ∩ i
class D(4) = _{def} B(3) ∩ j = A(1) ∩ a ∩ d ∩ j
class E(4) = _{def} C(3) ∩ k = A(1) ∩ b ∩ e ∩ k
class F(4) = _{def} C(3) ∩ l = A(1) ∩ b ∩ e ∩ l
class G(4) = _{def} D(3) ∩ m = A(1) ∩ b ∩ f ∩ m
class H(4) = _{def} D(3) ∩ n = A(1) ∩ b ∩ f ∩ n

From a purely definitional point of view, all the classes from A(2) to H(4) become classes of natural kinds, not classes of qualities, only because the highest class A(1) is a natural kind. If the presumed specific differences do not give rise to mutually exclusive classes, they can by definition not be called *differentia specifica*. In definitions like these, the highest genus as well as all the species-differentiating qualities have to be – in relation to the subsumption schema – undefined [12]. As is easily seen in table 4, the lower classes have (“inherit”) all the qualities that are essential to the classes above them.

Aristotelian definitions are put forward in the realist mode of speech. If we switch to the conceptual mode of speech, the given definitions of the classes turn into definitions of the corresponding concepts. For instance, the concept of “man” has then to be understood as being synonymous to the concept of “rational animal”. If, in the course of scientific development, a specific taxonomy is revised, then new real definitions have to be substituted for the old ones. When this happens, it is often the case that new or partly new concepts have to enter the scene. When, for instance, it was discovered that the class of whales should not be subsumed under the class of fishes but under the class of mammals, then the concepts of both “whale” and “fish” had to be redefined [13].

When table 2 is used to represent subsumptions under determinables such as length, color, and mass, the following should be noticed. If one wants to use the schema as a basis for definitions, one cannot proceed as in cases of genus-subsumptions. Why? Answer: (i) trivially, one cannot create divisions of a class only by means of the class itself, and (ii) since the highest class is now a determinable,

there are no qualities external to the class that can create subsumed classes. Therefore, the only way possible is to define the higher classes by means of the lower ones; which means that the lowest ones have to be regarded as undefined in relation to the schema. Since the lowest classes do not overlap, the definitions of the higher classes have to be made by means of the operation of union (\cup). The schema in table 2 can then be used to make the definitions stated in table 5.

Table 5. The formal structure of definitions of determinables by means of determinates

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class A(3) =def A(4)  $\cup$  B(4)
class B(3) =def C(4)  $\cup$  D(4)
class C(3) =def E(4)  $\cup$  F(4)
class D(3) =def G(4)  $\cup$  H(4)

class A(2) =def A(3)  $\cup$  B(3) = A(4)  $\cup$  B(4)  $\cup$  C(4)  $\cup$  D(4)
class B(2) =def C(3)  $\cup$  D(3) = E(4)  $\cup$  F(4)  $\cup$  G(4)  $\cup$  H(4)
class A(1) =def A(2)  $\cup$  B(2) = A(4)  $\cup$  B(4)  $\cup$  C(4)  $\cup$  D(4)  $\cup$  E(4)  $\cup$  F(4)  $\cup$ 
                                     G(4)  $\cup$  H(4)

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Some observations on the set-class distinction may once again be of relevance. If the definitions given would be definitions of sets instead of classes, then it would be tautologically and vacuously true that the union of A(4) to H(4) exhausts the set A(1), but when it comes to classes, the highest determinable has to insure that there is an internal coherence among the lowest determinates. Otherwise the latter would not be able to be subsumed under the *class* A(1). Therefore, the definition of the *class* A(1) as the union of the classes A(4) to H(4) is in effect a statement (non-vacuously true or false) that says that the members of the classes A(4) to H(4) jointly exhaust the class A(1). In case the highest determinable and the lowest determinates, but no classes in-between, are naturally pre-given classes (which I think is a very important case [10]), then all the in-between classes can be created by means of conventions. We then get a number of partly fiat classes, for which it holds true that:

- the conventionality in question is bounded by one bona fide class at the top of the subsumption schema and many bona fide classes at the bottom.

When fiat classes of the kind mentioned are created, one can in principle let them be either overlapping or mutually exclusive (on one level), but systems with mutually exclusive classes function much better from a communicative point of view; they simply contain more information. Then, for instance, one knows for sure that if one person says “this is an A(3)” and another person says “this is a B(3)” both cannot be right.

In everyday life, we divide length instances into classes such as “very short”, “short”, “medium”, “long”, and “very long”; temperature instances are similarly divided into classes such as “very cold”, “cold”, “neither cold nor warm”, “warm”, and “hot”. Classes like these can both subsume more determinate classes as well as be

subsumed under even broader classes. In physics, the same determinables ground linear scales. Such scales are special cases of determinable-subsumption. In themselves, they contain only two levels, the level of the highest determinable (length and temperature, respectively) and the level of the lowest determinates. The latter level contains (is the union of) infinitely many classes, one corresponding to each real number. For instance, the concept of “5.000789000 m” refers to one class of length instances, and the concept of “74.67823000 m” refers to another class. In all probability, many such classes are zero classes.

One difference between genus-subsumption and determinable-subsumption can now be summarized as follows: definitions based on determinable-subsumptions have to move bottom up with the help of the operation of class union, whereas definitions based on genus-subsumptions can also move top down with the help of the operation of class intersection.

Both the kinds of *is_a* subsumption relations distinguished have to be kept distinct from another relation that is also sometimes called ‘subsumption’, namely the relation between an individual (particular) and a class. In order easily to keep them distinct, the latter relation had better be called “instantiation” or “instance_of”. Hopefully, an example is enough to make the distinction clear. If Pluto is a brown dog, then both the statements “Pluto instance_of dog” and “Pluto instance_of brown” are true, but the statements “Pluto is_a dog” and “Pluto is_a brown” are misnomers.

3 Specification

Is_a relations such as “careful painting is_a painting”, “careless painting is_a painting”, “fast painting is_a painting”, and “slow painting is_a painting” seem neither to conform to what is typical of genus-subsumption nor to what is typical of determinable-subsumption. I will call them *specifications*. Let me explain.

The class “careful painting” is not identical with an intersection of two logically independent classes: “painting” and “careful”. There is no class “carefulness” that exists as an independent entity. Carefulness is always “careful activity”. Furthermore, the carefulness in “careful painting” is distinct from the carefulness in “careful reading”, “careful cleaning”, “careful watching”; each of these “carefulnesses” is logically secondary to, and takes part of its essence from, the kind of activity that is in each case mentioned. Therefore, “careful painting” cannot be genus-subsumed under “painting”. And what goes for “careful painting” goes for “careful painter”, too. It is a well known fact in philosophy, linguistics, and the information sciences that (to talk in the conceptual mode of speech) the extensions for expressions such as “being a careful painter”, “being a fast painter”, and “being a good painter” cannot be analyzed as being the intersection of the extension of “being a painter” with the extensions of the expressions “being careful”, “being fast”, and “being good”, respectively.

The difference between specification and determinable-subsumption is not equally clear, but one sign of it is the following. In the way I have shown, determinable-subsumption allows for definitions by means of unions of the subsumed classes, but it seems impossible to define any activity as the union of a number of specifications. For instance, “painting” cannot be regarded as identical with the union of “careful

painting”, “careless painting”, “fast painting”, “slow painting”, and so on for all possible specifications. Unlike genus-subsumptions and determinable-subsumptions, specifications cannot ground definitions at all.

The general remarks made above in relation to activities can be repeated in relation to processes (e.g., “burning”, “digesting”, and “circulating”). However, it has to be noted that some possible specifications of activities (e.g., “careful” and “careless”) cannot be specifications of processes, whereas others (e.g., “fast” and “slow”) are possible as specifications of both activities and processes.

Specifications differ in structure from both genus-subsumptions and determinable-subsumptions, but it is easy to conflate them, especially specifications and determinable-subsumptions. Nonetheless is the distinction reflected in everyday language. We say that “painting is a *kind* of activity” but that “painting carefully is a *way* of painting”. The crux of the matter is that different activities are not specifications but determinates of “activity”. That is, “painting” is a determinate that is determinable-subsumed by “activity”, whereas “careful painting” is a specification of “painting”; similarly, “careful activity” is a specification of “activity”. This complication can create a need to combine in one and the same classificatory tree both determinable-subsumptions (painting → activity) and specifications (careful painting → painting); such mixed graphs will be considered at the end of section 5.

The relation of specification seems not to be confined to activities and processes. Whereas (consciously perceived) color hues obviously are determinable-subsumed under the class of (consciously perceived) colors, the same is not true for color-intensities and degrees of color-saturation. They seem to be specifications of color hues just as carefulness is a specification of activities. When two different color hues, say a determinate red and a determinate blue, have the same intensity (or degree of saturation), the intensity (saturation) is logically secondary to, and takes part of its essence from the color hue in question; not the other way round. The fact that color hues are determinates but color intensities and saturations are specifications, is quite compatible with the fact that color hue, color intensity, and color saturation can, as in the Munsell color solid, be ordered along three different dimensions in an ordinary picture or in a three-dimensional abstract space (compare table 8 below, which combines a subsumption relation with one specification relation).

4 Specialization

Here are some examples of *is_a* relations that are *specializations*: “house painting is_a painting”, “outside painting is_a painting”, “summer painting is_a painting”, “car driving is_a driving”, “food digesting is_a digesting”, and “paper printing is_a printing”. In these cases, the class on the left hand side does not *specify* the activity mentioned on the right hand side of the *is_a* relation; it is doing something else. It relates the “right-hand-activity” to something (houses, outsides, and summers) that exists completely independently of this activity. This fact makes it at once clear that specializations cannot possibly ground definitions of the activities that they are specializing.

As we normally use the concept of “specialization”, we can say that one painter has specialized in painting houses and another in painting chairs, one in painting outsides of houses and another in painting insides. This is my main reason for having chosen the label “specialization”. However, my choice is in conformity with the terminology of a paper that has earlier mentioned the feature that I am now trying to make even more clear; the author in question talks about “*specializing* criteria” as a certain kind of subsumption (is_a) principles [14].

Some activities are simply activities performed by a subject (e.g., swimming and running), whereas others involve also one or several objects that are acted on (e.g., painting a house and driving a car). Similarly, some processes simply occur in an object (e.g., rusting and burning), whereas others involve also one or several objects that the process in question acts on (e.g., digesting food and printing papers). It is only in the “acting-on” kind of cases that specialization of activities and processes can come about. When there is talk about painting, driving, digesting, and printing as such, one knows that there is an object that has been abstracted away. It is this away-taken object that re-enters when a specialization is described, or when a corresponding is_a relation is stated. Nothing like this occurs in subsumptions and specifications.

In all the examples used above, the specializations are described by means of transitive verbs (or substantivizations of such verbs). And this is no accident. Transitive verbs are defined as verbs that can take (and often require) an object, whereas intransitive cannot. Nonetheless, even intransitive verbs admit of specializations. This happens when the activity (process) in question becomes related to a certain kind of time period or a certain kind of place: “summer swimming is_a (specialization of) swimming” and “pool swimming is_a (specialization of) swimming”.

Normally, an activity can be specialized in several different directions. One can paint a house, a car, or whatever. As soon as the object painted is such as to have both an outside and an inside, one can paint either the one or the other. Similarly, one may paint at a certain time of the year or at a certain kind of place. Therefore, some specializations have to have more than one is_a relation to the next level. Let me specialize “painting” along two different directions: what kind of object that is painted and what kind of part of an object that is painted. We then get the following is_a schema:

Table 6. A double-specialization schema

class A(1): painting	
class A(2): house painting	class B(2): outside painting
class A(3): house-on-the-outside painting	

“House-on-the-outside painting is_a house painting”, “house-on-the-outside painting is_a outside painting”, “house painting is_a painting”, and “outside painting is_a painting”.

5 Single and Multiple Inheritance

In the distinction between single and multiple inheritance, the concept of “inheritance” seems originally to have referred to inheritance of qualities in genus-subsumptions. A subsumed genus inherits all the properties that are essential to the subsuming classes. If a certain genus is subsumed by only one class on the nearest upper level, then there is “single inheritance” of qualities; if it is subsumed by more genera, then there is “multiple inheritance”. In determinable-subsumptions there are no real inheritances of qualities apart from the inheriting of the highest determinable; the rest is, as I have explained, a matter of mere unions of the lowest determinates. Nor in relation to specifications are there any literal quality inheritances. Nonetheless, the distinction between single and multiple inheritance is sometimes applied to all the kinds of is_a relations that I have distinguished. This means that when, in this general sense, it is stated that there is multiple (or single) inheritance, it is merely stated that the left hand class of an is_a relation has some is_a relation to more than one class (or only one, respectively) on the next upper level.

From my remarks on genus-subsumption and determinable-subsumption, it follows that in both cases the default norm for such is_a hierarchies should be that they contain no multiple inheritances. With respect to specification, it does not even make sense to speak about multiple inheritance *of only specifications*. As I have analyzed “careful painting”, it can only have a specification relation to “painting”, since “careful” in “careful painting” has no complete meaning independently of painting. With respect to specializations, however, things are completely different. Here we get multiple inheritances as soon as there are two or more different directions that a specialization can take. In table 5, “house-on-the-outside painting” is multiply (doubly) inherited.

Multiple inheritances are consciously and, according to my analysis, correctly used in the Gene Ontology [15]; for critical comments on some other aspects of GO, see [4]. The Gene Ontology Consortium states that “GO terms are organized in structures called directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), which differ from hierarchies in that a ‘child’ (more specialized term) can have many ‘parents’ (less specialized terms)” ([16] p. 3). The GO consortium uses the concept of “specialization” as a synonym for “is_a relation”, but always when a “child” in their graphs really has more than one is_a “parent”, then at least one of the is_a relations in question is a specialization in my restricted sense. Let me exemplify.

In the GO ontology for molecular functions one finds (hyphens added) “endo-deoxyribo-nuclease activity” (GO:0004520) inherited from both “deoxyribo-nuclease activity” (GO:0004536) and “endo-nuclease activity” (GO:0004519); both the latter are, in turn, inherited from “nuclease activity” (GO:0004518). Setting the arrows of GO’s graphs aside, these specializations can be represented as in table 7.

Table 7. A specialization schema with examples from the Gene Ontology

nuclease activity	
deoxyribo-nuclease activity	endo-nuclease activity
endo-deoxyribo-nuclease activity	

This is merely one of numerous examples of specializations that can be extracted from the GO. A nuclease activity is an activity (performed by an enzyme) that catalyzes hydrolysis of ester linkages within nucleic acids. Such activity can be specialized along at least two different directions: (i) according to *what* is acted on (deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA, or ribonucleic acid, RNA), and (ii) according to *where* the action takes place, i.e., cleaving a molecule from positions inside the molecule acted on (“endo-”), and cleaving from the free ends of the molecule acted on (“exo-”), respectively. Since nothing stops the specialization from going in both these directions at once, we get the schema for “nuclease activity” in table 7, which is completely analogous to the schema for “painting” in table 6.

Specializations allow, and often require, multiple inheritance. They differ in structure from genus-subsumptions, determinable-subsumptions, and specifications. However, I have so far spoken of hierarchies or graphs consisting of only one of these kinds of *is_a* relations, but the different *is_a* relations can also be combined with each other. (They can also, as in the GO, be combined with the *part_of* relation.) Also in such mixed cases can multiple inheritance be the normal and the required kind of inheritance. Two examples may show what I mean.

In the first example, table 8, “careful painting” is doubly inherited. On the left hand side, the *is_a* relation is one of subsumption, but on the right hand side it is one of specification. When the whole table is taken into account, a symmetry is displayed. Two specifications are diagonally opposed, and so are two subsumption relations.

Table 8. A combined specification and determinable-subsumption schema

	class A(1) : activity	
	<i>specification</i>	<i>subsumption</i>
class A(2) : careful activity		class B(2) : painting
	<i>subsumption</i>	<i>specification</i>
	class A(3) : careful painting	

In traditional non-phylogenetic classifications of animals, the *differentia specifica* are (broadly speaking) properties inhering in the organisms, but, of course, one can also try to classify animals according to where, when, and on what they perform various activities. Some live on land and some in the sea; some sleep during the night and some in the day; some eat meat and some do not. Therefore, classes of animals can via their activities also be made related in specialization relations. Most mammals live on land but whales live in the sea. We may speak of a class *marine mammals* that can be placed in an *is_a* schema such as that of table 9.

Table 9. A combined specialization and genus-subsumption schema

	class A(1): animals	
	<i>specialization</i>	<i>subsumption</i>
class A(2): marine animals		class B(2): mammals
	<i>subsumption</i>	<i>specialization</i>
	class A(3): marine mammals	

A couple of times, I have mentioned the *instance_of* relation (e.g., at the end of section 2). Now, in order to avoid all misunderstandings, I need to do it again. Everything that has been said about multiple inheritance above relates to *is_a* relations and not to *instance_of* relations. Trivially, an individual can instantiate many classes and in this special sense have “multiple inheritance” (better: “multiple instantiation”) when placed in a slot in a matrix. Many matrices that are used in the social sciences and in epidemiology to display correlations have this character. A simple but fictive example that contains this kind of multiple (double) inheritance for a group of hundred persons is presented in table 10 (from [17]).

Table 10. A correlation matrix relating political views (columns) to political interest (rows)

	Republicans	Democrats	Independent
High	14 (persons)	16	5
Medium	19	17	7
Low	5	5	12

Here, each of the fourteen individual persons in the upper left slot “inherit” two features: having high political interest and being republicans. Such tables must by no means be conflated with tables such as tables 6 to 9 above. Note, though, that if an individual is an instance of a certain class, then he is automatically also an instance of all classes that subsume this class.

6 Philosophy and Informatics

Can the taxonomy of *is_a* relations presented, as well as the remarks made around it, be of any use in informatics? Let me answer by means of a detour.

No observations can be reported, and no reasoning can take place, without classification. But a classification is not necessarily a taxonomy, i.e., it need not be a *systematized* classification. During medieval times, alchemists made extensive classifications of substances, and herbalists made the same with respect to plants, but in neither case was a real taxonomy created. Probably, the alchemists and the herbalists were to practical-minded. But with the advent of modern chemistry and botany things changed. Remarkable taxonomies with remarkable repercussions on the scientific development saw the light. Today, information scientists help other scientific disciplines as well as practical endeavours of all kinds to systematize their respective classifications. But, curiously enough, they seem nonetheless to have no deep impulse to systematize their own tools such as various kinds of *is_a* relations and different kinds of definitions. Despite being a philosopher by trade, I dare guess that at least some information scientific work can be done more efficiently if everyone (a) accepts that there is a distinction to be drawn between sets and classes, and (b) becomes aware of the taxonomy of *is_a* relations that I have put forward.

Much that has been created on a purely pragmatic basis has contained principles that only afterwards were made explicit. However, once discovered, such principles can consciously be put to work and, thereby, make future similar work a bit simpler. Without any explicit talk of a special kind of *is_a* relation, “specialization”, the

authors of the Gene Ontology choose to work with directed acyclic graphs instead of the set-theoretical inclusion relation, but this fact is no reason not to make the next generation of information scientists aware of the existence of different kinds of is_a relations.

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