ality cannot possibly be reduced to the kind of categories which make up natural facts in general or neurophysiological facts in particular. Ordinary materialist properties (like having shape, mass and electromagnetic properties) and relations (like being larger, being at a distance from, and being caused by) do not have the kind of directedness which constitutes intentionality.<sup>22</sup> Not even a velocity has the same kind of directedness as thinking and perceiving have, even though a velocity "points" in space.<sup>23</sup> I agree completely with John Searle when, in his book *Intentionality*, he writes:

My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that it is routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics. I have seen it claimed that mental states can be entirely defined in terms of their causal relations, or that pains were nothing but machine table states of certain kinds of computer systems, or that correct attributions of Intentionality were simply a matter of predictive success to be gained by taking a certain kind of "intentional stance" toward systems. I don't think that any of these views are even close to the truth..."24

Intentionality cannot be denied. Let us now investigate the peculiarities of that intentional phenomenon we ordinarily call veridical perception, and let us see whether veridical perception can be interpreted in a way which solves at least some of the problems which perceptual psychology poses for it. The first thing to be noted is that veridical perception contains what might be called *connection at a distance*. In the perception of a tree (see figure 2), the perceiving person is by intentionality connected with the tree despite the spatial distance between them. In veridical perception there is, so to speak, a 'hop' in space. A real material unit like a stone (i.e. *not* an aggregate like a number of stones spread out on the ground) is usually thought of as being compact in space, i.e. all its parts are contiguous in space. Veridical perception, however, is different. When a person perceives a thing, the person is at a particular place in space and the thing at another. The visual act connects the person and the thing without 'filling out' the space between them.

In physics, action at a distance has ever since Newton been looked upon with

suspicion. The gravitational forces of Newtonian mechanics looked mysterious even to Newton himself. How can the sun momentarily affect the earth which is eight light minutes away? How is this distance bridged? Causality means contiguity between cause and effect, but the concept of action at a distance denies this contiguity. Action at a distance is an occult relation. Like telepathy and telekinetics it connects cause and effect by a 'hop' in space.

Independently of whether or not action at a distance is possible, the actual existence of connection at a distance by means of intentionality is undeniable. It reoccurs in every everyday perception. Nor has anyone really denied it. But most philosophers have been content to say that it must be a mental phenomena, as though this classification would make it more easy to comprehend.

In our life-world there are colours, shapes, and a lot of other properties which are taken to be given facts. Whatever their ontological status is, they do exist. Similarly with connection at a distance. It is a fact that entities which are spatially apart can be directly connected. Whether these entities and the connection itself should be regarded as material, as spiritual, or as something else, may be open for discussion, but not that this kind of connection exists.

## X-ray perception

In what follows I shall assume that life-world veridical perception often really is veridical; I shall assume that direct realism is true. And by direct realism I do not mean that form which reduces intentionality to material states and dispositions and which ought to have another name.25 By direct realism I mean the view that in acts of real intentionality we can be in direct contact with material things and states of affairs.

In veridical perception we reach out towards persons, things, and states of affairs in the world, and sometimes we become connected with them. How, then, one might ask, is this peculiar connection at a distance related to the material things which occupy the intervening space?

According to all our knowledge, be it science or common sense, usually we see through the air. Sometimes, of course, we see through glass or water. The general conclusion is that in visual veridical perception we perceive through material things. Connection at a distance is here not connection across empty space; it is connection across a materially filled space. Superman is said to have x-ray vision. He can see through material buildings. My point is that, apart from perception in outer space, all visual veridical perception can be called x-ray vision.

Michael Polanyi has drawn attention to facts about perceiving which

amount to a similar conclusion with regard to the tactual sense, too.<sup>26</sup> Often, tactually, we perceive *through* material things which do not belong to our body. When we write with a pen we are not aware of the hand touching the pen. Instead, we are aware of the pen's touching of the paper. Similarly, when we use a hammer we feel the hammer against the nail, or even the nail against the wood, but not the hand against the hammer. When we are skiing we do not feel our feet against the ski but the ski against the ground.

If we only could be in direct contact with that part of nature which is at the the limits of our body, then we should only see the air just in front of our eyes, and we should only feel what the hands and feets actually meet. This, however, is simply not the case. Often we do, to summarzie the last two sections, perceive *through* material things *to* natural facts which are *at a distance* from us.

### Backward perception

Phenomenology tells us that if in veridical perception we can perceive nature, then we do it by means of connection at a distance and x-ray perception. Let us now repeat what today's science tells us. It says that there is some kind of energy flow from a perceived thing to the body of the perceiving person, and it also says that it takes some time for the energy to move from the thing to the person in question. Therefore, we have to accept that intentionality which is connection at a *spatial* distance is also connection at a *temporal* distance. When we perceive a thing, we do not perceive it as it is now. We perceive it the the way it was structured when the relevant energy (according to Gibson: electromagnetic radiation with stimulus information) left the thing. This view, by the way, is not strictly confined to science. There are life-world situations which display the phenomena. Thunder comes after the lightning, and when one sees a man hammering at a great distance the blows are heard after they have been seen, and *this difference is perceived*.

The difficulty with intentionality through time, in comparison with instantaneous intentionality, is that it implies that one is in direct contact with states of affairs which no longer exist. Connection at a spatial distance can be rather difficult to accept, but, as first presented, it is nevertheless a relation between a perceiving person and a perceived state of affairs which exist simultaneously. Temporal connection at a distance, on the other hand, connects a presently perceiving person with an earlier existing state of affairs. The farther away the perceived fact is, the more obvious is this temporal relation. Perception of distant stars is the paradigm example. We can

see stars which no longer exists. If this really is veridical perception, then veridical perception is *backward perception*.

I have maintained that *most* 20th century philosophers have, in different ways, avoided the problem of direct realism. One of the exceptions to the rule is Roderick Chisholm. He has written the following:

The belief that people perceive only appearances or that they cannot perceive physical things often results from what seem to be philosophical paradoxes. For example, when we learn about the velocity of light and about the distances of the stars we see at night, we may begin to wonder whether we do see the stars we think we see. And when we are told that stars sometimes disrupt and become extinct and that possibly some of those we see tonight ceased to exist hundreds of years ago, we may feel that there is some paradox involved in supposing that we can perceive anything at all. But the paradox arises only because we tend to assume, until we are taught otherwise, that any event or state of affairs we perceive must exist or occur simultaneously with our perception of it. We tend to assume, more generally, that S can perceive a at t only if a exists at t. If we combine this assumption with what we know about the finite velocity of sound and light, perhaps we can derive the conclusion that no one perceives any of the things he thinks he perceives. But to assume that S can perceive a at t only if a exists at t is no more reasonable than to assume that S can receive or reflect light from a at t only if a exists at t. The perception of a star that is now extinct should be no more paradoxical than the action of such a star on a photographic plate or its reflection in the water.27

To my mind, Chisholm does not take 'the problem of star perception' seriously enough. I agree with him that "the paradox arises only because we tend to assume, until we are taught otherwise, that any event or state of affairs we perceive must exist or occur simultaneously with our perception of it". But there is more to it than Chisholm recognizes. His presumed solution, i.e. the similarity he finds between perception and causality, does not exist. That, today, we can receive light from a non-existing star is of course no mystery. Such light has an existence which is independent of the star which emitted it a long time ago. There is a *causal chain* through time, but each part in such a chain exists only at one moment, and there is no direct connection between two parts which are not contiguous in time. In veridical perception it is different. Chisholm has no clear grasp of the concept of connection at a distance. If direct realism is true in relation to things around

us, then we perceive backwards in time, but it is then an extremely short time interval, almost infinitesimal, which we bridge. However, if direct realism is true even for star perception, then we can perceive backwards over a huge time interval. Mostly, we do in one and the same perception perceive things at different distances from us. This means that veridical perceptions of the world are *extended backwards in time*. This is what we have to teach ourselves if we want to be direct realists, but Chisholm doesn't even hint at this. As far as I know, there is only one philosopher who has stated this feature of perception clearly, and that is Samuel Alexander at the beginning of this century, but, for some reason, he mentioned it only in a footnote.<sup>28</sup>

In the former section I claimed that *connection at a distance*, which is a feature of veridical perception, is something other than *action at a distance*, which (if it is at all possible, which I think it isn't) is a kind of causality among material entities. Similarly, *backward perception* is a feature of veridical perception which must not be conflated with *backward causation*, which (if it is at all possible, which I think it isn't) is a kind of causality among material entities. In the next section we shall see that the existence of these features means that the limits of our ego are undetermined and very changeable.

### The changeful limits of our ego

What I have said about veridical perception has repercussions for our conception of the human ego. The history of philosophy contains several different ontologies of the ego which I find false in every important respect. I have already mentioned one such ontology, reductive materialism. Another easily refuted metaphysics is the one which takes intentionality on the one hand, and materialist categories on the other, to be merely different ways of apprehending the same phenomena. Such a Spinozist multiple aspect theory is reflexively inconsistent. The phrase 'different ways of apprehending' presupposes the category of intentionality. An act of apprehension is an intentional act, which means that a Spinozist view amounts to saying that intentionality and materialist categories relate to the same substance apprehended in different intentional acts. The last use of 'intentional act' cannot be replaced by any phrase containing concepts which only refer to materialist or other non-intentional categories, which means that 'the intentional aspect' as a whole cannot possibly be equivalent with 'the materialist aspect'.

The falsity of ontologies which, like those of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Berkeley, regard the ego as a *spiritual* substance, is not as total as that of reductive materialism. Such substance ontologies of the ego do not deny

the existence of irreducibly mental phenomena, but they lack a clear conception of intentionality. They have not noted a certain feature of intentionality, the non-substantiality of the ego, which Heidegger and Sartre<sup>29</sup> brought to our attention.

Heidegger characterises man by saying, among other things, that man's situation in the world is one of "Geworfenheit" (= thrownness). Man is in a sense throwned, flung, or cast out into the world. Sartre describes the essence of man as a Nothingness. Both descriptions, at bottom, focus attention on the fact that the directedness of intentionality is in many, perhaps most, intentional acts not apparent at all in the acts themselves. When we are fascinated by something we are observing, we are just 'thrown out' in the object; we do not perceive ourselves perceiving. We are aware only of the perceived object. The same goes for perceptions accompanying concentrated actions. All there is is the action. We are lost in it. Following or *unreflected* consciousness". <sup>30</sup>

The directedness of intentionality has two poles. One may speak of a 'topole' (an intentional object or correlate) and a 'from-pole'. If, now, in a reflective intentional act (i.e. consciousness in the second degree), we try to make the from-pole of an earlier act (i.e. the presumed ego) into the topole of this later reflective act, what do we find? When we make an earlier intentional act itself into an intentional correlate, i.e. the to-pole of the present intentional act, we find between the 'from-pole' and the 'to-pole' of the unreflected consciousness nothing similar to a relation between things. In the latter case - think for instance of a perception of the relation of being larger than - we perceive two things and a relation between them. In an unreflected intentional act directed towards nature we perceive things and states of affairs but no relation between ourselves and the intentional correlates in question. Therefore, it is adequate to say that the to-pole is something, whereas the from-pole of intentionality is empty. The ego which is assumed to exist in the from-pole seems to be thrown out into the to-pole or to be a kind of nothingness, or, better, emptiness.

It should be noted that when a reflective (second degree) intentional act is directed at the from-pole of an unreflected (first degree) act and discovers the corresponding emptiness, the reflective act is not directed at its own from-pole. This from-pole has the same emptiness, but in order to see it a third order act which has the second order act as its intentional correlate is needed.

That the from-poles of intentional acts are empty does not mean that they do not exist. Their existence may be compared to (but not identified with) that of the void (in non-relational conceptions of space). Where there are no things (or fields) in space there is void, but void is not nothing. It is

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empty space. The from-pole of intentionality is empty but nonetheless it is

The emptiness or nothingness of the ego is, it is important to note, only an emptiness on the level of intentionality itself. As stressed by another phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, intentionality so to speak radiates from our body.<sup>31</sup> When in reflective acts we are looking for the frompole of intentionality, we will always find a material body. Moreover, our own material body. In this sense we find something, but not what we are looking for. We look for our soul but we find our body. We find a substratum for intentionality. Perceptions are perspectival and they refer back to our body. Only an Aristotelian account of the soul can comprehend this feature of intentionality. Intentional acts presuppose for their existence something which is not part of themselves, namely a body with a nervous system and a brain. The ego, therefore, is neither only a Nothingness nor only a "Geworfenheit". It is a complex unity with both a body and intentionality; the body is a substratum upon which intentional acts are emergent

Looking upon Heidegger and Sartre from this Aristotelian point of view, Heidegger puts too much emphasis on the to-pole and Sartre puts too much stress on the emptiness of the from-pole of the ego. For Heidegger the ego seems to be merely "Geworfenheit", merely the indwelling in the perceived objects and facts; and for Sartre the ego seems to be nothing. The ego is not a pure "Geworfenheit", nor is it merely Nothingness, but neither is it a spiritual or material substance. It is intentionality fused with a body.

Since having perceptions (and having the capability of having perceptions) is part of the essence of human egos, egos cannot have the kind of spatial limits which material things have. Material things are enclosed in a space volume, whereas the ego in veridical perceptions reach out from the body into the world at a distance. Intentionality is not the only kind of phenomena which deviates from the things-with-properties or substanceaccidence scheme. Relations like 'being larger than' and 'being more circular than' are not confined to a compact space volume either. Instances of such relations exist in the scattered particulars they relate. The point I want to make, however, is not that intentional acts are some kind of relations. In my view, on the contrary, intentionality is a category distinct from both external, internal and grounded relations.<sup>32</sup> Reality contains several categories which, from the perspective of a substance-accidence scheme, have peculiar spatial limits. Therefore, one should not look for the spatial limits of the ego the same way one looks for the spatial limits of a material thing and its (monadic) properties.

Some things are easy to think, some things are hard. The spatial limits of

material objects are easy to think, the spatial limits of the ego is hard to think. Material objects have rather well defined spatial limits even if the limit, like that of a shrinking balloon, is rapidly changing. But intentionality behaves in a different way. It is not limited by other material objects nor by other intentional acts. In veridical perception the ego is fused with natural facts, and the spatial limits of the ego are the spatial limits of its intentional acts. Wherever an intentional act turns the non-perceiving of material things into perceiving, the spatial limit arises. The ego is *not* spatially continued to its body in spite of the fact that its intentional acts are existentially dependent upon the body. Intentionality makes the ego spatially undetermined. Normally, the limits of our ego are changing. At one moment we are looking at states of affairs close to us, and at the next moment we are looking at more distant states of affairs.

The common sense distinction between oneself and external things is easily turned into false philosophical ontologies of the ego, where an inner-outer distinction is wrongly made identical with a distinction between subjective (= mind-dependent) and objective (mind-independent) phenomena. In relation to material things, the distinction between being inner and being uter is clear. What is within the spatial limit of the thing is inner, and that outer is clear. What is within the spatial limit of the thing is inner, and that which is outside the limit is outer. But since intentionality does not have the same kind of spatial limits, we are not allowed to think the inner-outer distinction of the whole ego in the same way as we can think the distinction in relation to its body.

Usually, we perceive pains as located within our body. The same is true of our heart beats, of tired muscles, of nervous stomachs, and of other similar phenomena. In cases like these, the intentional correlate is both minddependent and inside our body. Subjectivity and inwardness here go together. We perceive ordinary things, plants and animals as located outside our body. Here, objectivity and outwardness go together; the intentional correlates are both mind-independent and outside our body. However, when we perceive the colours of the things in question, these intentional correlates are both mind-dependent and outside our body. We have subjectivity and outwardness together. The same is true in visual illusions and hallucinations as well as in tactual illusions like the "phantom pains" of amputated legs. If all mind-dependent intentional correlates are said to be inner, in contradistinction to mind-independent correlates which always are outer, then 'inner' looses its original contrast with 'outside the body', and, consequently, has to take on a completely new meaning. A meaning which has to turn all intentional correlates into inner entities, and we are back into the ontologies of idealism or dualism. In such ontologies nature can never be perceived.

In some intentional acts (like dreams and imaginations) the intentional correlate (the dream and imagination, respectively) is wholly mind-dependent, whereas in other acts (like veridical perception) some parts of the intentional correlate (for instance a material thing) are mind-independent and some parts (for instance colours) are mind-dependent. In the latter cases there is a fusion of mind-dependent and mind-independent parts. *Our egos are not spatially confined within the limits of our bodies*, this is the ontological truth to remember.

The ontology of the ego now sketched contradicts ordinary psychological (and Humean) projection conceptions in which secondary qualities, like colours and other life-world qualities, are projected onto nature. When, with a projector, we project a picture on a screen, there is a picture inside the projector which by means of a light beam is copied on the screen. However, most life-world qualities do not first exist inside our head in order, later, by means of a 'perceptual beam', to be copied out in the world. Their primary existence is outside our body. The projection metaphor is adequate only in those cases of writing and drawing when we know in advance what to write and what to draw. Here, first there are thoughts and then there are corresponding outward-oriented perceptions.

Just as the feature of connection at a distance implies that our egos are not spatially confined within the limits of our bodies, so the feature of backward perception implies that our present egos are not temporally confined within the limits of the present. If we are in direct contact with past states of affairs, part of the ego must be extended into the past. The time limits of our egos are, just like the spatial limits, undetermined and changeful. However curious this may seem, it should be noted that, according to the claims put forward here, the ego is never in veridical perception extended into the future. Also, I want to repeat, the closer to the perceiving body a perceived state of affairs is, the closer it is to the present. Our body only exists actually in the present, although it can preserve its identity through time. The body is never extended in time outside the present, only some acts of intentionality are.

# Life-world in contact with nature or monadology

If we want to claim that, in our life-world, we do really perceive parts of nature, then we have to accept that veridical perception is x-ray perception, backward perception and connection at a distance; we also have to accept that our ego has no determinate spatial and temporal limits. Peculiar fea-

tures. Perhaps they are too odd to believe in. But, we have to ask, on what grounds are we to take the decision to accept them or reject them? Since most philosophers nowadays are fallibilists in epistemology, the problem is not that I cannot *prove* that in (so-called) veridical perception we are in contact with nature. The only thing a fallibilist can do is to estimate the reasonableness of this view in comparison with other possible alternatives. Of course, one should choose the most credible view; or, as in this case, the least incredible alternative. In order to reject veridical perception, we have to find an ontological alternative which is cheaper. What, then, are the main alternatives to real veridical perception?

For many thinkers reductive materialism gives us the truth about perception, but, as is clear from my earlier remarks on this view, I regard reductive materialism as the most incredible of all views. It simply denies the obvious fact of connection at distance. Therefore, to my mind, the main alternative is the claim that connection at a distance is possible only in a completely mental sphere. In idealist conceptions and in indirect realism there is no need to postulate either x-ray perception or backward perception. If all intentional acts are wholly mental, then it is tautologically true that x-ray perception (i.e. perception through material things) is impossible. Backward perception, on the other hand, is not ruled out in principle, but there seems to be no reason at all to claim that there is a temporal distance between the perceiving person and that which is perceived. Note, though, that connection at a distance is not explained away. It is merely maintained that connection at a distance is wholly mental. There is no denial of my claim that the existence of connection at a distance is an indisputable fact.

If we dismiss idealism, be it old-fashioned or linguistic, then 'the mental alternative', taken together with perceptual psychology, implies a monadology. We are back in some kind of Cartesian-Lockean ontology. Every person is confined within his own mental world. The only connection which exists between people and between people and things are causal relations in the material part of reality. If we are not to abandon completely the belief that our life-worlds have something in common, we are forced in this ontology, as was Leibniz in his, to postulate a predetermined harmony among all the numerically different mental spheres. Fundamentally, we each live in our own mental world, but the worlds have great similarities with one another. Ontologically, we are as beings with a consciousness, in contradistinction to clumps of pure matter, completely and helplessly isolated from one another. My life-world is only mine and your life-world is only yours; even when our bodies, which are part of nature, are as close to each other as they can be. If life-world and nature is kept apart, the life-world breaks apart, too.

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As far as I can see, our fallibilist ontological choice today consists, to put it sharply, in either accepting a monadology or accepting a direct realism wich contains the peculiarities of connection at distance, x-ray perception, backward perception and undetermined limits of the ego. In my opinion, the monadological alternative is more incredible than direct realism with its implications.

What is most difficult to accept in the kind of naive realism, or lifeworld realism, which I am advocating, is of course that part which is not directly in keeping with genuine naive realism, namely the view that one perceives across or through time, not at one particular moment. But, I want to stress once again, 'through time' is always connected with 'through space'. The farther we get in time, the farther we have to get in space. Normally, when in one and the same instant we are looking at several things whose spatial distance to us varies, we perceive them as simultaneous. According to the view I have argued for, this must be wrong. Space cannot in veridical perception open itself towards more distant states of affairs without time's also opening itself – and vice versa. It is an illusion that ordinary veridical perceptions are momentary in time. If this is accepted, then it is not too difficult to accustom oneself to the view that one can perceive backwards through time.

### The perceptual bridge and other bridges

The problem of perception is merely one of a number of ontological problems which need to be solved before we get a stable philosophical connection between life-world and man-independent nature. Apart from the problem of perception, there are also the problem of agency (or of mental causation) and the connected problem of how to reconcile (to speak with Kant) causality of freedom with causality of nature. In our life-world we take it for granted both that our will can affect our body and that our actions are not wholly predetermined by natural laws, be they deterministic or statistical; indeterminism is something other than freedom.

I shall not discuss the problems of agency and determinism here, merely mention that they, like the problem of perception, can be viewed from a new perspective now that fallibilism reigns supreme in epistemology. Fallibilism means that neither ontologists nor scientists can speak with the voice of the one who has recourse to absolute truth. Philosophers can contest science and scientists can contest philosophy. A philosopher who contests science, need not and should not, regard himself as a 'master-scientist' standing above science; and a scientist who contests philosophy, need not and should not, take recourse to scientistic views. This means, among a lot

of other things, that the reductive views of the natural scientists should not have too much authority in ontology. Science cannot in and of itself show that the life-world experience of agency is false, and that, therefore, the concept of freedom should be wholly replaced by that of causality of nature.

The existence of agency implies that the future cannot be wholly predetermined. Something must be open. This means that veridical perception through time into the future is impossible. Forward perception conflicts with agency, but backward perception does not. And I have only argued for backward perception.

#### Conclusion

I do think that we are philosophically entitled to say that we, in our life-world, can be in contact with nature and with each other. However, since I regard my ontological views as fallible, I shall end by letting Nature herself speak. I can hear her saying: "To be perceived, or not to be perceived: that is the question." She is looking at a skull. A philosopher's skull. She wants it alive again.

#### **Biography**

Ingvar Johansson is associate professor at the Department for philosophy and philosophy of science, Umeå University, Sweden. He has been working both within philosophy of science (main work: *A Critique of Karl Popper's Methodology*, Scandinavian University Books 1975) and in ontology (main work: *Ontological Investigations*, Routledge 1989). He is member of the board for the Nordic Institute for Philosophy.

#### **Notes**

- 1. This paper develops thoughts that I have earlier argued for in my *Ontological Investigations*, Routledge: London 1989, chapter 13.7. Apart from the participants in the discussion at Odense, I want to thank Kevin Mulligan, Stefan Hansson, and Torbjörn Jakobsson for helpful comments.
- 2. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, vol. one, book II, chapter IX, section 3.

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- 3. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, part IV, principle CLXXXIX.
- 4. They are, in turn, figures 7, 29, and 38 from L'homme.
- 5. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, Allen & Unwin: London 1974, p 591.
- 6. Irvin Rock, *Perception*, Scientific American Books: New York 1984, p 5. What follows is in close accordance with Rock's views as presented on pp 8-13.
- 7. Rock, ibid. p 12, calls it "the stimulus perspective".
- 8. See The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Houghton Mifflin: Boston 1966.
- 9. Reasons for Realism. Selected Essays of James J. Gibson, eds. E. Reed & R. Jones, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.: London 1982.
- 10. Josef Seifert, Back to 'Things in Themselves', Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1987.
- 11. Ibid. p 28.
- 12. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London 1920, p 194.
- 13. Ibid. p 248-49.
- 14. Reprinted in Moore, Philosophical Studies, London 1922.
- 15. Reprinted in Moore, Philosophical Papers, London 1959.
- 16. Ryle *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson: London 1975, pp 8 & 7.
- 17. Ibid., p 11.
- 18. See Ryle, Collected Papers, vol. 1, chapter 11, Thoemmes: Bristol 1990.
- 19. Merleau-Ponty, *Texts and Dialogues*, (eds. Silverman & Barry, Jr.) Humanities Press: London 1992, p 61.
- 20. Ibid. p 67.
- 21. Ibid. p 65.
- 22. I have given a detailed argumentation of this irreducibility thesis in my *Ontological Investigations*, Routledge: London 1989, chapter 13.5.
- 23. For detailed arguments for this view see my paper 'Intentionality and tendency: How to make Aristotle up to date', in K. Mulligan (ed.) *Language, Truth and Ontology*, Dordrecht: Amsterdam 1992.
- 24. Searle, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983, p 262.
- 25. I am thinking of philosophers like D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Routledge: London 1968, and G. Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception*, Princeton UP: New Jersey 1971.
- 26. Personal Knowledge, Harper: New York 1962, chapter 4:5.
- 27. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Cornell UP: New York 1957, p 153.
- 28. See 'The method of metaphysics; and the categories', *Mind N.S. 21*:1-20, p 3 note 2 (1912). He says that any experience means "compresence within the world of the experiencer and the experienced", and the footnote reads "Perhaps I should say at once that compresence does not mean simultaneity in time. I am compresent with a past event which I apprehend. And indeed the events I perceive always are past, by however small an interval. Compresent means simply belonging to the same universe."
- 29. I am thinking of their famous books *Being and Time* and *Being and Nothingness*, respectively. Sartre's position, however, is more lucid in his *The Transcendence of the EGO*, Noonday Press: New York 1957.
- 30. The Transcendence of the EGO, p 41.
- 31. Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1962.
- 32. See Ontological Investigations, chapter 13.5.