Fictions and the Spatiotemporal World – in the Light of Ingarden

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Ingvar Johansson
Professor emeritus, Umeå University, Sweden

Abstract The paper is an attempt to take Ingarden’s unfinished critique of idealism one step further. It puts forward a schematic solution to the external-world realist’s problem of how to explain the fact that we can identify and re-identify fictions, entities that in one sense do not exist. The solution contains three proposals: to accept, with Husserl and Ingarden, that there are universals with intentionality (Husserl’s “intentional essences”), to accept, contra Husserl and Ingarden, an immanent realism for universals, and to accept Ingarden’s view that there is a mode of being distinct from those put forward in traditional metaphysics, that of purely intentional being. Together, these views imply that all the instances of a specific intentional universal are directed towards the same intentional object; be this object a really existing object or a fiction, a purely intentional being.

1. Ingarden’s unfinished critique of Husserl

One cannot know everything at once; rather, one has to analyze the matters slowly, and maybe revise oneself ten times.
(Ingarden, 1992, p. 293)

When trying to solve a certain problem, some philosophers become so absorbed in partial problems they meet on their way, that later on they never get the time needed to put forward a full-scale solution to the problem they started with. In particular, and regrettably so, I would say, this is true of Roman Ingarden. As a once student of Edmund Husserl, he criticized his master’s introduction of a constitutive transcendental phenomenology as a substitution for the original purely descriptive phenomenology and an external-world realism. (Ingarden himself has convincingly shown that the early Husserl really was a realist (1975, part I:1).) However, Ingarden never brought his critique of idealism and defense of realism to an end. This paper tries to take this project of his one step further.¹

Husserl’s re-orientation of phenomenology meant, briefly, that instead of trying to ground phenomenology in only an operation of suspending all beliefs in commonsensical, scientific-causal, and metaphysical explanations of the phenomenological data to be investigated, he tried to ground it in intentional acts of presumed transcendental egos. Following Dan Zahavi (2003, p. 46), I would like to keep this suspension operation distinct from Husserl’s later more embracing operation of transcendental reduction, and reserve for it the name ‘epoché’.

The original epoché phenomenology is compatible with all sorts of metaphysical positions: Platonism, reductive external-world realism (only the entities studied by physics and chemistry exist truly), non-reductive external-world realism (everything that exists, including minds and mind-phenomena, exist in our spatiotemporal world), subjective idealism

¹ Let me say at once that I do not know Polish, and that all my references are to works in English or German. In these languages, brief overviews of Ingarden’s philosophy have been written by A. Thomasson (2008) and D. v. Wachter (2000, ch. 2); book overviews have been written by J. Mitscherling (1997) and K. Rynkiewicz (2008). Unfortunately, there are sometimes in the English literature different translations of one and the same German term used by Ingarden. I will use the terms in the English translation (Ingarden, 1964b). The different translations are registered in (Johansson, 2009, notes 5 and 22).
(Berkeley), and the transcendental idealism of the later Husserl. Platonism and external-world realism posit entities that are completely mind-independent, whereas subjective and transcendental idealism claim that all entities, except the subjects/egos themselves, exist only in or for some kind of consciousness.

In order to criticize Husserl’s transcendentalism and defend his own kind of realism (a non-reductive external-world realism with a bit of Platonism), Ingarden thought it was a good move first to make a detailed traditional phenomenological investigation of the kind of phenomena that in our everyday world appear to us as being completely mind-dependent: the fictions of literary works. By doing this, he produced his first master-piece: The Literary Work of Art (Ingarden, 1973). It contains his famous four strata theory of literary works and the important notion of ‘purely intentional object’ (which will be explained at length in Section 4), but it contains no definite conclusion about transcendental idealism versus external-world realism. Ingarden makes this fact clear in his preface:

Although the main subject of my investigation is the literary work, or the literary work of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of idealism-realism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years. [...] In order to take a stance towards this theory [transcendental idealism], developed by Husserl [...], it is necessary, among other things, to indicate the essential structure and mode of existence of the purely intentional object so that subsequently one may see whether real objectivities can, according to their own nature, have the same structure and mode of existence. (1973, p. lxxii; 1960, p. X)

I refrain, in my book, from any judgment regarding the transcendental-idealistic point of view, and, in particular, the idealistic conception of the world. My book, however, does contain a series of specific findings which—if they are true—speak against this conception. (1973, p. lxxiv; 1960, pp. XII–XIII)

After the completion of this book in 1928, instead of immediately starting to develop his hints at a critique of Husserl, Ingarden started to analyze other forms of art; see his Ontology of the Work of Art (1989). Then, in 1935, he started to work on what should become his second master-piece: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt (“The Controversy over the Existence of the World”; 1964ab, 1965ab, 1974). Again, he had the issue between transcendental idealism and external-world realism in mind (1964a, p. ix). He thought that in order to settle the controversy in a truly good way, one should first investigate and become clear about what modes of being (or: ways of existence) are at all possible. He found four such possible modes, some with sub-modes or varieties (1964a, §33; 1964b, chapter V). Here they are listed (with a brief association creating example within parenthesis):

(A) Absolute, Timeless Being (think of the monotheistic God)
(B) Extratemporal Being, Ideal (think of numbers as Platonic ideas)
(C) Temporal Being, Real (think of ordinary material things)
(D) Purely Intentional Being (think of fictions)

On this analysis, it always makes good sense to ask a philosopher in which of these four modes a proposed kind of entity is meant to exist. For instance, one may ask her or him: do you mean that God exists absolutely, extratemporally, temporally, or only purely intentionally?: do you mean that the mathematical numbers exist absolutely, extratemporally, temporally, or only purely intentionally?: do you mean that the material things exist
absolutely, extratemporally, temporally, or only purely intentionally?; do you mean that Hamlet exists absolutely, extratemporally, temporally, or only purely intentionally? According to Ingarden, all modes of being are complex and constituted by a number of so-called ‘existential moments’ (for a condensed overview of the modes of being and their existential moments, see (Johansson, 2009).

The possible existence of these four modes, but no others, is by Ingarden regarded as a result of existential-ontological analyses. A kind of analyses that he distinguishes from two other kinds of ontological analyses: formal-ontological and material-ontological. But there is in the present context no need to present the latter (for a brief exposition, see (Mitscherling, 1997, pp. 84–88)); and for a long (Rynkiewicz, 2008, ch. IV)). In order to settle the issue what modes of being are not only in principle possible, but in some sense actual, Ingarden claims that a fourth kind of investigations, called ‘metaphysical’, is needed (Ingarden, 1964a, §§8–9; 1965a, p. 264). However, not even after the publication of Der Streit does he start any thorough such investigations. Perhaps the explanation is his age in combination with the lack of cultural freedom in Poland during the cold war and the period of Soviet dominance.

What I have said does not mean that there are no passing remarks and clues as to what Ingarden’s metaphysical views were; there are. According to Kazimierz Rynkiewicz overview of Ingarden’s philosophy – Between Realism and Idealism. Ingarden’s Overcoming of Husserl’s Idealism (2008, title translated) – Ingarden subscribes to a critical realism that can be stated thus:

The world in which I live is a real world that as a matter of fact exists. It does not, however, in its reality look exactly the way it appears to me, but in some other way. (Rynkiewicz, 2008, p. 578)

Before Rynkiewicz presents this summary, he states that Ingarden subscribes to some kind of realism with respect to universals, too (2008, p. 577).² Let me expand on this. Ingarden did not like to be called a Platonist, but this was not because he completely dismissed a Platonic extratemporal-ideal realm. In a footnote (not included in the translation 1964b), he explicitly mentions the “objection of being a so-called Platonist,” and then remarks only that his formal-ontological investigations go much farther than anything to be found in Plato, and that Plato’s view that knowledge about ideal entities is obtained through recollection is him quite foreign (1964a, p. 260, n.11). Ingarden’s kind of realism has two parts: realism with respect to the external-world and a transcendent realism with respect to universals.

Rynkiewicz says much about Ingarden’s “overcoming” of idealism, but he never discusses the problem of realism that I will focus on: how can external-world realists (with or without some Platonism) situate fictions within the external world and its real spatiotemporal entities?

Only the same year Ingarden died, 1970, did the English translation of Logische Untersuchungen appear.³ It is of course for many reasons a pity that it appeared so late, but it

² Rynkiewicz’ summary brings out a seldom noted fact: Ingarden’s realism has great similarities with Karl Popper’s. Popper accepts “common-sense realism” but criticizes the “common-sense theory of knowledge” (Popper, 1972, ch. 2). Furthermore, his ideas about “World 3” are, like Ingarden’s about universals, somewhat indefinite (Popper, 1972, chs. 3–4). Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008) thinks that Tarski’s analysis of the truth concept contributed to making Ingarden and other Polish philosophers critical to idealism and sympathetic to external-world realism. No doubt, it contributed to stabilize Popper’s realism (Popper, 1969, pp. 223–227).

³ It is a translation of the second and revised German edition from 1913; the first edition of LU appeared in 1900/01. Even though Husserl made his revisions after his transcendental turn (the second edition appeared in fact the same year as did the first edition of Ideas), I regard both editions as belonging to what I have labeled ‘epoché phenomenology’.
is also a pity for Ingarden as a person. I think he very much would have liked the following paragraph from the introduction by J. N. Findlay (who is also the translator):

[Husserl] thinks, however, that he can significantly ‘bracket’ the reality of all natural things, and even passes on from this to the idealistic conviction that physical things have, despite their transcendent status for consciousness, no more than a merely intended, phenomenal being, while consciousness itself exists in an ‘absolute’ manner (Ideas, §§41–46). To the extent that Husserl makes this move, he transforms his brilliant, original analysis of consciousness into one of those ordinary subjectivisms which comfort the shattered ego by assuring it, quite baselessly, that in some secret manner it has manufactured its own shattering world. (Findlay, in Husserl, 1970, p. 10)

2. Husserl and Ingarden on universals

In both the epoché phase and the transcendental phase of his thinking, Husserl firmly believes in the existence of universals. It should be noted, though, that he uses many different terms when he is talking about universals. Unequivocally, in Logical Investigations, Husserl states: “The empiricistic attempt to dispense with Species [universals] as objects by having recourse to their extensions can therefore not be carried out (1970, p. 345).” Some pages later, after having mentioned “the fictitious” and “the nonsensical,” he says: “Ideal objects [universals], on the other hand, exist genuinely (1970, p. 352).” Both statements are from the second investigation, which bears the title “The Ideal Unity of the Species and Modern Theories of Abstraction.” Here, he criticizes and clearly rejects nominalism, but what in detail his own realism with respect to universals amounts to is not equally clear. §1 of this investigation has as its title a whole statement: “We are conscious of universal objects [universals] in acts which differ essentially from those in which we are conscious of individual objects.” And the paragraph ends as follows (terms in added bold font, I regard as referring to universals):

But the same appearance [of a red house] sustains different acts in the two cases. In the first case it provides the presentative basis for an act of individual reference […]. In the latter case it provides the presentative basis for an act of conception and reference directed to a Species; i.e. while the thing appears, or rather the feature in the thing, it is not this objective feature, this feature here and now, that we mean. We mean its content, its ‘Idea’; we mean not this aspect of red in the house, but Red as such. This act of meaning is plainly an act ‘founded’ on underlying apprehensions; a new mode of apprehension has been built on the intuition of the individual house or of its red aspect, a mode of apprehension constitutive of the intuitive presence of the Idea of Red. And as the character of this mode of apprehension sets the Species before us as a universal object, so too there develop, in intimate connection with such an object, formations like ‘red thing’ (thing containing an instance of red), ‘this case of red’ (the red of this house) etc. The primitive relation between Species and Instance emerges: it becomes possible to look over and compare a range of instances, and perhaps to judge with self-evidence: ‘In all these cases individual aspects differ, but in each the same Species is realized: […] This distinction, like all fundamental logical distinctions, is categorial. It pertains to the pure form of possible objects of consciousness as such. (1970, pp. 339–340.)
According to this quotation, Husserl is of the opinion that there are universals, but also that they can be apprehended only in a certain kind of reflective acts that are directed back on a pre-reflective act directed at instances of universals; in Ideas (Husserl, 1982) such acts are said to require a preceding “eidetic reduction.” In my view, Husserl is in the quotation ambiguous on the question whether (i) the universal redness grasped in the reflective act does (as unnoticed) exist already in the pre-reflective perception, or whether (ii) it is created by the very reflective act. Option (i) is compatible with an immanent realism for universals, and option (ii) represents Aristotelian realism (as interpreted by Boethius and Thomas Aquinas).

Now, if Husserl wants to be true to his epoché phenomenology, he must choose the first option: he must mean that the universal redness exists in the pre-reflective perception of the individual red color of the individual house, too. Why? Answer: because the epoché is assumed not to create anything, only suspend judgment on some issues. Option (ii) in the ambiguity points, I would say, towards Husserl’s later views.

The immanent realism that I have now ascribed to the early Husserl is restricted to perception. Not only transcendent Platonic universals, but also universals conceived as immanent in the material world, fall prey to his epoché. Later, in his transcendental phenomenology, he can and does regard all universals as constituted by the transcendental egos. The early Husserl’s immanent realism differs from that of the reductive materialist David Armstrong (1978) also in another respect. Unlike the latter, Husserl allows the existence not only of immanent universals, but of instances of universals, too. From a phenomenological point of view, instances of universals appear in the natural pre-reflective attitude, and universals in the kind of reflective acts mentioned. Therefore, Husserl’s immanent realism is not of Armstrong’s type, but of J. Cook Wilson’s: there are both immanent universals and instances of universals (see Armstrong, 1989, pp. 17–18).

Like Husserl, Ingarden seems never to have doubted the existence of both instances of universals and of universals, even if he leaves the definite ontological status of universals somewhat undecided. That is, apart of course from denying that they are created by the activities of transcendental egos. Since he does not let himself be restricted by an eternal epoché, but regards such a suspension of judgment as only a temporary device, he can in principle try to make a metaphysical investigation of the following question: do universals exist (A) absolutely, (B) extratemporally-ideally, (C) temporally-really, or only (D) purely intentionally? But he doesn’t. Therefore, I will have to stick to some of his passing remarks.

He seems to have no definite view at all about the existence of absolute entities (A), entities such as God in medieval philosophy, the Idea of the Good in Plato’s philosophy, and Necessary Existentia in contemporary analytic metaphysics. He writes, for instance, that “Whether either of these varieties of ‘absolute’ being really occurs anywhere […] are all questions which must still be clarified (1964a, p. 257; 1964b, p. 157).” And I will simply leave this mode of being outside of the rest of this paper. With respect to the actual existence of entities in the temporal mode of being (C) and the purely intentional mode of being (D), he has no similar doubts. Obviously, Ingarden is of the opinion that there are mind-independent temporal-real entities such as material things, and purely intentional entities such as fictions.

About the existence of extratemporal-ideal entities (B) Ingarden once says: “it is of rather incidental [importance] to the problem of the existence of the real world what the modus existentiae of ideal objects or ideas is. Hence, only as a certain kind of hypothetical concept do I propose the [extratemporal] mode of being (1964a, p. 259; 1964b, p. 159).” But when he discusses universals he always writes as if they have what he calls an extratemporal-ideal way of existing. It seems to me as if Ingarden never thought of the possibility of ascribing

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4 Ingarden puts much stress on a distinction between two kinds of universals: ideas (“Ideen”) and pure qualities (“reine Qualitäten”). I will, however, leave this distinction out of account; for presentations, see (Ingarden, 1964a, pp. 38f), (Wachter, 2000, ch. 2.6), (Półtawski, 2005); and (Rynkiewicz, 2008, ch. II: §1a & ch. IV:§2b).
universals any other mode of being than that of the extratemporal (B); otherwise he wouldn’t have named this mode ‘Extratemporal Being, Ideal’. For Ingarden, either there are or no universals at all, or they must exist in the extratemporal-ideal mode of being (B). His argument is simply that they are by definition unchangeable (1973, p. 10; 1960, p. 7). He seems never to have entertained the possibility of an immanent realism of Armstrong’s or of Cook Wilson’s kind, i.e., a kind of realism where unchangeable universals exist only in the temporal-real mode of being (C).

In sections three and four below, I will try to write about universals in such a way that everything that I claim becomes compatible with four different kinds of realism with respect to universals: transcendent realism (Ingarden), transcendental realism (the later Husserl), Aristotelian realism, and immanent realism with instances (which is my own position; see (Johansson, 2009)). All four positions subscribe, although of course in different ways, to the following view: there are both instances of universals and universals.

As always when there is talk about universals, resemblance nominalists can in what follows try to exchange talk of instances of universals with talk of so-called tropes, and talk of universals with talk of resemblance classes of tropes. And then, with this re-interpretation, try to follow and make sense of what is being said. In fact, I think many resemblance nominalists could gain some important insights by such a re-interpretation of Husserl and Ingarden. However, since I am as convinced as an epistemological fallibilist can possibly be that we cannot understand our world ontologically without the positing of universals, I will continue to write as if all kinds of nominalism can be neglected.5

3. Husserl and Ingarden on intentional universals

When Husserl moves from his pure epoché phenomenology to his transcendental phenomenology, he also makes other and very interesting changes that – to my mind at least – very well could have been made while staying within his original phenomenology. For instance, when analyzing the general structure of intentional acts, he rejects the distinction between act matter and act quality in favor of analyses in terms of ‘hyle’, ‘noesis’, and ‘noema’; a change that very well could have been done within the epoché phenomenology. I am mentioning this fact, not in order to highlight such changes and save them from Husserl’s transcendentalism, but in order to make it clear that I am at the moment interested in something else. I will focus attention on an overarching abstract feature of his analyses of intentional acts that – in its abstractness – is the same in Logical Investigations and Ideas (Husserl, 1970, second inv., ch. 2, and Husserl, 1982, §§87–132, respectively). It can be stated thus:

- in every intentional act there is an intentional essence by means of which the act is directed at an intentional object.

The term ‘intentional essence’ is used now and then in both the books, but it is never given any prominence; and in what follows I will substitute it by ‘intentional universal’. The statement above contains the famous Twardowskian act-content-object tri-partition with ‘content’ exchanged for ‘essence/universal’, and I will next explicate how I think this tri-

5 I make my case in favor of realism in (Johansson, 2002) and, especially, (2009). At bottom, in my view, the issue between realism and resemblance nominalism boils down to the following question: should cases of exact simple property resemblance be regarded as grounded in and emerging “bottom-up” from instances of monadic universals (realism), or should instead such cases be regarded as consisting of different simple tropes, which receive their general property identity “top down” from a resemblance relation (resemblance nominalism)?
partition – intentional act, intentional essence/universal, and intentional object – should be understood. As far as I can see, my views are in conformity with the views put forward in the introductions to Husserl written by B. Smith & D. W. Smith (1999, 14–27) and D. Zahavi (2003, pp. 13–27), respectively; the difference is that they do not stress the distinction between universals and instances of universals as much as I will do. Let me in my preferred way unfold the statement above into four more detailed statements:

1. In a particular spatiotemporal intentional act, the intentional universal is never the only universal instantiated; there are instantiations of non-intentional universals, too.

2. In principle, two different particular intentional acts may be qualitatively identical and so be of exactly the same kind, i.e., be two instances of the same complex of intentional and non-intentional universals.

3. Neither an instance of an intentional universal in an act, nor the intentional universal as such, is identical with the intentional object of the act.

4. The intentional object is what an act is directed at; the instantiated intentional universal is something by means of which the act gets its directedness.6

Statements three and four involve the point that one always has to distinguish between a pointing and what is pointed at; statement four requires some extra words. Husserl does not in this connection use the foreground-background distinction, but I would very much like to say that the intentional object makes up the foreground of an intentional act, whereas the instantiations of the intentional and non-intentional universals make up the background.

Husserl rejects all so-called representational analyses of intentionality, i.e., analyses that claim that the subject of an intentional act is directed at a representation, which, in turn, has a relation of representation to the intentional object (this representation relation can then be analyzed along the lines of either ‘internalism’ or ‘externalism’). According to Husserl, the subject so to speak looks through the so-called representation to the intentional object, which is the only object the subject is directed at.7 In my view, Ingarden is of the same opinion. He makes the distinction between ‘instantiated intentional universal’ and ‘intentional object’ in terms of ‘intent’ and ‘target of an intention’; he writes:

The word “intentional,” used so frequently in modern philosophical literature, is ambiguous. At times, that which contains an “intention” is called “intentional.” In this sense, conscious acts, for example, are “intentional.” Wherever there is a danger of misunderstanding, we will use in these cases the term “intent” instead of “intentional” (e.g., “an act of intent” [i.e., an act with an instantiated intentional universal]). At other times, that objectivity is called “intentional” which constitutes the target of an intention [the intentional object].” (Ingarden, 1973, p. 117; 1960, p. 122; he repeats this remark in 1965b, p. 194 n22)

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6 If universals and instances of universals are kept clearly distinct, then, hopefully, no temptation to identify the intentional object with a corresponding intentional universal should arise. Neither should a temptation to identify Husserl’s noema with a corresponding ideal unity of a specific hyle and a specific noesis arise. This happens in (Smith D. W., 2007, ch. 6); in another place Smith summarizes: “The intentional process of consciousness is called noesis, while its ideal content is called noema. The noema of an act of consciousness Husserl characterized both as an ideal meaning and as “the object as intended”. Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-it-appears, becomes the noema, or object-as-it-is-intended. The interpretations of Husserl’s theory of noema have been several and amount to different developments of Husserl’s basic theory of intentionality. (Is the noema an aspect of the object intended, or rather a medium of intention?)” (2008, Section 3).

7 I consciously leave out of account an ambiguity in the term ‘intentional object’. As Husserl says (and Ingarden accepts), one must also distinguish between “the [intentional] object as it is intended, and the [intentional] object (period) which is intended.” (Husserl, 1970, p. 578).
As soon as the distinction between an instantiated intentional universal and the corresponding intentional object is accepted, the following question enters the agenda:

- an instantiated intentional universal is by definition an immanent part of an intentional act, but what about the intentional object, is it immanent in or transcendent to the act?

The question does not imply, note, that there must be one single general answer: all intentional objects are either immanent or transcendent; some may be immanent and some transcendent. Let us compare a veridical perception of a red house with a look at a painted picture of the same house; the intentional object is in both cases the same. If one is doing epoché phenomenology, one must say that the red house is immanent in the veridical perception, but external (transcendent) to the look at the picture. But what happens if one stops suspending judgment on the existence of the external world? With respect to the picture nothing happens; the house must still be regarded as external to the look at the picture. But with respect to the perception, two different metaphysical options pop up: the house can be regarded either as being external to the perception (representational realism) or as being immanent in it (direct realism).

Representational realists claim that, metaphysically seen, the naïve realism of our everyday world (which the epoché saves) must be rejected, and that the real house (the intentional object) has to be regarded as external to the perception. This is the view of, for instance, John Searle in his *Intentionality* (1983). The distinction between veridical and non-veridical perception is then explained by means of what kinds of causes different kinds of perceptions have; non-veridical perceptions lack brain-external causes.

Direct realists (under which heading some contemporary ‘disjunctivists’ fall) have the opposite view. They regard even from a metaphysical point of view the veridically perceived house as a partly immanent part of the perception. Unhappily, Ingarden does not make it clear whether he is a representational realist (all veridical intentional acts directed at the external world have a transcendent intentional object), or whether he is a direct realist (some veridical intentional acts have a transcendent and some an immanent intentional object). According to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, intentional objects are neither transcendent to nor immanent in the intentional acts of the transcendental egos. They cannot be immanent, since if they were they would be identical with the instantiated intentional universals; and they cannot be transcendent, since according to Husserl’s transcendentalism there are no transcendent entities. Therefore they must be ascribed the ontological status that Ingarden calls ‘purely intentional’. This takes us to the next section.

### 4. Ingarden on purely intentional objects

According to both Husserl and Ingarden, all intentional acts have an intentional object that is distinct from all corresponding intentional universals and their instances. However, with respect to the details of this general claim they are of different opinions. According to the later Husserl, all intentional objects are created by transcendental egos, but according to Ingarden none is, since there are no such egos. In Ingarden’s opinion, some intentional objects have a completely mind-independent existence (either as being spatiotemporally real entities or as

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8 A. Crudzimski, who has written much about the development from Brentano to Ingarden, and made many good points about it, denies that the distinction is valid (2002, 2005). My guess is that this is due to the fact that he does not stress the by-means-of function of the instantiated intentional universal. To relate myself in detail to Crudzimski’s papers would take up too much space.
being extratemporal entities), and some intentional objects have an existence that is dependent on ordinary minds (Ingarden says 'inseparable from'). It is the latter kind of objects he calls 'purely intentional objects'. But this dependence relation is only the starting point for his analysis of fictions and other purely intentional objects. His important insight is that, even from a strict ontological point of view, there is more to say about fictions than that they are existentially dependent on something, and that it holds true: no fiction without a mind-event. Existential dependence relations appear also in ontological corners that have nothing with intentionality to do; for instance, in traditional substance-attribute ontologies. Here it holds true: no property instance without a primary substance.

In what follows, I will neglect Husserl and concentrate on Ingarden; notwithstanding the fact that Husserl has made many good observations on fictions and related phenomena (1982, §§111–114). But Ingarden takes these into account and says more. To begin with, he distinguishes between two kinds of intentional objects:

- purely intentional object
- also-intentional object.

Also-intentional objects (hyphenation added) are all those objects that (i) can exist independently of all intentional acts, but also (ii) can be the target of intentional acts. Material things and their properties, and extratemporal entities if such exist, can be also-intentional objects. In representational external-world realism, all also-intentional objects are transcendent to the intentional acts that are directed at them, in immanent realism not all are; but even according to this latter view, all conceptual-descriptive intentional acts have transcendent objects.

Purely intentional objects are, in turn, of two different sub-kinds: originally purely intentional objects and derived purely intentional objects. When someone is reading about a fictional woman in a novel, then this woman is an originally purely intentional object; but when no one is reading the novel she exists in the text only as a derived purely intentional object.9 Using Aristotelian terminology, one might say that to be a derived purely intentional object is to exist potentially as a (originally) purely intentional object.

There is, though, here a complication that has to be mentioned. In The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden explicitly claims that there is a purely intentional object even in true assertions, i.e., intentional acts that have an also-intentional object (1973, p. 162–166; 1960, pp. 171–175). If this were the whole truth, the distinction above would have to be understood as a distinction between 'purely intentional object' and 'purely intentional object plus an also-intentional object'. On the latter interpretation, Ingarden is to me somewhat ambiguous on the question whether the two objects are in fact identical or only experienced as indistinguishable. The identity view is not consistent with his views in Der Streit, where he explicitly ambiguous on the question whether the two objects are in fact identical or only experienced as indistinguishable. The identity view is not consistent with his views in Der Streit, where he explicitly ambiguous on the question whether the two objects are in fact identical or only experienced as indistinguishable. The identity view is not consistent with his views in Der Streit, where he explicitly ambiguous on the question whether the two objects are in fact identical or only experienced as indistinguishable.

9 More precisely, she is the content of a purely intentional object. Ingarden says that purely intentional objects have a certain duality or two-sided nature, a structure and a content (1965a, §47a), but I will for the sake of a brief presentation write as if a purely intentional object can be identified with its content.
(1995, 2010). However, this issue need not bother us here, since I will only be concerned with originally purely intentional objects. If no originally purely intentional objects are possible, then there can be no derived purely intentional objects either.

For simplicity’s sake, I will in what follows often use the term ‘purely intentional object’ as shorthand for ‘originally purely intentional object’. Ingarden presents the notion as follows:

By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative sense “created” by an act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a formation (e.g., a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent, original, or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its existence and its total essence. [...] the determination above will serve only to distinguish the purely intentional objectivity in terms of its idea from objectivities that are ontically autonomous [italics added] with respect to consciousness. It is entirely accidental that the latter objectivities (if they exist at all) become targets of conscious acts and thus in a secondary manner become “also intentional” objectivities. (1973, p. 117; 1960, pp. 121–122)

Some pages later in The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden says that purely intentional objects are “in a true sense ontically heteronomous (1973, p. 122; 1960, pp. 127).” This contrast between autonomy and heteronomy is in Der Streit developed into a correlative pair of existential moments; it becomes one of the pairs that have the function of constituting modes of being (1964a, §12; 1964b, pp. 43–52). Each possible mode of being has to have one of the moments, and its entities have to be either autonomous or heteronomous. What, then, does Ingarden mean when he says that the mode of purely intentional being is characterized by the moment of heteronomy?

First, this moment must by no means be conflated with the moment of inseparateness. That an entity $E$ has the moment of inseparateness in relation to $F$ means: necessarily, $E$ exists only if $F$ exists. Think of a property instance such as the sphericity of a certain existing ball ($E$); its existence is inseparable from the existence of the ball ($F$). Think next of Hamlet. He is, as a purely intentional being, inseparable from the collection of intentional acts whose members have him as an intentional object. Heteronomy is something else, even though both inseparateness and heteronomy are necessary conditions for something to be an originally purely intentional being; (derived purely intentional beings have the moment of separateness). Ingarden explicates heteronomy by means of the notions of spots of indeterminacy and lack of existential inertia (1960 & 1973, §38; 1965a, §47b).

Finding out the height of Hamlet is not an epistemological problem; it is an ontological impossibility. Why? Answer: because Shakespeare created a fictional figure without a determinate height. Nothing like this can be true of ordinary things and their property instances, or of extratemporal entities. They are always ontologically determined, and are in this sense autonomous, even though for epistemological reasons it might be impossible for us to have knowledge about more than some insignificant part of them. According to Ingarden, it is of the essence of purely intentional beings to have ontological spots of indeterminacy.

In classical mechanics all material things are ascribed a state-of-motion inertia, which means that they are said to resist changes in their speed (rest included) and direction of movement. An external force is needed to change a state of motion, but nothing is needed in order to sustain an already existing state. Ingarden means that to have existential inertia is to resist going out of being. Extratemporal-ideal entities have existential inertia in the strongest possible sense: they cannot stop existing. Temporal-real entities, both property bearers and property instances, have existential inertia in the sense that something external is needed to
make them disappear. This is not the case with fictions. If people completely forget a fiction, then it simply goes out of being without any resistance at all. When Shakespeare for the first time had created what might be called Hamlet’s character, it may very well have been the case that Shakespeare’s brain state made resistance against changing Hamlet’s character, but Hamlet himself did not. Necessarily, a brain state (a temporal-real entity and an also-intentional object) is distinct from a purely intentional object.

Another existential moment that Ingarden ascribes to purely intentional beings is non-actuality. It is a constitutive part of extratemporal-ideal beings, too, but not of temporal-real beings. A fourth moment is derivation. This moment, on the other hand, is something that purely intentional beings have in common with temporal-real beings, but not with extratemporal-ideal beings; it means that every purely intentional being has to be caused by something.

To make things simple, let me say as follows. Ingarden tries to create a systematic framework within which a specific well categorized ontological taxon can be seen to take care of the intuitions we have that fictions are not eternal (derivation), have no clear position in space and time (non-actuality), are mind-dependent (inseparateness), and are “ontologically thin” and somewhat undetermined with respect to their properties (heteronomy). But is this characterization really enough to sustain the claim that fictions have a way of existing that differs from the ways in which Platonic, material, and mental entities exist? Why not say that Hamlet does simply not exist, and that what exists is only a class of temporal-real intentional acts that have the same intentional universal instantiated? My answer has to bring in again the distinction between purely intentional and also-intentional objects.

Let us compare Hamlet the fiction with Shakespeare the real person, and let me for brevity’s and some complication’s sake confine the comparison to conceptual-descriptive intentional acts. According to the Husserl-Ingarden analysis of the triad intentional act, intentional universal, and intentional object, the following holds: all numerically different but qualitatively identical true descriptions of Shakespeare have the same intentional object, namely the real Shakespeare (or some aspect of him; cf. note 7). Shakespeare is an also-intentional object, and here it is easy (given the Husserl-Ingarden analysis of intentional acts) to understand how many numerically different intentional acts can have one common intentional object. But what happens when purely intentional objects are brought in? Can even the following be true: all numerically different but qualitatively identical true descriptions of Hamlet have the same intentional object, namely Hamlet (or some aspect of him)? If ‘yes’, where is this intentional object? Ingarden writes:

[It] must be remembered that every intentional act indeed “has” its own purely intentional object but that, despite this, a discrete manifold of acts can have one and the same purely intentional object. The object is in that case individually the same. 10 (1973, p. 123; 1960, p. 128)

And some pages earlier he has said:

Purely intentional objects are “transcendent” with respect to corresponding […] conscious acts in the sense that no real element (or moment) of the act is an element of the purely intentional object, and vice versa. (1973, p. 118; 1960, p. 123)

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10 Let me here relate to the distinction made in note 7. If “the [intentional] object as it is intended” is meant, then the members of the manifold have to be qualitatively identical, but if it is “the [intentional] object (period),” then they may differ even qualitatively.
I take it for granted that Ingarden puts the words ‘has’ and ‘transcendent’ within scare quotes in order to indicate that they do not have their ordinary meaning. The originally purely intentional object is not transcendent (external) in the ordinary sense, since it has no existence that is independent of all conscious acts; and no intentional act has its intentional object literally, since the intentional object is not a part of the act. The quotations above are from The Literary Work of Art, and later in Der Streit he in fact makes an explicit distinction between two corresponding kinds of transcendence: ‘radical transcendence’ and ‘structural transcendence in the strong sense’ (1965a, p. 225). This notwithstanding, I will continue to talk about transcendence and “transcendence.” Now we can ask: where is the “transcendent” or “external” Hamlet to be found?

I will give an answer that I think is Ingarden’s, but even if it is not, I think it represents the truth. The general problem of universals is often framed as the problem of One-In-Many: how can one universal be in many places simultaneously? The realist claims: numerically different things can have the same color because there is One and the same color universal instantiated In all of the Many property instances. When this line of thought is applied to intentional universals, it says: numerically different intentional acts can have the same directedness because there is One and the same intentional universal instantiated In all of the Many acts. And now comes my essential (and Husserlian) point: necessarily, if two intentional acts have the same directedness, they have one and the same intentional object. In spite of the fact that there is no transcendent Hamlet, all the different (but qualitatively identical) acts have a common intentional object, the “transcendent” Hamlet. This consequence of the acceptance of (a) the existence of intentional universals directed at fictions, and (b) the distinction between such universals and intentional objects, is what makes it possible to explain how different persons are able literally to talk about the same fiction, and how one and the same person is able to re-identify a fiction.

To regard Hamlet as “transcendent” and as existing in the purely intentional mode, is not to look upon him as if he existed the way real persons do, nor to pretend that he exists the way real persons do (as Searle says, see (1979, ch. 3)). It is to look upon him as existing in another way than real persons do. Surely, in one sense Hamlet does not exist; he does not exist as a mind-independent autonomous object (in the temporal-real or extratemporal-ideal mode). He exists as a mind-dependent heteronomous object (in the purely intentional mode).

Often when new basic theories enter the scientific scene, old concepts have to be modified. Much discussed is the case where Newton’s unitary concept of mass had to give way for Einstein’s distinction between rest mass and relativistic mass. And the same thing can of course happen in philosophy. There is nothing in principle odd in Ingarden’s attempt to exchange the concept of ‘existence simpliciter’ for four concepts that represent four different modes of existence. Of course, even Ingarden can in a meaningful way put forward the straightforward question ‘Does the entity E exist?’, but this question is then only shorthand for this one: ‘Does the entity E exist in any of the modes A, B, C, or D?’ An unspecified first order predicate formula such as ‘(∃x)Fx’ has to be read as saying: in one of the four modes of being, there is an x such that Fx. Also, quantifiers in such formulas could easily be restricted to one specific mode of being by having a subscript ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, or ‘D’ added to them; a subscript that would indicate what mode of being the quantifier is meant to accept. A formula such as c(∀x)(Fx → Gx) should then be read: for all x in the mode of being C, if Fx then Gx.

I have now and then got the impression (rightly or wrongly), that some philosophers think that it borders on self-contradiction to invoke different modes of being. Perhaps they mistakenly think that this is an ontological lesson that follows from the existential quantifier

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11 The same is of course true of Alexius Meinong’s distinction between existence, subsistence, and absistence, but this many-modes-of-being philosopher does not fall within the scope of this paper.
of predicate logic. But there is nothing immediately contradictory or absurd in the notion of many modes of being; not even if it should turn out that the most reasonable metaphysical system really is, contrary to my strong conviction, a one-mode-of-being system.

5. Developing Ingarden

At least to my own satisfaction, I have in the sections above shown that Ingarden is able to give a schematic explanation of why and how fictions can be situated in the spatiotemporal world with its temporal-real intentional acts. But I would like to end with some words about some presuppositions of his. More precisely, I will comment on the following three:

I. his non-reductive external-world realism
II. his transcendent realism for universals
III. his non-representational analysis of intentional acts.

I. 
Here, I will be extremely brief. As I have said in section three, I would have liked Ingarden to say something about the issue between representational realism and direct realism. In my opinion, the fact that both positions contain serious problems is what make many persons tend towards idealisms of various sorts. However, like Ingarden, I think idealism suffers from the most serious problems.

II. 
Here, I will be very blunt. Ingarden’s transcendent realism for universals should be rejected. An immanent realism with instances is a very reasonable position; as I have myself tried to show (Johansson, 2009). Such a change of outlook on universals does not affect anything in sections three and four. Nothing that was said brought in Ingarden’s transcendent realism in particular; the assumption was only that – in some way or other – there are both universals and instances of universals.

Let me add that my immanent realism really builds on Ingardenian views. In the paper mentioned, I first accept his general distinction between existential moments and modes of being, and then I introduce a new pair of existential moments: monadicity and multiplicity. They give rise to two sub-modes of the temporal-real mode. In one of these sub-modes the entities have the moment of monadicity, and in the other that of multiplicity. Things and property instances have the moment of monadicity, and universals that of multiplicity. Therefore, it is even on this conception true that particulars and universals have different modes of existence, even if it is a matter only of sub-modes.

III. 
Here, I would have liked to say very much, but this is not the time and place to do so. Therefore, I will only outline some views. In order to become more convincing, I think that Ingarden’s non-representational analysis of intentional acts has to be improved on. As in Section 4, I will discuss only conceptual-descriptive intentional acts (furthermore, I will leave also tautologies and self-contradictions out; they bring with them some special problems).

All factual assertions (be they about temporal, extratemporal, or absolute entities) differ from all fictional assertions, i.e., from assertions in fictional discourse. All factual assertions lay claim to be true, but only some are; fictional assertions, on the other hand, lay no claim to be true, and are therefore neither true nor false. Since factual assertions can be divided into two groups, we obtain the following threefold distinction:
• true factual assertions
• false factual assertions
• fictional assertions.

False factual assertions and fictional assertions are in one respect different and in another similar. The radical difference between them is shown by the fact that it is possible to tell a lie about the real world by means of a false assertion, but not by means of a fictional one. When we are lying, we present as true an assertion that is false, but since fictional assertions lack the ordinary true-false dimension they cannot be used to tell lies about the world. The similarity is that neither a false factual assertion nor a fictional assertion has a truthmaker that corresponds (exactly) to the assertion. A false factual assertion lacks a truthmaker, and a fictional assertion cannot possibly have one.

Now back to Ingarden and the problem I mentioned early in Section 4: the post-Der-Streit Ingarden cannot possibly claim what the pre-Der-Streit Ingarden perhaps had partly in mind, namely that in true factual assertions a purely intentional object and an also-intentional object are identical. Neither, however, can he say that they are different, because then he would have to give up his whole non-representational analysis of intentionality. If they are not identical, there must be some kind of representation relation between them; otherwise nothing explains how the intentional act can reach beyond its intentional object and be connected to the also-intentional object, too. Also-intentional objects can exist in the three modes of being A, B, and C, but purely intentional objects can of course only exist in the mode D, the mode of the purely intentional.

What makes Ingarden think that true factual assertions must have a purely intentional object, and not only an also-intentional one, is probably the following line of thought. First, since, according to the Husserl-Ingarden analysis of intentional acts, all intentional acts have an intentional object, not only true, but even false factual assertions must have an intentional object. Second, he takes it for granted that a factual assertion has the same intentional object independently of whether it is true or false (which I will question below). Third, by definition no false assertion can have an also-intentional object. Fourth, taken together, points one, two, and three imply that all true assertions must beside their also-intentional objects have a purely intentional object, too. As he says: “Thus, in the case of true judgments as well, the existence of the two states of affairs—the purely intentional and the objectively existing—is unquestionable (1973, p. 165; 1960, p. 175).”

Independently of whether a factual assertion such as ‘this pen is blue’ is true or false, it has on this account the same purely intentional object. And Ingarden claims that even when ‘this pen is blue’ is said by a fictional person in a novel it has this intentional object. Ingarden distinguishes between pure affirmative propositions (“reine Aussagesätze”), judgments (“Behauptungssätze” or “Urteile”), and quasi-judgments (“Quasi-Urteile”). The first distinction has great similarities with Frege’s distinction between contents and judgments, and quasi-judgments are typical of fictional discourse. Quasi-judgments are claimed to exist in-between pure affirmative propositions and judgments (1973, p. 167; 1960, p. 177). As far as I can see, Ingarden must be ascribed the view that it is only the pure affirmative proposition of a factual or fictional assertion that creates the intentional object in question. If \( p \) is a variable for pure affirmative propositions, \( Q \) the name of a quasi-judgment operator, and \( J \) the name of a judgment operator, then, from a theoretical point of view, \( Q(p) \) and \( J(p) \) can be

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12 The difference is that whereas Frege has the view that the denotation of all true assertions is the same, namely The True, Ingarden has the more commonsensical view that the denotation of each true assertion is an obtaining state of affairs.
regarded as variables for quasi-judgments and judgments, respectively. In this kind of
symbolism, Ingarden’s view is that it is only what \( p \) represents that gives rise to an intentional
object; and then of course the intentional object must always be a purely intentional object.

In my present opinion, the only way to retain both a non-representational analysis of
intentionality and the view that no entity can have two modes of being is to claim that what \( Q \)
and \( J \) represent partake in the creation of the intentional object, too. In the case of \( Q \), the
change from \( p \) to \( Q(p) \) is not great enough to create anything but a purely intentional object,
but in the case of \( J(p) \) it is. Ingarden says that the purely intentional object (coming from what
\( p \) represents) is *transposed* (“hinausversetzt”) from the realm of the purely intentional to the
realm where the also-intentional object is (1973, p. 161–162; 1960, pp. 170–171). My claim is
that in the change from \( p \) to \( J(p) \) a completely *new* intentional object appears on the scene.
That is, what \( J(p) \) represents has another intentional object than what \( p \) represents has. And
this claim of mine brings with it an epistemological change: when making a factual assertion,
one does not infallibly know what the intentional object is, i.e., whether it is an also-
intentional or a purely intentional object. This follows from the fact that (in contradistinction
to fictional assertions) factual assertions lay claim to be true but need not necessarily be so.
To make a factual assertion is to attempt to achieve something; but whether one succeeds or
not is for the future to decide.

(In passing, at the end of Section 3, I mentioned what is called ‘disjunctivism’; more
precisely disjunctivism with respect to perception. It claims, first appearances
notwithstanding, that veridical perceptions and corresponding hallucinations are as
perceptions not qualitatively identical. In analogy with this, the view of assertions just put
forward can be called ‘disjunctivism with respect to assertions’. It claims, first appearances
notwithstanding, that true and false assertions are as assertions not qualitatively identical.)

If we grant that true factual assertions have also-intentional objects, and only such, what
kind of intentional objects do false factual assertions have? I will discuss on the simplifying
assumption that there is nothing at all that corresponds to false factual assertions. Since this is
true also of fictional assertions, the intentional objects of false factual assertions ought to be
similar to the purely intentional objects. And I think the solution to the question I have put
forward is easy to find. Purely intentional objects can be of two different kinds: *necessarily*
purely intentional objects and *contingently* purely intentional objects, respectively. The fact
that fictional assertions and purely propositional sentences have an intentional object that
necessarily is purely intentional follows from their very character; but the fact that false
factual assertions have a purely intentional object, and not an also-intentional one, is a
contingent matter. The tri-partition of intentional objects that I want to introduce is this:

- also-intentional objects (the objects of true factual assertions)
- contingently purely intentional objects (the objects of false factual assertions)
- necessarily purely intentional objects (the objects of fictional assertions).

In Section 4, I explained how numerically different but qualitatively identical fictional
assertions can have one single intentional object in common. This explanation can be validly
repeated for numerically different but qualitatively identical false factual assertions, too.

Ingarden’s philosophy is by no means a closed totality that does not allow of revisions and
developments. Rather, the contrary is the case.\(^{13}\)

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References


